PREFACE

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E. M. CABLE.
PREFACE

The preparation of this investigation of the United States Korean Relations from 1866 to 1871 has occupied my spare time for several years. It is now presented in printed form and I trust it will be of interest and profit to those who are interested in the early relations of the United States with Korea.

This investigation has been a great pleasure to me and would have been impossible without the help of a good many individuals, both in Korea and the United States of America. Practically all the documents both Occidental and Oriental have been examined and the field of source material has been pretty well exhausted. The only original source material I was not able to get at was the Yi Dynasty Annals from 1871-1872. These are in the Library of the Keijo Imperial University and are not open to the scrutiny of Occidentals. However, I have been informed by Korean scholars that The Unofficial History of Korea (Chosen Yasa) covers this period and contains the same evidence as the Yi Dynasty Annals for the same period.

I wish to acknowledge my debt to Mr. Thomas Hobbs for helping to read the proof; to Homer B. Hulbert for securing the valuable photos and the Excerpt of the Diary of Lieut. A. S. Snow; to the U. S. Navy Department for the excellent photos of the vessels composing the squadron of Rear Admiral Rodgers and the Map of Military Operations; to Mr. Han Chul Shin of the Chosen Christian College Literary Department '33; to Mr. R. P. Choi A. B., and P. H. Pak of the Class '36 Chosen Christian College who helped in the translation of the Oriental Source material; to G. M. McCune of the University of California for his assistance in the Romanization of the Oriental names and places in this work and to Dr. D. W. Lee for the Lunar Calendar dates of Sin Mi.

E. M. CABLE.
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Map of Korea Showing the route of Admiral Rodger's Squadron from Nagasaki to Boise Island.

Sequence Track of Squadron

--- ships of Squadron

North Hankyŏng Province
South Hankyŏng Province
North Pyeongan Province
South Pyeongan Province
Pyongyang
Hwanghae Province
Kangwon Province

Kensha Id.
Boise Id.
Roze Road
Chemulpo
Kyŏnggi Province
Seoul
Harvyang-bu
Gulf of Aman

NORTH KYŏNGSANG Province

Ferries
Anchorage

North Chŏlla Province

South Chŏlla Province

Korean Strait

Quelpart Id.
THE UNITED STATES-KOREAN RELATIONS
1866—1871

Part I.

The General Sherman

It might seem like a work of supererogation to attempt to cover part of a field which has been gone over frequently in recent years. However, the writer being deeply interested in the relations existing between the United States and Korea during the eventful years from 1866-1871, and especially those events which led up to the sending of the punitive expedition under Rear Admiral Rogers in 1871, ventures once more to try and give the facts and all the documents in as chronological order as possible. It must be remembered, however, being so far removed from the actual events in time, and to the fact accurate records were probably not made in every instance by the Korean government, due to lack of proper reporters and facilities of communication, the task becomes a very difficult one.

We ought to remember that we are more than seventy years removed from these stirring events and while, from an historical standpoint such an elapse of time is almost insignificant, it simply goes to prove how very rapidly the history of Korea has changed during the last seven decades.

In attempting to cover this period it will be necessary to discuss those events which led up to and including the Naval Incident of 1871, chief of which will be the General Sherman affair. Here again, I shall trespass upon ground which has been fairly well covered by other investigators. However, I shall present native documents which I believe have never been submitted in any investigations of this subject. I trust I will be pardoned as I once more take you over this well travelled road.

I hesitate to caption the event of 1871 a Naval Expedition and much less an American-Korean war, as some
writers have been bold enough to do. Both these are misnomers and do injustice to the actual facts. It was not a war. The Supreme Court of the United States in an oft quoted sentence laid down the following definition of war: 'Every contention by force between two nations in external matters, under the authority of their respective governments is public war.' I do not believe for one moment that the facts of the Naval Incident of 1871 warrant us in affirming that it was a war. Therefore, the writer prefers to use the term, Naval Incident.

In the first place, neither the United States nor China, whose suzerainty over Korea was ever questioned, made declarations of war. It should be remembered that Korea had been under the domination of China for centuries. Its relation however, was one of loose affiliation with that country. The Korean kings were vested with authority to rule by the emperor of China. We are told that when emissaries from the respected and feared Court of Peking came to the capital of the vassal kingdom, His Majesty, the King of Korea, left his palace, went humbly outside the gates of his city on the road to Peking and at an arch of stone raised in the highway, exchanged bows with the representatives of His Imperial Majesty, the Emperor of China. This political status was maintained until the opening up of Korea to the intercourse of the world. Nevertheless this vassalage was more or less a mere matter of 'ceremony' for we are informed that in 1867, when the U. S. attempted to make inquiry into the matter of the loss of the General Sherman through China, she was informed that the relationship of the governments was merely one of ceremony.

Korea had lived a life of isolation for many centuries, refusing to have intercourse with the outside world. It was a well known fact that she prohibited the entry into her ports of foreign ships and particularly traffic on her inland water-ways. The only relations she had with the outside world, were those that seeped in through her limited inter-
course with China. Very little was known of her people, her resources, and her powers. Even those living in the immediate vicinity of the country had not the faintest idea of its people, its products, and its real condition. The idea seems to have gained prominence, as has been said, "that its inhabitants were giants in stature, that their strength was herculean, their ferocity inferior only to that of the tiger; that their guns were of the latest type, and their marksmanship equalled by that of the William Tell of fable; their courage was comparable only to that of the defenders of the historic Thermopylae".

The reports of the treatment of ship-wrecked sailors upon her dangerous and inhospitable shores were replete with acts of barbarism. To be wrecked upon the shores of Korea, was paramount to being subject to a terrible death of torture.

In this connection writers have cited the stories of Wetteree of the "Hollandra" and Hamel of the "Sparrow Hawk." To be sure these men and their companions did suffer much at the hands of the Koreans but to cite only these, without at the same time mentioning the hospitable treatment of men under like circumstances, hardly seems fair to Korea. No doubt the United States had some misgiving and fear that some of her sailors being wrecked upon the dangerous coasts of Korea might suffer fates such as Hamel and Wetteree.

We are very happy to record the fact that not all ship-wrecked sailors shared such a fate as mentioned above. On June 24th, 1866, the American schooner, Surprise, while sailing off the coast of North Pyengan Province was wrecked and lost. It should be recalled, too, that this happened at a time when the whole country was deeply stirred over the massacre of the French Catholics and their followers, and the people might have been expected to show hostility to any and all westerners cast upon her shores. However, the skipper of the Surprise, McCaslin, and all his crew were safely landed
and conducted to * Ch'ŏlsan where they were carefully questioned by the local magistrate, and later by a special commissioner from Seoul, and then feted, presented with tobacco, medicines, and clothing. By special order of the Taewon'gun, (reigning regent) who it must be remembered was notoriously hostile to foreigners, they were safely conducted to Uiju and after being feted once more, were then led to the border Gate (Shan Hai Kwan), and set free. Perhaps this act of kindness upon the part of the Taewŏngun, was only an apparent one, and was done out of fear that another experience with foreigners, such as he had had with the French in 1866 at Kangwha, might prove his undoing. However this is only mere conjecture.

In connection with the wreck and treatment of the crew of the schooner Surprise the following documents might be of interest.

Dr. S. Wells Williams, Secretary of the Legation of the United States at Peking, in writing to Mr. W. Seward, Secretary of State in Washington, on October 24th, 1866, says:

Sir: I have the honor to bring to your notice the case of the shipwrecked crew of the American schooner Surprise, the treatment which they received at the hands of the Corean and Chinese officials, and the kindness extended toward them by a French missionary who met them on their journey. I have condensed the principal facts of their history from the narrative of McCaslin.

On the 24th of June the crew left the schooner in a sinking condition, and reached an island, whose inhabitants

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* Korean names are Romanized throughout this monograph according to the system of Romanization devised by G. M. McCune and E. O. Reischauer. A complete explanation of their Romanization, including simple rules for its use, will be published in the forthcoming Transactions of this Society. Mr. McCune has kindly arranged the Romanization throughout this monograph. It should be noted that certain names have been Romanized according to their traditional spelling, such as Seoul, Pyongyang and Kangwha.
supplied them with rice, but wished them to leave as soon as they had eaten it, which, however, a storm prevented their doing until the next day. Going on nearly twenty miles toward the north-west, they saw a village on the main land, which they thought best to reach, if possible, in order to obtain food and rest. On approaching it from the beach, they were surrounded by about 200 natives, who would not allow them to move until an officer arrived and was ready to receive them. This was done in the open air, and by means of the Chinese cook they were able to make him understand their condition, after which they were comfortably provided for during two days. Another official then arrived who likewise interrogated them minutely, but would not let them leave the village, keeping the party under a guard of soldiers within a small inclosure. On the fourth day a third officer came from the capital, bringing with him a Chinese interpreter, who henceforth took charge of them, giving them abundance of good food, tobacco, and even medicines for the sick.

After remaining in this village for 24 days, a special courier arrived from the capital to conduct the whole party to the Chinese frontier. The first day's journey of 14 miles on foot, over a rugged mountainous country, brought them to a large city, Chulsan, where they were courteously treated, furnished with suits of clothes, and well fed. From this place, two days riding, brought them to the large frontier town where they were comfortably lodged until notice could be given to the Chinese, and another escort arrived on the tenth day. Meanwhile they were placed in a government building, under a guard, and each man furnished with a suit of clothes. Chickens, beef, corn, and rice were served out to them, and on three occasions they were invited to dine with the authorities of the town, when each of them received a catty of tea and a fan.

Two days journey on horseback from this city, through a wild and uninhabited country, brought the party to a wall 30 ft. long, and 20 ft. high, in which was the gate that di-
vides Korea from China; they stopped in a town near it that night, and the next morning went to a walled town about ten miles off, where they were delivered to the Chinese authorities, and remained two days. Their food was insufficient, and of the poorest quality: and during the journey to Mukten, which city they reached after six days of hard travelling, they only had an allowance of millet and corn. The officer at Mukten would give them nothing, and the escort took them to an inn outside of the city, where a French missionary, hearing of their distress, sent for them; but the escort refused to let them go. However, Captain McCaslin and two others did go, and were kindly received and supplied with a good meal. The next day the authorities again declined to receive them, and they all went back to the inn to spend the night; but before going to bed all went on to Père Gillié's house, who furnished them with a dinner.

Next morning they were again brought before the city authorities, who gave them in charge to four people, one of whom furnished mats for sleeping, and the others took them to kind of a lock-up, where several hundred criminals were detained. The filthiness of the place was unendurable, and some of the men managed to rush about and get outside of the enclosure, from whence they all ran beyond the city gates, and reached Père Gillié's house only a few moments before the policemen came to carry them back. He refused to let them go, until a proper place for lodging was provided, and sufficient food. After two days, he went with them into the city to the authorities, and according to McCaslin's belief, it was entirely owing to his energetic remonstrances and intervention that the party were saved from death through starvation and exposure in Mukten by being immediately sent on to Yingtsz after seven days journey, they were delivered to the United States Consul nearly two months after they were ship wrecked.

S. WELLS WILLIAMS.
Hon. William H. Seward,
Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.
Later the United States government through Mr. Williams, the secretary to the American Minister in Peking, sent the following communication to Mr. Bellonet, the French chargé d'affaires in Peking. It reads as follows:

Mr. S. W. Williams to Mr. H. Bellonet,
Legation of the United States,
Peking, September 15th, 1866.

Sir:

It affords me very high gratification to be the medium of conveying to you the thanks of Captain McCaslin, as given in the inclosed narrative of the humane conduct of the Rev. Père Gillié, who successfully assisted a company of ship wrecked American sailors belonging to the schooner Surprise, late under his command, in their journey across Manchuria to Nieuchang. The consciousness of having been the means of preserving the lives of these unfortunate mariners, as they state was the case, will be of itself a great satisfaction to Père Gillié; and I wish to add my own sincere thanks to him for his kindness to my countrymen in their trouble. Will you, Sir, oblige me and them by conveying to him this expression of our united thanks, either through Bishop Mouilly or otherwise, as you deem proper, and I shall make known his noble conduct, so courageous to his sacred calling, to the President.

I seize this occasion to renew the expression of the high consideration with which I am, Sir, your obedient servant.

S. WELLS WILLIAMS.

Henry Bellonet Esq.
French chargé d'affaires.

Following closely upon the wreck of the American schooner, Surprise came the alarming news that the American schooner, General Sherman with foreign notions for the purpose of trading with Korea had been lost on the Korean coast and word reached the United States capital at Washington that the vessel had been lost and its crew murdered by the Koreans.
At this time it must be remembered the country was in a state of intense excitement due to the persecution and massacre of the French priests and their Korean converts by order of the Taewŏn'gun. Anti-foreign feeling was running high and this bitterness was only increased by the sending of a French punitive fleet to Korea during the same summer of 1866, shortly after the destruction of the General Sherman.

The General Sherman was owned by Mr. Preston, whom we are informed, was making the trip for his health. The vessel was consigned to Messrs. Meadows and Company, a British firm in Tientsin, and arrived in that port late in July, 1866. When she had unloaded her cargo an agreement was made by the above mentioned firm for Mr. Preston to load her with cloth, glass, tin plate, etc.-goods that would possibly be salable in Korea in the hope that such a voyage might mean the opening up of Korea to commercial intercourse. This would seem to indicate that it was purely a trade mission; but there were those even at that time, who entertained some misgivings as to the real object of the adventure.

It would seem that the communication of the British firm of Messrs. Meadows and Company in Tientsin to Mr. Burlingame on October 27, 1866, make quite clear the purpose of the visit of the General Sherman to Korea. It read:

"During the latter half of July last an American schooner, the General Sherman arrived at this port, and was consigned to our care by Mr. Preston, the owner, who had come as a passenger on the vessel for his health. After we had taken delivery of the inward cargo, Mr. Preston and we came to an agreement that we should load her with a cargo of foreign merchandise, and on the 29th of July last she left Tientsin."

The personnel of the General Sherman consisted of three Americans and one Englishman, besides sixteen Chin-
ese and two Malays. The owner of the vessel was Mr. Preston, the Master, Mr. Page, and the Mate, Mr. Wilson, and Rev R. J. Thomas, an English missionary. It would be indeed interesting if we could find out definitely just what was Rev. R. J. Thomas’s motive in coming on the General Sherman. Mr. M. W. Oh in his study of the life of Rev. Thomas would have us believe that it was purely missionary. He says,

“He came to Korea neither as a pilot nor as a mere student of the language. He came to perfect his knowledge in order to preach the Gospel and establish a Protestant Mission in this land.”

I sincerely hope he is correct in his hypothesis. We do know that Rev. Thomas had come into contact with refugee Koreans in Chifoo and had made some study of the Korean language. The presence of these refugee Koreans in Chifoo was due to the terrible persecution of the Roman Catholic Christians in Korea by the Taewŏn’gun (Prince Regent).

The General Sherman sailed from Tientsin, July 29th, 1866, and first proceeded to Chifoo where she took on Mr. Hogarth, an Englishman as super-cargo and a Cantonese schroff belonging to the firm of Meadows and Company. We are told that Mr. Hogarth had preceded the General Sherman to Chifoo. The General Sherman left Chifoo on August 9th with the complement of five foreigners and nineteen Chinese and Malaymen. The vessel bore a west northwesterly direction toward the mouth of the Taedong river. On the way we are told that the vessel called at White-wing island, one of the Sir James Hall group. Those who summer at Sorai beach know the island well. In this connection Mr. Oh says:

“The spot at which it anchored was Tumo-jin (豆毛津). On hearing of the arrival of a foreign vessel at that place, the Mandarin in charge of this island ordered his garrison to attack it.”
From here the vessel took a more northerly direction and anchored at Totchōm. At this point Mr. Oh says, "Rev. R. J. Thomas here met the Chinese sailor Yu Wen Tai, who had brought him to Korea the year before. Mr. Thomas asked the sailor to guide the General Sherman up the Taedong river, to which the sailor agreed; but when they had reached Moon U-Koo, some of Yu Wen Tai's crew objected to his going as far as Pyengyang; for they apprehended some danger of his being associated with foreigners in their attempt to enter the "Hermit Kingdom". For this reason Yu Wen Tai refused to go further and returned to Chifoo."

From this point it would be exceedingly interesting and helpful if we could know exactly the movements of the General Sherman, but as we are compelled to rely largely upon Korean reports made at different times and from different locations, and since most of the old names have disappeared, the question of absolute accuracy becomes extremely difficult. It is the writer's purpose to give translations of the reports in the Annals of the Yi Dynasty and from other sources as to the movements and investigations of the General Sherman in her progress up the river and her fate at Pyengyang."
THE YI DYNASTY ANNALS CHAPTER XXII

I. Korea and America

In the sixth month (August) an American schooner entered the Taedong river laden with foreign notions to exchange for Korean commodities. Inquiry indicated that the vessel was English and that on the ship was a man by the name of Ch’oe Nanhyŏn (Thomas) who could speak a little of the Korean language. He inquired of the Koreans why they were persecuting the Catholics and asked them if they did not know that the Catholics were a branch of the Christian Church engaged in the propagation of the Gospel. He also asked the Koreans the meaning of the white marble Buddha in Seoul and wanted to know whether it was not used for the purpose of the worship of Buddha.

This Ch’oe Nanhyŏn (Thomas) appeared to be a Christian missionary in China who had previously been in communication with Koreans there and had been able to learn a little of their language, and was more or less familiar with Korean affairs. The Koreans were a little doubtful as to whether Ch’oe Nanhyon was his real name. Upon questioning Ch’oe Nanhyŏn he informed the Koreans that the name of the vessel was the same as that of an American General, the General Sherman.

The Americans relied upon the strength of their ship and its excellent equipment. They looked down upon the Koreans as a weak and inferior people and proceeded upon their way surveying the river, and all the time pretending they were going to Pyengyang for the purpose of trade.

Ch’oe Nanhyŏn being able to speak some of the Korean language took charge of affairs. The ship went far up the river and grounded in shallow water. There was quite a number on the ship.
II. The Record of the Investigation of the Foreign Ship at Pyengyang

It was reported that the ship that visited Pyengyang was a French vessel because that year the French fleet had committed barbarous acts off the coast of Kangwha island and had approached the capital. It was inferred from this that the vessel that had reached Pyengyang must have been a French ship. However, this report founded upon hearsay, proved to be incorrect.

The following year, 1866, when the French fleet was engaged in the survey of the sea-coast off Hwanghae province, a Catholic missionary by the name of Ch'oe Nanhŏn entered the Taedong river on a small vessel. Pak Kyusu (朴珪壽) was governor of Pyengyang Province at this time. The governor ordered boats to be loaded with wood, set on fire and floated down the river to where the vessel was anchored. The French ship opened fire with their cannon on the approaching fire-boats. However, the fire boats set the vessel on fire and the ship was seized and the crew killed.

III. The record of the Foreign vessel at Pyengyang taken from the Kwansŏn Ilsŏngnok Kisa (官省日省錄記事)

1. This record is from a report made by the military officer, Yi Yongsang (李容象) on the investigation of the foreign vessel (General Sherman) at Yonggang-hyŏn.

"On July 15th, 1866 (Tuesday, August 25th), six foreign vessels anchored at Yonggang-hyŏn, Tami-myŏn, Sangch'il-li, Chuyŏng-p'o (龍岡縣多美面上七里珠英浦). The village people said that on the 7th, three small sized boats put out from the vessel and went to Samhwa (三和) while one large vessel headed for the "Water-Gate". From the point it proceeded along the shore and arrived at Pongjin (埀津).

"On the opposite side of Pongjin is the territory of Hwangju (黃州). Here the water runs very rapidly and it is about ten li between Pongjin and Hwangju. However, since this vantage point was not under the administration of
Hwangju it was difficult to make inquiry. Since the matter was of such grave importance, and I could not make an accurate investigation, I called a man skilled in such matters and thoroughly familiar with the water in this region, and ordered him to go and make investigations. He reported "The vessel is surely a foreign vessel. As I approached the ship the men on the ship called to me, put out their hand and helped me to get aboard. After introducing himself, the man who seemed to be in charge of the vessel and knew a little of my language, gave me his name, but as he did not speak very intelligibly I had some difficulty in recording it. He then handed me a glass of liquor saying, "This is from Peking," and requested me to drink it without having any anxiety. The taste was certainly very excellent. Then they all drank. When I looked at their faces they were very strange. They were like giants and they wore red caps coming down to their eyebrows. The faces of two of those standing about them were black and their eyes were like those of fierce wild animals. They were all dressed in either black or white and held sharp spears in their hands. Mr. Ch'oe Nanhyŏn (崔蘭軒) told us that they were foreigners but that the others standing around them were from Peking.

"They told me that the ship was anchoring there for only a very short time and that they intended to go to Pyengyang. Then they asked me about the character of the country in Pyengyang, whether there was much wealth in the country and in what city I lived. I replied in writing, "My city is strongly fortified but the country does not possess any very great wealth." Then they said, "Is it possible for seven of our people to be murdered by your countrymen? Some of our vessels have gone to the South river Han-gang (漢江) near Seoul, but we are going on to Pyengyang."

"Then they showed me a book. The first part of it contained a complete map of Korea while the second part was a relief map showing the counties, mountains and streams in
black, like the embroidery women do. The letters were like seal characters and I was unable to read them. Then I was asked to go on the upper deck of the vessel where I saw hats, caps, clothes and the like, either spread out on the deck or hung upon lines. They showed me pistols of two and six chambers, about six inches long, and told me that they hit the mark every time they were discharged. Then they asked me to play on the piano. The melody that came from it was wonderful.’ The report made by this man was exactly as above stated.

‘The vessel had already entered the Pyengyang water-gate and would probably sail in a day or two for Pyengyang. Therefore, it was necessary, that we call men who were capable and able to help solve this problem, and as opportunity afforded station them along the river bank. They came back and reported that the ship had already entered the Pyengyang Water-Gate. This investigation is without doubt correct.’

The mayor of Pyengyang, Sin T’aejŏng (申泰鼎) ordered the soldiers to go to where the vessel was and investigate the reason for its presence and movements and to come back and report.

On the 6th of July, (Sunday August 16) the Sinyŏng (臣營) ordered Pak Inhwan (朴麟煥) to take soldiers and investigate the affair. They returned and Pak Inhwan made the report. In the report it says, “Three small boats had already gone to Samhwa and there should have been a report from the official of that place, but there was none, and it was difficult to understand this oversight. So I made inquiry of the officer of the place, Chŏng Chihyŏn (鄭志鉉).

“Tami-myŏn, Sangch’il-li, Chuyŏng-p’o (Port) is the first point from the entrance of the bay after having passed Samhwa. It is about sixty li from the official’s office and on the opposite side is Anak (安岳). The Water-Gate from Chuyŏng-p’o is about twenty-five li and on the opposite side is Hwangju.
"The vessel had two masts and four sails. It was difficult to estimate the size of the ship as one could not see it all. It was larger than our largest ship and very different. How it was propelled and operated I do not know. It had a foreign name but we could not make out what it was. We might have learned the name by writing but as there was no one skilled in our language sufficiently it could not be done. It was impossible to determine the number of the crew as they were in side the ship."

The Record of the Investigation of the Foreign Vessel by Pak Sŏng-hui (朴承輝) governor of Hwanghae (黃海) province.

In the report of Pak Sŏng-hui it says that the governor of Hwanghae province reported that the foreign vessel arrived and anchored off the coast of Samjŏn-bang (三田坊), Song-san-ni (松山里). In the report of the officer at Hwangju, Chŏng Taesik (丁大植), it says that on July 7th, (Monday August 17th) an officer, Sin Yŏnghan (申永翰) together with the officials Yi Yongsuk (李容肅) and Chi Myŏngsin (池命臣) arrived where the vessel was anchored on the 8th of June, (Tuesday August 18th.) "We delivered the Governor's message inquiring the reason of the presence of the vessel. They replied to our communication in Chinese characters, saying, 'Come and see'. On approaching the vessel we observed that there were twenty or thirty men who came out on the deck with guns and swords in their hands to resist us if necessary. We were finally allowed to go on board. Some of the men were sitting down on the deck while others were lying down sleeping. We were invited to sit down and then we asked them in writing from what country they had come and the object of their visit. They also replied in writing, 'The members of our crew are from several countries. Among those sitting here are Ch’oe Nanhyŏn and Hogarth who are Englishmen; Mr. Preston there is from America, and Mr. Page is from Denmark.'
"They all had deep set eyes and large noses. The color of their hair was light and their eyes blue. There was no doubt about their being foreigners. Mr. Ch’oe Nanhyŏn not only spoke Chinese but also some of our language. He seemed to be in charge of the ship. Among the others of the crew were men from Shantung and Shanghai. We next inquired the name of the vessel and were informed that that was none of our concern. We next asked them from what place they had sailed and they told us from the West. They said that they had come several thousand miles and had left Shantung on the 7th and passing Paengnyŏn-do (白翎鳥) (White Wing Id.) they were on their way to Pyengyang. ‘Our vessel has the appearance of a man-of-war but really it is only a trading vessel and we have come to Korea to exchange our cloth, iron, and machinery for Korean paper, rice, gold, ginseng, and tiger skins. We have no intention of doing harm to anyone and when we have completed our mission at Pyengyang we will return at once.’ They then asked us if any foreigners had ever traded with Korea and we informed them that they had not. We told them that it was all right for their ships to anchor in the seas off the coast but that the King of Korea had forbidden any foreign vessels to enter the inland waters of the country. They then replied, ‘Who can prevent us from going to Pyengyang and we intend to sail as soon as a favorable west wind comes up.’ We then asked them if any other vessel had accompanied them to which they replied, ‘It is none of your business, that is a question only for the government to ask,’ and refused to make any further statements.

Ch’oe Nanhyŏn was thirty-six years old, seven feet and five inches tall, thin face, light hair, and black beard. He wore a grey uniform, white topee, black shoes, leather belt around the waist, and carried a pistol and a sword. He was a military officer from England.

"Mr. Preston was forty eight years old, seven feet and five inches tall, thin face, light hair, and curly whiskers. He wore a black uniform of mohair cloth, white silk shirt,
pongee silk trousers, old shoes, and carried a pistol and a sword. He was an American military officer.

"Mr. Hogarth was thirty seven years old, seven feet tall, thin face, light hair, and wore a beard. His uniform was of white material. He wore a cap, trousers made of pongee silk, slippers, leather belt, and carried a sword. He was an English military officer.

"Mr. Page was forty five years old, seven feet five inches tall, thin face, light hair and whiskers, wore a dark uniform, black shoes, leather belt. He was armed with a sword and pistol and was a military officer from Denmark.

"We then inquired the names and ages of the other members of the crew, but as Ch’oe Nanhyŏn refused to answer any further questions, saying that they were only servants, we were not able to secure any more information. We observed, however, that their hair, beards, faces and clothing were truly those of Orientals.

"The ship was about 180 ft. long, 50 ft. wide, and 30 ft. high. It had two masts; one was about 130 ft. high, and the other 50 feet. There were two large white sails and two smaller ones. We saw many other things on the ship but as we did not learn the names of them we cannot make a definite report. The small boats were about one or two Pa (one Pa is six or seven feet) in length and were painted blue."

(3) The Record of the investigation of the Foreign Vessel by the military official, Yi Yong-sang (李容象), on July 18th (August 28th) 1866.

The report says, "The object of the anchoring of the Foreign Ship at Pyengyang, Choribang Irijang Sa-p’o (草里坊二里場沙浦) has already been mentioned. On the 13th (Sunday August 21st, 1866), an official from Pyengyang, Sin Tae-jŏng, the Sŏyun (庶尹) or mayor of Pyengyang, and Pang Igyŏng (方益鏢), the Yŏnggwan (領官) or Lieutenant-General, left on the 11th, and came to the place where inquiries concerning the ship had been made, but the
vessel had already moved and anchored at P'onbu Sinjang-p'ogu. It was night when we arrived at the place and so waited until daylight the next morning. Then with Chun Yōngni and Kim Naksun we visited the ship and asked the object of its visit. Their reply was given us in writing and asked us to come and find out for ourselves. We then got into a small boat and rowed out to the vessel and anchored near it. Some of them with spears in their hands arose and asked us to come aboard. We communicated with them in writing, asking them from what country they had come, and the reason of their visit. One of the men who seemed to have more authority than the rest said, 'My name is Ch'oe Nanhyn and I am an Englishman. Cho Nungbong (趙凌奉) there is from Peking, and Cho Pangyong (趙邦用) is a Bible colporteur, and Yi P'alhaeng (李八行) (Page) is from Denmark. We are Westerners and are on a commercial mission. We sailed from Shantung about the 1st of July and after passing several islands off the coast of Hwanghae we came to Hwangju, and after a day or two of rest, we intend to go to Pyengyang.'"


On the 22nd (Tuesday September 1st) the Pyengyang military official, Yi Hyōnik (李玄益) who surrendered his office and the official who had previously delivered us his office were rewarded.

In the report of Pak Kyusu it says, 'The vessel which had anchored at Hant'an (閭灘) proceeded to Hansa-jōng (閭似亭). It's anchorage had already been reported.

Then the mayor of Pyengyang, Sin Taejōng, received the report and it said, "Yesterday afternoon between five and seven, six foreigners came to Yujōng from Hansa-jōng and anchored. Here they got into a little green boat and began to ascend the river. An officer from that place took a small boat and followed them. All of a sudden the foreigners turned round, seized the boat, arrested the official, and took him on board the foreign vessel. Hearing of this, Sin
Taejong went out to where the foreign vessel was, and remained all night, begging that the foreigners return the official but without avail. Between 9 and 11 of that day, after the vessel had set sail, and was proceeding up the river, it began to discharge its guns recklessly, and finally arrived and anchored at Hwanggang-jong (黃江亭). Then five foreigners got into a small green boat and as they were proceeding towards Mat'an (馬灘) to survey the river, the people of the village gathered on the river bank calling loudly, 'Give us back our Colonel.' Then they returned to the village, demanding that the officer be given up. All the populace became greatly excited and began to cast stones. Some of the village men skilled in archery shot arrows and some of them fired guns at the foreigners. The foreigners hastily left their little green boat and fled to the upper part of the island of Yanggak (羊角) and finally returned to the ship. Then the foreign vessel proceeded to the lower end of the island of Yanggak and anchored. The little green boat in which the foreigners had ridden was taken and left in the river.

'Between three and five o'clock that same day, the officials of the city, Pak Ch'un'gwon (朴春權) who had surrendered his office, together with some of the military officials under the Colonel, courageously ventured out to the foreign vessel in a small boat and rescued the Colonel. The Colonel's official seal had been taken away from him. It is not known whether the official Pak Ch'i-yong (朴致永) and Yu Sunwön (俞淳遠) who accompanied the Colonel on the day the latter was seized, were thrown into the river from the foreign vessel or not but were never seen again. It is not definitely known whether they survived or not.

'It is my purpose to report on the attitude and the extreme carefulness with which the foreign vessel was observed.

'The crafty and beast-like foreigners entered the inland waters of the Taedong, and in a few days, came and anchor-
ed near the city without manifesting the least signs of fear. Their attitude was so threatening that one could not help but being terrified. Being strangers from a distant foreign country they should have approached us in a courteous and friendly manner if they intended to enter the city in the interests of trade. On the contrary they acted in such a way as caused us to have great suspicion. They seized our Colonel and kept him imprisoned all night on the ship. All their actions were such as to give cause for suspicion and revenge. It would not have been difficult to have destroyed the ship which was ground in the middle of the river, but realizing that the ship would not attempt to remain long in such a condition we waited hoping that it would soon withdraw. Not only was the Colonel, Yi Hyŏnık, imprisoned on the vessel but the loss of his official seal was all the more alarming.

"Since the official seal was lost there was nothing left to do but to have the Colonel surrender his office and report the matter to the government. I pray that the Ministers of State will adjudicate this matter as soon as possible. This is the report of the mayor of Pyengyang upon the investigation and guarding of the foreign vessel at Pyengyang."

V. The Ministers of State deliberations as to how to deal with this serious question.

"In order to preserve the honor and dignity of the Orient we must destroy the trespassing foreigners."

The Ministers of State met on July 25th, (Friday September 4th), 1866, in the Hŭijŏng-dang (熙政堂). Minister Kim Chwagŭn (金左根), who had investigated the matter of the foreign vessels at Kangwha had returned, but as there were other matters to look into, it was not known whether he would come again or not. However, the actions of the Foreign Vessel which had anchored at Pyengyang were truly terrible and gave cause for complaint. The report of the Chinese government to Korea is really a cause for great concern. It can only be decided after all the particulars are
fully known. There is no other method of deciding the matter.

Yi Kyŏngjae (李景在) said, "Foreign vessels have had the right to navigate the sea off our country before but this is the first time one ever entered our inland waters and truly its attitude is very lamentable. The foreign vessels which anchored off Kangwha (江華) have all gone but the one at Pyengyang still remains, and gives us great cause for complaint and alarm." The King said, "That is very true. No foreign vessel has ever entered our inland waters before, even though they have sailed our seas." Kim Pyŏnghak (金炳學) replied, "Indeed this is the first time." Then the King said, "This is due to the fact that we have dealt with them too generously," to which Cho Tusun (趙斗淳) replied, "Yes that is certainly true." Then the King said, "Send word to the eight provinces and the four large cities to guard carefully and sternly against such dastardly fellows." Kim Pyŏnghak replied, "Yes we must once more deal very severely with such men. There is no other way but to go in to the particulars of their case very carefully and deal with them sternly. The foundation and perpetuity of the nation is in its righteous principles. If the proper law is administered in such an emergency as this, such lawless fellows will naturally disappear. If the acts of such vicious men as these take place within our borders how can our country be considered a civilized nation? Therefore, we must in this crisis administer the proper law. I beg your Majesty to give careful consideration to this important matter." Cho Tusun said, "What Minister Kim has just said is truly correct. The administration of righteous law is certainly the proper thing to do." Finally Kim Pyŏnghak said, "I beg of your Majesty the King, that in as much as this matter is a most serious one we meet again tomorrow, and decide quickly to apply the proper law in this case." The King replied, "I shall think about the matter."
VI. The Foreign vessel plunders merchant ships and kills Koreans.

The report made by Pak Kyusu, governor of Pyengyang, on the plunder of Korean merchant ships and the murder of Koreans by the foreign vessel.

The report says, 'It had been previously reported that a foreign vessel had arrived and anchored off the Pang-susōng, Pyengyang, but that it had been directly reported to the military officer and magistrate, Paek Nagyŏn (白樂淵) of Ch’ōlsan (鐵山) and Sin Taejŏng, mayor of Pyengyang, that on the 25th of June, (Friday September 4th), the foreign vessel did not appear to have any intentions of withdrawing but occasionally plundered provisions from Korean ships, recklessly discharging its guns and killing seven and wounding five Koreans. There has never been such a thing as a foreign vessel entering the inland waters of the country and remaining for a number of days. They say they are going to threaten the Koreans with violence in order to force them to trade with them. Therefore, seeing their determined attitude, we could not help but be afraid of them. However, since they had come from such a far country, we preferred to speak to them kindly, and have them depart with a sense of gratitude, rather than to force them to go by the means of applying the law so we treated them generously many times with food but they did not go and finally acted in a barbarous way, capturing and imprisoning our Colonel. They also discharged their guns killing and wounding not less than twelve of our people, so that nothing remained for us to do but to destroy the vessel.

'This report was made by myself who went out to the river and made observation.

'Through the instrumentality of the Tongsik (董飾) and the Chunggun (中軍), together with the mayor of Pyengyang, they attempted to destroy the vessel either by cannon or fire rafts. However the foreigners on the vessel used great strategy by placing wire and nets to ward off the fire-
rafts. In the struggle that followed, Kim Pongjo (金奉調) killed a member of the crew. After fighting all day the foreigners' ammunition was exhausted, and the ship being grounded on a shoal, it could not move. The members of the crew, though not many, were not easy to capture because of their very clever manoeuvring and use of dangerous weapons.

"The populace were very angry and only waited an opportunity to destroy the entire crew. The military too, became greatly incensed over the matter, and used all their ingenuity to assist the populace in the accomplishment of their desired object."

VII. The magistrate of Pyengyang orders the destruction of the foreign vessel.

By order of the Western Province the foreign vessel was to be destroyed as soon as opportunity offered.

The Minister of State replied, "I have just sent the report of the governor of Pyengyang, Pak Kyusu, which says, "The foreign vessel plundered Korean merchantmen and killed and wounded many of our people. It behooves us to destroy the vessel as soon as opportunity offers. Furthermore, since foreign devils have invaded our country, committing such terrible acts of violence, who could harbor any regrets concerning their destruction? We had thought at first to treat them kindly and urge them to withdraw out of a sense of gratitude. However, they misinterpreted our purpose, captured our Colonel, and finally killed and wounded a number of our people. Because of this the wrath of our people knew no bounds. The military also became very much excited over the matter and resolved on a plan to destroy the vessel as soon as the opportunity offered.""


On July 27th, 1866 (Sat. Sept. 6th), Pak Kyusu, governor of Pyengyang, reported upon the destruction of the
foreign vessels. The report says, "The foreign vessel anchored at Pyengyang carelessly discharged its guns, killed and injured a number of our people. In contemplating a plan for the destruction of the vessel it was finally decided to try and set it on fire by the use of fire-rafts. When the fire-boats approached the vessel, Ch’oe Nanhyŏn and Cho Nŭng-bong, came to the prow of the vessel and jumped into the river, at the same time, begging to have their lives spared. They were both seized, bound and brought to the shore, where they were at once beaten to death by the enraged people and military. They then proceeded to kill the remaining members of the crew. When the last member of the vessel was despatched the anger and excitement of the people subsided.

"The magistrate and military officer from Ch’ŏlsan, Paek Nagyŏn and the mayor of Pyengyang, Sin Taejŏng exerted all their ingenuity and strength with the result that the vessel was destroyed.

"Their virtue was most extraordinary and ought to be duly rewarded. It was a most difficult task. No one was able to prohibit the Foreign Vessel proceeding up the Pyengyang river. It seized and imprisoned our Colonel, so that nothing remained to do but to destroy the foreigners. They were treated most generously in the place where once a great king had lived, and though they, like ourselves, were human beings, they acted most immorally and did such horrible things, that they greatly annoyed us. They say that Pyengyang is the place where Kija lived. The customs of the people were refined; they were loyal to the nation. The subjects practised virtue, and there were a multitude of families, for many generations, as virtuous as the nation itself. But now these vile foreigners have come up the Tae-dong River, seized and imprisoned our Colonel, killed and wounded a number of our people, and committed other violent acts. Even though we lack courage in arms, there was only one thing left for us to do in view of all this. The
military then considered plans to destroy the foreigners when the opportunity offered. The populace, military, and officials heartily united in the act of killing the crew. This brave act was magnificent.

"We, Pak Kyusu, governor of Pyengyang, Paek Nagyŏn military and civil official of Ch’ŏlsan, together with Sin Tae-
jŏng mayor of Pyengyang, present this report."


In reporting the affair to the Chinese government the Korean authorities said, "We have sent full particulars of the whole matter of the destruction of the foreign vessel and request that they be forwarded to the proper authorities."

X. The Burning of the Foreign Vessel.

On August 8th (Thursday September 17th), Pak Kyusu governor of Pyengyang made a report on the burning of the foreign vessel and the confiscation of the metal of the ship. The report says, "The burning and destruction of the foreign vessel that grounded on the shoal near the Pang Su-
sŏng (防水城) in Pyengyang has already been mentioned. After the destruction of the vessel by fire, the metal in the vessel which was not melted, was salvaged, such as cannon, nails, anchor chains and the like. The material salvaged was placed in the arsenal for preservation and future use. The following is a specific list of the material:

3 Cannon and shells
2 loads of iron
162 Pa (about 1,000 feet) small and large chains
1300 lbs. of tin
2250 lbs. wire
2145 lbs. miscellaneous metal.

XI. The Inquiry Concerning the Foreign Vessel.

On November 5th, 1866, (Tuesday Dec. 16th), the Sŭngmunwŏn (承文院) reported in Seoul that it had just seen the Inquiry from Peking concerning the Foreign Vessel.
The inquiry said that the United States Minister, Mr. Williams, reported that a two masted schooner had proceeded to Korea, grounded on a shoal, and that the Korean General had burned the vessel, taken the crew prisoners, and that he did not know whether they were dead or alive.


"On July 7th, 1866 (Monday August 17th), a foreign vessel arrived and anchored in Pyengyang. It seized and imprisoned the naval officer and killed and injured a number of the people, extorted much material, and recklessly fired its guns until it finally grounded on a shoal and was destroyed. Among those who were drowned were the self-styled Englishmen, Ch’oe Nanhyŏn, and Yi P’alhaeng. Formerly there was no two masted American schooner grounded on the shoal, burned and its crew killed. If one considers the report of Mr. Williams carefully he will find that there is no good ground for such a report. The ship of which he speaks was not an American but an English ship."

The Christian Church and Foreign Relations.

The "Christian Church and Foreign Relations" by Yi Nünghwa says, concerning the General Sherman, "Shortly after the wreck of the American sailing vessel Surprise, the General Sherman owned by Mr. Preston came loaded with goods the Koreans much desired: cotton goods, glass ware and many other articles. It left Chefu and sailed for Korea. The owner of the vessel was Mr. Preston and the captain was Mr. Page and Rev. R. J. Thomas was the interpreter, altogether five Europeans and fifteen Chinese and Manilla-men, making a total crew of nineteen.

The Arrival of the ship at Pyengyang.

"The vessel arrived by way of Hwanghae and Pyengan provinces on August the 11th and began to ascend the Taedong River to the city of Pyengyang. Therefore the General sent a Changgyo, Kim Naksu, to inquire into the reasons for the arrival of the vessel. Rev. Thomas came and told
them that they had come to trade with the Koreans and to secure food. On August 18th the vessel reached Hansa-jŏng by nightfall, and after dark it put out a small boat and advanced up the river.

The Vessel captures the General.

"The Pyeongyang Adjutant, Yi Hyŏnik, seeing the small vessel ascending the river got into a small boat and tried to follow it. But the foreign boat suddenly turned around and seized the boat Yi Hyŏnik was in and took it to the vessel. The Adjutant was taken and imprisoned on the General Sherman. The Korean authorities were greatly alarmed and sent the Lieutenant Governor of Pyeongyang, Sin Taejong, to the General Sherman to demand his release but the foreigners refused to give him up. The news of the imprisonment of the Adjutant on the foreign vessel spread to all the populace and they gathered like a cloud on the banks of the Taedong River to witness the strange foreign vessel. They called to the vessel to restore Yi Hyŏnik to them. The foreigners replied that they would consult with the Mayor of Pyeongyang the next morning. The people gathered on the shores of the river became very angry and began carelessly to throw stones. Therefore Pak Ch'unch'wŏn, a retired officer, took a small boat and went out to the General Sherman and rescued Yi Hyŏnik, and reported that the seal which had been thrown into the water by Yi Hyŏnik had been seized by the foreigners.

The Foreign Vessel continued to go up the river.

"On account of rain for several days the river had risen very high but the foreigners thought that this was the natural height of the water in the river and so went carelessly on up the river. After a few days the water began to recede and the vessel grounded. The situation became more serious and since it was impossible to communicate with the Koreans the food of the vessel ran low and the foreigners began to forage, so that it was necessary for the Koreans to destroy them.
The Destruction of the Foreigners.

"The Governor of Pyengyang reported the actions of the foreigners to Seoul and then began to consider plans for the destruction of the vessel with the officer of Ch’ŏlsan, Paek Nagyŏn. On September the 3rd the Koreans prepared fire-boats, tying them together and let them float down the river to the Sherman and soon she was on fire and the smoke and fire of the vessel reached unto heaven. The foreigners came out on the prow of the vessel and begged to be saved but the Koreans would not listen to them and they were taken ashore and murdered before the populace and soldiers.

The Foreigners Destruction.

"The news of the murder of the crew of the foreign vessel was reported to the capital and the Taewŏn'gun was greatly elated. He ordered the officials that had had anything to do with the destruction of the crew to be rewarded and proposed that Pak Kyusu, who had been governor of Pyengyang, should go to China and inform the officials there of the matter."

Pyŏngin Record.

The following is Yasa (野史) Unofficial History, from a small work called "Pyŏngin (丙寅) Record" (1866). It gives some interesting information concerning Rev. Thomas and the destruction of the General Sherman.

On July 7th, 1866 (Monday August 17th), Pak Kyusu governor of Pyengyang, made a report and it says, "The mayor of Pyengyang, Sin Taejŏng, reported that a foreign vessel had anchored at Sinjiang-p’o, Chori-bang, Pyengyang Prefecture.

"The Adjutant of Pyengyang, Yi Hyŏnik (李鉉益) and Sin Taejŏng, made an investigation in which it was said that one of the men on the vessel who spoke some Korean was called Ch’oe Nanhŏn, and he was an Englishman. Cho Nŭngbong (趙凌奉) and the colporteurre, Cho Pamyong (趙方鷹) were from Peking. Yi P’alhaeng (李八行) was the
captain of the ship. The captain said, 'We intend to visit Pyengyang in order to exchange our foreign notions for Korean commodities.' The Koreans replied, 'It is against the law of our country to trade with foreigners.' Ch'oe Nanhyŏn replied, 'On the 21st (Friday August 21st) of this month, did I not send a letter from China, inquiring whether it would not be possible to trade with Korea? We arrived here on June 22nd (Saturday Aug. 22). Why is it you are persecuting and driving out the Roman Catholic Christians? Our Protestant church too, makes good and upright men through the teaching of the truth. However, I would have you know that Protestantism is not the same as Catholicism.'

'The Koreans replied, 'Both of these forms of Christianity are prohibited by our country.' Then Ch'oe Nanhyŏn asked, 'Why did you kill the French Bishop, Priests and the Koreans who believed in their doctrines?' The Koreans replied, 'According to the laws of our country, foreigners who dress in different clothes and travel through the country deceiving our people and treacherously plotting are to be punished with death, and, as for taking the lives of our people, that is no concern of yours.' 'How many are there with you?' they then asked. Ch'oe Nanhyŏn replied, 'Five foreigners, thirteen Chinese, and two negroes (Manilla-men).’ They said their food was exhausted and upon their repeated request for help, we supplied them three different times with rice and meat.

'They next went to Pyengyang and once more demanded food. On the 18th of June (Tuesday August 18th), six of the men from the vessel boarded a small blue boat and began to ascend the river. Yi Hyŏnik was pursuing them in order to observe what they intended to do. All of a sudden the foreigners turned, seized the Colonel’s boat, took it to their vessel, imprisoned the Colonel on the ship, and refused to let him go. The next day some of the soldiers went to rescue the Colonel when the foreigners opened fire on them, killing
and wounding thirteen Koreans. The foreigners said, 'If you will give us 1,000 bags of rice, gold and silver, together with a number of Koreans as hostages, we will deliver to you your Colonel.'

"The people of the city were terribly incensed at this outrage and on the 24th of July (Thursday September 3rd), the foreign vessel fired upon our ships. Consequently their boat was set on fire and twenty foreigners were either burned to death on the vessel or jumped into the river and were drowned."

A History of the Korean People.

In addition to the official reports of the disaster of the General Sherman we give the testimony of an eye-witness. This is recorded in the "A History of the Korean People", Chapter 37, written by Dr. James Gale. We give it here in full as it quite coincides with the substance of the official reports.

Mr. Chung Heuijo (鄭義祖), of Pyengyang, who had seen it as a boy and told it as only a beholder can tell. "As the American ship," said he, "came up the river, news of its approach was sent by courier post". The governor at that time was a great scholar and highly-honoured gentleman, Pak Kyusoo, whom Yuan Shi Kai once called si-che-saram; Man of the times! Mr. Chung went on to say, "Little by little the boat came further up, the water being exceedingly high at that season. When the news of it got abroad the people of the city fled for their lives out of the gates, and when they were ordered shut, over the walls. Many like myself, however, were moved by curiosity and desired to see who Choi Nan Hyun was, for this, we were told, was the name of the foreigner in command of the fearful expedition. Governor Pak summoned Colonel Chung Chi-hyun, who was in command of the troops, and sent him to make inquiry. He went, but for some reason, was detained on board and not allowed to return. Seeing this, crowds of people armed with stones, sticks, and bows and arrows, went out on the river
to get within throwing distance. Suddenly a cannon was fired from the ship that wrought great havoc among those who ventured near. Some lost an arm, some a leg, some were blown up and killed. The Colonel made every effort to get away, but the foreigners held him fast and finally took his seal from him.

"By means of the written character he conversed with a Chinaman who happened to be on board, named Cho Yoong Pong. In this conversation Cho wrote, 'Is there a stone pagoda anywhere near?' The Colonel replied, 'Yes' and asked what he meant by such a question. Cho made answer, 'Before coming on this trip I met a fortune teller who read my chances for this journey and wrote:

A thousand year old city!
Stone pagoda, very terrible.
which means that a stone pagoda standing before a certain city of a thousand years was greatly to be feared.' Strange as it may seem, a stone pagoda did stand just over Keui-ja’s dyke in the willow grove just opposite to which the ship hung fast....

"The Governor then summoned the guard, several hundred men, also a group of tiger hunters, fifty or more, and ordered them to fire on the ship. But the cannon shots that came in reply spread terror everywhere and ploughed the land where potato patches now are. This continued for several days during which time news was being constantly sent to Seoul. Finally word came back from the old Regent, "Destroy them utterly."

"Among those who ventured to try a hand against the foreigner was a man who had a boat protected by a bull’s hide. A cannon shot however, sunk and slew him, his bag of gun-powder and all. He was killed and my father took pity on his son and brought him into our home where he lived for many years.

"While the ship was still fast aground a bold sculler went outward close up and called Colonel Chung to jump.
The Colonel being free at the moment did so, also one of his attendants; but one, Yoo Bok Ee, missed his footing, fell into the water, and was drowned.

'Though the attacking party was balked for several days, at last, by loading a scow with brushwood sprinkled with sulphur, she got the ship afire, and the crew smoked out. Into the water they dashed and Choi landed with Cho the Chinaman. Both offered submission, bowing deeply, but this was refused. They were pinioned at once with the rest among whom were two black men, negroes, and were led over Keui-ja's wall to the willow grove where the fated pagoda stood and there beaten to death. The man who first struck the American Choi was a brother of the Colonel's attendant who was drowned. There were about twenty in all and they met their fate on the 22nd day of the seventh Moon (Tuesday September 2nd) in the year of Pyung In.'

United States Diplomatic Correspondence.

In the United States Diplomatic Correspondence concerning the loss of the General Sherman and the murder of its entire crew we offer the following. This material is found in the Diplomatic correspondence between China and the United States for the years 1866 to 1868.

Mr. Williams to the Foreign Office.
Legation of the United States,
Peking, October 23, 1866.
To the Foreign Office:

A report has been received here from Chifu that an American schooner, the General Sherman, was wrecked last month on the coast of Corea, and burned by the natives; her officers and crew, 24 in all, being captured by them, but it is not certainly known whether they are still alive or not. It is the usage of the Corean government to deliver all such persons at the frontier of China to her officers, to be handed over to their respective consuls at Niuchwang. In the month of June last a small American vessel was lost on the coast of Corea, and her crew were very kindly treated by the people,
and handed over to the officers in Manchuria, whose treatment was, on the other hand, in utter contrast with that of the Coreans, very harsh, the poor men not having enough to eat. However, owing to the exertions and exhortations of Pere Gillies, a French missionary, at Mukten, they were sent to the consul at Niuchwang.

I have to request, that orders may be immediately sent to the officers in Manchuria that if the Coreans should deliver over these twenty four men to them, to treat them with kindness and protect them, and not with the harshness shown to the former company. All expenses incurred by the authorities there on account of these will be repaid by the government of the United States.

I have, etc.,

S. Wells Williams.

Mr. Burlingame to Mr. Seward.
United States Legation,
Peking, December 15th, 1866.

Sir: I have the honor to inform you that the French fleet of six vessels and 600 men, under the command of Admiral Roze, left Chefoo on the 11th of October for the purpose obtaining satisfaction for the murder of the French missionaries. It arrived on the 13th at the mouth of a river on which is situated Seoul, the capital of Corea; ascending this to Kang-hoa, a city of twenty thousand inhabitants, on the 14th the Admiral landed his force, and on the 15th and 16th captured the city without loss. Great preparations had been made by the Coreans to meet the French all along the river, but the French arriving before the completion of their works they abandoned them at first without a struggle.

A deputation arrived from the capital, 26 miles from Kang-hoa, complaining of the conduct of the missionaries, but ending with a request that the Admiral should go to the capital and discuss the affair in a friendly manner. The Admiral conceived this to be a ruse to entrap him and refused to go, but invited them in return to come to him. In the
mean time large forces began to gather about Kang-hoa. On the 26th a reconnaissance was made with 150 men, who, upon nearing a pagoda, were fired upon by 500 Coreans, and at the first volley three were killed and 32 wounded, whereupon a retreat was made, and Admiral Roze, probably finding that nothing could be done with his limited force, left Korea to recruit, without which he can do nothing until the next spring or summer.

Anson Burlingame.

Hon. William H. Seward
Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

Mr. Burlingame to Mr. Seward.
United States Legation,
Peking, December 15th, 1866.

Sir: It is my painful duty to inform you that the United States Schooner General Sherman, while on a trading voyage to Corea, was destroyed and all on board murdered by the natives. The news was brought to Cheefoo by Admiral Roze, of the French Fleet, the particulars of which please find in Mr. Sanford’s despatch, (A). I refer you also to the letter of Meadows and Company, (B) from which you will learn that the schooner was chartered and loaded by them and for what purpose.

As Corea was formerly tributary to China I brought the affair to the attention of prince Kung, who at once disavowed all responsibility for the Coreans, and stated that the only connection between the two countries was one of ceremony. I thereupon addressed the letter, (C) to Admiral Bell, in which I limited myself to a suggestion as to what action shall be taken.

As the French are seeking redress for the murder of their missionaries, it may be that those on board the General Sherman were by the Coreans confounded with them; this seems the more probable inasmuch as the crew of the Sherman were heavily armed. Recently an American crew under Captain McCaslin, wrecked in Corea, were treated with the
utmost kindness. My colleagues have written to their admirals, and I suppose in the spring there will be a large fleet in Korea. The issue of all will be the opening of the country. If my advice can have weight it will be that our presence there shall rather restrain than promote aggression, and serve to limit action to such satisfaction only as great and civilized nations should, under the circumstances, have from the ignorant and weak.

You have seen from my despatch, No. 122 what passions are aroused and to what their indulgences would lead. I am informed the French government does not contemplate an expedition against Corea, but after the virtual repulse of Admiral Roze it will be impossible to avoid it.

I have honor to be, Sir, your obedient servant,

ANSON BURLINGAME.

Hon. William H. Seward,
Secretary of State, Washington D. C.

Inclosure A.
Mr. Sanford to Mr. Burlingame.
United States Consulate,
Chifu October 30th, 1866.

Sir: I have the honor to inform you that the French Fleet returned from Corea, October 3rd, and on the 4th it was reported here that the American schooner, General Sherman had been wrecked, and all on board murdered by the natives. I immediately wrote to the Admiral, requesting him to furnish me with information he could, to which he replied:

"In reply to the letter which you have done me the honor of writing, I can do no better than send you the exact copy of a note that was sent me by Rev. P. Ridel, Apostolic missionary: On the 30th of September we were at anchor near Woody Island, (Chagyakdo) on the coast of Corea. During the night a Corean boat, with two natives on board, approached the "Deroulede". Having recognized in one of the sailors who had accompanied me in the spring on the
voyage from Korea to Cheefoo, I succeeded in inducing them to come on board. Among other information they told me that about the middle of the moon, (about the end of the month of August), a small vessel from the country of the West had appeared on the coast of Corea, in the province of Phien-g-an-so, which is in the extreme northwest of the kingdom. She was endeavoring to ascend the river, and to reach the city of Phien-ganso, capital of the province, and had already arrived almost off the city, when she grounded on a sand-bank. The government at once sent to the king’s father for instructions, whether he should put to death those on board or burn them and the vessel together. The king’s father replied, to burn the vessel and all on board. This barbarous order was executed. Such, Sir, is the only information bearing at all upon the matter to which you allude, that has reached me.”

The General Sherman left here on the 9th of August. She called for water; took Mr. George Hogarth (British subject) as supercargo, and Rev. Mr. R. J. Thomas (British) as interpreter. The owner, W. B. Preston, (American) also went with them,—Page, Captain,—Wilson, chief mate, (both Americans). The crew consisted of from fifteen to twenty, (Malays and Chinese), cargo, cotton goods, glass, tin-plate, etc. etc. On October 7th the Chinese junks arrived from Corea and made the following report respecting the wreck and burning of a foreign schooner, viz; the captain of one of them was engaged by Mr. Thomas to pilot the schooner up the river Ping Yangso, as he was acquainted with him previously; he yielded, and took her up four tides. But this time the alarm had spread amongst the natives, they taking her for a pirate, and would not believe the pilot when he told them she was a peaceful trader. (The General Sherman was heavily armed.) All trade was stopped, and the natives began to collect in large numbers. His friends on board the junk becoming alarmed refused to allow him to go up any further, saying that if he was killed, they would have no face to return to Yentai. He, therefore, left them
opposite to little Ping-Yangso, about half way up the river. They were still determined to proceed; this was about the middle of the 8th moon. You will notice a disagreement here between the dates given by the French missionary and this man. However, the other junk, it seems, did not reach Corea. On its nearing the coast, a junk put off, and warned them not to go in, as a foreign vessel had been wrecked opposite Ping-Yangso, and the vessel, with all hands burnt, on which the junk returned to Yentai.

On the night of the 24th instant, the two French missionaries, who had been concealed in the mountains of Corea, reached this place. They state that a foreign vessel was wrecked opposite Ping Yangso; after some fighting between the natives and those on board the schooner, the natives succeeded by strategy in dragging the men on shore, when they were surrounded, and their hands tied behind their backs. They were then made to kneel down on the shore, and were decapitated. The missionaries report that there were twenty thus put to death.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant.

G. Stanford,
U. S. Consul.

Hon. Anson Burlingame,
Minister of the United States, Peking.

Inclosure B
Messrs. Meadows and Co. to Burlingame.
Tientsin, October 24th, 1866.

Sir: The undersigned British firm, beg leave to bring your excellency’s notice to the following circumstances, in order to obtain your excellency’s assistance in getting redress.

During the latter half of July last the American schooner, General Sherman arrived at this port, and was consigned to our care by care of Mr. Preston, the owner, who had come as a passenger on the vessel for the sake of his health. After we had taken delivery of the inward
cargo, Mr. Preston and we came to an agreement that we should load her with a cargo of foreign merchandise, and despatch her to Korea with a supercargo to sell the goods there. We accordingly loaded her with foreign merchandise, and on the 29th of July last she left Tientsin. Mr. Hogarth, one of our clerks, who went as supercargo, left previously in the steamer, Shaftesbury, for Chefoo, in order to have a pilot and shroff ready for the General Sherman arriving there, and thus save delay. On the schooner, Mr. Hogarth, accompanied by a Chinese pilot and a Cantonese shroff belonging to our firm, went on board also Mr. Thomas, who having expressed a wish to go to Korea again, in order to extend his knowledge of the Korean language, went as passenger. From the day the vessel left Chefoo until now we have received no written advices from Mr. Hogarth or Mr. Preston, or in fact, from anyone on board when she left Chefoo.

On the 8th of October current we received letters from the partners of our firm in Chefoo acquainting us that the French Admiral’s vessel had come to Chefoo, from Korea, with the news that the king of Korea had caused the General Sherman to be burned with all on board, while proceeding up the Pingyang river.

We immediately addressed Dr. Williams on the subject, copy of our letter herewith enclosed.

On the 20th of October current we received further advices from our partrener in Chefoo, informing us that he had seen a junk captain who had piloted the schooner four tides up the Ping Yang River, when he left her and returned to the mouth of the river to his junk and finally to Chefoo. This man stated that Coreans had told him their king was opposed to foreign intercourse with his country. We imagine that this man, who understands something of the Korean language, knows something more about the vessel than he is inclined to divulge, fearing, Chinese—like, to mix himself up in the matter with the authorities to question him later on the points.
As the act of visiting Corea for the purpose of trade was not an act which could, in the eyes of civilized Western nations, justify the Corean government in destroying those who committed it, we, the undersigned, have taken the liberty of addressing you for the purpose of bringing the above matters to your excellency’s notice, with the request that you will be pleased to beg his excellency Admiral Bell to make inquiries regarding the destruction of the vessel and her people, and take steps to cause the Corean government to make redress as far as such in the nature of this is practicable.

We have the honor to be, Sir, your Excellency’s most obedient servants.

Meadows and Company.

Hon. Anson Burlingame.
United States Minister Plenipotentiary.

P. S.—We beg to enclose copy of our letter to H. B. M.’s consul, Mr. Morgan, on the loss of the General Sherman and requesting the British admiral’s assistance in the matter, Mr. Hogarth and Mr. Thomas both being British subjects.

Meadows and Company.

Inclosure C.

Peking. November, 27th, 1866.

Sir: I find that the Chinese government disavows any responsibility for that of Corea and all jurisdiction over its people. Consequently the occurrences there relating to the General Sherman are beyond my jurisdiction. It may, however, strengthen your hands to receive a suggestion from me, that if consistent with your instructions, it may be well to send a vessel of war to inquire into the facts of the case, to the end that they may be reported to the government for its instructions. Having great confidence in your discretion, I leave the matter in your hands, where it properly belongs.

ANSON BURLINGAME.
H. H. Bell
Acting Admiral Commanding,
U. S. Asiatic Squadron.
Messrs Meadows and Company to Consul Mongan.
Tientsin, 23rd October, 1866.

Sir: We take the liberty to communicate to you the following matter, in which two British subjects are concerned, in order that you may report to Admiral King, the British Naval Commander-in-chief in China, that he may take such steps as may be best in accordance with his duty, in a position where the lives and properties of his countrymen are concerned.

About three months back the American schooner General Sherman arrived at this port, and the owner, Mr. Preston, who had come on board the vessel, consigned her to our care. After we had discharged her inward cargo, which was sent to our care, Mr. Preston, who resided on shore in our house soon after his arrival, and during his stay in Tientsin, we came to the determination to see if any business could be done in an adventure to Corea; we consequently loaded the vessel and despatched her on a trading voyage to Corea. One of our clerks, Mr. Hogarth, was sent by us as supercargo and to assist Mr. Preston in making the trip a profitable one. Mr. Thomas, a friend of the writer, having expressed a desire again to visit Corea, in order to improve his knowledge of the Corean language, went as passenger in the vessel. He and Mr. Hogarth going aboard at Chifu. We may now state that both Mr. Hogarth and Mr. Thomas were natives of Great Britain; Mr. Preston, the owner of the General Sherman was an American citizen, and the Mate, Mr. Neilson, was a naturalized citizen. Mr. Hogarth took from our firm in Chifu one of our Cantonese employees, by profession a shroff, to assay the silver or gold which he might receive from the Corean merchants as payment for our merchandise. Mr. Thomas we understand took two Pe- kinese with him, and the crew was formed of Malays and
two Shantung men as pilots.

From the time the General Sherman left Chifu till the arrival of one of the French men-of-war at Chifu, we received no written advices from the General Sherman.

Peking, July 31st, 1866.

Sir: Referring to Mr. Burlingame's despatch No. 124, of December 15th, 1866, and other relating to the fate of the American Schooner General Sherman in Corea. I have now the honor to inclose a correspondence (Inclosures A. B. C.) with the Chinese government, which commenced for the purpose of engaging its good offices in ascertaining, by direct application to the king of Corea what were the real circumstances connected with the loss of the vessel.

The reason why an earlier application was not made to Prince Kung, after receiving your despatch, was that it was deemed best to wait the arrival of the annual Corean embassy at Peking, when more direct intercourse with the officials from that country could perhaps be obtained. This embassy did not reach the capital until January, and at that time the rumor mentioned in my note to Prince Kung, had assumed so much probability that I wished to learn what grounds there were for believing it. This, unfortunately, could not be done until after the Coreans had left for the country, but in any case I could not have asked them directly, as the Chinese officials in the city are particularly careful to keep these tributary nations confined to their own quarters, and they themselves are shy of all intercourse.

I was, however, able to see one of the confidential members of the Corea Mission, and ascertained from him privately some particulars relating to the attack of the schooner. He told me that he was not himself in that part of the country at the time she was in the river at Pingyang, but he heard that after the vessel had gone ashore, she keeled over as the tide receded, and her crew landed to guard or float her. The natives gathered around the vessel, and ere long
an altercation arose between the two parties which soon led
to blows and bloodshed, and a general attack on the for-
eigners, who were all killed on the spot by the mob of na-
tives, of whom fully twenty were killed. He understood
that the vessel was French, though he knew nothing of the
flag or distinction of foreign flags; but he was sure that all
her company were dead, and had moreover believed that the
wreck still remained in the Pingyang river.

Before the reply from the Korean authorities was re-
ceived in Peking, the Corvette Shenandoah had returned
from her visit to that country, where Captian Feiberg went
in March to ascertain the truth of the same rumor I referred
to in my note of A. From what he learned, combined with
the reply given him, and apparently intended for the United
States steamer Wachusett, when she was there in 1867,
there can be no reasonable doubt that the whole company on
board the General Sherman were killed about September,
1866, and the evidence goes to uphold the presumption that
they invoked their sad fate by some rash or violent acts
toward the natives.

I have the honor to be, sir your obedient servant.

S. WELLS WILLIAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward
Secretary of State, Washington D. C.

Inclosure A.

MR. WILLIAMS to Prince Kung.
Legation of the United States
Peking March 3rd, 1866.

Sir: Referring to my note to the Foreign Office of
October 28th, 1866, respecting an American merchant vessel,
the schooner General Sherman, which had been stranded in
Corea in August of that year, at which time I was favored
by a reply assuring me that the military and civil authorities
of Manchuria should attend to the wants of such as might be
handed over to them. I have now the honor to bring the
subject again before your Imperial Highness, with the re-
quest that you would communicate upon it with the Corean government.

It appears, from reports received after the date of my note of October, 1866, that when the General Sherman got ashore in Corea the natives of the country flocked about her, and that a quarrel arose between them and the crew, resulting in injury and wounds to both parties, and a fight, in which all the latter were ultimately destroyed. In consequence of this report, the Admiral commanding the U. S. Squadron in these seas last summer despatched one of his vessels to Corea to make inquiries into the matter, and ascertain the real circumstances of the affair on the spot; but this he was not able at that time to do in a satisfactory manner.

A day or two since I received from the United States Consul at Chifu the report of a pilot, named Yu Wantai, who last year returned from Corea, and related to him that he had gone up a stream called Pingyang river, and about ten miles from the sea had seen a foreign vessel lying on the southern bank without masts or sails, and her hull full of water. He also met a Corean, Kin Tsz ping a native of an island called Tsioh Tai or Sparrow Island, who told him that in March last he had himself seen two foreigners and two Chinese at the magistrate's at the chief city of the district of Pingyang. The rest of the foreigners and two Chinese had all been killed by the farmers and people of the country, and not by the Corean authorities or soldiers. He saw these two foreigners walking in the streets without any instruments of torture upon them, followed by policemen to see that they did not get away; but he could not ascertain why the Corean magistrates detailed them in this manner.

The report of the pilot Yu Wantai seems to me to possess a degree of truth, and not to be a made up story, and I therefore lose no time in making it known to your Imperial Highness, to see whether some plan cannot be carried into effect to secure the liberation of these four men. I have
myself also received direction from the government of the United States, in consequence of the report having reached Washington of the destruction of the General Sherman by the Coreans two years ago, to ascertain the true facts of the case and report upon them. This order, in connection with the unsuccessful visit for that purpose of the U. S. man-of-war last year leads me now to make known these particulars to your Imperial Highness, and respectfully request that a communication be sent by His Majesty’s government, to the Corean government for them to deliver over the two foreigners and two Chinese to the Chinese authorities.

The government of the United States has no direct relations with that of Corea, but there is something quite inexplicable in the fact that when this American vessel went there her crew should be treated so barbarously, and there must have been some cause for it, which the American government cannot pass by silently, and without full investigation being made into all the circumstances.

The government of China and the United States have long been on the most friendly terms, and I therefore entertain the strongest expectation that His Imperial Majesty will so represent this affair to the Corean government that they will see the propriety of transmitting a correct account of all the facts connected with the destruction of the American schooner within their territory, in order that I may report the same to the President. This act of courtesy will likewise add another evidence of the friendly relations existing between our respective governments, and will be duly appreciated.

I have the honor to be, with great respect, your Imperial Highness’s obedient servant.

His excellency S. WELLS WILLIAMS
United States Chargé d’ Affaires ad interim.
Inclosure B.

Prince Kung to Mr. Williams
Translation
March 10th, 1868.

Prince Kung, chief secretary of state for foreign affairs herewith sends a reply:

"On the second instant I had the honor of receiving Your Excellency's despatch, in which you inform me of the report that two foreigners and two Chinese are now kept in durance by the Coreans, and request that the Chinese government should demand of the Corean government to hand them all over to the Chinese officers, etc.

On the same day that I received this communication the British minister, Sir Rutherford Alcock, also sent a despatch to the following effect:

"Last year the French admiral took his expedition to Corea, where a collision took plack with the authorities; and it was after that occurrence that an American vessel went to Corea with the intention of trading, and was attacked in the Pingyang river, which she had entered, by the people. The report that came to me at that time was, that her crew had been entirely cut off; but afterwards many persons reported that some of them were yet alive, and detained in confinement by the Coreans. Recently a Chinese pilot has informed the United States Consul at Chifu that he knows two foreigners and two Chinese belonging to the vessel are still alive in Corea."

On receiving these despatches I have recurred to the note written by Your Excellency on the 28th of October, 1866, in which you stated that an American schooner had been wrecked in Corea, that the vessel had been burned, and twenty four of her crew carried off, concluding with the request that directions might be sent to the authorities in Mukten that if any of these men were handed over they might be carefully cared for by those officials. The members of the Foreign Office personally assured you that the time
any persons were thus delivered by the Coreans, those authorities should be directed to do everything necessary for their comfort; and corresponding instructions were immediately forwarded to the general in command at Mukten and to be the collector at Niuchwang. In due course a reply was received from the former officer, in which he stated that the Corean authorities had previously given over to the district magistrate of Ching-teh six distressed foreigners, saved from the wreck of the Surprise, a vessel which had been driven ashore in their country; that they had been already sent on to Yingtsz and handed over to Mr. Knight, the United States Consul at that port, since which time no foreigners had been delivered to them.

Taking all these considerations together, and reflecting that an American ship of war has already visited Corea, but was unable to ascertain all the real facts about the matter, and that more-over the French and Coreans seem likely to engage in hostilities, it must be acknowledged that it will be rather difficult to learn the truth of the case. In the despatch under reply you propose that measures be taken by this government to bring about the release of these men; and if I delay a little, to consult as to the best mode of procedure, it is that the affair may get the benefit of the best deliberations we can give it. It really will not be best to presently send off a mission to Corea asking about the surrender of these prisoners, for it will probably be evasively excused, and the peaceable success of the effort imperiled; or else, in our hurry, we shall not get at the real and right beginning of the matter; (referring probably to the misconception of the demand thus suddenly made on them).

I would further wish your excellency to reflect that, although Corea is in one sense a dependency of China, her authorities are now engaged in eradicating religion and forbidding its exercise; and their proceedings in the matter are carried on by themselves just as they please, but in what manner His Majesty’s officials have not heard. A moment’s
reflection will no doubt enable you to see the whole bearing of this suggestion.

I have, however, already sent a reply to the British minister and to yourself in regard to it.

His Imperial Highness Prince Kung,
Chief Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

Note from the Foreign Office.
July 11th, 1866.

When we received the despatch (of March 3rd) from Your Excellency, relating to the American schooner General Sherman, lost in Corea in 1866, concerning which an American man-of-war had gone to inquire about and had not succeeded in her mission, so that you requested us to communicate with the government of Corea to ascertain who were the two foreigners reported to be held in confinement there, and learn the reasons why they were so treated, that something might be done for their welfare, we replied that measures would be taken to further your wishes.

We accordingly presented a memorial to the throne, requesting that orders might be transmitted to the board of rites directing its president to address the king of Corea and ask him to inquire whether two foreigners were really detained in his country. We have recently received a despatch from the Board of Rites stating that a reply had been received from the king to the following effect;

"A two-masted foreign vessel went ashore in the Pingyang river, but this government had no hand whatever in the disasters which happened to her and her crew; nor has the envoy from the United States been here to inquire respecting them. If you have any means of communicating this to him, you can no doubt fully inform him of this fact. It is a fixed rule of this country, moreover, that when unfortunate men are cast like this, such pitiable cases here of persons who had drifted down upon us, how could we detain them against their will?"
"The rumor of two foreigners and two Chinese being kept here has no foundation and is a point, too, which can be easily ascertained. I shall be obliged if the officers of the Board of Rites will make these explanations on my behalf to those who may wish them."

It appears to us from the above that the statement by the Korean authorities that none of your countrymen are detained in their borders has much to confirm it; and in sending this reply we avail ourselves of the occasion to renew to you the expression of our best wishes for your happiness.

Prince Kung
Wansiang
Pauyun
Tung Siun

Tan Tingsiang
Tsung Lun
Seu Ki-Yu

Hyonjae-jip

In the Hyŏnjae-jip (韓齋集) we have discovered a record made by Pak Kyusu, governor of Pyengyang province which gives an account of the visit of the U. S. S. "Wau-chesett" at Changyŏn. The name of the ship is given which assures us that the record is authentic. The record reads as follows:

Report of the reply of the Governor of Hwanghae province to the questioning of the Americans.

In the twelfth month of the year Pyŏngin (丙寅) January 1867 an American vessel arrived and anchored off the coast of Hwanghae province, Changyŏn. The Commander expressed his thanks for the hospitable treatment and safe delivery to Peking of the sailors which were wrecked on the American schooner Surprise, formerly driven by a storm upon the Corean coast, and also made inquiry concerning the loss and murder of the crew of the American vessel that went up the Taedong River to Pyeongyang in the fall of Pyŏngin (1866).
The local official was not familiar with the circumstances of the case and could not make a reply so that the Americans were finally compelled to leave without learning the particulars of the case.

Having lost the opportunity to investigate this matter and since it had become badly twisted when I heard about it, although sick in bed, I could no longer contain my anger. I arose from my bed with great difficulty and recorded the answer, that I said I had given.

The record of the investigation of the affair by Pak Sŏnghŭi, governor of Hwanghae province.

In the twelfth month and on the 18th day of the year of Pyŏngin (Sunday January, 1887), an American man-of-war, A-Kei Sa (Wachusett) arrived off the coast of Changyŏn and sent a communication requesting that it be forwarded to the Foreign Affairs Department of the Korean government and a reply brought back.

The local officials replied to the Americans saying that Seoul was a long way from there and that it would take too much time to get a reply.

The Americans arrived saying, "The making of such a statement before a reply is received is very impolite to say the least," and their attitude was not good. The local officials then assumed all responsibility for the enforcement of the law of their country and delivered the following note:

"According to the laws of our realm a foreign ship adrift and in distress, although not wrecked, can be supplied, and aided to proceed on its way when the storm has subsided; but when a vessel is wrecked and unable to proceed under its own power, the crew may ask the officials to assist them in any manner they like. Such a crew will be protected on land and sent on to Peking as has already been done in several instances. This indicates that our people have manifested their humane spirit toward neighbors in distress and thus kept the sanctions of the moral
law. However, it is shameful that you have questioned our moral actions in this case.

"Concerning the incident that occurred on the Taedong river at Pyengyang, it is very true that a ship did ascend the Taedong river to Pyengyang last fall. The local officials took it to be a ship that had probably been forced there by the storm and took small boats to go out to investigate the matter but the foreigners on the vessel insulted them and refused to have any intercourse with them. They closed their eyes and went to sleep, totally ignoring our officials. Nevertheless our officials endured the insult, controlling their anger and replied to them in a polite manner saying, 'It is very apparent that your vessel is not one that has been driven here by storms.'"

"At this point the man who called himself Ch'oe, whether a Frenchman or Englishman we do not know, said, 'If you will promise to trade with us, the military of the two countries concerned could easily adjust the matter amicably.'

"The local official replied, as follows: 'A local official has no authority to decide upon such a question.' Then Mr. Ch'oe, pretending that he did not understand, spoke all the more vehemently.

"We told him that such a large vessel could not possibly hope to reach Pyengyang in such shallow water; but they paid no attention to our warning, and proceeded on up the river every day on each tide.

"The Koreans hoping that the matter would not assume serious aspects gave them beef, vegetables, fruit, fire wood, and every day the crew promised to return. However, they kept on going farther up the river until they had almost reached the city of Pyengyang.

"Each day the Colonel of the city of Pyengyang took a small boat and attempted to hinder the further approach of the vessel. One day, while thus engaged the crew let down a chain, caught the boat in which the Colonel was, pulled it
away and arrested him and several others, making them prisoners on the vessel. When the Korean boats attempted to go near the vessel they fired their cannon and small arms, robbed the boats, and killed and injured some Koreans. The exact number was not known. The people of the neighboring villages, not being able to control their anger any longer, armed themselves to fight the foreigners.

"Even though the Koreans politely requested that the Americans release the Colonel, they replied, 'Wait until we reach Pyengyang and we will set him free.' The man who styled himself Ch’oe spoke Korean well and he was a splendid specimen of a man. He said, 'Our plan is to go to the city of Pyengyang.' We did not exactly know what he meant nor what their purpose was. Therefore, all the people of the city and several thousand of the military, not being able to control their anger longer, went out to the river side, and after fighting, succeeded in releasing the Colonel. A number of Koreans were shot to death. The populace were all the more enraged and used guns, fire-brands, and finally succeeded in blowing up the magazine of the vessel. A column of black smoke rose high into the sky and the ship was burned. It was not known whether all perished or not. Was this the ship of which you speak?"

"This Ch’oe was not of the same nationality as the men on your vessel. I have enumerated all the circumstances concerning this matter from begining to end. We have learned through Peking that your country is a very honorable one but in the questionings of your communication you speak about "cruel murder" and we consider it very improper, coming from you, and cannot help but being somewhat suspicious."

The rumor still persisted that some of the crew of the General Sherman were still alive, and the desire on the part of the United States government to make every possible effort to rescue them resulted in the despatch of a second man-of-war to Korea by Admiral Rowan, in command of the Eastern Asiatic Fleet. The S. S. Shenandoah, under the
command of Febiger, arrived in Korea some time in May, 1867, about five months after the visit of the S. S. Wau-
chesett. The Shenandoah reached the estuary of the Taedong river and made surveys of the channel. We are told
that the inlet was named after the vessel and is marked Shenandoah Bay on the old hydrographic maps.

The Chosen Christian Church and Foreign Relations.

Yi Neungwha, in the Chosen Christian Church and Foreign Relations says concerning the visit of the Shenandoah, "The U. S. S. Shenandoah appeared at the mouth of the Taedong River between Hwanghae and Pyengyang provinces in 1867 to demand the return of the survivors of the General Sherman and also to make further inquiries concerning the fate of the foreign vessel and its crew. The local official refused to answer the inquires and asked his interpreter, Hong Myōngsik, to write to the Commander, telling him that the Taedong river was so shallow and dangerous that a foreign ship could not possibly navigate it, whereupon, the American vessel indignant at this reply, raised its sails and departed."

Yi Neungwha also says concerning this vessel, "In the 5th month of the 6th year of Tongch‘i and 18th day, the American vessel arrived at the mouth of the Taedong River, between Whanghai and Pyengyang to demand the delivery of the remainder of the crew of the Sherman and to make further inquires about its destruction. The vessel entered the river’s mouth and blocked the harbor for about a month and finally withdrew without being able to satisfy itself that any of the crew of the General Sherman remained alive or any further information concerning the destruction of the ship and the murder of its crew."

Commander Febiger, commissioned as he was by Admiral Rowan to make an investigation of the fate of the General Sherman, would certainly not have come to Korea without having delivered some official document to the Korean government. Korean evidence indicates that such
a document was delivered and the Commander of the S. S. Shenandoah also received a communication from the Koreans.

**Corea the Hermit Nation.**

Griffis says, "A report was delivered to the Commander which reads, "A foreign vessel arrived in the river two years before. The local officials went on board the vessel and addressed the two foreign officers of the ship in respectful language, but the latter rudely insulted the native dignitaries; i. e. they turned around and went to sleep."

"A man on board, whom they spoke of as "Tong" a Frenchman, used violent and impolite language toward them. The Koreans treated their visitors kindly, but warned them of their danger, and the unlawfulness of penetrating into, or trading in the country. Nevertheless, the foreigners went up the river to Ping-an city, where they seized the Colonel's ship, put him in chains, and then proceeded to rob the junkers and their crews. The people of the city aroused to a great state of excitement, attacked the foreign ship with fire-arms and cannon; they set adrift fire-rafts, and even made a hand-to-hand fight, with pikes, knives, and swords. Finally the ship caught fire, and blew up with a terrible report. This report was not believed by Commander Febiger."
YI DYNASTY ANNALS, CHAPTER XXIII.

We here attempt to give the reports as presented in the record of the Yi Dynasty. These are translations and we trust are quite accurate. They throw considerable light upon the subject in hand.

I. The Arrival of the Foreign Ship at Changyŏn.

(Wauchesett)

On the 24th of the Third month, (Monday April 18th, 1868) the military officer of Hwanghae, Yi Minsang (李敏庠) reported, "The foreigners from the vessel have landed and entered the village."

The report also stated that, "A company of about twenty men from the vessel at Changyŏn, Ido-bang, Ori-p’o (長連二道坊五里浦), came into the bay and by means of Chinese characters, stated that the vessel was an American ship and requested the villagers to get them chickens, dogs, pigs, and sheep. They said that if these were not forth coming they would return again in the evening, burn their homes and forcibly take their animals. The ship was anchored some distance from the shore so that it was impossible to say how many there were on the vessel. Of the twenty who came in the small boat, five of them landed and entered the village. Three of these were dressed in blue uniforms and their hair was braided in four strands and hung down their backs; two of them were dressed in black, and for the reason that they wore helmets, it was impossible to see how their hair was cut. Those dressed in the blue uniforms said they were from Tèng-chou (登州) and that they had been sold as hostages by their people to the Americans and that was why they were on the ship. They further said that unless their demands were met they would come again the next day. Shortly these five men returned to the small boat, and rowed back to the vessel.

"Therefore, hearing that the people of the village were terribly disturbed over the matter, an official took several
petty officers and went through the village to find out concerning the demands made by the landing party. The village folk were fearfully wrought up over the affair. It is reported that tiger-hunters were sent from the official headquarters to assist in the settlement of the matter."

II. Report on the Investigation made by Pak Kyusu, governor of Pyengyang, concerning the foreign vessel, made on March 26th, 1868. (Wednesday, April 20th).

In the report it says, "A foreign vessel with three masts anchored at P'ido, Sinnam-bang, Samhwa" (三和新南坊避島), on March 21st, (Tuesday April 15th) between 5 and 7 in the morning. I took a subordinate official from the Yamen and went to O-ori (吾吾里). Here we climbed a high eminence and putting our hands to our eyes I looked for the vessel. It had already moved westward in the direction of Changyŏn and anchored. The distance between it and myself was too great to observe it distinctly. It was engaged in gun practice so that passing boats could not approach near to it. I waited for an opportunity to observe the affair and went to Pugudong. The next day I gave the attendant with me paper on which to make an investigation and report, and had him go to the vessel and take down in writing his observations. He returned and reported as follows:

"We took the paper and started in the evening for the spot where the vessel was anchored. When we were within a short distance of the vessel a small boat from the ship put out and would not allow us to go near. The upper and lower decks of the vessel were brilliantly lighted and a great noise came from the ship. The ship was about 20 chang (about 120 feet), long and about 4 chang high (24 ft.). Its three sails were set and there was a great funnel in the midst of the ship. There were six men in the small boat and as for their appearance they had big noses, deep set eyes, kinky hair, and were all dressed in blue. In order to investigate the matter we asked them from what country they had come, if any of them were sick after their thousands of miles over
rough and dangerous seas, what plan they had for staying there for the night, if they intended to carry on trade in the future. I said, 'Our appearance, mode of dress, manners and language are different but we are all like one great family and ought we not to make clear our purposes and intentions to each other? I trust you will be very frank and make clear your plans.' At this the foreigners raised their hands, perhaps because they did not understand the questions. We asked them to receive our communication but their boat returned to the ship. After a little while they returned with a man who understood a little of our language and told us that they were Americans and that the ship was an American man-of-war (Wachusett). 'There is a matter about which we are going to Pyengyang to make inquiry,' they said. 'We can make no reply to you at this time.' Their appearance was not comforting. The firing of their cannons was continued, and since there was no chance to make further inquiries or observations we returned.'

III. The Investigation of the Foreign Vessel.

On March 26th, 1868 (Wednesday April 20th), the officer Yi Minsang (李敏埈) made a report on his investigation of the foreign vessel.

On March 21st, between five and seven in the morning Yi Minsang taking several of the subordinate officials from the Yamen went about sixty Li (20 miles) to the place where the foreign vessel was to be observed. In the village was a Chinese scholar by the name of Im Pyŏngjŏng (林秉正) who had questioned the foreigners. But the characters of the Chinese scholar were too difficult and long to record. Therefore, we make only a brief report. The report said,

"The Chinese scholar at Ori-p’o, Im Pyŏngjŏng, asked the foreigners from what country they had come and the object of their coming. They replied in writing and we observed that their letters were English. "Several years ago an American vessel disappeared here. Do you know anything about it?" Im Pyŏngjŏng answered, "We know
nothing about it.’ Then they said, ‘We have come to make inquiry concerning it.’ Then they asked us the name of our Colonel and Im Pyōngjōng being somewhat suspicious replied, ‘The port is Ori-p’o (五里浦) and the water-gate is Taejin (大津) port.’ The foreigners again asked, ‘Is the capital far from here? Is it all right if we go and visit the city? We would like to visit your village.’ Im Pyōngjōng replied, ‘It is impossible for you to do this as our country is different from others.’ Once more the foreigners said, ‘We would like to go into the village and talk peace. Where is your home? Would you mind if we went to your home? We do not wish to inquire into your customs. How is it that you treat us as ordinary folks? In the teachings of Confucius we discover the teaching of the truth about the world. We know that truth too. Wouldn’t it be well to go and have a conversation with your teacher?’ Im Pyōngjōng made no reply to all these inquiries. Among the Koreans was a man by the name of Yi Kwangjōng, who said, ‘Are there not Americans in China teaching the Christian doctrine?’ Then the foreigners asked the Koreans if they had any eggs. ‘We will pay you for them.’ Then the foreigner took two books from his sleeve and threw them down on the sand. We refused to receive them and tossed them at him. He once more threw them at us and then got into the small boat and rowed back to the vessel. I looked at the books and discovered that one was a copy of the Gospel of Matthew and the other was the entire copy of the New Testament. Pak Chejang asked, ‘What country are you from?’ They replied, ‘We are Chinese. We came here to fish for herring and were captured by the Americans and have come on their ship.’ Then we next asked them who the foreigners were who had red hair, deep-set eyes, and prominent noses?’ They replied, ‘They are Americans.’ They once more asked the foreigners, ‘How far is it from here to Seoul? How many cities are in the country? Where is the seed for rice and cotton sown?’ The answer we gave them was, ‘Why is it that foreigners should ask
the distances to our cities and where our seeds are sown?"
Upon the conclusion of these inquiries the foreigners re-
turned to their ship.

IV. The Investigation of the Foreign Ship.

The report of the investigation of Pak Kyusu, governor of
Pyongyang, on the foreign ship made on March 28th
(Friday April 22nd), 1868. The Ch'ongnam (清南) water
guardian, Yi Kijo (李基祖) made a report on March 5th. In
the report it said, "The Interpreter in the garrison, Hong
Myonjo (洪勛祖), went to the place where the ship was an-
chored and ordered Pak Hyongch'o (朴亨初) and some
subordinates to make an investigation of the ship. Upon
their return they reported as follows:

"We started out to where the vessel was anchored but
when we had almost reached it a small boat put out from the
ship and came hastily toward us. They seized our boat and
would not allow us to go near the ship. Then we came to
O-ori-do with their small boat and anchored. By means of
Chinese characters we informed them that we very much
desired to go on board their ship. They informed us that
we would not be allowed to do so. Soon their countenance
changed and they took hold of their arms. Shortly after-
wards we heard the report of firing on the ship. They then
set sail and moved out into the channel."

V. The Investigation of the Foreign Ship.

The report of the foreign vessel by Pak Kyusu, governor of
Pyongyang, made on March 30th (Sunday April 17th).
"Between the hours of nine and eleven in the forenoon I
wrote a letter and placed it high on a pole on the shore
opposite where the ship was anchored. The foreigners came
and got the letter, answered it and placed it back on the pole.
Their communication said, "We have read the letter you
put on the pole and have answered the questions you asked
concerning our nationality and the object of our visit. We
are Americans. We are about fifty thousand li (fifteen
thousand miles) from home. Our ship is from Kwangtung and Shanghai and we sailed from Yen-t'ai (煙台) on March 15th for Korea. We have not come for the purpose of trading but to make inquiry. Three years ago one of our American merchantmen came to the mouth of the river and disappeared. We are, therefore, sending a letter of inquiry to you which we hope your local officials will forward directly to the king in Seoul. The purpose of our coming is also to express our friendship to Korea and express the hope that our two nations may ever continue in peaceful relations. Further, we desire to purchase fowls, meat, and food stuffs from your people." This was the communication. This return of the vessel was not a good omen."

VI. Matters concerning the letter despatched to the King:

On April 8th 1868, the Korean government sent a letter to the officials of the locality where the ship was anchored concerning the communication from the foreign vessel. It said, "We have investigated the matter and advise you that in case another communication is despatched to you that you reply to it in a very conciliatory manner." The government also added, "We have seen the report made by Pak Kyusu, governor of Pyongyang, in which it is stated, that a foreign vessel anchored at Samhwa, Namp'o, Piyŏn-do (三和南浦庇鎖島); that fourteen men from the ship landed on an island and, that five of them entered the village, delivered a communication and then returned to the ship. We have replied to the local officials requesting them to investigate all the details and to write them again placating them and have them go away. If they should send another communication answer them the best you can according to circumstances."

I have given all the evidence from the Korean and United States sources that are open to investigation. It might be of interest to give the findings of some writers who have made investigations along the same line. However, the writer
has no knowledge to what extent the various writers have been dependent upon each other.

**History of Korea.**

In the History of Korea by H. B. Hulbert the writer says, "In September 1866 the sailing vessel General Sherman entered the Tadong. She carried five white foreigners and nineteen Asiatics. Her ostensible object was trade. Though told that this was impossible, the foreign vessel not only did not leave, but on the contrary pushed up the river until she reached a point opposite Yangjak island, not far from the city of Pyengyang. This rash move astonished the Koreans above measure. Something desperate must be the intentions of men who would drive a ship thus to certain destruction. The Regent sent word to attack her if she did not leave at once. Then the fight began, but without effect on either side until the Koreans succeeded in setting fire to the General Sherman with fire-rafts. The officers and crew were then forced to drop into the water and were drowned. Those that reached shore were immediately hewn down by the frenzied people. No impartial student of both sides of the question can assert that the Koreans were especially blameworthy. The ship had been warned off but had ventured where no ship could go without being wrecked even were all the circumstances favorable. The Koreans could not know that this was a mere blunder. They took the vessel to be a hostile one and treated her accordingly."

**Investigation of Lieutenant Bernadon.**

"In 1884, Lieutenant T. B. Bernadon, U. S. Navy, made a journey from Seoul to Ping-an, and being able to speak Corean, learned the following from native Christians. The Sherman, arriving during the heavy mid-summer rains, which made the river impassable to native boats, was seen from the city walls, and caused great excitement. When the waters subsided the governor sent officers to inquire her mission. Unfortunately to gratify their curiosity, the com-
mon people set out in a large fleet of boats, which the Sher-
man’s crew mistook for a hostile demonstration, and fired
guns in the air to warn them off. Then all the boats re-
turned. When the river fell the Sherman grounded and
careened over, which being seen from the city walls a fleet
of boats set out with hostile intent and were fired upon.
Officers and people, now enraged, started fire-rafts, and
soon the vessel, though with white flag hoisted was in flames.
Of those who leaped into the river most were drowned. Of
those picked up one Tchoi-han-un (Rev. R. J. Thomas), who
was able to talk Corean, explained the meaning of the white
flag, and begged to be surrendered to China. His prayer
was in vain. In a few days all the prisoners were led out
and publicly executed.”

Corea The Hermit Nation.
Griffis himself says anent the matter, “The “General
Sherman” was an American schooner, owned by Meadows
and Company, a British firm in Tientsin, and reached that
port July 1866. After delivery of her cargo, an assignment
was made by the firm and owner to load her with goods
likely to be salable in Corea, such as cotton, cloth, glass,
tin-plate, etc., and despatch her there on an experimental
voyage in hope of thus opening the country to commerce.

“Leaving Tienstn July 29th, the vessel touched at Chifu,
and took on board Mr. Hogarth, a young Englishman, and a
Chinese Shroff, familiar with Corean money. The comple-
ment of the vessel was now five white foreigners and nine-
teen Malay and Chinese sailors. The owner Mr. Preston,
the Master Mr. Page, and the Mate Mr. Wilson, were Ameri-
can, the Rev. Mr. Thomas, who had learned Corean from re-
ugees at Chifu, and made a trip to Whanghai on a Chinese
junk, went on board as a passenger to improve his knowl-
edge of the language.

“The schooner, whether merchant or invader, leaving
Chifu, took a north-west direction, and made for the mouth
of the Tadong River. There they met the Chinese captain
of a Chifu junk, who agreed to pilot them up the river's mouth and sailed back to Chifu, where he was met and questioned by the firm of Meadows and Company.

No further direct intelligence was ever received from the unfortunate party. According to one report the hatches of the schooner were fastened down, after the crew had been driven beneath, and set on fire. According to another all were decapitated. The Coreans burned the wood for its iron and took the cannon for models.”

After the destruction of the General Sherman and the experience with the French off Kangwha, the Regent, (Taewŏn'gun) together with the entire Korean court, assumed a very anti-foreign attitude toward all Westerners, and also to all Koreans who were in any way conniving with them. This was unmistakably manifested in the very stringent laws which the Korean court passed to control or eradicate them, and in the tablets prepared and erected in various places in Korea against them.

One of these tablets was set up in Pyengyang and one in the city of Seoul near where the Chong-no bell now stands. The inscription on the tablets reads as follows:

“The barbarians from beyond the seas have violated our borders and invaded our land. If we do not fight we must make treaties with them. Those who favor making a treaty sell their country.”
KOREA
Ports and Batteries
Engaged by The
LAND AND WATER FORCES
OF THE
U.S. ASIATIC FLEET
JUNE 1871
U.S. Forces
Ready for Attack

ISLAND OF
KANG WHA

Scale One Mile

COMPILED FROM
FRENCH CHART NO. 261N
C. S. SURVEY JUNE 1871 AND
PHOTOGRAPHIC VIEWS BY F. BECK
BY ORDER OF
REAR ADMIRAL JOHN RODGERS, U. S. N.
TOTTEN, LIEUT., U. S. N.
REDRAWN AND ADAPTED
OMITTING SOUNDINGS
FOR
THE KOREA BRANCH
OF
THE ROYAL ASIATIC SOCIETY
Names unverified, but take a in the same room as the picture of officers with Rear Admiral Rodgers.
THE UNITED STATES KOREAN RELATIONS

Part II.

The Naval Incident Under Rear Admiral John Rodgers

A careful consideration of all the available facts concerning the loss of the General Sherman leads one to conclude that both parties concerned were more or less to blame for the unfortunate affair. The question as to which party first provoked the trouble will, I fear, always remain an open question. However, I think we ought to give the Korean side the benefit of the doubt inasmuch as the General Sherman was the aggressor.

In the communication of the King of Korea to the Board of Rites, Peking, China, September 30th, 1866, the blame for the destruction of the General Sherman is laid to the action of the crew. He said, "These magistrates answered very clearly, giving the circumstance of a strange vessel having pushed her way in the autumn of 1866, of wounds and injuries inflicted on the inhabitants, of the detention and the indignity to an officer, and of the consequent exasperations of the people, resulting in self-provoked disaster and destruction."

"If the American vessel had not abused our people how could the Korean officials and people have wished to maltreat them first."

Hon. Fredrick F. Low, United States minister to China, in his communication to Hon. Hamilton Fish, Secretary of State, on June 6th, 1871, seems to indicate that the crew of the American schooner was largely to blame for the attack and destruction of the ship and the crew. He said, "During the same year another American schooner, the Surprise, had been wrecked and become a total loss; but the officers and crew were safely sent through to China by land. This circumstance led many to believe in the truth of the stories told by the Korean officials about the wanton acts of the persons on board the Sherman, which brought down the wrath of the people upon those on board."
According to the usages of international law, the General Sherman was committing a breach of the above mentioned law, in that it was attempting to navigate the inland waters of a foreign country with which the United States, not only had no treaty, but the officers of the said vessel had been repeatedly warned by the Korean officials not to do so. Such a breach of international etiquette created an embarrassing, if not a most critical situation, for both the crew of the General Sherman and the United States government. On the other hand, such an infringement of international courtesy, did not warrant the offended power in committing such barbarous acts upon the vessel and its crew, as investigations lead us to believe were done. International law has a more just and humane way of dealing with such infractions of law. Korea, even in her isolation, could not plead ignorance as an excuse for such a cruel act.

The most deplorable thing about the matter is that there was not a single survivor of the ill-fated vessel from whom a full and accurate report could be obtained. The information upon which the final conclusion is based, comes from parties not actually engaged in the affair and who were, no doubt, in most cases, prejudiced or influenced by greatly exaggerated reports due to intense excitement and hatred. Again, the investigator must bear in mind another fact in order to understand the attitude of the Koreans at this particular time. *In 1866 the French government had sent a punitive expedition to Korea to demand satisfaction for the murder of a number of the French Catholic priests and the killing of many of their Korean converts. This expedition under Admiral Roze, though only partially successful, was still fresh in the minds of the Korean government and people and created a feeling of antipathy, if not bitter antagonism, to all Westerners. In the opinion of most of the

* Admiral Roze was in command of the French punitive expedition to Korea in October 1866, consisting of the vessels “Guerreire”, “Laplace”, “Primauguet”, “Drouled”, “Tardif”, “Lebrethon”, and “Kien-chien” with 1000 troops.
Hon. Frederick F. Low, U. S. Minister and Envoy Plenipotentiary to China, E. B. Drew, Secretary to the U. S. Legation in Peking with two Chinese interpreters.
Korean people and the officials, the expedition was a total failure, and served not only to intensify their belief in their own superiority but their self-sufficiency. The reigning Taewon’gun (regent) vowed to have nothing to do with Western countries and did his utmost to incite the whole nation into an attitude of bitter opposition to them. This is obviously seen, not only by the manner of his dealing with the representatives of Western powers, but in the erection of the tablets he had prepared and set up in Pyengyang and Seoul, to which reference has already been made.

Another fact which made it very difficult to deal directly with Korea in this matter was that she was not an independent nation, and all negotiations had to be made through China, of which Korea was then a tributary state. Such negotiations meant long delay and great embarrassment. Diplomatic negotiations with Oriental countries, such as China and Korea at the time of the General Sherman Affair, were very slow and required consummate patience, shrewd political sagacity and diplomacy of the highest order.

The wreck of the American Schooner Surprise and the destruction of the General Sherman with the murder of the entire crew, raised at least three important issues for the United States to adjust, viz., the investigation of the causes of the destruction of the American Schooner, the securing of a treaty to protect wrecked American seamen, and the consummation of a commercial treaty between the two nations.

The need for a treaty of amity to protect American seamen who might be wrecked off the dangerous Korean coasts was made imperative by the destruction of the General Sherman and the wreck of the Surprise. Cases of a similar character might arise at any time as the ships of the United States were frequently sailing the Korean waters on their way to Japan and China. In a communication from Hon. Hamilton Fish to the United States Minister to China, Hon. F. F. Low, this fact is emphasized. He said, "It has been decided to authorize negotiations to be had with the
authorities of Korea, for the purpose of securing a treaty for the protection of ship-wrecked mariners...."

The need for a treaty of commerce was very urgent. The United States had already concluded commercial treaties with Japan and China and as her ships were compelled to travel on seas in proximity to the Korean coasts, dangers to seamen and shipping were not only apparent but real. The United States minister, Hon. Fredrick F. Low, in his communication to Secretary of State, Hon. Hamilton Fish, on July 6th, 1871, said,

"The opening and rapid increase of trade with China, Japan, and Russian Manchuria, required vessels to skirt the coast of Korea in voyages and brought prominently into view the undesirability of allowing a country directly in the track of a great commerce bounded on two sides by the sea, to remain with its coasts, outlying islands and dangerous passages, totally unexplored. The Korean government would neither make these surveys itself, nor allow other nations to do it without incurring great risk."

Moreover, the United States minister argued, that his insistence upon the right to demand a commercial treaty with Korea, was not based upon any selfish motive, but upon a natural law which it was not possible for any nation to totally ignore. He said in the same communication as above mentioned,

"It will hardly be contended, I imagine, that the natural law, or the right of self-preservation, will permit any nation occupying territory bordering upon the sea to so far exclude itself from all intercourse that it will neither adopt means to survey its coasts, islands, channels, nor allow this to be done by others; nor is it consistent with the principle of humanity that an isolated nation shall be allowed to maltreat and massacre without question those whom the perils of the sea cast upon its shores."

"On the contrary, the sea is the great highway of the nations, which no country is at liberty to obstruct with impunity, and where natural obstacles and dangers exist, all governments have a right to demand that they shall be clearly defined and marked so that they may be avoided. It is also the right of all countries, which should be jealously guarded, to provide adequate means for the safety and protection of its mariners and the recovery of their property. This no nation can properly deny."
It is interesting to note the reasons given by the Korean court, in its communication to the Board of Rites in Peking, China, for its refusal to negotiate commercial treaties with foreign nations. It said:

"Heretofore, foreign nations have been in ignorance of the character and productions of this country, and we have been repeatedly pestered with applications for commercial intercourse; but that is entirely out of the question with this country, and that merchants would not find it profitable was set forth in a communication to the Board in the 5th year of T'ungchih (1866) somewhat as follows: It is universally known that our humble state is a small dependency in a corner of the sea; that the people are poor and the articles of commerce scanty; that the precious metals and the precious stones are not found here, while grain or cloth fabrics are not abundant; that the products of the country are insufficient to meet domestic wants; and if they were permitted to flow abroad, thus impoverishing us at home, this insignificant land would certainly be in extreme danger, and difficult to protect from ruin; furthermore, that the habits of the people are sparing and plain, the workmanship poor and crude; and that we have not a single article worthy of commerce with foreign nations."

"The constant wish for commercial intercourse, while the utter impossibility of this country's entrance into relations of trade, and the unprofitableness of it all to foreign merchants, are such as above described, is no doubt to be ascribed to the want of full knowledge on the part of the people of remote countries on the subject."

"Now although this letter of the American envoy has not spoken out fully, yet it asks for an official to consult and arrange (business) effecting both countries, it most likely alludes to this sort of thing, (viz. commercial intercourse.) As the rescue and forwarding of shipwrecked crews is provided for by existing laws it is unnecessary to take further trouble to make a fixed arrangement."

The communications of Hon. George F. Seward, to Hon. William H. Seward on April 24th, May 25th, July 3rd, and October 14th, 1868, indicate very clearly the urgent need of treaties with Korea.

In an attempt to solve the several issues raised between Korea and the United States, Hon. George Seward, Consul General at Shangnai, China, urged Hon. William Seward Secretary of State at Washington D. C., to appoint a commission with power to proceed to Seoul and negotiate directly
with the Korean court, rather than attempt to do it by diplomatic correspondence, which owing to the circumstances, could at best be only very slow and unsatisfactory.

Hon. George Seward, in his communication to Washington, D. C., April 24th, 1868, said,

"I propose, therefore, in case the proposed mission be concluded on, and it shall seem desirable, upon the receipt of your instructions, that authority be given to me to request of Admiral Rowan the use of two vessels of war, to employ one or more interpreters, and to proceed to Corea in order to ask an official explanation of the Sherman Affair, and to negotiate, if possible, a treaty of amity and commerce similar to those now existing with China and Japan, and such other lesser treaty as may be expedient and attainable without exercise or show of force."

The constitution of such a mission as was proposed engaged the attention and thought of the United States representatives, both in China and the United States. A commission empowered with authority to make such important treaties as were suggested, demanded men of wide experience in statecraft and foreign diplomacy. The personnel of this mission was even suggested by Hon. George Seward, in his communication to Washington D. C., October 14th, 1868. He said;

"A mission, then, such as the one I have indicated, will require a cordial co-operation with the Navy. Admiral Rowan has himself proposed to me that authority and instructions in joint names to prosecute the mission shall be applied for."

"I am disposed to think it desirable, if a mission is sent to Corea, that it should be provided with a number of vessels. Reasons are so obvious that I will not dwell to review them. But of course I contemplate only the display of force, not its use, and not intimations that it be used."

Also in the same communication of Hon. George F. Seward to the Secretary of State, Hon. William H. Seward, concerning the propriety of despatching such a mission to Korea, he says,

"The first object of a mission would be to procure information of the loss or destruction of the American schooner General Sherman, and in case the wrongful treatment of the crew proves correct, indemnity or satisfaction therefor — All other efforts to procure
This was the flag-ship of Admiral Rodgers. It was a screw steam frigate of 3,032 tons, 45 guns, built at Norfolk Navy Yard and launched in 1856. It had three masts rigged with sails. Steam was the auxiliary power.
information have hitherto resulted not altogether satisfactorily, and there seems no way to procure perfect information except by direct communication with the Korean government."

"The second object is to obtain a treaty. I have hesitated to say that there is an adequate object to render it perfectly desirable to procure a general commercial treaty—. But all my reflections lead me to believe that it will be well for us to make the attempt."

"In the third place, whether a general treaty is desirable or not, there can, in my opinion, be no question of the need of one that shall provide for the safety of seamen and others wrecked or driven on the Korean coast. Indeed we can hardly consent that it shall remain peculiarly dangerous to our navigation."

By April, 1870, matters had so crystalized that the appointment of such a mission had actually been decided upon. The time of the visit of the mission to Korea had not been fixed, but was to be left to the judgment of those composing the mission. In the meantime, Admiral Rowan had been relieved of the command of the Far Eastern Fleet in 1869 and Rear Admiral John Rodgers appointed to succeed him. Rear Admiral Rodgers sailed from New York, April 9th, 1869, with the U. S. S. Colorado, his flagship, and the U. S. S. Alaska.

It is not out of place here to speak of the new Admiral. He was born in 1812, the son of John Rodgers, a naval officer. He was a graduate of the U. S. Naval Academy and entered the navy as a midshipman in 1828. He saw service in the Seminole War. During the years 1852-1855 he commanded government exploring expeditions to the North Pacific and Arctic Oceans. He served on the iron-clads during the Civil War where he distinguished himself with marked valor and chivalrous courage. He was a veteran in war and naval science. It is also said of him that he was possessed of rare judgment, and knew the exact moment to supplement diplomacy with force. He was in the prime of life when he took command of the Far Eastern Fleet and was considered as one of the foremost naval men of his age.

Rear Admiral Rodgers arrived in Shanghai during September 1869, at a time of great anxiety and unrest in China,
owing to the massacre of French nuns at Tien Sien and the threatened anti-foreign uprising. It is said that his arrival with the Fleet inspired confidence and a feeling of security in the minds of the foreign residents in Shanghai and other places in China.

Hon. Fredrick F. Low in a communication to Hon. Hamilton Fish, Secretary of State, July 16th, 1870, issued this statement, "I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your No. 9, with enclosures, instructing me to proceed, at such a time as may be convenient with the Admiral commanding the Asiatic Squadron, to Corea, for the purpose of negotiating a treaty for the protection of ship-wrecked sailors, and, if practicable, to secure commercial advantages also."

Also the Secretary of State, Hon. Hamilton Fish, in his communication to Hon. Fredrick F. Low, American minister to China, wrote,

"It has been decided to authorize negotiations to be had with the authorities of Corea, for the purpose of securing a treaty for the protection of ship-wrecked mariners, and to instruct the conduct of the negotiations to you—"

"Admiral Rodgers will receive instructions, a copy of which has been forwarded you in my No. 8 from the Navy Department, to place at your disposal accommodation on the flag-ship, and to accompany you himself upon this mission, with a display of force adequate to support the dignity of this government."

"In arranging the item for carrying out these instructions, it is also desirable, if possible, to secure the presence and co-operation of Consul General Seward, who has great experience in oriental character, and who has made a study of this question. It is not supposed here that you will be able to comply with these instructions before next year, in which case Mr. Seward will be at his post."

"The department relies upon you, in fulfilling these instructions, to exercise prudence and discretion, to maintain firmly the right of the United States to have their seamen protected, to avoid conflict by force unless it cannot be avoided without dishonor, and to seek in all proper ways the harmonious and friendly assistance of the Chinese government."

In compliance with Hon. Hamilton Fish's request that the American minister secure the good offices of the Chinese
On board the Alaska. At the head of the companionway stands Lieutenant Snow a portion of whose diary has been furnished by his wife who is still living, in Brookline, Mass.
government in the proposed mission to negotiate with Korea we have the following correspondence:

"In relation to this request we may observe, that although Korea is regarded as a country subordinate to China, yet she is wholly independent in everything that relates to her government, religion, and her laws; in none of these has China hitherto interfered. It was necessary, therefore, in order to forward your despatch, for the Foreign Office to present a memorial, requesting that it might be transferred to the Board of Rites to be sent on; but we previously stated to you, that it is impossible to determine now whether the Korean authorities will return an answer."

"On the 12th instant we memoralized the throne requesting that the Board of Rites might be allowed to write a despatch to accompany this letter to be forwarded to Corea, and notified that board at the same time. We have now received an answer from the board, stating that on the 23rd of this month His Majesty had been informed that this despatch, carefully sealed, had that day been transmitted to the board of war to be sent on by its couriers."

This communication was signed by several Chinese officials as is evidenced by the document in the appendix.

Following out the instructions of the United States government in the matter of the constitution of the mission to negotiate with Korea, Rear Admiral Rodgers, Hon. Fredrick F. Low, and Consul General Seward met in Peking during November, 1870, to consult as to the constitution, time, and method of carrying out the object of the mission.

The result of the conference was a decision to despatch the mission to Korea; the time to be left to the discretion of the American Ambassador and the Admiral. Hon. Low in his communication to Mr. Fish, said,

"It seemed very desirable to select a favorable season for the visit to the coast of Corea, of which so little is known, and at the same time it was my desire to so arrange it as to interfere as little as possible with the plans of the Admiral and the requirements of naval forces in other places."

"In order that the Coreans may not have any grounds on which to base technical objections, I have, most respectfully, to request that a commission may be sent, by the steamer leaving San Francisco not later than the 1st of March next (1871), authorizing me to negotiate on behalf of the United States such a treaty, or treaties with the government of Corea as may be deemed advisable."
The personnel of the mission, when finally decided upon, consisted of the American Minister to Peking, Hon. Fredrick F. Low, Acting Secretary of the Legation, E. B. Drew, Assistant Secretary of the Legation, John P. Cowles as interpreter, together with two Chinese interpreters. Rear Admiral Rodgers, Commander of the Far Eastern Fleet, was to represent the Navy.

I should mention the fact that Hon. Fredrick F. Low, the Ambassador to China at Peking, was appointed by the United States government to head up this important mission to Korea. He was a man of wide experience in statescraft, having served one term in the United States Congress, and had been governor of California from 1864-1868. President U. S. Grant appointed him Ambassador to China in 1869, the same year as Rear Admiral Rodgers had been appointed to the command of the Far Eastern Fleet, to succeed Admiral Rowan who was retiring.

Rear Admiral Rodgers issued orders to the squadron that was to proceed to Korea, to assemble in the harbor of Nagasaki in May of 1871. The squadron was to consist of the gun-boats, Monocacy and Palos, the corvettes Benicia and Alaska, and the flag-ship Colorado. These vessels were of the antiquated type and in comparison with modern war-craft very inferior. A description and photo of each vessel is given in this paper. The Koreans made some attempt, in their crude way, to describe them. They said,

"Three of the ships had three masts each while two had two each. The largest of the five had four stories (decks) and was about 24 pal high. It had fifteen rooms on each story."

"On April 12th, (May 30th) five ships, pouring out black smoke passed by the fort and were carefully observed. One of them was about 40 pal long and poured out water on the right and left sides. It was about four kil high. The forth ship had three masts and was very little different from the third. Each of the ships had a flag flying from the stern."

In compliance with the Admiral's order, the fleet assembled in Nagasaki harbor, as pre-arranged. In a communication, the Hon. Fredrick F. Low, on board the flagship
This was a tug of 350 tons, carrying 6 howitzers, built in 1886. It was a screw tug fitted with two masts and rigged with sails. This vessel took the leading part in the attacking expedition and in the attack upon the Korean forts, June 10th and 11th. Commander H. C. Blake, in charge of the expedition against the forts was on this vessel. The vessel took an active part in storming the forts on June 11th and ran upon a ledge of rocks and was badly damaged.
On Tuesday, May 23rd, the squadron arrived at Eugenie Island, Ipp’a-do, (立波島) in Prince Jerome Gulf (牙山灣) off Asan. This is the first appearance of the Fleet off the Korean coast. The arrival of the vessels is verified by the Koreans in their Unofficial History (朝鮮野史) which says, "The governor of Kyŏnggi province reported, that the Prefect of Inchŏn (仁川) had communicated to him the information that on April 6th (May 26th), five strange looking ships entered the Tori sea (道里海) and one of them approached direct from the sea to P’almi-do (八尾島)."

On the 8th of the 4th month, (May 27th) the Prefect of Namyang, Sin Ch’ŏlgŭ (申轟求) reported:

"According to a statement of the Prefect of Inchon, five ships appeared about 5 P.M. on April 8th, (May 26) and anchored between the islands of Chemul (濟物) and Pungdok (豊德). Three of the vessels had three masts each and two had only two each. One of the ships came very near to the island of Yonghung (靈興島), Namyang (南陽) county, early on the morning of the 6th of the 4th month (May 24th), while two small boats surveyed the depth of the water in the small estuaries, finally departing for the island of Wanju."

It was while the fleet was anchored near the vicinity of Namyang prefecture that the American ambassador sent his first communication to the local official. In the correspondence of the American minister to Homer C. Blake, on board the flagship Colorado, we quote the following: "Herewith I beg to hand you a sealed letter written in Chinese and directed to the King of Corea, which I desire you to forward to its destination by an official of the highest rank you may meet, if you find such a course practicable."

We have no evidence in the correspondence of the members of the mission that this communication was delivered to an official at Namyang. However, in a reply brought by Koreans to the flagship Colorado on May 30th, we find this notation: "A day or two since, on the transmission of your honorable missive to Namyang-bu, the court for the first time recognized that your honorable ships are (the ones) sent from America to enter our humble confines."
We got a fresh breeze from the N. W. and a very rough sea on the 17th, in which the Monocacy was somewhat damaged, and on the following day, the 18th she obtained permission to make the best of her way to anchorage and bore up under the land for smoother water.”

“At 6:00 P. M. of the 19th Inst. the fleet came to anchor off the Ferrières islands which had been appointed as a rendezvous in case we should be obliged to separate. We found the Monocacy at anchor here.”

Although the Admiral was in possession of the nautical surveys made by the French, they were not fully adequate, and in some instances, possibly incorrect. The squadron moved with great caution owing to the dangerous shoals, treacherous currents, fast running tides, numerous islands, and hidden rocks, of which the sea off the western coast of Korea abounds.

These charts were mere reconnaissances, made from time to time by vessels happening near the coast. The islands, headlands, bays, and rivers, marked on the charts bore French names, but in all instances the locations were found to be incorrect.

After the fleet left Nagasaki on Tuesday May 16th, we have no more information as to its whereabouts in the correspondence of the American ambassador or the Admiral until it reached the Ferrières islands, on Friday evening, May the 16th. However, in the diary of Lieut. A. S. Snow, we have quite a good account of the movement of the Fleet from Nagasaki to Eugenie Island. He said:

“On the 21st of May we got under way and steamed for the mouth of the Han-Kang River in line ahead, Monocacy leading, followed by the Palos, Benicia, Alaska, and Colorado, each vessel signalling the sounding which we found not to vary much from those of the French survey. At 3:15 P. M., it being very foggy, the Colorado fired a gun as a signal to anchor, and we anchored in 27 fathoms. On the 23rd inst. the fleet got under way at 9:15 A. M. and moved slowly up the river, taking soundings every five minutes. At 12:20 we steamed into the eastern side of the fairway and came to anchor on the following bearings. Chapeau Island NW 1/2 and N; Oliveir SW 2/3 W. We hauled fires intending to remain here until the boats made a further survey of the river.”
U. S. S. S. BENICIA AND ALASKA.

These were sister ships. They were wooden screw steamers, ship rigged, of 1,122 tons, 12 guns; length 250 ft. 6 in., beam 38 ft., depth 19 ft. 2 in., commissioned in 1869. These ships were described by the Koreans. The Commander of the Alaska was H. C. Blake and the Commander of the Benicia was Lewis A. Kimberley.
It seems that the Prefect of Namyang, Sin Ch'ölgù had communicated with the fleet while it was in the vicinity of Eugenie Island. In the Unofficial History it says; "The official of Namyang, Sin Ch'ölgù, made an inquiry concerning the presence of the fleet. He wanted to know when it had arrived, the object of its coming, and when it expected to leave. This letter was sent to the American minister, Hon. Fredrick F. Low."

The movements and operations of the fleet after its arrival at Eugenie Island can be quite clearly followed by the correspondence of the Admiral and the various members of the mission, together with the information gathered from The Unofficial History.

The anchorage at Eugenie Island was known as Roze Roads. It was named after Roze, the French admiral, who had led a punitive expedition to Korea in 1866. It is necessary to keep this fact in mind for without it it will be impossible to follow, with any accuracy, the movements of the American fleet from this point. Some have been inclined to locate Roze Roads at Chemulpo near Roze Island. This, however, is inaccurate.

On May 24th, the next day after the arrival of the Fleet at Eugenie Island, (Ipp’a-do) the Admiral decided to send a surveying expedition to the North. This was composed of the Palos accompanied by four steam launches under the command of Captain H. C. Blake. This reconnoitring party was to proceed to the North and make a survey of the waters, shore line, etc. Captain Blake, was accompanied by J. P. Cowles, Chinese interpreter, and assistant Secretary of the Legation in Peking. In the communication of Hon. F. F. Low to Hon. Fish, May 31st, on board the flagship Colorado off Boisée Island, he said;

"When we reached Eugenie Island the Palos and four steam launches were sent northward to sound the channels as far as the point. They met with no resistance, nor was any attempt made by the natives to communicate with either the launches or the vessels."
"Captain Blake of the U. S. S. Alaska was placed in command of the party. Also John P. Cowles, Jr., assistant Secretary of the Legation, was sent as interpreter. While laying at the anchorage, near Eugenie Island, boats were sent out sounding in the immediate vicinity. The first day the natives fled to the hills upon the approach of the boats to the shore."

The surveying party steamed slowly to the North chartering the channel and the waters adjacent to the coast. Quite an extensive survey was made in the Gulf I’Imperatrice and the comments on this are very interesting, if not illuminating. In the correspondence of John P. Cowles to the United States minister, Hon. F. F. Low, he says;

"I have to report that, in obedience to your instructions, I accompanied Captain Blake in charge of a surveying expedition up towards the mouth of the Salie River, leaving on the morning of the 24th, on S. S. Palos, and with four fully equipped steam launches, reached Boisé Island at noon of the 26th, and found there a fine harbor equal to all requirements. It was ascertained upon the trip up, by the thorough investigation of the commander of the launches, that the Gulf I’Imperatrice is a shoal bay, which though reaching far in towards Seoul, would cross much less elevated land than generally prevails, is yet too shoal to admit vessels of light draft. Numerous junks were observed in the N. E. of this gulf, and it is surmised that in that neighborhood lies the approach to Jenchuan, a place which should by the map, be not less important officially than Kangwha, and can lie but five miles or more from Boisé. It is thought by good judges that the track of ships approaching the Seoul river from the southwards will henceforward not make the Ferrieres Islands as their first land, but instead run for Round Island about five miles below Boisé Island. The launches were in some cases shouted at by the natives, some displaying bows and arrows, some matchlocks, but the greater part of the population were unarmed, and showed alarm by retreating to the clumps of trees on the hill tops. The islands were, only in exceptional cases wooded, and water seemed not very abundant. The Tache Blanche, four miles below Roze Island, was visited at low water and declared to show many indications of iron. The French charts were found remarkably accurate, except that not all the barriers to seaward can be substantiated. The navigation in clear weather would be very easy. The water there is still salt supporting the sobriquet given by the French of Salt River."

"The surveying expedition reached the vicinity of Boisé Island on May 26 as evinced by the communication from which I have just
U. S. S. "Alaska" sister ship of the "Penedia". Lieut. A. S. Snow was an officer on this vessel.
quoted which definitely stated that the vessels reached the island on the 26th. Although we have no definite information confirming the fact that the vessels must have made some surveys in the immediate vicinity of Boisée Island, certain statements or suggestions in the communication would lead us to definitely conclude that they did. One paragraph in this communication says:

"We saw no indication of fortifications until we reached Boisée; This island and Roze island, a narrow passage of a mile and a half existing between the mainland and the large island Tung Jhong (Young jong) to the west. On the east of this island—Tung Jong—, is the village with rather Japanese like wall, with a sea-front of perhaps a mile and a half. The wall is perhaps 15 ft. high, but not apparently, thick."

"The inhabitants were spying at us from hiding places about the wall, as we came before the place with our decks cleared for action. The next morning, May 27th, the alarm had spread; men were coming in from the neighborhood, and some 200 troops or armed citizens, paraded under military Mandrins, armed with sharpened wooden lances, banners etc.—. On the morning of the third day, 27th, at Boisée, as we left there seemed little or no excitement. A few curious people were peeping at the vessels from behind corners of houses in the village and those who moved more to the front and into our view were warned back by Mandrins. The walls were without guns so far as we could see."

The surveying expedition having completed its work, as per instructions of Admiral Rogers, begun its return journey on the 27th of May and reached the rendezvous of the fleet at Roze Roads on the evening of the 28th. The fleet then moved on towards the new anchorage decided upon by the Admiral, Boisée Island, (Chagak-to) on the 29th. However, owing to a dense fog which had settled down obscuring all vision of land or sea, the fleet anchored a few miles below Boisée Island, and waited until the next day when the fog lifted, and made it possible for the fleet to proceed and anchor between Boisée and Guerriere Islands. This position was much more protected from the storm than Roze Roads. It was from this rendezvous that the operations against the Kangwha forts were directed.

Lieutenant A. S. Snow of the Alaska in one of the surveying launches, gives quite a vivid account of this first
surveying expedition from Roze Roads to Boisée Island. He says:

"On the 24th the Palos with all the steam launches of the fleet, Captain Blake in charge of the party, left the fleet on surveying duty. In our launch were Chester and myself and we were given the channels inside the islands to explore. The Benicia's steam launch with H. S. Baker and S. Schroeder took the same route. The Palos with the Colorado's launches with W. W. Meade and G. M. Totten in charge, took the main channel and we were to join them after making the detour of the islands. We found that the French charts were only accurate in describing the islands on either side of the main channel, as we found many of them not laid down. We passed very near to some of the islands, especially in going through one narrow channel and saw a number of natives, but they were evidently only fishermen and gave us no trouble perhaps because our little twelve pounder was mounted very conspicuously in the bows.

On the afternoon of this day we were left high and dry on the flats for several hours, the Benicia's launch, waiting for us in the channel, only a few yards distant. Towards dusk we steamed into the main channel where we found the Palos at anchor with the other launches put up on board her for the night. We had to stow close but enjoyed the novelty none the less for that reason—continued surveying on the 25th, 26th, and 27th inst. returning to the Palos each night. We encountered some very rough weather for the launches, but succeeded in finishing the main channel as far as Boisée Island where it was intended to bring the fleet for anchorage during the negotiations for a treaty. We passed one small fort just before reaching Boisées (probably on the Island of Yongjong) but to all appearance it was not manned and made no opposition to our progress. On the 28th the Palos got under way, taking the launches in tow, and returned to the fleet, where we arrived at 9:30 P. M. and were the lions of the evening until we had related our adventures."

A report from the Chosen Yasa (Unofficial History of Korea) verifies the account of the American fleet that made its final anchorage between the islands of Boisée (Chagakto) (苟藥島) and Guerriere (Ul-do 禦島) on May 30th, in the following words:

"A report from the Yongjong fortress stated, that on April 12th (May 29th) about 2 P. M. five ships, pouring out black smoke passed by the fort……" The vessels anchored in the following order: the first at the landing nearest Pup'yong (富坪) and then
A reply to this communication was made by Mr. Cowles at the order of the American minister, explaining the presence of the squadron and requesting the Korean government to despatch a minister to interview the American envoy and the admiral.

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"The inhabitants were spying at us from hiding places about the wall, as we came before the place with our decks cleared for action. The next morning, May 27th, the alarm had spread; men were coming in from the neighborhood, and some 200 troops or armed citizens, paraded under military mandarins, armed with sharpened wooden lances, banners etc.—On the morning of the third day, 17th, at Boisée, as we left there seemed little or no excitement. A few curious people were peeping at the vessels from behind corners of houses in the village and those who moved more to the front and into our view were warned back by the mandarins. The walls were without guns so far as we could see."

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one after the other, the fifth and last being near Ho-do (虎島).
When the last ship let down its anchor it made a sound like that of
cannonading."

Rear Admiral Rodgers in his report on June 6th, 1871,
to the Navy Department, Washington D. C., made this
statement concerning the new anchorage;

"On Monday May 29th, the fleet got under way and pro-
ceeded, but was compelled to anchor some miles below
Boisée Island, owing to a thick fog which came up and hid
the land from view. On May 30th, the fog dispersed by a
breeze, we proceeded and anchored in the afternoon between
Boisée Island and Guerriere Island."

Lieutenant A. S. Snow, an officer on the U. S. Alaska,
in his diary said concerning the movement of the fleet from
Roze Roads; "At 11 A. M. on the 29th instant the fleet got
under way and moved up the river in inverse order, signal-
ning soundings, but were obliged to come to anchor about
2:30 P. M. on account of fog. At 2 P. M. on the 30th, the
fleet again got under way and this time succeeded in reach-
ing the Boisée anchorage where we finally moored about 6
P. M. having been obliged to shift anchorage once; The
Colorado just below us, Benicia above and the Monocacy and
Palos in toward Boisée Island."

On the same day the fleet reached its new anchorage
four Koreans came to the Colorado with a communication
purporting to have come from the high officials of the gov-
ernment. It was written in Chinese and read as follows:

"A day or two since, on the transmission of your honorable
missive from Namyang-bu, the Court for the first time recognized
that your honorable ships sent from America to enter our humble
confines. Whereupon the officers (who are the writers of this) were
sent forward to ask particulars (of your mission). Your vessels lie
at anchor out in the sea, and as ours are not used to going to and
from in the stormy waves, we remain temporarily on the seashore of
Inc’un-bu. We first make this announcement and wait for a few
words in reply."

4th moon, 12th day (May 30th, 1871).
"A report from the Yŏngjong Fortress stated, that, on April the 12th, (May 30th) about 2 P. M. five ships, pouring out black smoke passed by the fort...." The vessels anchored in the following order: The first at the landing nearest Pup'yŏng (富坪) and then one after the other, the fifth and last being near Ho-do (虎島) Tiger Island. When the last ship let down its anchor it made a sound like that of cannonading."

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anchor between Boisée and Guerriere Islands. This position was much more protected from the storms than Roze Roads. It was from this rendezvous that the operations against the Kangwha forts were directed.

Lieut. A. S. Snow of the Alaska, in one of the surveying launches, gives us quite a vivid account of this first surveying expedition from Roze roads to Boisée Island. He says:

"On the 24th the Palos, with all the steam-launches of the fleet, (Captain Blake in charge of the party) left the fleet on surveying duty. In our launch were Chester and myself and we were given the channels inside the islands to explore. The Benicia's steam-launch with H. S. Baker and S. Schroeder took the same route. The Palos with the Colorado's launches with W. W. Meade and G.M. Totten in charge, took the main channel and we were to join them after making the detour of the islands. We found that the French charts were only accurate in describing the islands on either side of the main channel, as we found many of them not laid down. We passed very near to some of the islands, especially in going through one narrow channel and saw a number of natives, but they were evidently only fishermen and gave us no trouble—perhaps as our little twelve pounder was mounted very conspicuously in the bows. On the afternoon of this day we were left high and dry on the flats for several hours, the Benicia's launch, waiting for us in the channel, only a few yards distant. Towards dusk we steamed into the main channel where we found the Palos at anchor with the other launches put up on board her for the night. Had to stow close but enjoyed the novelty none the less for that reason—continued surveying on 25th, 26th, and 27th inst. returning to the Palos each night. We encountered some very rough weather for the launches, but succeeded in finishing the main channel as far as Boisée Island where it was intended to bring the fleet for anchorage during the negotiations for a treaty. We passed one small fort just before reaching Boisée Island (probably on the Id. of Yongjong) but to all appearance it was not manned and made no opposition to our progress. On the 28th the Palos got under way, taking launches in tow, and returned to the fleet, where we arrived at 9.30 P. M. and were the lions of the evening until we had related our adventures."

A report from the Chosun (Unofficial History) verifies the account that the fleet made its final anchorage between the islands of Boisée (chagyak-to 荏薬島) and Guerriere (Ul-do 蔚島) on May 30th, in the following words:
Korean minor official and servant who visited our vessels.
A reply to this communication was made by Mr. Cowles at the order of the American minister, explaining the presence of the squadron and requesting the Korean government to despatch a minister to interview the envoy and the admiral.

On May 31st, eight officers of inferior rank arrived at the anchorage of the Colorado, and requested an interview with the American envoy and the admiral. Upon learning that they were men of inferior rank, and did not truly represent the Korean government, the American ambassador and the admiral refused to interview them but ordered the secretary, Mr. E. A. Drew to receive them and show them around the ship.

Mr. Drew informed these minor officials of the purpose of the United States government in coming to Korea and assured them that the object of the visit was entirely friendly and non-aggressive and that no Koreans would be molested unless they first assaulted the Americans. They were also given to understand that a survey of the waters and the shore line would be made in the interests of science and requested the Koreans not to molest the surveying parties as they passed up and down the rivers, and to inform the Koreans of these intentions. Mr. Drew also told these officials that no attempt would be made to survey the waters until after 24 hours in order to give the Koreans time to be duly informed of the matter. When the officials made no objections to these requests it was taken for granted that their consent was given, and the admiral ordered such surveys to be made while further negotiations were pending.

Acting upon the instructions given in the interview with the minor Korean officials who visited the S. S. Colorado on the 31st, Admiral Rodgers immediately organized the expedition that was to make the survey of the Salee River which empties into the bay. This was to be composed of the S. S. Monocacy under Commander McCrea, S. S. Palos under Commander Lieutenant C. H. Rockwell; the Colorado's steam launch, Lieut. W. W. Meade; Colorado's steam
cutter, Lieutenant G. M. Totten; Benicia's steam launch, Master S. Schroeder: all under Commander H. C. Blake. The instructions given to Captain Blake by Hon. Frederick F. Low, the American envoy, were very explicit as is shown by his letter.

The expedition set out from the rendezvous of the fleet about noon on the first of June, 1871. The Palos and Monocacy were preceded by the four steam launches which charted the channel and took the soundings of the waters. The procedure was naturally slow owing to the total ignorance of the channel and the nature of the uncharted waters. We are told that no resistance was met with until after the expeditions had passed Fort Palos (Sondolmok) and Kwang-sŏng Fort (Fort McKee) and masked batteries. Here the river makes a very sharp curve and narrows down to about 300 feet wide, in which is a very dangerous whirlpool. Navigation is always dangerous, even to small craft, owing to the heavy tide which rushes through this narrow neck at a very rapid pace. In Griffis' Korea The Hermit Nation, and in the United States Diplomatic Correspondence, this point is given as Fort DuConde but this must evidently be an error. Fort DuConde is far below this point.

Mr. Cowles who was with the surveying expedition gives a vivid and accurate account of this engagement and I take the privilege of quoting him here.

"Going northerly upon the river, we passed numerous forts to the left on islands, and to the right on the mainland. At 2 P. M. we were passing around and below of land to the east of our generally northerly direction (Sondolmok). As we were entering a whirlpool as bad as that of Hell Gate, New York, full of eddies and ledges, and immediately under a fort (Kwangsongjin on the end of the elbow above mentioned, mats and screens were suddenly alive with the discharge of 80 pieces of artillery into the launches which were under the forts. The launches, as fast as the whirls and eddies allowed turned their howitzers to the forts and the Monocacy's eight inch shell frightened the men in the batteries so much that they fled precipitately, and wrenching up their innumerable flags and standards, retreated to ravines and brush cover, further back on the neck of the peninsula."
"The launches and gun boats were swept rapidly past to above and to the rear of the batteries. There they anchored, and leisurely shelled the forts and ravines near."

"The Benicia's launch, Master Schrorder, being delayed by accident, was later in reaching the forts. Instead of avoiding the almost certain fate which running the batteries threatened, he pressed through to join his comrades above the fort, firing as he passed. They came through without harm, though they were met with the splash of the water about them."

"The Monocacy having struck a ledge, and leaking, the further pursuit of the survey had to be postponed, and the party returned to the fleet at Boisée Island. The few shells thrown into the forts as we returned elicited no reply. The scientific character of the expedition had prevented orders being given to cover such an emergency. The party was therefore forced to return without spiking the guns and bringing away the headquarters flag of the enemy, as all were eager to be permitted to do."

"Some two hundred discharges of light and heavy guns must have been made in the ten minutes that the launches were beneath the forts, and how the launches escaped with only two wounded seems marvellous. The guns were noticed as we returned, and "lay nearly as thick together as gun to gun, and gun behind gun on the place of the ordinance store."

The American envoy, Hon. Frederick F. Low, in reporting the engagement to the Secretary of State, Hon. Hamilton Fish, said:

"That the attack was unprovoked and wanton and without the slightest shadow of excuse, must be apparent to you as it is to me; for all our operations hitherto have been conducted with the greatest caution, in the hope that the assurances of our peaceful intentions which were sent to the court from Peking, supplemented by similar protestations here, and coupled with absence of all ostentatious show of war, would so fully persuade the government of our good faith as the result aimed at might be accomplished without the use of even the display of force."

This may seem to be good logic from the American minister's view-point but it was certainly an unfortunate conclusion. The presence of an alien armed force in the vicinity of a fortified and prohibited zone of another country without its permission, and with which the invading force had no treaty of any kind, was in itself, a challenge to war. I maintain that the Koreans who fired upon the American
Looking slightly north-easterly through twisting, tide-swept estuary leading to the mouth of the Han River. The point of land in the very center of the picture extends out in a long and dangerous reef around which shipping has to creep far to the right. In the left center is Fort McKee. It lies directly above the right hand one of two trees beneath which soldiers are standing. On the high bluff in the right center is seen some military works which our men named Fort Palos. It was just as the Monocacy and Palos were rounding this point that the batteries on the left fired upon them on June 1st. It was just above the bush, in the fore center, that the Monocacy lay when she was bombarding the fort as our troops stormed it from the West, on June 12th.
vessels were only doing their duty as soldiers intrusted with
the responsibility of guarding their nation’s gateway. They
only did what soldiers of any civilized nation would have
done under similar conditions.

The Prefect of Pup’yông, in his communication to the
United States minister said;

“You criticize me because I did not forward your communica-
tion to the King so I must make an explanation. In the first place
your vessels should have anchored in a place where vessels are sup-
posed to anchor and be received. Instead, your ships entered the
narrow, our fortified zone, thus compelling our troops to fire upon
them. We are very sorry about the matter. Your vessels entered
this zone, killed and injured many of our people. Our court is
very much surprised at this act and does not believe, under these
conditions, that you have come upon a peaceful mission. It would
be impossible now to forward a letter to the court. It would be a
breach of etiquette to do so, and I would be very seriously reprim-
anded for it.”

In the communication of General Cheng, guardian of
Kangwha prefecture, of June 6th, 1871. he says;

“The barriers of defense of a country are important places,
within which it is not allowable for foreign vessels to make their
way (without previous understanding).”

“This is the fixed rule of all nations. Hence it was the ascent
(of the river) to the sea-gate by your vessels the other day that
brought on the engagement between us. As you say your intentions
in coming (to this country) are good it is much to be regretted it
should have occurred.”

In the questioning of one of the Korean prisoners cap-
tured during the engagement at Kwangwha fortress on June
11th, he said when asked why the soldiers fired upon the
American vessels; “We did not fire upon the ships until
they entered the fortified zone. After they had done this
the only thing left for us to do as patriots, was to fire upon
the vessels, and try to prevent them from passing our na-
tion’s gateway. We only did our duty.”

This act of armed violence made further peace negotia-
tions impossible. The object of the mission had already been
checked and the only question now remaining for solution
was how to get satisfaction for the insult to the American flag. Hon. Frederick F. Low in his communication to Hon. Hamilton Fish, Secretary of State, said:

"Our peaceful operations looking to the opening of negotiations with Corea met with a sudden and unexpected check yesterday. The events of yesterday convince me that the government of Corea is determined to resist all innovations and intercourse with all the power at its command, without regard to nationality or the nature of the demands made; and that all overtures will be treated alike, whether they look to the opening of the country and residence and trade of foreigners, or whether they are confined, as I have endeavored, to securing humane treatment for our unfortunate countrymen who may be thrown by the perils of the sea upon these shores, whose safety and welfare depend, under present circumstances, upon the magnanimity of the semi-barbarians and hostile race."

"The only question now is, what is a safe and prudent course to pursue, in view of the temporary check."

"My own view is that a sufficient force should be sent back to the place where the vessels were attacked yesterday, to take and effectively destroy the fortifications above that place as far as the northerly end of the island of Kangwha. This the admiral expects to do, provided he finds his forces are able to do it without incurring too much risk."

"It is quite impossible to foretell what course events in the future may compel me to pursue—. But when the representative of the government, and upon a peaceful mission in the interest of humanity, is met by uncalled for attack, as has been the case here, any hesitation on my part in sanctioning the seeking of redress for the wrongs and insults which we have suffered might properly be set down as shrinking from a responsibility, which I have no right to do, with the vast interests intrusted to my care."

Rear Admiral Rodgers and the American minister, Hon. Frederick F. Low, concurred in the opinion that the government could not tamely submit to insult and injury without seriously compromising its dignity and that reparation must be demanded. Nevertheless, the use of force at their command should not be contemplated further than the redress of wrongs and insults; namely the capture and destruction of the defensive works and forces that had insulted the flag. However, before such action should be taken, an oppor-
Koreans on board our vessels. Captives—some of them wounded.
tunity ought to be given for the Korean government to make a disavowal of the responsibility for the attack and offer an apology for the same. In the note of the Hon. Frederick F. Low to Hon. Hamilton Fish anent this matter he said; “The local official and his superior, the governor of Kangwha, were informed that a disavowal of the responsibility for the outrage was expected from the government, and that, to enable this to be done, a reasonable time would be allowed; and it was clearly intimated that the failure of the government to comply with this reasonable demand would leave the admiral at liberty to pursue such a course as he might deem proper to obtain redress.”

A respite of ten days was decided upon by the admiral and the Korean authorities were so informed. It was during these ten days that we have a number of communications from the local authorities to the American ambassador and a reply from the former to the latter. I have given all the communications which passed between both parties in the appendix of this paper. The translations of the letters from the Unofficial Korean History confirm the validity of these communications.

A letter was fixed on a pole erected on Guerriere Island on the morning of June 3rd. While there was no name attached to the communication it came from the prefect of Pup’yŏng and was written in a complaining spirit. This letter is given in full in the Appendix.

On June 5th, Edward B. Drew, acting secretary of the legation of the United States at Peking replied to this communication stating that the intention of the squadron in coming to Korea was peaceful, but that their overtures were met with wanton and unprovoked attack. He further stated that the admiral hoped that this was only the act of the local military and not that of the government. Time would be given for the government to make an apology for the attack before further action would be taken. He urged the prefect to have the government send a minister to consult with the American envoy and the admiral in order to adjust the matter.
On June 7th, Yi, guardian of Pup’yŏng prefecture, sent a reply to Mr. Drew’s letter which was as follows: ‘I have control of local matters only, and dare not myself discuss any matters belonging to the central government; I accordingly transmitted your reply to my superior officer, the general and governor of Kangwha prefecture; and have to-day heard that a dispatch from him has just been sent on board your honorable vessel. I trust all future correspondence will be carried on with the above named official as I cannot presume to interfere further in the matter.’

The dispatch above mentioned from the guardian of Kangwha, received on board the U. S. S. Colorado, June 6th, was on the whole a very complaining letter. The writer stated that the Board of Rites in Peking had forwarded a communication to the Korean government which had been replied to by that government. This communication is interesting because it makes no apology for the attack but criticizes the United States fleet for entering the fortified zone.

On June 7th, Edward B. Drew was instructed to reply to the communication received from the guardian of Kangwha. It expressed regret at the attitude of the Korean government for declining all friendly discussion of the matters for which the American envoy had come and refusing to apologize for the attack upon the ships, but rather justifying the act of the military authorities.

He also expressed the thanks for the gifts (three bullocks, 50 chickens, and one thousand eggs) sent by the guardian, but was sorry to say that under existing circumstances the gifts could not be accepted.

June 10th was the day set for the operations against the offending forts and batteries. All hoped that some authoritative communication would come asking for an interview, or making some sort of apology for the wanton attack upon the surveying expedition on June the 2nd. However, the zero hour was fast approaching and no official communication had yet come from the Korean court.
The Monocacy was an iron sidewheel, double ended steamer, 2-masted schooner rigged, 71/2 tons, 6 guns, length 295 feet, beam 25 ft., depth 1 ft. Completed 1860. E. F. McCrae, Commander at the time of the expedition. It returned, however, and used her 10 in. gun on the forts.

The garrison of Kanges was under the command of Gen. A. W. Terry, American minister at the time.
Rear Admiral Rodgers had been busy preparing the punitive expedition. It was to consist of the gun-boats Monocacy and Palos, four steam-launches, 20 boats to convey the landing force which was to consist of 651 men; the naval force on the above mentioned vessels was 105 men, making the total number of the punitive force 759 men. The landing force was arranged into ten companies of infantry with seven pieces of artillery.

The naval force, consisting of the Monocacy and the Palos, was to accompany the landing force and bombard the fortresses from the sea. The Monocacy was armed with two nine inch guns from the Colorado in addition to her own armament. The whole expedition was to be placed under the command of Captain H. Blake.

We are told that the morning of June the 10th dawned bright and clear and that every man of the expedition was on tiptoe, eager and ready for the fight. No pains had been spared in making preparations. The boats were provisioned, equipped and armed. The force took its place in the boats and the expedition left the rendezvous of the fleet at 10:30 A. M. proceeding slowly and cautiously directed by the two steam-launches; the Monocacy in the lead, followed by the Palos, which was towing the boats with the landing force. The expedition, on reaching Primanguet Island (黃山島) was hailed by a Korean junk, carrying a white flag, and holding a letter from an official of the state. The letter was received by an officer in one of the steam-launches piloting the expedition and was delivered to Mr. Edward B. Drew. A translation of the communication is as follows:

The guardian of Kangwha Fu, Korea, Chung, ex-officio general and governor, makes a reply to His Excellency, the American minister.

"I beg to observe that your honorable despatch contains many things I had not anticipated. I am still (as when writing you before) perplexed and pained. As Your Excellency said you were coming on a peaceful and friendly errand, our court preparing to treat you in a befitting manner, before (receiving from you information of your arrival), sent officials of the 3rd rank to inquire whe-
ther your voyage had been prosperous, and further to ask what the business was which you wanted to discuss and negotiate.

"This was the course of politeness, but contrary to expectation your officials said that these persons were not of high rank, denied them an interview, (with your excellency), and sent them back. Before the officials who had been sent to inquire concerning the fatigue of your voyage got back to the capital, your honorable ships suddenly entered our narrow pass (from the sea)." 

'Although you had said you would inflict no injury, yet, as the vessels on which you came (up the river) were vessels of war, our people and soldiers could not but be filled with alarm and suspicion, and knew not what to make of it. Now, I apprehend that the way of concord and the rule of propriety in entering another country do not justify this. As this place has been the scene of battle before, it is now always strictly guarded. Although I deeply regret the firing affair—indeed by the sudden sight of an unusual thing—and the alarming of your people, still, to defend a pass leading into your territory is what you would do were the case your own.

"Your blaming us recently—as is shown by the (demand for an) apology is truly incomprehensible. Your excellency's insistence upon meeting a high official with whom to consult and settle matters, I presume your letter of last spring, had reference solely to the affair of two merchant vessels in the year of 1866. Of these, one was destroyed while the crew of the other was rescued; and you wished to get at the reason for the difference of treatment, and to make provision for future cases of disaster to American vessels on our coast."

"That one of the vessels (alluded to) was a trader of your country and not known to us; and the violent and lawless Tsuy-Lankee (Rev. R. J. Thomas), who came in her, himself brought on the destruction that occurred—. It was not our people who maliciously commenced it—."

"As to rescuing American vessels in distress, our country has a regulation on this point, and there is, therefore, no necessity for going farther and laying it down after consultation—."

"Why should you have been so narrow as to decline the trifling presents offered? I cannot but sustain my regrets at this."

It was near the middle of the afternoon before the expedition reached the first fortress which the French had named Fort Du Conde. The infantry were to disembark at this point. The Palos and Monocacy bombarded the fort from the sea while the infantry made a dash for the shore. Somehow the plan of Commander, L. A. Kimberly, did not
Lieutenant Snow called this a magazine in a marine redoubt, which seems to indicate that it was not in Fort McKee, but whether it was in the redoubt near the point where the troops were landed on June 10th, or whether in the redoubt near the waters edge in front of Fort McKee, it is difficult to say. It could be verified only by visiting the spot.
work out as intended and the landing force was divided, the left wing of the battalion landing below the fort on the mud flats. Their howitzers sunk in the mud to the hubs and even the infantry experienced great difficulty in reaching hard ground.

The battalion landed and began its approach to the lower fort (DuConde.) As it neared the rampart the Koreans fired a few guns and quickly departed from the fort leaving it to the mercy of the invaders, who immediately entered the fort and began to destroy everything of military importance, rolling the guns into the river and destroying the military stores.

By the time this fort had been dismantled and everything of any military importance destroyed it was too late for the troops to make any further advance. Commander Kimberly gave orders for the battalion to go into camp for the night. Pickets were thrown out far in the foreground of the fort and the artillery was placed in positions to protect all the approaches to the fort while the Monocacy and the Palos were so stationed as to guard the flanks of the battalion.

During the night the troops camping on the high ground behind the fort were aroused by the pickets exchange of fire with the enemy. It was reported that the Koreans were forming in the woods back of the fort preparatory to making an attack upon the American force. The artillery which had been placed in positions to command the approaches of the fort were brought into play and soon dispersed the enemy. The remainder of the night was quiet.

However, Commander Kimberly held a night council in which the method of the campaign was carefully discussed and finally decided upon. Commander Kimberly then uttered these memorable words; "We will fight to a finish. It is to be a war upon the foe after the most approved modern methods and to spare nothing that can be
reached by shot, shell, fire, or sword.” Captain Blake in command of the naval force of the expedition was informed of the decision.

This took place Saturday at midnight, June 10th. Sunday morning, June 11th, the men of the battalion were up bright and early eager for whatever the day might bring to them. It was a beautiful clear June morning, without a cloud in the sky, such as is very common in Korea at that time of the year. After a hurried breakfast the American forces broke camp, filling their canteens with drinking water, their cartridge boxes with shells, their knapsacks with all necessary equipment, and were ready for marching orders. Just before leaving camp, company C. was detailed to go into the fort which had been captured the night before and see if there was anything left that had not been destroyed. It is said that they burned the rice, dried fish, and all the buildings that were still standing which could be used for military purposes.

The next object was the fort to the north of DuConde, Ch’oji, known as the middle fortifications. The battalion was on the march at 7 A. M. and was only a short time in reaching the above mentioned fortifications. In the meantime the gunboats, Monocacy and Palos, had moved up the river and taken a position to shell the forts. So effective was their fire that the Koreans fled pell mell from the fort and when the infantry reached it they found it entirely deserted. The enemy did not have time to eat breakfast as the American troops found their kettles still boiling.

The American forces entered the fort unmolested and began at once to dismantle it. Sixty brass cannon of 2 inch bore were rolled into the Han River, military stores destroyed, and the buildings fired. It is said that this fire unfortunately reached a Korean village and entirely wiped it out. The Americans named this fort, Fort Monocacy, after the gunboat Monocacy.

The most difficult march of the expedition was now facing the American troops. By this time it had become very
Unites States troops on the wall of Fort McKee after the battle.
hot and the day was sultry. The road from Fort Monocacy was over a succession of hills and ravines, interspersed with not a few bogs. The commanding general sent a force of sappers ahead to widen the road and cut down the undergrowth. Those who have travelled on Kangwha or in the interior can easily understand what a road in Korea in those days was like—only a narrow path, rough, without proper bridges, over narrow defiles, and steep hills. Korean forces were constantly hovering on the flanks of the advancing battalion. The commanding officer threw out a strong force of pickets to prevent a surprise attack and to clear the woods of the enemy.

The advance from Ch’oji and the capture of the strong citadel, Kwangsŏng, together with its batteries, is so graphically given by Rear Admiral Schley in his “Forty Five Years Under The Flag,” that I take the privilege of quoting from it. Admiral Schley was himself a participant in the engagement so that we can rest assured his account is an accurate one, He says:

“The difficult march was assumed under a hot sun and steaming heat. A succession of steep hills lay before them. Sappers and miners went ahead levelling and widening the roads. Guns had to be hauled up and let down steep places by ropes. Large masses of white coats and black heads hovered on their flanks, trying to get to the rear. Their numbers were ever increasing and the danger was immanent. The fort must be taken soon or never.”

“A detachment of five howitzers and three companies were detached to guard the flanks and rear under Lieutenant Commander Wheeler. The main body then moved forward to storm the fort. This move checkmated the enemy and made victory sure.”

“Hardly were the guns in position, when the Koreans massing their forces, charged the hill in the teeth of the howitzers. The American artillery took sure aim, and by steadily firing at long range so shattered the attacking force that it broke and fled, leaving a clear field. The fire of the howitzers made it impossible for any large body of Koreans coming into action.”

“The Monocacy had moved up the river and begun to pour a steady fire of shells into the forts while the howitzers from behind reversed their guns and begun to fire at the garrison over the heads of the American troops in the ravine.”
"The American troops which had been resting in the valley began to charge the fort. This fort was the key to the whole line of fortifications. It crowned the apex of a conical hill 150 feet high, with the redoubt below it mounted with 148 guns. The sides of the hill were steep, the walls of the fort joining it almost without a break. The Americans had to rush up this steep hill in the face of garrison fire. The tardiness with which the Koreans got into action lost the day for them."

"A terrible reception awaited the Americans. Every man inside was bound to die at his post for the fort was the key to all the others, and was held by tiger hunters, who if they flinched before their enemies, were to be put to death by their own people.

"The American troops, with a yell rushed for the redoubt, officers in front. A storm of gingal balls roared over their heads, but they went up the hill so rapidly that the Koreans could not depress their guns and shoot fast enough. They couldn’t load fast enough for the swift Americans; goaded to despair the tigerhunters “chanted their war dirge in a blood chilling cadance which nothing can duplicate”. They mounted the parapet, fighting with furious courage. They threw stones down upon the American troops. They met them with spear and sword. With hands emptied of weapons they picked up dust and threw in the invaders eyes to blind them. They stood to the bitter end. Scores were shot and tumbled into the river. Most of the wounded were drowned, and some cut their throats as they rushed into the water."

"Lieutenant Hugh McKee was the first to mount the parapet and leap inside the fort (Kwangsong). For a moment he stood alone. A bullet struck him in the groin, a Korean rushed forward, and, with a terrible lunge, thrust him in the thigh, and then turned upon Lieutenant Commander Schley, who had leaped over the parapet. The spear passed harmlessly between the arm and the body of the American as a carbine bullet laid the Korean dead."

"The fort was now full of officers and men, and a hand to hand fight between the blue and the white began to strew the ground with corpses. The garrison fought to the last man. Nearly one hundred Koreans were shot and bayonetted in the fort. Not a single unwounded person was taken. The huge cotton yellow flag, which floated from a short staff in the center was hauled down by Captain McLane Tilton and two marines. A desperate fight continued outside the fort. During the charge some of the Koreans retreated from the fort. This caught the eye of Captain McLane."

By a quick move he cut off their retreat. They were all killed after some desperate fighting. Another party attempting to retreat
were almost annihilated by Cassel's battery, which sent canister into their flying backs, mowing them down in swaths. Moving at full speed, many were shot like rabbits, falling heels over head. Captain Tilton passed to the right of the fort and caught another party retreating along the crest of the hill joining the two forts, and with a steady carbiné fire, thinned their numbers. By 12:45 A.M. the Stars and Stripes floated over all their forts."

"When the battle was over 243 corpses in their white clothes lay in and around the fort. Many of them clothed in thick cotton armor, wadded to nine thicknesses which now slowly smouldered. A sickening stench of roasted flesh filled the air, which during the day and the night, became intolerable. Some of the wounded fearing their captors worse than their torture, slowly burned to death; choosing rather to suffer living cremation, than to save their lives as captives. Only twenty prisoners, all wounded, were taken alive. At least a hundred corpses floated or sank in the river, which ran here and there in crimson streaks. At this one place as many as 350 Korean patriots gave up their lives."

"Lieutenant McKee, first on the inside of the fort was mortally wounded and died soon afterwards. One landsman of the Colorado, Dennis Hamahan, and one marine of the Benicia, Seth Allen, were killed. Five men were seriously wounded and the same number slightly wounded."

"The other two below the citadel being open to the rear from the main work were easily entered, no resistance being offered. The result of 48 hours on shore, 18 of which were spent in the field, resulted in the capture of five forts, probably the strongest in the kingdom, 50 flags, 481 pieces of artillery, chiefly ginal, and a large number of match-locks. Of the artillery 11 were 32 pounders, 14 were 24 pounders, two were 20 pounders, and the remaining 454 were 2 and 4 pounders. The destruction of the forts was complete."

The trophies taken by the Navy as relics of the expedition to Korea were not a few as is seen by the admiral's report to the Navy Department. In a recent communication from the Navy Department at Washington D.C., I am informed that in a letter dated July 8th, 1871, from Rear Admiral Rodgers to the Secretary of the Navy, it stated that the admiral was forwarding four boxes of battle-flags and suggested that one be given to the President, one to the Secretary and one to the admiral, and the rest to be placed..."
in the Museum at the Naval Academy at Annapolis. The present catalog of the Naval Academy Museum lists 25 battle-flags, four ancient bronze guns, a suit of armor and hat as relics of the Korean expedition.

"The wounded were removed to the Monocacy. The forts were occupied all Sunday night June 11th, and early Monday morning the whole force was re-embarked in perfect order, in spite of the furious tide, rising to 20 feet. The fleet moved down the river with the captured colors at the mast heads and towing the boats laden with trophies of war. They reached their anchorage at 10:30."

"Later in the day, June 12th, Dennis Hamahan (or Hendrin) and Seth Allen, were buried on Boisée Island, the second and third American soldiers to be buried on Korean soil. At 5:45 P.M. McKee breathed his last."

"The wounded were kindly cared for, and their broken bones mended by the fleet surgeon, Dr. Mayo."

In the Unofficial Korean History (朝鮮野史) there is no little evidence to substantiate the truth of the engagement of the Korean forces and the destruction of the forts by the American forces. In a report from the governor of Kônggi province on June 11th, it says,

"I have received a report from the prefect of T'ongjin in which he said, two small ships which had two masts each and three small vessels, reached here. The small vessels which were in the lead discharged many cannon between T'ongjin and Kangwa. When the vessels having three masts each and four vessels arrived here the prefect climbed a high mountain to observe them. One of the vessels remained here while one of the smaller ones anchored at Ch'oji; one anchored at Hwangsan Isle (黃山島) and discharged more than one hundred shells. Hundreds of the enemy landed from the vessels which numbered more than ten. They then came to Ch'oji, (草芝) and there they raided the place stealing many pigs and fowls."

On April 23rd, (June 10th) the prefect of T'ongjin reported as follows: "More than ten small vessels landed at Ch'oji and entered the fort, threw the guns into the river, and looted the place. Much of the loot was taken away in the small boats."

On June 10th the Commander of the fort reported, "After the engagement at Ch'oji one of the enemy ships came here belching out black smoke and discharging its
This shows the large standard that floated over Fort McKee and which was captured by the three men shown, as the fort was rushed. The officer is Captain Tilton and the two other men are corporals Purvis and the other (not given on the original but given, I think, in the records of the Navy).
The enemy force which landed at Ch’oji appeared to be about one hundred and just as the sun was setting they went into camp and lighted fires. During the engagement at Ch’oji our forces were defeated.”

On April 24th (June 12th) the Commander of Kangwha made the following report:

“On June 11th, four or five hundred of the enemy attacked Kwangsŏng fortress from the way of Tŏkjin. We tried to oppose them but the enemy’s shells fell like rain drops and the missiles from the howitzers like hail. The attack was so terrible and swift that our forces were not able to withstand it and our army was broken through almost immediately.”

“The enemy surrounded and entered the fortress while at the same time they shelled the other fortresses with small pieces. The engagement was very violent for a time. The enemy entered the citadel of Kwangsŏng. The ships of the enemy which were anchored at Tokjin began to come up and if they shell Sondolmok (fort Palos) it will soon be destroyed too. The magazines and stores of Kwangsŏng were all fired.”

The Koreans testified to the violence of the engagement at Kwang-sŏng fortress. In the Unofficial History of Korea, the Commanding officer of Kangwha says.

“On the 25th, of April (June 12 h) the enemy started to return and I ordered the troops to stop their advance. When Cho Sangjun (曹鍾俊) arrived at the fortress of Kwangsŏng he found the fort already in total ruin. He said the scene was terrible to behold. Heads of corpses were scattered here and there while what once appeared to be soldiers uniforms strewed the ground. The fort was all demolished. We ordered the nearby villagers to come to the fortress to begin the work of restoration. In digging, the bodies of Ō Chaesun, (魚在淳) brother of Ō Chaeyŏn, (魚在源) Yi Hyŏnhwak, (李永鶴) Im Chip’ang, and Kim Hyonk Yong (林之影) were found which had been buried by the enemy. Other bodies had been burned by the enemy and thrown into the graves with heads and bodies so promiscuously mixed up that they could not be identified. The body of the Admiral of Kwangsŏng, Pak Ch’isŏng, (朴致誠) was identified by his insignia......”

“In the terrible attack upon Kwangsŏng, Adjutant Ō Chaeyŏn, fearless of the enemy’s merciless fire, rushed upon them and killed many. He finally fell fighting——.”

The number of wounded placed on board the American vessels is mentioned as twenty. No unwounded prisoners
were taken. Rear Admiral Schley says, "Only twenty prisoners, all wounded, were taken alive."

The Korean reports of the atrocities practiced by the American troops upon the prisoners of war are entirely without any confirmation. One cannot conceive of such barbarous acts as were reported by the Koreans being perpetrated upon those who had the misfortune to be captured while in the honorable discharge of their duties in war time by any civilized nation. Such reports, I am quite sure, can be dismissed at once as entirely groundless.

The Unofficial History of Korea says concerning the atrocities practiced by the Americans upon the prisoners of war as follows: "It is said that the enemy seized Kim Tongjin (金東鎬), took him to the ship, and then placed him between two large planks, while the soldiers stood around him with their swords and guns."

The Commander of Kwangso Fortress (Fort McKee) on May 4th, June 21st, said,

"The Korean prisoners taken in the engagement at Kwangso were five; Yi Taekil (李大吉), Kim Uido (金宜道), Sin Wonch'ul (申元喆), Ch'oe Un'gil (崔云吉) and one other. Upon their release and return to the Koreans they were asked to make statements concerning their treatment while in the hands of the Americans."

"Kim Uido said, 'that when the enemy attacked Kwangso the assault was so terrible and swift that the Koreans were very quickly defeated. He said he had hidden behind a rock back of the fort, but was discovered by the enemy, seized, bound hand and foot, and taken to one of the enemy's ships which had two masts. Here he remained one night and the next day was transferred to a ship which had three masts. Here he was placed down on the fifth deck and only given a cup of tea and two pieces of bread three times a day. I refused to eat he said, and only waited for an opportunity to jump overboard and escape."

The punitive expedition returned to the base of the fleet at Boisée Island on Monday afternoon, June 12th. Towards evening the bodies of the two men who had been killed in action, Seth Allen and Dennis Hamahan, were taken to Boisée island and there interred.
United States troops resting at the Fort after the battle.
In a recent communication from the Navy Department in Washington D. C., in reply to my letter of inquiry as to whether the bodies of these two soldiers had been removed and buried elsewhere, it said, "The Department is unable to find any record of the burial or the subsequent removal of the bodies of Seth Allen, landsman of the U. S. S. Colorado and Dennis Hamahan, marine private on the U. S. S. Benicia, who were killed in the attack on Fort McKee (Kwang-song) on June 11th, 1871."

This definitely answers the query in my mind as to whether these bodies had not been removed and buried elsewhere. Reports have come to me stating that the bodies had been removed. I wrote Mrs. W. George Bennett of Chemulpo, in charge of the Foreign Cemetary records, and she says there is no record of the bodies of these men having been interred in the foreign cemetery there.

The first American soldier to be buried on Korean soil was Thomas Driver. He died very suddenly on the morning of June 2nd. Lieutenant A. S. Snow of the U. S. S. Alaska says of this event, "On the 2nd instant we went ashore on Boisée Island to bury Thomas Driver who died very suddenly this morning of brain fever. We had the launch armed and equipped, but there were apparently no natives to oppose our landing."

It is, therefore, very evident that the bodies of these three American soldiers still rest somewhere on the island of Boisée. I do not know whether their graves are marked or whether any of the natives now living on the island have any knowledge of their locality.

Recently a suggestion was made by a certain person to the effect that he thought a proper monument should be erected to the honor of these men who fought and died for the honor and glory of their fatherland in a foreign country. Surely it would be most fitting if some sort of a memorial could be set up and the United States government ought to look into the matter and take proper measures to have it done.
Captain McKee U. S. N. who was mortally wounded, while leading the gallant attack upon Kwangsoong Fortress June 11th, 1871, and died on board the U. S. S. Monocacy the same day, was taken to Lexington, Kentucky, and buried with military honors in the national cemetery there.

The fleet remained at Boisé Island sixteen days after the return of the punitive expedition from Kangwha Island. It would be interesting to know exactly what transpired during these days. In the Diplomatic Correspondence between the members of the Mission and the Secretary of State at Washington D. C. and from the Unofficial History of Korea, we have considerable information as to the exchange of notes.

One June 12th, the same day of the return of the expedition from Kangwha, Yi, Guardian of Pup'yon Prefecture, sent a communication to Mr. E. B. Drew, which read as follows:

“Politeness of course, characterized our reception of you since your honorable ships came professing friendship and amity, where shall we find in your abrupt dismissal of our officials who came with inquires as to your suffering, (on the voyage); in your wrongly entering the territory of Kuan-Hai (locality of the action of the 11th instant), ignoring your ships short comings from the right, and only blaming our soldiers for attempting to ward off calamity in utter unwillingness to listen, and your sole interest upon raising a disturbance. When the affairs had already been completely solved in correspondence.”

“Looking at it now, can know this much for certain: under outward profession of friendship you cherish false and deceitful designs. To come to your landing, and thoroughly displaying your force of committing public buildings to the flames, burning cottages, stealing property, sweeping up everything to the veriest trifle. These are the actions of thieves and spies. In your ships you have brought many of our kingdom’s outlaws, rebellious brigands who have forfeited life, to connect yourselves with and collect such a following as guides to our neighborhood. This is to become the lair to which pirates flee.”

“The upshot will be a wild and disorderly discharge of gun and cannon, the battering down of walled town and fort, the slaying and injuring army and people. Where was such unsparing and implacable savagery ever exceeded? You came with professions of
This is a scene in a marine redoubt, whether the same one as the other picture gives or not it is impossible to tell. This one shows a number of the crude, breech-loading cannon used by the Koreans.
friendship and amity, and wish us to treat you with politeness, and your actions, forsooth, are such as these. Not only will every urchin of our kingdom spit at and curse you, but more yet in the world will indignantly sympathize with us, and debar you from intercourse, and break off such as you already hold. I had not thought such as these would have been the actions of one intrusted with his kingdom's commission to bind in friendship another kingdom."

"In those sea-ports where your ships shall hereafter arrive, who will be willing again to meet you, with politeness, discuss the obligations of good faith and renew friendship. I conceal the shame I feel for your honorable country."

Mr. E. B. Drew read this communication and drafted a reply June 15th, as follows:

"I had the honor to receive your note dated the 12th instant, in which you complained in unbecoming language of the results which necessarily followed the wanton attack upon our vessels."

"Correspondence between officials, of whatever rank, should contain none other than respectful language; and as you choose to disregard the rule in this respect, it did not occur to me, until your communication came this morning, that a reply was expected."

"The occurrence of the last few days, and the necessary consequences of the evil acts of your officials, of which neither you nor your government have just grounds of complaint. The minister and admiral regret the necessity which compelled this action. They hoped this government would make such reparation as would render forcible redress unnecessary. Ample time was allowed for this to be done; but instead of responding to our overtures the government remained silent, and the officials from whom we hear, yourself among the number, apparently justified the attack upon our vessels. Under these circumstances how could you expect immunity? The operations of the naval forces have been confined to destroying the places from which we were assaulted and routing the soldiers that defended them; although you cannot fail to be aware that a large country which contains many villages, lie within the reach of the guns of our ships, and which remain un molested. This ought to afford convincing proof that we had no disposition to make indiscriminate warfare upon your country or your people."

"The minister and admiral, as was announced to your government in advance, desire peace. They are ready to treat all friendly overtures in a reciprocal spirit, and it is to be hoped that your government will adopt a wise and prudent course so that in the future all trouble may be avoided."
On June 14th, Hon. Frederick F. Low, on board the flagship Colorado prepared a communication for His Majesty, the King of Korea, which he forwarded to the prefect of Pup'yŏng, requesting him to see that it was conveyed to the King. The letter was as follows:

"The undersigned, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of the United States to China, charged with a special mission from Peking March last, that the government of the United States desired to come to some definite understanding with that of His Majesty with reference to the protection and rescue of seamen who might be wrecked upon the islands and coasts of Corea, and thus remove in advance all cause of rupture of friendly relations between the two countries. To carry out this intention and allow an opportunity for all to be discussed in a spirit of amity and good will, His Majesty was informed that the undersigned would leave his post in China temporarily and go to Corea; that he would go in a ship of war, accompanied by an admiral, in order to add dignity to his mission, and not with any design of harming the people as long as the vessels and the men on board were treated with consideration and kindness. His Majesty was also informed that as we were animated by friendly motives we should expect to be received and treated in a friendly way, and the undersigned expressed the hope that a minister of suitable rank would be deported to meet him, upon the arrival of the ships on the coast, to whom full particulars of the business could be made known, and with whom it could be discussed with a view to amicable settlement. Upon his arrival at this point no persons of suitable rank presented themselves, nor were those who came furnished with any evidence of their having been sent by the government. These men were received with politeness by the person next in rank to the envoy. They were informed that the undersigned would remain at this place some days, in order that His Majesty might send a suitable person to meet him; in the meantime some of the smaller vessels of the fleet would be engaged in exploring the channel and the island. They were requested to inform the local magistrates and the people of the admiral's intentions so that no cause of difficulty might arise between the surveying vessels and the people. The views and the intentions of the undersigned were frankly explained to the persons who came in the full expectations that as soon as His Majesty became aware of them no delay would occur in taking steps to comply with the reasonable request made."
"After a delay of one day to allow the admiral's intentions to be made known, the surveying vessels started on their errands of humanity, and after proceeding a few miles from the anchorage, they were, without notice, wantonly fired upon by the forts and masked batteries, to which the vessels replied. No gun was fired from the vessels, or menace made, until after the batteries on shore commenced the attack. After silencing the batteries the vessels returned and reported the outrageous conduct of the military authorities. Even after all this had occurred, so great was the desire of the admiral and the undersigned for peace that it was concluded to allow ten days to elapse before taking any further action, in the hope that it would be found that the attack was unauthorized and that His Majesty would cause a suitable apology to be sent, and also a minister, as has been suggested. The local magistrate at Kangwha was informed of our lenient disposition in order that future hostilities might be avoided. These peaceful overtures being declined, or neglected, left no other course open to the admiral than to seek redress by arms, as is usual among all civilized nations, for wrongs and insults which our vessels had suffered. This has been fully done, the forts have been destroyed, and the armies defending them routed and scattered. Many hundreds of the soldiers were killed and wounded, and others are prisoners on board our ships."

"The latter will be treated with humanity and kindness, and upon a proper engagement being entered into that they shall not again take up arms against us, will be released and sent to their homes. It is the custom of my country to treat all prisoners that fall into our hands with humanity, and the undersigned begs to assure His Majesty that those now held captive on board our ships will suffer neither insult nor injury.

"The events of the past few days afford convincing proof of our power whenever we choose to exert it. In the present instance the admiral concluded to go no further than destroying the fortifications that had assaulted his vessels, although well established precedent would sanction the moving of our forces against any and all places of the kingdom. Although possessed of the power my government does not seek war or conquest. It does not wish to acquire a single inch of your territory; nor does it seek control over your people. It has no desire to disturb the institutions of the country, or interfere in any matters of local concern. On the contrary, it desires to cultivate friendly relations with His majesty as the sovereign of an independent nation. My government wishes to be at peace with
all countries, neither giving just grounds for offense, nor allowing unprovoked assaults nor insults to its vessels or people to go unredressed."

"When its citizens offend against the laws and customs of other countries they are duly apprehended and punished. This cannot be done unless some arrangement is made by which they can be arrested and given up for trial and punishment. Arrangements for doing this now exist in China and Japan. Why should not Korea enter into similar engagements? Will not a definite understanding on this point prevent irritation and ill-feeling?"

"To discuss and arrange this question, as well as to provide for the protection and rescue of those who may, by misfortune, be cast on the shores of your kingdom, are the chief objects which the undersigned had in view in coming here."

"These objects he is still anxious to accomplish and is prepared to exercise patience and forbearance in order that further hostilities may be avoided."

"It remains for His Majesty to decide whether the ends aimed at shall be attained peacefully in accordance with the earnest desire of the undersigned and his government, or whether our peaceful overtures will be met with in the future, as they have been in the past, by force of arms."

"The undersigned trusts that His Majesty will, upon a careful review of the whole question, conclude to meet these advances in a just and friendly spirit, and that a person of suitable rank will soon be sent to consult, with a view of arranging the questions which are likely to disturb amicable relations. The undersigned hopes for a speedy and frank reply to his note."

This communication of the American envoy was forwarded by Mr. E. B. Drew to the prefect of Pup’yōng, with the sincere hope that it would be sent to the Korean court. But the reply of the prefect to this letter clearly indicates that the communication was not forwarded and he states his reason for being unable to do so. The letter was not brought directly to the ship, because since the storming of the forts Koreans refused to have any further official relations with the Americans, which was paramount to a state of war. This communication was placed upon a pole on Guerrière Island which had been set up for that purpose. The letter read as follows; Yi, Guardian of Foo-Ping
(Pup’yŏng) prefecture, Korea, makes the following communication to Mr. E. B. Drew, acting Secretary of the Legation;

“Your dispatch has been attentively read. Its only purport is to place the blame upon the local civil and military authorities. It is unnecessary to multiply elaborate discussions as to who has been in the right and who the reverse, in what has taken place; the duty of us, the local authorities, is that we all (according to commands of His Majesty) should confine ourselves to defending (the district committed to our care) or to giving battle, and to these things alone.”

“I dare not send up to the court the dispatch now to hand from His Excellency, and beg respectfully to return it herewith.”

“As you must have seen that we have not fired upon the men of your honorable ships landing for water, but have let them come on shore, you must, I presume, be aware that we, too, do not pride ourselves in our power to kill and injure people.”

On June 18th, Mr. E. B. Drew was authorized by the American envoy to make a reply to this communication of the prefect of pup’yŏng. While these communications were impotent to accomplish anything under the circumstances they clearly show the temper and mind of the officials, and incidentally that of the people. The reply of Mr. Drew was as follows:

I had the honor to receive, by hand of messenger yesterday morning, your note of that day, returning a dispatch from His Majesty, the King. In your note you say that it not within your province to forward the dispatch to its destination, and intimate that further correspondence will not be likely to serve any useful purpose.”

“I’m instructed by His excellency to say, in reply, that your refusal to forward his dispatch to the government seems extraordinary and that he is unwilling to believe your course would have the sanction of His Majesty were he aware of the real facts. It is hardly possible that His Majesty would so far disregard the established rules common among all nations as to deliberately obstruct all channels of communication between an ambassador of a friendly nation and the government of Korea, thus closing the door to attempts at the settlement of differences that now exist, or that may hereafter arise, by amicable negotiation. I am further instructed by His Excellency to say, that as he contemplates a prolonged stay in the vicinity of the capital, he has concluded to retain the dispatch
until the means are found to forward it to its destination; and he indulges the hope that you will, upon reflection, conclude to transmit, or make known to His Majesty that his excellency desires to send me."

"This is especially desirable; for if His Majesty frustrates all efforts to open negotiations the situation will be relieved of embarrassment in case the minister and admiral are compelled to seek other means to bring the business with which His Excellency is entrusted to the notice of the court. A refusal by order of the government will also show to the nations of Europe, as well as to the United States, that Korea persistently declines to hold communication with the ambassador especially sent on an errand of peace and humanity."

"If, however, you conclude to adhere to the determination indicated in your note, I deem it my duty distinctly to inform you that for your refusal to perform a service incumbent upon all officials of every nation, the same responsibility will attach to His Majesty as if the act was done by his express order."

The last communication, so far as we know, came from the prefect of Pup’yŏng in reply to Mr. E. B. Drew’s letter of June the 18th. These communications from the Pup’yŏng prefect did not aid the minister in his endeavors to reach the court. They are rather complaints expressed at the presence and acts of the American fleet. They elicit no interest on the part of the local officials to expedite the matters for which the American envoy had come; on the other hand, they show the fine art of oriental procrastination. The prefect said,

"To the reply which I had the honor to send you the other day I had not expected there would be a rejoinder. But I have now to acknowledge your answer, expressing surprise that I do not dare to forward his excellency’s dispatch to the court, and inquiring into the matter. An explanation of my reasons are therefore indispensable."

"Although the place where your honored ships came to anchor on their arrival here (Boisée Island) was amply suitable for intercourse and correspondence, yet you, ascending the tide, entered the narrows, and this caused those holding the place to open fire upon you. As we had written expressing regret at the infelicity of that affair, you might have passed it over, but no! on the contrary, you went up a second time and fought a battle, in which many of our
people were killed and wounded. Our court is terribly incensed at this, and no longer believes in the (alleged) peaceful nature of your visit. Under these circumstances, although his excellency wishes a dispatch to be forwarded, yet, in view of the utter irreconcilability of a foreign minister's writing our sovereign direct on terms of equality with what is due to rank, dignity, and ceremonial propriety, how could I, an humble official, venture to transmit it? Our court could certainly severely censure and disgrace me for such an act; and how could I escape this punishment? And is this no matter of concern to his excellency? It is, after repeatedly and unremittingly revolving the matter in my mind, that, dreading the law and holding to the cannons of usage, I dare not recklessly forward the dispatch."

"The business with which his excellency has encountered the hardship of a long voyage to consult about and arrange can, in all probability, be nothing else than that he does not fully know why, of two vessels (which came to our shores) one was rescued and the other was destroyed; and because he is solicitous for the future, lest in the course of their voyage vessels may perhaps again meet with unforeseen disasters, he therefore desires to make a compact of peace, (treaty) forever preventing the infliction of injury; and this is the way matters stand."

"But can this be pronounced other than a manifestation of extreme over-anxiety and the taking of unnecessary trouble? As to the case of the vessel which was involved in misfortune by those on board her, who brought the catastrophe upon themselves, this is an affair of a kind totally unexpected to us. As to vessels loosing their course in fogs at sea, or being driven by stress of weather, these and all similar dangers and disasters, concern human life; that this country will with fidelity rescue mariners and send them forward by land, as they desire, is recorded as our established law, enduring as the elements."

"Although you have not consulted about and settled any business, yet granted that you had done so, the results would have been to the above effect and nothing more. There is no need for a compact of peace, and friendly feeling will be naturally found in what I have above stated."

The fleet remained at Boisée Island until July 3rd, three weeks after the engagement against the Kangwha forts and masked batteries. One might wonder why this long delay after reparation had been fully made for the insult upon the flag on June 2nd.
It must be remembered, that, although, this had been satisfactorily accomplished, the real object of the mission in coming to Korea had not been realized and the American envoy and the admiral hesitated to leave Korean waters, without in some measure, realizing their goal. However, the mission might have known that after such a display of force and the wounding of the nation's pride no amount of waiting and persuasion could induce the Korean court to accede to their demands.

In a communication from the Hon. Frederick F. Low to the Secretary of State, Hon. Hamilton Fish, on July 6th, 1871, we find the reason succinctly set forth for the lingering of the squadron after the redress had been fully made. It says,

"It appeared to me indispensably that the fleet should not leave Korea while there remained any reasonable ground for the government to believe that we had been defeated by force of arms. As I anticipated would be the case, the Coreans believe that we were defeated on the 1st of June, and so reported it to China."

"The news spread far and near causing much excitement among the Chinese and great anxiety to the foreigners."

"Notwithstanding our significant military success it may be doubted whether the King of Korea is aware of the real facts in regard to the disaster to his arms. It is so manifestly the disposition and policy of oriental officials to misrepresent misfortunes when their reputation is involved that the central government is rarely advised of the real truth."

In view of the information from Korean sources, I feel that we can successfully contradict this statement of the American minister because the king of Korea, in this instance, was kept well informed of the situation as is seen by the records in the Unofficial History of Korea and by the great solicitude he showed for the soldiers, engaged in the fighting and especially for the killed and wounded.

The orientals have a way of spreading news very rapidly. Then too, we must remember that the fire signals, the ancient method of conveying news, was in full operation at that time. In the Unofficial History of Korea it is said that
the Fire signal (pongdae) on Namsan (South Mountain) in Seoul was used to inform the palace.

The American envoy also hoped that his communication might reach the king and that a minister from the court might be sent to consult with the ambassador concerning the issues in question. Delay in this matter was a better policy than haste since procrastination in oriental diplomacy is not the exception but the rule. The American envoy in writing to the Secretary of State said concerning this,

"Procrastination is the formidable weapon in diplomacy with orientals: every possible device will be resorted to hinder and obstruct action on disagreeable subjects, hoping by this means to weary their opponents into compliance with their wishes. In view of this characteristic announcement that we intend to make a protracted stay on the coast might, I thought, induce the government to send some one to treat with me: and besides, at the date on which the note was written it was not impossible that additional instructions might reach me by telegraph which would detain the fleet there longer than I would feel authorized to do without them, unless a favorable change in the status of affairs should occur in the meantime. The withdrawal of the fleet was not decided upon until all reasonable efforts at peaceful negotiations, warranted by your instructions, had been exhausted, nor until I had become entirely satisfied that further delay and effort would be entirely useless. When that time had arrived I did not feel justified in keeping longer all the available vessels of the fleet on the coast of Corea, when their presence on the coast of China and Japan might be necessary for the protection of our citizens there; to send away a portion of the vessels and remain longer myself appeared useless and worse than useless, as the weakening of the force might induce the Coreans to commit some assault or offer insult which could not honorably be allowed to go unredressed."

In a communication to the Department of State, July 6th, 1871, the American ambassador said, "After waiting long enough to demonstrate the fact that there was no probability of the government responding to our overtures, I concluded to withdraw and submit the whole question to the President for his decision. Prior to leaving I caused a despatch to be sent to the prefect of Foo-ping (Pup’yŏng) explaining the cause of my departure."
A careful study of the Naval Incident under Rear Admiral John Rodgers in 1871 leads me to draw several conclusions which I assure the reader are not intended to reflect any criticism upon any of the personnel who took part in the expedition, but simply to state some of the results following upon such an armed display.

First, the object in sending a mission to Korea to negotiate by peaceful methods a treaty of amity for the protection of American ship-wrecked sailors who might be cast upon the Korean coasts, and also, to open up the country to western intercourse by a commercial treaty or treaties, was in itself most commendable and desirable.

Korea, being situated upon one of the important sea highways of oriental trade, could not hope to keep this permanently closed and thus interfere with the legitimate commerce of the world; neither could she expect to successfully succeed in keeping her doors closed to the march of modern civilization. The United States government acted within her prerogative in sending a mission to negotiate treaties as might secure the above desired results. Indeed I can say without fear of successful contradiction, that she had just provocations for doing so. Furthermore, she was following the precedent established by civilized nations in attempting to open up a seclusive and backward nation to the culture, intercourse, and commerce of the civilized world. Japan, Korea's nearest neighbor, was an excellent example of oriental countries. The United States government was fully cognizant of the important consequences of such an attempt and the difficulty attending it. Tyler Dennett in "Americans in Eastern Asia", said, in connection with the movement to open up Korea, "It was by far the most important political action undertaken by the United States in Asia until the occupation of the Philippines in 1898. To disturb Korea in any way was to disturb the equilibrium of the Far East."

The United States government could have approached Korea through China, which had, at least, a ceremonial
suzerainty over Korea, or through Japan's expedient relationship with Korea, but she preferred to negotiate directly. This probably was decided upon because of one or more reasons. The American authorities knew the tedious process of oriental diplomacy, especially if it had to be done through another oriental government. The government realized the difficult task before her as is seen in the communication of the United States minister to China, Hon. Frederick F. Low, to the State Department July 6th, 1871. It said, "Efforts to open up intercourse with isolated oriental countries, whose rulers are ignorant, conceited and exclusive, have been invariably surrounded with difficulties and embarrassments and neither history nor precedent offer a safe guide for action. In these respects the mission to Korea formed no exception."

Second, the expedition from a military standpoint might be said to have been a signal success. The American units equipped with modern weapons and skilled in the most modern arts of warfare swept everything before them. The offending forts, numbering five, including the earth-works and masked batteries supporting them, were totally destroyed. Rear Admiral Rodgers says in his report, "The result of 48 hours on land, 18 of which were spent in the field, 5 forts were captured, 50 flags, 481 pieces of artillery were taken and more than three hundred killed."

The engagement in and around the chief fort (Kwang-sŏng) probably the strongest in the whole kingdom, was fierce and most sanguinary. After the roar of cannon and the rattle of musketry had ceased, the bodies of 243 Koreans were counted, most of them within the fort. The carnage was frightful. The Koreans are said to have fought with great courage and tenacity, silencing forever the charge of cowardice, so often hurled at them. Even though facing a foe of far superior military strategy, discipline, modern equipment, and experience in war, the Koreans fought with great gallantry. In the communication of Hon. Frederick F. Low of June 20th, 1871, he says, "All accounts concur in
the statement that the Coreans fought with desperate courage, rarely equalled and never excelled by any people. Nearly all the soldiers in the main fort were killed at their posts. They exhibited a bravado and recklessness that it is hard to account for upon any other hypothesis than that, finding there was no chance for escape, and believing that no quarter would be shown by us to the prisoners, they concluded to perish by fighting, even after all hope of success was gone."

The American loss was two killed and five wounded, a very insignificant loss, facing the great odds the American troops did in storming these strongly fortified citadels. It is very interesting to know that among the troops assisting in the storming of these forts was Winfield S. Schley, who later became admiral in the American Navy, and brought great honor and glory to it. He was the one who attempted to rescue Lieutenant McKee after he had been shot and was almost killed himself by a Korean who attempted to thrust a spear through him. The U. S. S. Palos and U. S. S. Monocacy, both of which had been damaged by striking ledges of hidden rocks in the naval operations against the forts and masked batteries, had been temporarily repaired so that they were able to proceed to Shanghai under their own power.

Third, the efforts of the mission to negotiate the desired treaties with Korea were frustrated by the unfortunate attack upon the vessels sent out by Admiral Rodgers to survey the upper channel of the river and the subsequent military reprisal on June 10th to the 11th.

The members of the Americen mission defended their surveying operations on the ground that they were being done in the interests of science and humanity, which from the standpoint of those engaged was quite laudable. However, I feel quite sure that the United States, represented by the American minister and the admiral, laid itself open to legitimate criticism, if not censure, in sending her armed vessels into the most strategic fortified zone of the empire
whose favor she was endeavoring to court, even though, as we believe, she had only the best intentions back of it. This in itself was an act provocative of war. As an American citizen I cannot but feel sincerely sorry for this breach of etiquette on the part of my own Government. I wish that she might have pursued such a policy as not to have given the least provocation for armed resistance. How could the troops who were ordered to guard this strategic gateway of the nation know the U. S. vessels were not attempting to force their way up to the capital of their country as the French had done five years previously.

This may have not been an entirely just cause for the Korean troops to treat the American vessels as they did, but I can say, without any fear of successful contradiction, that the Korean soldiers did what the soldiers of any other nation in the world would have done had an alien armed force attempted to forcibly enter the gateway of their nation without mutual consent.

Prof. H. B. Hulbert F. R. G. S., in defending the Korean attack upon the American vessels of the surveying expedition says,

"The approach of the United States vessels up to the very gate of the Gibraltar of Korea was in itself a declaration of war. The Koreans supposed that these vessels were approaching for the purpose of assault. Indeed no information seems to have been given the government that this surveying expedition was planned and as the narrow passageway was considered the gateway to the approaches of Seoul, the Coreans argued strictly from the book and the American contention that the assault was unprovoked falls to the ground. The approach itself was abundant provocation."

This statement of Prof. Hulbert is only partially correct. It may, and in all probability was true, that no information was transmitted to the government concerning the proposed surveying expedition, yet we know from the communication of the American minister and Admiral Rodgers, that the local officials were informed concerning the expedition and requested to make it known to the people so as to allay any suspicion. Knowing the Koreans as well as I do, I
believe the authorities in Seoul were kept posted on all matters connected with the movements of the fleet and the communications of the parties concerned.

The negotiations were now dead-locked. The Americans had failed to understand the Korean character. The work of the mission was at an end. A virtual state of war existed between the two nations, although no formal declaration of the same was made or even thought of. The policy of attempting to open the door of an isolated country like Korea by shot and shell, might be effective, but never prudent. The shells that destroyed the fortresses on Kangwha Island closed the doors of Korea tightly for eleven long years more.

Fourth, although the expedition was considered a success by Americans in wiping out the insult to the flag it was looked upon by the Koreans as a signal success for their arms. The whole country was jubilant over the victory. Korean arms and prowess had triumphed over a great western foe. The news was published far and wide. Even China believed in the report of the Korean victory.

The Korean government was not much disturbed over the loss of a few forts and several hundred men on the Island of Kangwha. The gateway of the nation had not been entered; the main force of the Korean army had not been harmed; and the capital had not been reached by the invading forces. Only the capture of the capital and the king, together with the dethronement of the bigoted and haughty Taewon’gun would have been considered a defeat for Korean arms and a victory for the Americans. Had Rear Admiral Rodgers done this with the forces at his command, the Koreans would no doubt have been glad to sue for peace at the cost of any kind of a treaty or treaties. But the admiral, fearful lest the forces at his command were inadequate for such and undertaking, and not willing to sacrifice men needlessly refused to do so, and therefore in the estimation of the Koreans lost the victory.
Prof. H. B. Hulbert in the "Korea Review" for 1901, says, "Even if the Americans had taken half the Peninsula and yet had not unseated the Regent or endangered the person of the King their departure would have left the Koreans in the firm belief that the foreigner had been defeated."

A very interesting note, though of little historical value, appears in the Table of Dates in the Oriental History (Tongsa Yonp'yo (東史年表), edited by Ō Yunjŏk (魚允德) and published in 1915. It says," The Americans in order to wipe out the disgrace of Mussinnyŏn (戊辰年) 1868, (this is a mistake and ought to read Pyongin (丙寅) 1866) sent five battleships to attack Tŏkchin (德津) but Ō Chaeyŏn (魚在淵) Lieutenant General of the Korean troops, counter attacked and greatly defeated the enemies and they escaped and fled from the country."

It is not difficult to understand this author's object in making the above statement, since he was the grandson of Ō Chaeyŏn and wanted to reflect great credit upon his grandfather's skill and courage.

After the French naval expedition had retired from Korean waters in order to recruit more troops for the further prosecution of the war in 1866 the Koreans reported that the French had been defeated and were compelled to withdraw. Likewise, when the American squadron sailed away July 3rd the Koreans said it was because it had been defeated.

Tyler Dennett in "Americans in Easter Asia" says, "Korea was again left in the belief that the foreigners had been compelled to retreat before her army and the expedition was looked upon by the Chinese also as a defeat for the foreigners."

It is interesting to note how quickly the news of this affair reached China. It must have been telegraphed to China as a defeat for the American arms. The Chinese reported that the American troops had been defeated and her ships destroyed. The Germans were so disturbed over
this news that the Commander of the German frigate "Hertha" then in Shanghai, made a hurried trip to Korea to investigate for himself.

In the communication of the American envoy to the State Department on July 6th, 1871, he comments on the failure of the mission to Korea in these words; "The Korean government will exult over the fact that it has been able to keep foreign nations from entering its territory and prevent their ministers from communicating with its high officers."

Tyler Dennett also says, "The expedition to Korea under Rear Admiral Rodgers was as much a failure as most imitations are. It reflected no credit upon the Americans."

However, though the main object of the mission was not realized, the American envoy and the admiral tried to console themselves by saying that they felt that the expedition had not been a total failure. The American envoy said,

"But while failing to obtain the object for which the mission was sent the ultimate results arising from it are not, I am happy to say, likely to prove as mischievous as I had feared, and at one time anticipated. The chastisement which the attack upon our vessels by the Koreans rendered necessary, judging from all I can see and hear, has done good; it has convinced the Chinese as well as their vassals, that insults and injuries will not be allowed to go unredressed, which has increased the respect of this government for us as a nation. A lesson has been taught the Korean government which will prove useful, it will, I feel certain, tend to guarantee humane treatment of ship-wrecked people, who may be unfortunately thrown upon the mercy of the nation, more certainly than all the voluntary promises of the king heretofore, made through the Peking government.

Fifth, the failure of the American expedition lowered the prestige of not only the United States but all Western nations in the minds of the Koreans. This had been the second attempt of western powers to break through Korea’s gate-way within five years without success. To be sure, Korea had lost several hundred troops and a number of
forts, but the country and the court had not been touched. The very fact that neither of these expeditions returned to execute their threats only helped to strengthen the belief that Korea was impregnable and that Korean arms were able to ward off any foreign enemy. The Tae Wongun settled back in his smug position and congratulated himself and the nation he was guiding, upon the great accomplishment.

J. H. Longford in his book, "The Story of Korea", commenting on the result of the American expedition, together with that of the French in 1866, says, "The results of these two expeditions within a few years of each other were not only fruitless as far as the promotion of Western interests were concerned, but were on the contrary, mischievous in the extreme. Koreans claimed victory over both: their victory served to confirm the worst and most bigoted prejudice, not only of the autocratic Regent, but of the entire official hierarchy, their resolution to maintain their own national isolation, and their confidence in their own invincibility."

Also, Dr. L. G. Paik, in the "History of Protestant Missions in Korea", says, "The effect of these two expeditions to the Hermit Nation (including the French expedition in 1866) tended to increase the conceit and false sense of security of the Tae Wongun (reigning regent). He was so elated at his success that he composed a couplet the substance of which reads: 'The smoke and dust of the vessels of Westerners cover the world with darkness, but the great light of the East enlightens it throughout eternity'."

Ex-Secretary of State, John W. Foster, was of the opinion that the American undertaking, "placed the American Minister and the American Navy in a false light before the world, and that it might be regarded as the most serious blunder of American diplomacy in the Orient."

Even the American Ambassador, Hon. Frederick F. Low, in his more serious moments said, "This will reach China and prevent further concessions being made. It will
also furnish additional arguments to the anti-foreign party, who insist upon the right and duty of China to expel all foreigners.”

Tyler Dennett in “The Americans in Eastern Asia,” says, “The outcome of the expedition was regretted by the foreign communities because it tended to lower the prestige of the foreign powers in Asia at a time when the Chinese were stiffening their opposition to the revision of the treaties.”

There is no doubt in mind that the result of the expedition, instead of instilling a sense of fear and respect for the prowess of foreign arms and the genius of Western diplomacy, created a still more bigoted, self-complacent, conceited, and exclusive spirit; an all absorbing ambition to have no intercourse with Western nations and to be content in complete isolation. It also strengthened the national consciousness in its own self-sufficiency and in the belief in the superiority of its own ideals and culture which took eleven more years to eradicate.

Sixth, the result of the expedition also defeated, or retarded, for many years, the foreign trade policy advocated by Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State from 1861 to 1869. It was the policy of the United States to establish American foreign trade with the Orient on a firm foundation. Statesmen and financial interests spared no pains in trying to open up trade with these far eastern countries. Tyler Dennett, in “Americans in Eastern Asia”, in the chapter concerning Seward’s Far Eastern policy says, “He was a hearty supporter of every movement to establish American foreign trade on a firmer basis. “This nation”, he said, must command the empire of the seas, which alone is real empire. This empire must include the Pacific as well as the Atlantic.”

“He had a very definite idea as to the function of the American people in the commerce of the Pacific Ocean. Foreign trade was to replace military conquest and to become a vehicle for the commerce of ideas.”
This great ideal led the Secretary of State to bend every effort to secure its accomplishment, and many new projects were inaugurated to promote the object. It led the Secretary to advocate as the key word of his trade policy, "A policy of justice, moderation and friendship is the only one that we have had a chance to pursue, and that has been as wise as it has been unavoidable."

The punitive expedition on Kangwha closed this trade door of opportunity advocated by Hon. Seward for more than a decade and paved the way for an oriental nation to accomplish what the United States might have done had she pursued a different policy in her negotiations with Korea.
Geo. F. Seward.
Mr. Fish to Mr. Frederick F. Low.
Department of State.
Washington, April 20th, 18th, 1770.

SIR: It has been decided to authorize negotiations to be had with the authorities of Corea, for the purpose of securing a treaty for the protection of ship-wrecked mariners, and to intrust the conduct of the negotiations to you. Should the opportunity seem favorable for obtaining commercial advantages in Corea, the proposed treaty should include provisions to that effect; but the President principally aims in this mission to secure protection and good treatment to such seamen of the United States as may unhappily be wrecked upon these shores.

The inclosed copies of the treaties concluded with Japan at Kanagawa in 1854, and at Yedo in 1858, will serve to point out the kind of protection which you will seek to secure as well as the commercial articles which it may be desirable to enter into. These copies together with the copies of dispatches from Consul General Seward, which are inclosed, indicate fully what you are to endeavor to obtain.

Little is known of the shores or internal waters of Corea, or of the people who inhabit that country. Before leaving to carry out those instructions, you will endeavor to gather all the information on these subjects that can be obtained in Peking. Some political connection exists between China and Corea, which may make it advisable for you to secure, in advance, the good will and, possibly, the good offices of the Peking government. You will, of course, do whatever can be done in that way.

Admiral Rodgers will receive instructions, a copy of which has been forwarded you in my No. 8 from the Navy Department, to place at your disposal accommodation upon the flag-ship, and to accompany you himself upon this mission, with a display of force adequate to support the dignity of this government. You will maintain entire frankness and unreserve with Admiral Rodgers, conferring freely with him in every stage of the negotiations.

In arranging the item for carrying out these instructions, it is also desirable, if possible, to secure the presence and cooperation of Consul-General Seward, who has great experience in Oriental character, and who has also made a study of this question. Admiral Rodgers has instructions to take that officer with him in case he returns to China before you go. It is not supposed here that you will be able to comply with these instructions before next year, in which case Mr. Seward will probably be at his post.

It will also be necessary in making your arrangements to consult the convenience of Admiral Rodgers, and to defer to his superior knowledge of the best season for navigating those waters.
The Department relies upon you, in fulfilling these instructions, to exercise prudence and discretion, to maintain firmly the right of the United States to have their seamen protected, to avoid a conflict by force unless it cannot be avoided without dishonor, and to seek in all proper ways the harmonious and friendly assistance of the Chinese government.

You will keep an account of your necessary expenses in carrying out these instructions, and draw upon Messrs. Boring Brothers and Company, of London, for the amount thus expended, and furnish the necessary vouchers therefor.

Hamilton Fish.

Inclosures

1. Treaty between the United States and China, concluded July 3rd, 1874.
2. Same between same and same, concluded June 98, 1858.
3. Mr. George F. Seward to Mr. W. H. Seward, No. 281, April 24th, 1868.
4. Same to same, No. 282, April 24th, 1868.
5. Same to same, No. 292, May 25, 1868.
6. Same to same, No. 294, July 3rd, 1868.
7. Same to same, No. 317, October 14th, 1868.

(Inclosures Nos. 1 and 2 not printed.)

Inclosure No. 3.

Mr. George F. Seward to Mr. William H. Seward.

United States Consulate General.
Shanghai, April 24, 1868.

Sir: Mr. Frederick Jenkins, a citizen of the United States, formerly interpreter to this office, gives me the following information:

There are now in Shanghai four Coreans and a bishop for Corea, of the Romish Church. These persons have been sent here by the Corean government. The purpose is to make inquiries concerning the state of feeling existing toward Corea in regard to the alleged murder of French priests and of the crew of the American schooner General Sherman, with a view to determine whether it will be wise for the Corean government to send an embassy to America and Europe to explain those occurrences and to make desired treaties of amity and commerce. Mr. Jenkins expects to sail with these persons for Corea in a few days, and believes that the result of the report of the commissioners and of his visit will be the sending of an embassy, as proposed. He expects to return to Shanghai in about a month, and that ambassadors, as indicated, will come with him.

Mr. Jenkins further informs me he is told that the priests were executed in punishment for schemes of theirs at the court.

The General Sherman trouble is explained as follows: That vessel had reached a point in the interior on a river, of which he does not know the name. Several of the crew went ashore and became embroiled in a row growing out of the wrongful treatment of some women, and were arrested.
A force was then sent from the Sherman, which rescued the men and took them on board, together with two native officers, who, it is supposed, the master intended to hold as hostages. This excited the people, and they attacked the vessel, killing eight persons and capturing the others, who are still held.

Mr. Jenkins says that this information is known only to the ambassadors and himself, to a Jewish merchant who has visited Corea several times, and by whom the commissioners were brought to him, and to one other person who has necessarily been spoken to in order to arrange for the charter of a steamer to proceed to Corea. He assigns as reasons why he has been approached, the belief of the Corean government that the proposed embassy would be more favorably received in America than elsewhere, and should be sent there first; and the fact that he is familiar with the Chinese language, which is the written language of Corea. He is unable to explain how it happens that the Corean government is now employing confidentially the Romish bishops, one of a class they have so severely treated. He expects to bring back with him those of the crew of the General Sherman who are still living.

The Shenandoah has lately left from Chefoo for Corea to make inquiry regarding the crew of the General Sherman, information having been previously received which indicated that some of the number are living.

It is difficult to say whether anything will be accomplished by her commander. Mr. Jenkins says that the Coreans now here declare that the visit will be useless.

Geo. F. Seward.

Inclosure 4.

Mr. George F. Seward to Mr. William H. Seward.


Shanghai, April 24, 1868.

SIR: My dispatch No. 281, herewith, offers information touching the General Sherman case, which has heretofore engaged your attention. It is a subject for congratulation that it is likely to be satisfactorily explained and any necessity for hostile action averted. It is also satisfactory, if true, that the Corean government is anxious to enter into treaties with the western powers. The empire is independent, although it sends complimentary tribute to Pekin. The population is said to be about six millions, or onethird that of Japan. The climate is mild for the latitude. The people are described as peaceful and industrious. In my opinion there is no sufficient object obtainable to render it advisable to use force, or even the show of force, to procure a commercial treaty with the Coreans. It may be considered, however, that the interests of our shipping require that at least a treaty providing for the kind treatment of shipwrecked people should be entered into. But if the Coreans are prepared to go to the extent of
opening up their country to our merchants, this opportunity is not one that should be lost.

I respectfully propose, therefore, in case the proposed embassy be not concluded on, and it shall seem desirable, on the receipt of your instructions, that authority be given me to request of Admiral Rowan the use of two vessels of war, (one like the Shenandoah or Iroquois, the other smaller,) to employ one or more interpreters, and to proceed to Corea in order to ask an official explanation of the General Sherman affair, and to negotiate, if possible, a treaty of amity and of commerce similar to those now existing with China and Japan, or such other lesser treaty as may be expedient and attainable without the exercise or show of force.

If unsuccessful—and I am inclined to believe that the exercise of a degree of discretion and patience would insure a more or less complete success—the undertaking could do us no harm.

Geo. F. Seward.

Inclosure No. 5.

Mr. George F. Seward to Mr. William H. Seward.
No. 292.
Shanghai, May 25, 1868.

Sir: I have the honor to advise you that the United States steamer Shenandoah, which left this port for Corea on the 10th of March last, has returned to Chefoo. The commander had intercourse with officers at different points on the coast, but learned nothing to corroborate the reports which have been prevalent here that some of the crew of the General Sherman are still living, and that the government is disposed to send an embassy to western states. Mr. Jenkins has also returned. He had frequent communications with the Corean officers, and virtually confirms the information brought by the Shenandoah. Whatever causes may be at work in Corea, I am now led to believe that the negotiations, not supported by a considerable show of force, would be likely to be successful,

Geo. F. Seward.

Inclosure No. 6.

Mr. George F. Seward to Mr. William H. Seward.
No. 294.
United States Consulate General,
Shanghai, July 3rd, 1868.

Sir: On the 24th of April I had the honor to advise you, in my dispatch No. 281, that I had received information from Mr. F. Jenkins which indicated that some of the crew of the schooner General Sherman were still living and held in custody in Corea, and that the Corean government was anxious to enter into negotiations for treaties of amity and commerce with the several western powers; and on the 25th May, I had again the honor to inform you, in my dispatch No. 292, of the visit of the Shenandoah to Corea, and of the return of Jenkins, and that their further information indicated that there was no reason to believe that any of the crew of the Sherman
were still surviving, or that the Coreans were desirous of entering into relations with western states as alleged.

At the date of writing the latter dispatch I had become informed that the party with which Mr. Jenkins proceeded to Corea had been engaged in an attempt to take from their tombs the remains of one or more sovereigns of that country for the purpose, it would seem, of holding them for ransom. I therefore entered upon an investigation of the facts with a view to determine the nature of Mr. Jenkins connection with the expedition, and whether I ought to prosecute him. I regret to inform you that the information gathered by me has convinced me that it is my duty to do so. The indictment which I have caused to be prepared I inclose herewith. The trial will proceed in a few days, and I shall transmit to you a full copy of the minutes. The consuls of other powers concerned await the result of my action before determining whether to proceed against their nationals.

Geo. F. Seward.

Inclosure No. 7.

Mr. George F. Seward to Mr. William H. Seward.
Shanghai, October 14, 1868.

Sir: I wrote to you on the 28th ultimo, giving a general statement of my impressions touching the Corean question. Having now had the benefit of consultations with Messrs. Brown and VanValkenburgh and with Admiral Rowan, I propose to offer some brief remarks bearing on the propriety of our sending a mission to Corea, and its form. They will doubtless touch considerations which you have already duly weighed, but perhaps something may be added which will prove of interest to you.

The first object of a mission would be to procure information of the loss or destruction of the American schooner, General Sherman, and in case the reports of the wrongful treatment of the crew prove correct, indemnity or satisfaction therefor. I shall not dwell on this point further than to say, that it cannot be well to let pass uninvestigated a matter which there is reason to believe may have been a very grave outrage on a vessel and persons sailing under our flag; that all our efforts to procure information have hitherto resulted not altogether satisfactorily, and that there seems no way to procure perfect information except by direct communication with the Corean government.

On the other hand, there is something due from us to the Coreans. We should assure them of our appreciation of their kindness to the wrecked crew of the Surprise in 1866, and disposed as we are not only to assert our dignity, but as well our intent to deal justly, we cannot be indifferent to the propriety of offering to Corea an explanation of our views and conduct in regard to the recent expedition of an armed force for the purpose of exhuming and holding for ransom the remains of one or more sovereigns of that country, in which one of our citizens has been charged as a leader. It is satis-
factory to know that we have only to ask from Korea proof that she dealt as honorably with us in the Sherman case as we have with her in the latter matter.

The second object is to obtain a treaty. I have hesitated to say that there is one adequate object to render it perfectly desirable to procure a general commercial treaty. Commercial intercourse with states where we take on ourselves the responsibility of protecting and altogether controlling our nationals, and where the result of intercourse is the introduction of ideas and forces, calculated to work changes that may not be gradual and benign, but may upturn in a revolutionary way the existing order of government and even of society, is not to be inconsiderately sought. But all my reflection leads me to believe that it will be well for us to make the attempt. We have three ports of China in the Gulf Pechili much frequented by our vessels. There are three of Japan on the west coast similarly available to us. Right down between these juts the Corean peninsula. The streams of the northern branch of the Pacific Mail line run for a distance almost within sight of the coast of the peninsula. To the north of Corea stretch away possessions of Russia, having the river Amoor as a natural channel and guide of their commerce to the Pacific. Here are regions of China, Japan, and Siberia, which have already a considerable trade. Within a year or two coal will be extensively worked in each, and it will soon be no longer necessary to bring this indispensable article in navigation of the present day around the Cape of Good Hope. Thereupon will follow a development of trade here, which will, I think, surprise the most sanguine.

Centrally situated, midway in the long stretch of the eastern Asiatic coast, with foreign vessels already skirting her shores in very considerable numbers, Corea cannot hope to exclude foreigners much longer, nor can it be possible that, with a mild climate and a large and industrious population, commerce would not, under favorable auspices, flourish in her cities.

France has been unfortunate in Corea. Great Britain has hardly a greater interest at stake than we, and no grievances to redress. North Germany, with her increasing commerce and great fleet of coasting crafts, has yet no determined policy in the East. We are favorably known, and all the circumstances indicate that an attempt to open the country may best be made by us.

But whether a general treaty is desirable or not there can, in my opinion, be no question of the need of one that shall provide for the safety of seamen and others wrecked or driven on the Corean coast. Indeed we can hardly consent that it shall remain peculiarly dangerous to our navigation.

I remarked in the dispatch referred to in the outset, that the settlement of the Sherman matter, and a treaty of the latter sort may, it seems to me, be obtained without great difficulty, but that a considerable show of force would probably be needed to secure a general treaty.
If the Coreans were excited by grossly wrong conduct on the part of the Sherman crew to engage in a struggle with them, we may perhaps be saved great trouble in this branch of the negotiations and there is enough in the general conduct of the Coreans to indicate that they would not be greatly averse to giving us formal guarantees to care for persons wrecked, and to arrange measures by which they could be speedily returned to some hospitable district.

Touching the broader negotiations it may be assumed, generally, that eastern states have a settled policy toward western powers which is dictated by fear that intercourse will result disastrously; they find occasion for their fear in the harsh lessons of the past, and in the actual condition of a considerable portion of their continent. And, indeed, China is only just emerging from an internal struggle which has threatened most severely the controlling power of the empire, while Japan is, at this moment, in the throes of revolution—troubles which it would not be difficult to connect with the introduction of foreigners.

There are arguments which may be advanced to show the Coreans that a juster consideration of eastern states is prevailing in the west: that China would not have encountered the rebellion had the government been at all a wise one, while from the stronger constitution of Japan the result of war was almost inevitable; that foreign intercourse is in many ways desirable, and that it is surely becoming unavoidable. It is indeed doubtful, however, whether there can be found in Corea men able to weigh justly the position of the state, and to bring about, in face of all preconceptions and of conflicting interests, the radical changes contemplated.

But it is to be said that these eastern people are not unalterably wedded to old practices and institutions. Japan accepted Commodore Perry’s peaceful but formidable mission without great opposition, and of late all parties in that state have vied among themselves in availing themselves of foreign knowledge and material. China, naturally less mobile by reason of her continental position, vast territory and population, has been more consistent in all her history than Japan; but she has not failed to acknowledge, from time to time, the force of new ideas and circumstances, and, even with her, sweeping reforms have been effected by peaceful means working from within. It may not be altogether visionary, therefore, to hope that such a condition of affairs may be found in Corea as will render it possible to attain success without the exercise of force.

But, as intimated, I am disposed to think it desirable, if a mission is to be sent to Corea, that it should be provided with a number of vessels. Reasons are so obvious that I will not dwell to review them. But of course I contemplate only the display of force, not its use, and not even intimations that it may be used. I know well there should be no irregular action; and that it will be time enough for the United States to determine on the exer-
cise of force when peaceful efforts shall have been exhausted, and all the circumstances broadly considered.

A mission, then, such as the one I have indicated, will require a cordial cooperation with the Navy. Fortunately this is perfectly within reach. Admiral Rowan has himself proposed to me that authority and instructions in our joint names to prosecute the mission shall be applied for. He has not a large fleet, but one perhaps sufficient, since Korea is so near at hand, to enable him to look out for the general interest of the station, and at the same time to spare a few vessels for this particular purpose. I have favored this proposition and have now to ask for it your consideration. While I have indicated one advantage only that would be secured by the course, I do not wish to say that the expedition might not be well left in the admiral's hands. There are numerous precedents for deputing such authority to a naval commander-in-chief, and the instances are not few in which that course has resulted most satisfactorily. Yet I think the admiral would prefer to be associated with me. And looking to the facts that such work naturally belongs to my own branch of the public service, that I have the advantage of a not inconsiderable experience in matters of eastern politics and trade, and that the negotiation may cover a considerable period, it seems well that we should be associated, and this would be more satisfactory to me. But should the President prefer to confer the authority upon the admiral alone, I shall, remembering that the general objects, and not individual preferences or ambitions, are to be consulted, render to him any assistance within my power that he may wish.

Geo. F. Seward.

Mr. Frederick F. Low to Mr. Fish. Legation of the United States, Peking, July 16th, 1870.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your No. 9, with enclosures, instructing me to proceed, at such a time as it may be convenient with the admiral commanding the Asiatic Squadron, to Korea, for the purpose of negotiating a treaty for the protection of shipwrecked mariners, and, if practicable, to secure commercial advantages also. Since my arrival in China, I have endeavored to obtain all the information possible about Korea, but I regret to say that my efforts have met little success.

Korea is substantially an independent nation, to be sure it sends tribute to China annually, but from the best information I am able to obtain the tribute is sent rather as a quid pro quo for the privilege of trading with the Chinese than as a governmental tribute. It is brought annually by land, and is accompanied by a large train of camels laden with Corean products, paper, ginseng, etc., for private trade and traffic. These trading expeditions are allowed to remain in Peking three months in each year.
Beyond these arrangements, which have been in existence for many years, there seems to be no connection between China and Corea, nor do the Coreans regard the Chinese as having any right to interfere or exercise any control over their governmental policy.

The object aimed at, in connection with the proposed expedition, is well worth the effort, and I shall use all available means to make the negotiations a success. I shall be glad to avail myself of Mr. Seward’s experience and assistance in this matter; hence no preparations will be made for the expedition until next year, when he will be able to accompany me. In the meantime the Department will be kept fully acquainted with all the information I am able to obtain.

Frederick F. Low.

Mr. Low to Mr. Fish
Legation of the United States,
No. 37.
Peking, November 22, 1870.

Sir: During the recent visit of Admiral Rodgers and Consul General Seward to Peking, an opportunity was afforded for the admiral, the consul general and myself, to consult together in regard to carrying out the instructions contained in your No. 9, with reference to opening negotiations with Corea.

It seemed in every respect desirable to select a favorable season for the visit to the coast of Corea, of which so little is known, and at the same time it was my desire to so arrange it as to interfere as little as possible with the plans of the admiral and the requirements of the naval force in other places.

It is now determined—subject however to any change which may be rendered necessary by circumstance, either to the admiral or myself—that the expedition shall start from Shanghai, or Chefoo, the latter if possible, between the 1st and 15th of May next. The line of procedure will so much depend upon the temper of the Corean officials that no definite plan can be decided upon at the present moment.

I shall be glad to avail myself of the services of Mr. Consul General Seward, and shall expect to profit by his experience, if he goes. He has shown your instructions to me, and invited me to join the expedition. If he reaches China in season after his visit to India, where he goes for the winter, he may accompany me.

In order that the Coreans may not have any grounds on which to base technical objections, I have, most respectfully, to request that a commission may be sent, by the steamer leaving San Francisco not later than the 1st of March next, authorizing me to negotiate and sign on behalf of the United States such treaty or treaties with the government of Corea as my be deemed advisable.

During the winter I shall use every exertion to obtain information in regard to this unknown country from the Chinese authorities, and also, if pos-
sible, from the Korean officers accompanying the Tribute which reaches Peking annually in December or January.

The North German minister in Japan attempted to open communication with Korea last summer. To facilitate his proceedings, he took a Japanese official with him, hoping by this means to reach the government of Korea. I inclose copy of an extract from a letter from the minister in Japan to the North German minister in Peking. (Inclosure A,) giving a brief account of his visit and hasty departure. From this it appears that the Coreans are disposed to seize upon any subterfuge to oppose the entrance of foreigners into their dominions.

As stated in a former dispatch, I am not sanguine of favorable results; at the same time the object aimed at is worthy of trial, and no effort on my part shall be wanting to accomplish it.

I have etc.,

Frederick F. Low.

Inclosure A.

Extract from a letter from M. Von Brandt, minister of the North German Union in Japan, to Baron de Rehfues, Peking.

The vicinity of Korea induced us to make a little trip in this direction, and we arrived there on the forenoon of the Ist of June.

The harbor of Fusang is excellent, but the country dreadful; quite bare and yellow, only in some few places overgrown with wood, and quite deficiently cultivated. The Japanese station is a miserable colliery, most houses of which are in ruins. They are inhabited by a half dozen officials, and thirty or forty coolies, who are not allowed to absent themselves farther than a half a mile from their lodgings, and are altogether very badly treated by the Coreans. My chief object was to obtain a clear insight into the whole matter, and through the interposition of an officer of the Japanese foreign office, whom we had on board, I requested the Japanese Chief of the factory to tell the Corean officials that, in case they were desirous to receive a communication regarding ship-wrecked German subjects, I could give them such information either on board or in the Japanese factory.

The answer to this proposition is highly characteristic, and will convey to you the plain truth about the state of affairs in these parts better than anything else. The Corean authorities thought it exceeding impudent that the Japanese had delivered a message of this kind, and they also declared it quite improper that some Japanese had dared to come to Corea on board a foreign vessel. For these reasons the relations between the Japanese officials and the Corean government must be broken off immediately and they were not to be resumed until a Japanese on board the foreign vessel had left the country. This proof will be sufficient for you. I hastened, of course, to assure the Japanese officials that I should be incon-
soluble if any difficulties were likely to result to the Japanese from the circumstance that some of their officers were on board our ship. We would start, therefore, as soon as possible. This Captain Kohler did, on the 2nd of June, after some gun-practice.

During a walk on shore, the people we met in the fields were tolerably courteous, but as we approached a village the whole of the inhabitants assembled in the street, offering passive resistance, and declaring that the Japanese were not allowed to go any farther. Of course we retreated courageously, and cannot complain about the people generally, who behaved themselves toward us in a more civilized manner than the brave Germans would have done toward the Coreans. They are strapping fellows, all dressed in white, as they are represented in pictures. Their villages and towns are miserable, like their junks and boats.

No arms whatever are to be seen, and are said to consist solely of match-boxes. During the gun-practice, a few thousand people with flags had assembled from a large town in the neighborhood, but on this occasion, too, no arms were seen.

No. 61.

No. 29.

Mr. Low to Mr. Fish,
Legation of the United States.
Peking, April 3, 1871

SIR: I have the honor to send herewith translations of a note from the Foreign Office, in reply to one from me requesting the good offices of the Chinese government to send a letter from me to the King of Corea.

The note you will observe, contains a declaration that, while Corea is considered and treated as a tributary kingdom, entire independence is conceded in all that relates to its government, religion, and intercourse with foreign nations. The declaration is made at this time, undoubtedly, to guard against complications that may possibly grow out of an attempt by foreign nations to open intercourse with Corea, and relieve this Government of all responsibility for the acts of the Coreans, whether hostile or otherwise.

It is altogether probable that this course has been adopted by the Chinese officials in consequence of the action of the representative of France, who assumed to hold China responsible for the acts of the Coreans who murdered and expelled the French missionaries in 1866.

The announcement that the sending of the letter is a departure from long-established custom and therefore exceptional, which must be construed into a precedent for granting similar favors in the future, is put forth in this way to be quoted in case any other government should ask a similar favor.

The timidity of the Chinese officials when called upon to perform any duty not in accordance with long-established precedent and custom is quite
apparent, and also their desire to avoid all complications which may by any possibility involve their government in difficulty.

The note in question also exhibits in rather a striking manner the superabundance of circumlocution with which all action of the officials is attended. This will be more apparent when you are informed that, prior to writing the letter in question or making any request to have it sent, I sought an interview with the members of the Foreign Office, at which I explained fully my purposes, the object I had in view and what I desired them to do and obtained from them a promise that my wishes should be complied with.

I have the honor, etc.

F. F. Low.

No. 1

Letter from the Foreign Office,
March 28th, 1871.

SIR: We were honored on the 7th, of this month by receiving your dispatch, in which you informed us that, as you had been appointed special envoy to go to Corea, there to negotiate upon matters of public interest, you had decided to send a letter to the authorities of that land, and therefore requested us to forward it on your behalf.

In relation to this request we may observe, that although Corea is regarded as a country subordinate to China, yet she is wholly independent in everything that relates to her government, religion, her prohibitions, and her laws; in none of these has China hitherto interfered. It was necessary, therefore, in order to forward your dispatch, for the Foreign Office to present a memorial, requesting that it might be transferred to the board of rites to be sent on; but we previously stated to you, that it is impossible to determine now whether the Corean authorities will return an answer.

On the 12th instant we memorized the throne requesting that the board of rites might be allowed to write a dispatch to accompany this letter to be forwarded to Corea, and notified that board at the same time. We have now received an answer from the board, stating that on the 22nd of this month His Majesty had been informed that this dispatch, carefully stated, had that day been transmitted to the board of war to be sent on by its couriers. This answer further stated that in all the relations of China with its dependent states the long-established rules of the board of rites had never contained any provision about forwarding letters to them; the permission now granted for it to do such a thing was therefore only for this occasion; it was an extraordinary favor, quite in excess of usage, and one which could not, on any account, be again granted.
We, therefore make known the reply to your excellency; and while doing so avail ourselves of the opportunity to wish that you may enjoy daily happiness.

Cards of Wansaing
Paoyun
Tung Siun
Shin Kwei-fan
Mao Chang Hi
Tsunglum
Chinglin.

Mr. Low to Mr. Fish.

No. 91. On Board of flag-ship Colorado,
No. 69. Harbor of Nagasaki, May 13th, 1871.

SIR: I have the honor to report my arrival in this harbor in the flag-ship Colorado, on the morning of the 12th instant, having left Shanghai on the 8th instant. Our departure from Shanghai was delayed several days in consequence of the necessity of the admiral's presence there in arranging for the repairs of the Ashuelot, and other business pertaining to his fleet, the Monocacy and Palos accompanied the Colorado, and are now in the harbor. We found the Benicia and Alaska here awaiting our arrival. The fleet expects to sail on Tuesday the 16th instant, and, if nothing unusual occurs, will reach the coast of Corea in three or four days thereafter. The admiral has gathered all the information possible in regard to the coasts, harbors, and rivers of Corea, and I have collected all the data that can be found, private as well as public, about that country and its inhabitants. It is, however, meager, and not to be relied upon as a guide for action.

The fact is that Corea is more of a sealed book than Japan was before Commodore Perry's visit. The scanty information obtainable, if taken as a guide, will be more likely to mislead than otherwise, and hence I shall consider personal observation and experience as the only safe and reliable basis from which to form conclusions, and on which to found action.

I apprehend that all the cunning and sophistry which enter so largely into oriental character will be brought to bear to defeat the object of our visit, and if that fails it is not unlikely that we may be met with a display of force. It is impossible to say what the exact line of action will be, as so much depends upon the temper of the Corean officials. I hope that the object sought for may be accomplished peacefully; but if it becomes necessary to use force, I shall endeavor to confine it to repelling unprovoked attacks, and redressing actual wrongs and insults. It is mistaken policy when
dealing with oriental governments and people to allow insults and injuries to go unredressed.

Such lenity leads them to believe that fear alone prevents retaliation, and adds to their arrogance, conceit, and hostility.

It gives me pleasure to add that I am comfortably situated on the flagship, and every disposition is manifested to contribute to my convenience and comfort. Admiral Rodgers exhibits an anxiety to render the mission a successful one, and I doubt not there will be entire concurrence and cooperation between us on all measures which may be deemed necessary for the public interest. It is doubtful if I shall be able to communicate with you again until the mail leaves Shanghai July 12.

I have the honor, &c.,

Frederick F. Low.

No 32.
Mr. Low to Mr. Fish.
On Board flag-ship Colorado,

Off Isle Boisée, Corea, May 31st, 1871.

SIR: Referring to my No. 65, of 25th ultimo, and No. 69, of 18th instant, I have now the honor to report my safe arrival at this point yesterday afternoon. The other ships of the squadron are also at this anchorage. The ships left Nagasaki on the 16th instant, Ferrière Islands, off the coast of Corea being designated by the admiral as the place of rendezvous. From there to this anchorage our progress has been slow, it being necessary to send the smaller vessels and the steam-launches ahead to explore the channels before proceeding with the larger vessels. Dense fogs for several days further hindered our progress. This accounts for the length of the voyage.

A map which is inclosed herewith will give you a general idea of the configuration of the coast, the position of the squadron at the present moment, and an outline of the water approach to the capital, as well as the general direction by land and the approximate distance by either route. This map is made from the explorations and surveys of the French squadron when here in 1866, and has been found as far as verified, substantially correct. The distance from here to the capital by water is about fifty miles; by land about half as much. It is believed that it will be found impracticable to move the Colorado, Alaska, and Benicia any farther up without great risk. The Monocacy and Palos can undoubtedly go to Seoul by taking advantage of the tides, the rise and fall of which varies from 20 to 40 feet. These extraordinary tides cause very rapid currents varying from four to eight miles an hour in velocity.

When we reached an anchorage off Eugénie Island the Palos and four steam-launches were sent northward to sound the channels as far as this point. They met with no resistance, nor was any attempt made by the na-
tives to communicate with either the launches or the vessel. I inclose here-with copies of my instructions to Captain Blake, of the United States steamer Alaska, who was placed in command of the surveying expedition. I also sent with him as interpreter Mr. John P. Cowles Jr., acting assistant secretary of the legation. Inclosed you will find his report of the incidents that occurred on the trip. While lying at the anchorage, near Eugénie Island, boats were sent out sounding in the immediate vicinity. The first day the natives fled to the hills upon the approach of the boats to the shore. The second curiosity evidently overcame their fears, and some came down to the beach near the boats and handed to the officers some slips of paper written in Chinese, inquiring where we were from, what was our business, etc., etc.

As their actions, appeared to be friendly I ordered a reply to be returned, giving assurance of our friendly intentions, and sent Captain Nichols, Chief of the admirals's staff, and Mr. Drew, on shore to deliver it. They met the people assembled about fifty in number, and had some conversation with them. No official appeared acknowledging himself as such.

Soon after the ship anchored here, yesterday, a native boat made its appearance near by, the men on board holding up a letter and beckoning for some one on the ship to come and get it. Mr. Drew went off in a boat, boarded the junk, and got the letter, a copy of which, together with my reply, I have the honor to inclose. The men in the junk were invited on board the ship, where they came without hesitation, and a considerable conversation ensued between them and Captain Nichols and Mr. Drew. They said that three officials of the third rank were waiting at a place near here, having been sent down by the government to see and to inquire into our particular business, and that they had been sent by the three officials to bring their note. These men were informed that the three officials referred to would be received on board whenever they chose to come. In the reply which was returned the officials were informed that a surveying party would proceed up towards Kang-hoa; that the common people need not be alarmed at their approach, as our intentions were entirely peaceful. The messengers were verbally requested to ask the officials to send word up the river to the people not to molest the surveying vessels, and thus avoid all chance of trouble. The assurance of our peaceful disposition was accepted with indications of much satisfaction.

To-day the three officials came on board, and as they appeared to be of minor rank and failed to exhibit any authority from the government I declined to see them, and substituted Mr. Drew and Mr. Cowles to meet them in my stead. They were again informed that the surveying vessels would go up higher to-morrow, and were assured of our desire to avoid trouble in every way. They made no objection, but, on the contrary, gave tacit assurances that the expedition would meet with nothing but civility and kindness from the natives. Mr. Drew also informed them that the minister on board
had important business with the government, which would be made known to a person of equal rank duly appointed by the King, and that it was our desire to establish peaceful relations between the two countries which would be lasting. They acknowledged having seen my letter written at Peking, and stated that while the King desired to maintain friendly relations, he did not desire to make treaties—a treaty in their estimation meaning trade.

In reply they were informed by Mr. Drew that he was not authorized to discuss these points, and that all this could with propriety be left for discussion when a high official came to meet the minister. They were shown over the ship, and upon their leaving Mr. Drew requested that a report of the interview might be made known to the King, to which they made no objections. What the result will be it is as yet premature to predict. I place little confidence in oriental professions of friendliness. Every effort will be made to avoid trouble, unless forced upon us in a way that cannot be escaped without dishonor.

Frederick F. Low.

I have, etc.,
List of inclosures.
No. 1. Map West coast of Corea.
No. 2. First letter of instructions to Captain Blake.
No. 3. Second " " " "
No. 4. Report by Mr. Cowles of surveying voyage from Rcze Roads.
No. 5. Note of May 30 from Corean Officials.
No. 6. Note of May 30 to Corean officials.

Inclosure No. 2.

Frederick F. Low to Homer C. Blake.

Sir: Herewith I beg to hand you a sealed letter, written in Chinese and directed to the King of Corea, which I desire you to forward to its destination by an official of the highest rank you may meet, if you find such a course practicable. If no official makes his appearance during your explorations south of the island of Kang-hoa, you will retain the letter until you reach an anchorage opposite the city of the same name upon that island.
If, upon your arrival there, no officials make their appearance, through whom you can communicate with the capital, it is my wish that you shall write a note in your own name, with your rank attached, to the highest official resident at Kang-hoa, informing him that you are the bearer of an important dispatch from the minister of the United States to the government of Corea, which it is desired shall reach its destination without unusual delay, asking him at the same time whether it will be more convenient for him to forward the letter, or whether, by declining this service, he will leave the United States minister free to seek such other means of communicating with the capital as shall be by him deemed advisable.
If an official undertakes to deliver this letter, you will endeavor to procure a proper acknowledgment in writing, of his promise, and, if practicable, get him to name the time when and the place the answer will be returned. If, during your trip to Kang-hoa, you will find no one who will undertake to perform the service, you will return the letter to me with a report of your proceedings.

It is not unlikely that you will be visited by natives, both official and unofficial, who will make inquiries concerning the visit of the squadron, and the objects we have in view. It is my desire that neither you nor the officers under your command shall hold conversations with any except officials, with reference to the object of my visit or that of the squadron. In conversation with officials, and in reply to the inquiries they will probably make, you are at liberty to say that I am sent by the President of the United States to arrange important matters with the government of Corea, the particulars of which will be fully and frankly made known when a person of suitable rank and station is duly appointed to meet and confer with me; that I desire nothing but what is reasonable and proper, and which I cannot doubt will be agreed to after the government shall be made acquainted with my requests; that I do not expect that this can be done in a few days, and therefore I have come prepared to spend a considerable time upon the coast, in order that a thorough understanding may be arrived at which will render the friendship of the two countries firm and lasting; that considerable delay will undoubtedly be necessary in order that the difficult channels may be explored and sounded, and thus rendered safe for the larger vessels to approach nearer to the capital, where it is my wish that negotiations may be carried on; which delay will afford ample time for the government to consider and discuss the matter, and enable it to give an answer, probably, by the time I shall have reached the capital or some point in its vicinity.

If they ask why so many ships-of-war have come on a professedly peaceful errand, you can reply that a minister of my rank does not travel except in a dignified manner befitting his mission, with force sufficient to repel attacks, and chastise all who may molest or insult the minister or the flag of the country he represents.

Mr. John P. Cowles, Jr., acting assistant secretary of legation will accompany you as interpreter.

Relying upon your good judgement and tact to successfully carry out my wishes, I am, etc.

F. F. Low.
Inclosure No. 3.
Frederick F. Low to H. C. Blake.
On Board flag-ship Colorado, May 23, 1871.

Sir: With this you will find a general letter which I had prepared for your guidance during your preliminary trip to the northward. Inasmuch as you will not proceed as far as the island of Kang-hoa, before returning to the flag-ship, I do not send the letter for transmission to the King of Corea. I shall retain it here; and if you meet any officials desirous of learning the object of our visit to the coast you will be guided by the tenor of the general letter accompanying this in your conversation with them. You will further inform them that I am on board the flag-ship, and have a letter which I desire to send to the government.

Respectfully yours,
Frederick F. Low.

Inclosure No. 4.
John P. Cowles Jr., to F. F. Low.
U. S. flag-ship Colorado, Roze Roads,
Corea, May 29th, 1871.

Sir: I have to report that, in obedience to your instructions, I accompanied Blake in charge of a surveying expedition up towards the mouth of the Salée River, leaving on the morning of the 24th, in the steamship Palos, and with four fully equipped steam-launches, reached Boisée Island at noon of the 26th, and found there a fine harbor equal to all requirements. It was ascertained upon the trip up, by the thorough investigation of the commanders of the launches, that the Gulf de l'Imperatrice is a shoal bay, which though reaching far in towards Seoul, and that too in a direction where the air-line to Seoul would cross much less elevated land than generally prevails is yet too shoal to admit vessels of even light draft. Numerous junks were observed in the N. E. of this gulf, and it is surmised that in that neighborhood lies the approach to Jen-chuan, a place which should, by the maps be not less important officially than Kang-hoa, and can lie but five miles or so below Boisée. The launches were in some cases shouted to by natives, some displaying bows and arrows, some matchlocks; but the greater part of the population were unarmed, and showed alarm by retreating to the clumps of trees on the hill tops. The islands are, only in exceptional cases wooded, and water seemed not very abundant. The Tache Blanche, four miles below Round Island, was visited at low water and declared to show many indications of iron.

The French charts were found remarkably accurate, except that not all the barriers to seaward can be substantiated. The navigation in clear weather as far as Isle Boisée would be very easy. Plenty of water can be
carried to Boisée. The water there is still salt, supporting the sobriquet given by the French of Salt River.

We saw no indication of fortifications until we approached Boisée: this island and Roze Island, a narrow passage of a mile and a half, existing between the main land and the large island Tung-Tjong to the west. On the eastern end of this island—Tung-Tjong—is the village with a rather Japanese like wall, with a sea-front of perhaps a mile and a half. The wall is, perhaps, 15 ft. high, but not, apparently, thick. Its age would seem to point back to Japanese tuition. Launches could not approach it within a dozen rods at high tide, if the position of fishing-boats, lying under the flats of it at low tide, be evidence.

The inhabitants were spying at us from hiding places about the wall, as we came before the place with our decks cleared for action. The next morning, (May 27) the alarm had spread, men were coming in from the neighborhood, and some two hundred troops or armed citizens, paraded under military mandarins, armed with sharpened wooden-lances, banners etc. The mandarins are in the uniform described in Belcher's "Voyage of the Samarang" to Quelpart: peacock feathers in the hat, pink or scarlet cuffs turned back, tunic of gray and mantle or cloak of dark blue. On the morning of our third day at Boisée, as we left there seemed little or no excitement. A few curious were peeping at the vessels from behind corners of houses in the village and those who moved more to the front and into our view were warned back by the mandarins. The walls were without guns so far as we could see: gingalls they may nevertheless have. A ferry crosses to the mainland from the above village and a path runs from the ferry-landing towards Seoul.

By ferry is meant a single sampan, making perhaps, a dozen trips a day. Island Boisée is quite exceptional in being wooded, and it is worth inquiry whether it may not be one of those wooded and sacred islets never disturbed but by robber-Chinese sailors. Toward the northwest of the above island, with the walled village, exist other villages and weirs for fishing. We saw several Corean two-masted vessels, of from ten to eight tons burden, but they avoided us. It is thought that, had launches gone within bow-shot of the sea-wall of the above village on Saturday morning, May 27th, during the great excitement, of especially the military portion of the community, it is probable they would have run great risk of being fired into. The next day when, after taking ineffectual departure, we were driven back for shelter, we found them quiet. It is thought the eight mile wall along the river edge of Kang-hoa Island is probably similar to that above the village. Also, that the surprised and excited, but soon pacified, conduct of the islanders points to no special influence or command from the court authorities in this instance but is rather the carrying out of the traditional habit toward foreigners. It is therefore thought that we shall meet the same surprised conduct in
natives till we eventually reach some place where special instructions have been, or shall have been, sent down from the court for either peaceable or hostile reception.

The Palos would appear to be indispensable as a base of supplies, etc., and for the launches which, from their complicated wants, need of some reliable store on which to draw to meet emergencies almost hourly arising in their excursions; such as want of water, coal, kindlingwood, and repairs—the latter by no means unfrequently. With such a movable base, a boat force is almost as much at home before Seoul as at Boisee.

The temper of the village on the 27th forenoon may prove of value in showing that the meeting of both sides with arms in hand (as was the case in Japan when Commodore Perry sent the President's letter on shore) may pass off without accident, for their sudden pacification on the morning of the 28th shows it to have been a temporary excitement, very dangerous while it lasts, but better than a settled line of policy of 'shoot whoever lands—cold blood or hot blood matters not,' which we might have anticipated.

We enjoyed most favorable weather. The sun's heat was never oppressive. The nights were rather cool.

The country appears thus far poorer than North China. Only a small portion of the houses of a village are tiled. The yamen is far from creditable, from a Chinese point of view, and few buildings equal the yamen.

If a collision was the thing most immediately to be deprecated, launch work similar to the above, with orders not to land, would seem the safest measure to prevent it, yet as they also soon show themselves peaceable, the excitement dies. The numerous trips of the launches, too, make each launch's total of impression upon the natives perhaps equal to that of a larger steamer. The demonstration of launches into the northeast of the Gulf de l'Imperatrice was not carried out—the weather being too rough to permit the launches to succeed in reaching the east of the bay. The land seems to break down in the direction of Seoul, as per French chart. Numerous vessels were reported in the northeast bight of the gulf, and it is thought their destination may have been the Jen-chuan of the map, where officials, perhaps slightly inferior to those of Kang-hoa, may be located.

As, in accordance with instructions, intercourse with the natives was rather avoided than sought, I was not called on for any service as interpreter etc.,

As the character of the fine force under Admiral Rodgers has and will come under your own observation, it is unnecessary for me to express my individual admiration of the faithful execution of duty which brought to completion the above reconnaissance and survey; one carried out with no small discomfort to the officers in the launches, and during the rough weather of the 28th at their no little personal risk.

Very respectfully, etc.,

John P. Cowles, Jr.,
Inclosure No. 5.

Translation of note in Chinese, undirected and undisguised, brought by four Coreans to the Colorado at Isle Boisée, from three officials, on the afternoon of the 30th of May.

A day or two since, on the transmission of your honorable missive from Nam Yang Foo, the court for the first time recognized that your honorable ships are (the ones) sent from America to enter our humble confines. Thereupon the officers (who are the writers of this) were sent forward to ask particulars (of your mission). Your vessels lie at anchor out in the sea, and as ours are not used to going to and fro in the stormy waves, we remain temporarily on the sea-shore of Jên-Chuan Foo. We first make this announcement and wait a few words in reply.

4th Moon, 12th day, (May 30th, 1871)

E. B. Drew.

Inclosure No. 6.

English version of note in Chinese handed to four Coreans in reply to a note brought by them to the Colorado at Isle Boisée, from three officials, on the afternoon of May 30th.

A note inquiring into the circumstances of the American ships coming into these waters has been received, and the purport communicated to the minister and the admiral.

His excellency, the minister, instructs me to send a reply, saying that the ships have come to bring a high envoy, who has important business with the government of this country: that he does not doubt that persons of high rank will in due time be appointed to confer with him, to whom it will be proper to make known his business; that he will remain on board the ship here for several days, to wait for any communication the government may make; but in the meantime the smaller vessels of the fleet will make explorations farther on, in order that the large ships may move nearer the capital, in case the minister deems it necessary; that the common people need not be afraid of the ships harming them so long as the people on board are treated with civility and kindness; and the minister and admiral hope that such instructions will be given to the people, so that no trouble may occur.

E. B. Drew.
No. 71.

Mr. Low to Mr. Fish.
Near Isle Bosiéé, Corea, June 2nd, 1871.

SIR: Our peaceful operations looking to the opening of negotiations with Corea, met with a sudden and unexpected but not unprepared check yesterday. As had been previously announced to some officials that came on board, the Monocacy, Palos, and four steam-launches started yesterday to explore the passage northward between the mainland and the island of Kangwha. These officials were informed that our intentions were peaceful, and that no one would be harmed or disturbed unless we were attacked; but that if the vessels or their crew were molested in their peaceful operations, force would be met by force. The admiral placed the expedition under the immediate command of Captain Blake of the "Alaska," and, with my assent and approval, instructed him to proceed cautiously, avoiding all menace, through the passage before referred to, taking careful soundings, and making such scientific observations as would enable a correct chart of the channel to be made. Captain Blake was further instructed, in case a hostile attack was made, either upon his men or vessels, to reply by force, and destroy, if possible, the places and the people from which the attack came; that any advantage gained should not be pursued by landing a force, but that he should quietly proceed in the further prosecution of the work in view until he reached the northerly part of the island of Kangwha, and, if found to be practicable should go a few miles up the river Seoul, but not attempt to reach the capital. After doing this he was directed to return to the flag-ship and report the results of his proceedings. The two letters of instructions with reference to communicating with the natives, which had been given him on a previous occasion, Captain Blake still retained for his guidance on the present expedition. I also sent Mr. John P. Cowles, Jr., acting assistant secretary of legation, with him as interpreter.

The vessels of the expedition left the anchorage here at 12 o'clock M., and steamed slowly, sounding as they went, without meeting or seeing any signs of hostile resistance until they reached a sharp point in the river indicated on the map as Fort DuConde. This name was given to the point by the French Admiral, when he visited the locality in 1866. When the two vessels and three of the launches came directly in range of the two batteries situated opposite each other, one on either side of the river, the matting and brush which concealed the guns were suddenly thrown aside and a fire opened upon them. I enclose a report from Mr. Cowles, to which I beg to refer for full particulars of the engagement.

The vessels silenced the batteries and drove the enemy from their fortifications. An unfortunate accident to the Monocacy, caused by striking
upon a rock, induced Captain Blake to return before proceeding further. The Secretary of the Navy will receive a report in detail of the operations of the Navy, to which I am obliged to refer you if particulars are desired.

That the attack was unprovoked and wanton and without the slightest shadow of excuse, must be apparent to you as it is to me; for all our operations hitherto have been conducted with the greatest caution, in the hope that the assurances of our peaceful intentions, which were sent to the court from Peking, supplemented by similar protestations here, and coupled with absence of all ostentatious show of war, would so fully persuade the government of our good faith that the result aimed at might be accomplished without the use of even the display of force.

The events of yesterday convince me that the government of Corea is determined to resist all innovations and intercourse with all the power at its command, without regard to nationality, or the nature of the demands made; and that all overtures will be treated alike, whether they look to the opening of the country and the residence and trade of foreigners, or whether they are confined, as I have endeavored to securing humane treatment for our unfortunate countrymen who may be thrown by the perils of the sea upon these shores, whose safety and welfare depend, under present circumstances, upon the magnanimity of the semi-barbarians and hostile race.

The question now is, what is the safe and prudent course to pursue, in view of the temporary check, which the Coreans will undoubtedly construe into a defeat of the "barbarians," but which, according to the recognized rules of civilized warfare, was a complete victory on the part of the naval forces. In estimating the effect it may exert upon our power and prestige, which will effect the interests of our people in the East, the situation must be viewed from an oriental standpoint, rather than the more advanced one of Christian civilization. If the squadron retires now, the effect upon the minds of the Coreans, and, I fear, upon the Chinese also, will be injurious, if not disastrous to our future prospects in both countries. Corea will rest firmly in the belief that she is powerful enough to repel any of the Western states singly, or even all of them combined; and this opinion will be likely to react upon China, and strengthen the influence of those who insist that it is practicable to drive out by force all the foreign residents. In view of these considerations, I cannot advise the admiral to abandon the field without further attempts at redress for the wrongs and insults which our flag has suffered; at the same time I am fully impressed as to the inadequacy of the force at his command to carry on offensive operations to conquer this people and compel the government to enter into proper treaty engagements. The configuration of the coast, studded with islands; the shallowness of the rivers; the rise and fall of the tides, which vary from 20 to 40 feet; the rapidity of the currents in the rivers, and in passages between the islands and the mainland; the mountainous and broken character of the country bordering upon the coast and rivers; the distance of the capital and the
other principal cities from the navigable waters, present obstacles which are not easy to be overcome without the presence of a considerable land and naval force acting in conjunction.

My own view is that a sufficient force should be sent back to the place where the vessels were attacked yesterday, to take and effectually destroy the fortifications above that place as far as the northerly end of the island of Kangwha. This the admiral expects to do, provided, he finds his forces are able to do it without incurring too much risk. That would make a virtual though not declared, blockade of the entrance of the River Seoul, which leads to the capital, which can be kept up until the northern channel is sounded, and will afford active and useful occupation for the vessels of the squadron until the further orders and instructions of the President can be received. It may possibly lead the government to make terms. Of this, however, I am not sanguine.

It is quite impossible to foretell what course events in the future may compel me to pursue. In any case, I shall not lose sight of the main object the Government had in sending me here, and shall endeavor to comply with the spirit as well as the letter of my instructions in the most peaceful and conciliatory manner compatible with the dignity of the Government I represent, and the honor of its flag. I am not unmindful of the fact that the general policy of the Government, is peace, and that hostile operations in a distant portion of the world are to be most carefully avoided. But when the representative of the Government, and upon a peaceful mission in the interest of humanity, is met by uncalled for attack, as has been the case here, any hesitation on my part in sanctioning the seeking of redress for the wrongs and insults which we have suffered might properly be set down as shrinking from a responsibility, which I have no right to do, with the vast interests intrusted to my care. The admiral will send a telegram to the Secretary of the Navy, and I shall send a short one referring you to the Navy Department for details.

I have, etc.,

Frederick F. Low.

Inclosures

No. 1. Mr. Cowle's report of the surveying expedition above Isle Boisee, and the engagement of Fort Du Conde, of June 1.

No. 2. Copy of Telegram to the Secretary of State.
Inclosure No. 1.

Mr. J. P. Cowles, Jr., to Mr. Low.
United States Ship Colorado,
Isle of Boisée, Corea, June 2, 1871.

SIR: In accordance with your instructions, I yesterday joined Captain Blake upon the S. S. Palos, to accompany a surveying expedition up the River Salée as interpreter; You informed me that intercourse with the Coreans would be neither sought nor avoided; and that answer to civil inquiries about our purposes would be that yourself and Admiral Rogers had already explained to officials from the court that it was our peaceful intention to survey the approaches to the Seoul River so soon as the delay yourself and the admiral offered to make, that they might assure the population along the margin of the river of our friendly character, had expired; that we should land only at uninhabited points, and that all nations offer facilities for such surveys of their coasts.

The party started at noon of the 1st. instant, and consisted of the four steam-launches, under command of Lieutenant Commander Chester, Lieutenants Meade and Totten, and Master Schroeder; the Monocacy, Commander McCrea, and the Palos, flying Commander Blake's flag, as the officer in charge of the whole expedition, and under command of Lieutenant Commander Rockwell.

The launches led and indicated the channel to the gunboats following. Master Schroeder followed a mile behind delayed by momentary accident.

Going northerly rapidly upon the river, passing numerous forts to the left, on islands, and to the right on the mainland. At 2 P. M. we were passing around an elbow of land to the east of our generally northerly direction. As we were entering a whirl, as bad as that of Hell Gate, New York, full of eddies and ledges, and immediately under a fort on the end of the elbow above mentioned, mats and screens were suddenly alive with the discharge of eighty pieces of artillery directly into the launches which were under the forts. The launches, as fast as the whirls and eddies allowed, turned their howitzers to the fort, and threw in some 80 rounds of shells. The gun-boats, though in the midst of a perilous navigation, trained their guns on the fort, and the Monocacy's 8-inch shell frightened the men in the batteries so much that they fled precipitately, and wrenching up their innumerable flags and standards, retreated to ravines and brush cover, further back on the neck of the peninsula. The banner of "Generalissimo", as it appeared to be, in the headquarters on the top of the hill, was left flying.

The launches and gun-boats were swept rapidly past to above and to the rear of the batteries. There they anchored, and leisurely shelled the forts and ravines near.

The Benicia's launch, Master Schroeder, being delayed by accident, was later in reaching the forts. Instead of avoiding the almost certain fate which
running the batteries threatened, he pressed through to join his comrades above the fort, firing as he passed. They came through without harm, though they were met with the splash of the water about them. The "Monocacy" having struck a ledge, and leaking, the further pursuit of the survey, had to be postponed, and the party returned to the fleet at Boisée Island. The few shells thrown into the forts as we returned elicited no reply. The scientific character of the expedition had prevented orders being given to cover such an emergency. The party were therefore forced to return without spiking the guns and bringing away the headquarter's flag of the enemy, as all were eager to be permitted to do.

Some two hundred discharges of light and heavy guns must have been made in the ten minutes that the launches were beneath the forts, and how the launches escaped with only two wounded seems marvelous. The guns were noticed as we returned, and lay nearly as thick together as gun to gun, and gun behind gun on the place of an ordinance store.

The pluck of all engaged, but especially of the launches, words can do no justice to. Admiral Rodgers comment you must allow me as mine: "There is no lack of pluck in the American people."

I have the honor, etc.,

J. P. Cowley, Jr.

Inclosure No. 2.

Copy of a telegram sent this day to George F. Seward, Shanghai, to be forwarded from there by telegraph, June 3rd, 1871.

(Telegram.)

Coast of Corea, June 3rd, 1871.

My overtures of peace have been met by wanton attack upon surveying party. See Secretary of State, Washington, United States.

Low.

The above is a true copy.

F. F. Low.

No. 34.

Mr. Low to Mr. Fish
On Board Flag-Ship Colorado
Off Boisée Island, Corea, June 15th, 1871.

SIR: On the evening of the 10th instant a Corean junk came along-side and from the actions on board we concluded that they desired to communicate with the ship. The interpreter whom I sent to ascertain their business, reported that the people on the junk were Christians; that three Catholic priests were looked for on the coast, and hearing that a foreign fleet had arrived, they naturally expected the priests would have availed themselves of
the opportunity to come. Their business was to ascertain whether any priests were on board our ships, and if so, to put the junk at their service, to convey them to any point they might choose. The coming of these people naturally excited my suspicion, but subsequent questioning fully satisfied me of their good faith. The zeal and religious enthusiasm which had induced them to run such risks to find their priests, impressed me profoundly with the power which the Romish church is able to exercise over an alien and ignorant people. These men evidently belong to the peasantry, as but few of them have any education. They were quite free to communicate any information they possessed, but owing to their ignorance and the difficulty of acquiring authentic information in such a country as this, their statements cannot be relied upon, except concerning facts that have come under their personal observation.

They represent that there is great discontent among the people generally caused by the tyrannical conduct of the government and the exactions of the local authorities; that the will of the officials is the only law, and that summary executions is the universal penalty adjudged for its violation. They represent the number of Christians in the country prior to the persecutions of 1866 at 30,000, of whom 10,000 were sacrificed at the time the French priests were massacred; that not only the remaining 20,000 Christians but a large minority, if not a majority of the people beside, desire the overthrow of the present despotic and tyrannical government, and would join any movement foreign nations might make which would accomplish the result. As failure would involve the certain destruction of the natives who might join foreigners, it could not be expected that the standard of revolt would be raised until success could be reasonably assured. From them we gained considerable information in regard to the principal cities and their relative importance. The most important intelligence, however, was a connected and apparently truthful account of the destruction of the American schooner "General Sherman", in the Ping Yang River, in 1866. (See Diplomatic Correspondence 1867, Part 1 pp. 426, 427, 428.)

One of the Christians affirms that he resided near the scene of the disaster, and was perfectly familiar with the whole proceeding. His story appears so reasonable when tested by the other information I have been able to gather concerning this people and their acts, that I feel bound to say that in my opinion it is substantially true. He says the people on board the schooner were enticed on shore by fair promises of civil treatment and trade, were entertained and treated to drugged spirit during which they were fallen upon suddenly, seized and bound and all massacred. Some were beheaded, and the others were beaten to death with clubs, the cargo was taken out, and the vessel burned to get the iron used in her construction. They further say that the cannon found on board were taken out and sent to the capital, from which patterns were made and guns manufactured. This story was told in a straightforward manner without undue question-
ing. On the contrary, the interpreter endeavored to obtain a voluntary statement of the General Sherman affair, in order to test the good faith and truthfulness of these people. It corresponds so nearly with the account given by the French priests at the time, that I consider it more entitled to credence than the report of the officials made to the Commander of the Shenandoah, or that to the board of rites, Peking. It is unreasonable to suppose that the persons on board the schooner, the owner of which was largely interested in the cargo, would inaugurate hostile proceedings to force the natives to open trade; it is to be presumed rather that, as they were bent on trade and gain, they would endeavor by conciliation to induce the people to purchase the cargo. To be sure, the attempt to open commercial relations with this people had not the previous sanction of treaty right or the permission of the government of Corea in any way, the entrance of the vessel into Corean waters being in violation of the laws and policy of the country. And while this is the fact, it affords no justicication for the action of the government or people in the destruction of the vessel and cargo, and still less for the massacre of the people on board. The statements of the officials which have been reiterated so often and with such persistency are scarcely worthy of credence, and should be received with great caution. Were they honest in the belief that their action can be justified, or the truth of their statements substantiated. Why did they appease so persistently and prevent the Shenandoah and Wachuset from going to the spot where the vessel was wrecked, and making inquiry of the people who witnessed the whole affair, and thus satisfy the government of the United States of the real facts? And why are the officials of all grades so profuse in their protestations to me of the primary offense of the people on board the schooner, and so anxious lest I should desire to make further inquiries into the facts? The government in its communication to the board of rites, Peking, you will observe, takes great pains to throw the whole responsibility for the disaster upon the foreigners, and insists that the statements shall be received and accepted without question by that of the United States. In view of all the evidence, direct and circumstantial, which I have been able to gather the conviction is forced upon me that the statements of the Corean government in regard to the General Sherman case are unreliable and unworthy of belief, and that if the exact facts could be known, it would be found that the vessel was plundered and then burned, and the men on board wantonly and treacherously massacred.

It remains for the government of the United States to say whether further efforts shall be made to ascertain the facts, and if the government of Corea is found to be culpable, to demand and inforce means of redress, or whether the statements of the semi-barbarians and hostile people shall be received without question in justification of their acts or robbery and murder, committed upon the property and people of the United States.

I have etc.,

Frederick F. Low.
Mr. Low to Mr. Fish.

On Board Flag-Ship Colorado,
Near Boisée Island, Corea, June 20th, 1871.

SIR: My dispatches Nos. 70 and 71 informed you of all that had occurred up to the 2nd instant, including the hostile reception the smaller vessels met with while absent on a surveying expedition. In addition, the latter contained my opinions with reference to what should be done immediately, without waiting further instructions, to prevent danger to the lives and property of our people in China as well as Corea. A careful review of the situation in consultation with the admiral, confirmed me in the opinions I had formed; and also that the dignity of the United States would be seriously compromised unless reparation be sought, and enforced if necessary, for the unprovoked assault upon the vessels. It also seemed reasonable that a demonstration such as was contemplated would, if successful, convince the government that we would not tamely submit to insult and injury, and so impress it with a sense of our ability to redress wrongs as to cause it to be more careful in the future. Nor did it seem likely that such a step would by any possibility lessen the chances of negotiation, and it might improve them, for evidences were multiplying that all our overtures made in a conciliatory spirit would be pre-emptorily rejected. Although fully impressed with this belief and skeptical in regard to any favorable results coming through delay, I still deemed it my duty to discourage hasty action, and advised delay in seeking forcible redress and retaliation until the government should have had time to learn the facts and disavow its responsibility for the outrage, if the course of the military authorities was authorized. In this view the admiral fully concurred; and beside, our success would be rendered more certain by a delay of ten days, as the state of the tides would then be more favorable, which would insure greater safety to the vessels and more efficiency to their co-operation. It was also decided to confine the movement to the capture and destruction of the forts that had participated in the attack upon our vessels and not to go beyond that point, although abundant precedent could be found to justify the infliction of the most extreme punishment and damage upon this government and people, after unprovoked hostilities had once been inaugurated by them in such a treacherous manner. I was the more inclined to confine our hostile efforts within these limits, because I doubted whether the President contemplated the use of force further than the redress of wrongs and insults, and because the capture and destruction of these defensive works would be likely to produce the same effect upon the government as any more extensive operations which did not include the occupation of the capital.

The correspondence with the local officials, copies and translations of which are herewith inclosed, will show the earnest and persistent efforts that
were made to adjust the difficulty amicably, and the stubborn reluctance of the government touching this particular affair, as well as all matters connected with my mission.

I deem it proper to observe, in this connection, that the history of negotiations and intercourse between western nations and oriental governments goes to prove that every artifice which human ingenuity can devise will be resorted to to maintain their own superiority, and prove to their people the absolute inferiority of foreigners. Refusal to negotiate is usually the first step, and when compelled by force or otherwise to recede from that position, every effort is made to induce foreign ministers to treat with native officials of low rank and position. As illustration of this peculiarity, I beg to call your attention to the communication from the King of Corea to the board of rites, Peking (inclosure 6). You will observe that a reply to my letter is evaded rather than refused. The King affirms, however, that “a minister of the emperor must not have relations with a foreign state”, and prays, “that the emperor (of China) will send forth a special edict to exhort and instruct” me in my duties.

My own observation and experience, as well as the experience of others, convinced me that concession on these points would lower my position, lessen my influence, and thus render the task more difficult; I therefore determined to adopt a firm and dignified policy—to demand as a right, and not solicit as a favor, those acts of courtesy due from one nation to another; to submit to no semblance of inferiority by consenting to consult or correspond with officials of inferior rank that might, and probably would be put forward to meet me; to seek such guarantees as would render reasonably safe the lives and property of American citizens that might be wrecked upon these shores as a right which the United States could properly claim for its citizens and not as a concession which Corea could grant or refuse with equal propriety. This course I have steadily pursued; and when officials of low rank came in person or wrote letters the secretaries were deputed to meet them and reply to their communications. This will explain why it is that the correspondence with the local officials has been conducted in the name of Mr. Drew.

The local official near here and his superior, the governor of Kang-Hoa, were informed that a disavowal of the responsibility for the outrage was expected from the government, and that, to enable this to be done, a reasonable time would be allowed; and it was clearly intimated that the failure of the government to comply with this reasonable demand would leave the admiral at liberty to pursue such a course as he might deem proper to obtain redress, see, inclosures 2 and 6). The replies of these officials (inclosures 3 and 4) contain, you will observe, nothing that can be construed into an apology. They simply express regret at the necessity, but approve of the acts of the military authorities. Indeed I feel sure that the governor of Kang-Hoa has military as well as civil jurisdiction, and is really the person who planned
the attack and issued the orders to fire upon the vessels. So great was the anxiety of the admiral as well as myself to avoid if possible, further hostilities, that orders were given to Captain Blake and Mr. Drew (inclosures 7 and 8) to cause hostilities to be suspended whenever they could obtain any reasonable assurance that peaceful negotiations would be assented to by the government. They did receive, while on the way up to the forts and before the attack was made, a communication from the Kang-Hoa magistrate, (inclosure 9) but as it contained only a repetition of his former statement they very properly paid no attention to it.

The expedition started on the 10th and returned on the 12th instant. The work it was sent to do was successfully and fully accomplished. Five forts were taken, which with the munitions of war found in them, were completely destroyed. About two hundred and fifty of the enemy's dead were counted lying on the field, fifty flags and several prisoners were captured and brought away; among the latter were some wounded. Several books, manuscripts, orders, etc., were found. The contents of these documents are interesting, and enable a better and more reliable estimate to be made respecting the attitude and action of the government than was possible from our previous sources of information.

It was deemed advisable to bring away but few prisoners, only a number sufficient to demonstrate that we do not treat prisoners that fall into our hands cruelly, and that wounded men, although enemies, are humanely and tenderly cared for. Our loss was three killed and nine wounded. For full particulars of the engagement I beg to refer you to the Navy Department, where complete reports of the admiral will be found.

All accounts concur in the statement that the Coreans fought with desperation, rarely equalled and never excelled by any people. Nearly all the soldiers in the main fort were killed at their posts. They exhibited a bravado and recklessness that it is hard to account for upon any other hypothesis than that finding there was no chance for escape, and believing that no quarter would be shown by us to prisoners, they concluded to perish fighting even after all hope of success was gone; either this, or that their government had threatened the soldiers defending that particular fort with dire retribution in case of defeat. Some such reasons must have existed, because there were outside of the fort, but in the immediate vicinity, several thousand troops which were kept at bay by the field artillery with small effort. Instead of recklessly rushing on to destruction, these troops showed little inclination to come within the range of the weapons of our troops. A proposition was made to release the prisoners on parole, (inclosure 10) to which a reply was returned (inclosure 11) saying that the prisoners had incurred a severe penalty from their own government by surrender, and it was immaterial whether they were released or not. After a detention of a few days they were all unconditionally released. It is to be hoped that our humane treatment and release of these prisoners may disabuse the minds of the common people of their unjust suspicions regarding
foreigners, and induce the government to spare the lives of those who may by misfortune or reverses in war fall into their hands.

The officers and men engaged in the expedition all behaved nobly. Their gallantry and heroism were conspicuous, reflecting upon themselves great credit, and upon the Navy and Government they represented honor and renown. I should be doing less than my duty were I to omit to add my testimony to these acts of devotion, or to acknowledge my obligations for the cheerful co-operation of Admiral Rodgers, and the zealous and efficient support of the officers of the fleet in all things where the honor or interests of the United States are involved.

On the 15th instant, I addressed a dispatch to the king, (inclosure 15) and caused it to be sent to the prefect of Foo-Ping-Foo with a request that it should be sent to the capital. It was returned on the 17th instant with a note from the prefect (inclosure 16) saying that he dare not forward a dispatch to his sovereign. To this I caused a reply to be sent (inclosure 17) requesting him either to send the dispatch or inform the court that I desired to communicate with His Majesty or a high minister. This met with the same refusal as the former one had, (see inclosure 18).

The first opportunity that offers will be availed of to open communication with the government, if it can be done without discredit, nor will my efforts to accomplish what the government desires be relaxed until all reasonable means are exhausted, and I am convinced that further delay will serve no useful purpose. I have, however, little hope of bringing the king to any proper terms. Everything goes to prove that the government from the first determined to reject all peaceful overtures for negotiation or even discussion; and that the recent demonstration, which would have produced a profound impression upon any other government, has little or no effect, favorable or otherwise, upon this. The operations of the 10th and 11th were more significant than those of the English and French in 1858, when the capture of the Taku forts at the mouth of the Peiho River, caused the government of China to immediately send ministers and conclude treaties at Tientsin, and yet this government shows no sign which leads to the belief that there is any change in its attitude of defiance to all other nations.

I have the honor, etc.,

F. F. Low.

Inclosures

1. Paper found attached to a pole on Guerriere Island, from the Prefect of Fu-Ping, 3rd of June, 1871.

2. Reply of Mr. Drew to prefect of Fu-ping, an explanation or disavowal of the attack of June 1 required, 5th June, 1871.
3. Prefect of Fu-Ping to Mr. Drew. Reply to foregoing will be made by his superior officer, 7th June, 1871.

4. Kang-Hoa high magistrate's reply to No. 2; attack of June 1st regretted but justified, 6th June, 1871.

5. King of Corea to board of rites, Peking.

6. Mr. Drew to Kang-Hoa high magistrate; his letter (No. 4) not satisfactory, 7th June, 1871.

7. Admiral Rodger's instructions to Captain Blake for Fort duConde expedition, 9th June, 1871.

8. Mr. Low's instructions to Mr. Dew, for same expedition, 9th June 1871.

9. Kang-Hoa high magistrate, to Mr. Low in reply to No. 6, 9th June, 1871.

10. Mr. Drew to Kang-Hoa high magistrate, prisoners will be released on parole, 13th June, 1871.

11. Prefect of Fu-Ping to Mr. Drew, in reply to No. 10, 14th June, 1871.

12. Prefect of Fu-Ping to Mr. Drew; indignant comments on the capture of Fort duConde, 12th June, 1871.

13. Memorandum of intimations that a reply is wanted to No. 12, 13th, and 14th June, 1871.

14. Mr. Drew to Prefect of Fu-Ping, in reply to No. 12, inclosing dispatch from Mr. Low to King of Corea, 14th June, 1871.

15. Mr. Low's dispatch to the King of Corea, 14th June, 1871.

16. Prefect of Fu-Ping to Mr. Drew, he declines to forward and returns Mr. Low's dispatch to the King, 17th June, 1871.

17. Mr. Drew to the Prefect of Fu-Ping, 18th June, 1871.

18. Prefect of Fu-Ping to Mr. Drew; reply to No. 17; still declines to forward the dispatch to the King; reason assigned, 20th June, 1871.

**Inclosure 1.**

Translation of paper found attached to a pole on Guerriére Island, 3rd June, 1871, brought on board the Colorado:

In the fourth month of the year, Mow-Chew (1868) Captain Febiger, captain of your honorable country's admiral's vessel, came and anchored in Jaw-Ho prefecture, Pingyang province. I was at that time the prefect. The communication between us offered no cause of offense, the one to the other, and the captain went away peacefully.

Now, again, your honorable country's vessels come and anchor within the borders of the prefecture of Foo-Ping, and truly in a different manner. I avail myself of this communication. Do not hold back your valued reply.

Our kingdom is placed east of the Eastern Sea. Your honored country is located west of the Western Ocean. All winds and sands for the extent of more than 70,000 li (23,000 miles). How can there ever have been vessels coming and going between us? From Tan-Chi (early Corean King) down
these 4,000 years there has been no communication between yours and ours. It may then well be said that it is Heaven's limitation that has placed us so far apart as to cut us off from each other.

Our respective dispositions are naturally dissimilar; our guiding principles are not alike.

We find that in the autumn of the year Ping Yin (Pyung In 1866) there suddenly arose a troublesome involvement (of us) in a matter of mutual concern. The destruction in Ping-Yang River (of the General Sherman) was brought swiftly on by themselves; and for the wreck in the Kang-Hoai prefecture, who is to be blamed?

There was formerly not a particle of ill-feeling existing between us. Why should arms now drag us into mutual resentment? Yet unless destruction lead (you) to repentence, you will again be taking upon you to constantly return toward us. What affairs would you transact? What words speak? Will you wish to take possession of our land people, or will you wish to consult upon and carry out friendly relations? If you are going to want us to give away land and people, then let me ask how can 3,000 li (1,000 miles) of river, hill, city, and country be lightly thrown away? If you will desire us to agree to negotiate and carry out friendly relations, then let me ask how can 4,000 years' ceremonies, music, literature, and all things, be without sufficient reason, broken up and cast away? It does not consist with right, it cannot be spoken of.

You do not hold the course of justice, (lit., as the bear keeps to his native hill, and the fish keeps to his native water,) but, on the contrary, dare to consult mere expediency, (lit., act as the heron with the shell-fish. Having experienced difficulty and danger in tossing over billowy seas (to our country) how long, let me ask, can you annoy (lit., ravage) district and prefecture?

It would be better early to mark out a right course of action and each remain peacefully in his own place.

We inform you, that you may ponder and be enlightened. From the General (guardian of Foo-Ping prefecture.)

(No name signed.)

Inclosure 2.

Reply to a communication found on Gurrière Island, on Saturday morning, June, 3rd.

A reply from Edward B. Drew, acting secretary of legation of the United States:

A communication was found on shore two days since, purporting to come from the guarding General of Foo-Ping prefecture, which has been read, and the contents thereof made known to the minister and admiral.

They have instructed me to make reply, that our intentions in coming to your country were peaceful, as was announced to your sovereign by letter
from Peking in advance. He was told that the minister has important business with the government, and hoped that a person of high rank would be sent to meet him when the vessels reached the coast of your country, to whom the full particulars could be made known, and with whom all matters could be arranged and settled. This course is still open if the king chooses to avail himself of it.

We do not want your land or men nor any thing that will affect your ceremonies, music or literature.

Your people have met our peaceful overtures by an unprovoked and wanton attack. The admiral hopes that it will prove that all this was done by the common people, without the sanction of the government; and has concluded to allow sufficient time to pass to enable the king to learn of it, and send an apology for this outrage if it was unauthorized, before taking any further steps. It now lies with your government to say whether it will disavow this outrage, and send a high officer to meet with and consult the minister, and endeavor to settle the business in an amicable manner, or whether, by failing to do, leave the minister and admiral to pursue such a course as they may deem proper to obtain redress for the wrongs done to us. It is a question which His Majesty should seriously consider before taking up a war-like attitude. Five or six days longer will be allowed the government to consult and determine what it will do.

When Captain Febiger was here, he was told that the king would not treat with him because he did not come by order of the President. Now the high minister of the United States to China is sent by special order of his sovereign; with the most peaceful intentions and friendly assurances, and without warning you fire upon the vessels and try to destroy them. How is this? The vessels now here are part of a large fleet that is constantly kept by the government on the coasts of China and Japan. When they need repairs, others are sent to take their places. They are constantly within two or three days sail of your country, and if they choose, can destroy your towns and annoy your districts and departments for an unlimited number of years. But this is not our wish. We desire peace and friendly feelings to exist between our country and all others. China and the United States are friends, and the high ministers of each country are received in the other and treated with respect. If anything occurs which may lead to trouble, it is discussed and settled in a friendly manner, without resorting to hostilities.

If the government sends any notification of its intentions, the communication should be sent to the ships. No boats or messengers will be molested that bring letters or persons who desire to discuss matters with us.

A necessary communication.

June 5, 1871.

To the Guardian General of Foo-Ping prefecture.
Inclosure 3.

Li, Guardian General of Foo-Ping-Fu to Mr. Drew, June 7th.
A communication in reply. On receipt of your dispatch in answer to my former one,
I read its contents carefully,
I have control of local matters only, and dare not take on myself to discuss any matters belonging to the central government; I have accordingly transmitted your reply to my superior officer, the minister, who is general and governor of Kang-Hoa prefecture; and have to-day heard that a dispatch from him has just been sent on board your honorable vessel.
I trust that all future correspondence will be carried on with the official above named, as I cannot presume to interfere in it further.
A necessary communication in reply to Mr. Drew, acting secretary of the legation.
Tung-Chih, 10th year, 4th moon, 20th day, (June 7th, 1871.)

Inclosure 4.

Translation of dispatch brought on board Colorado from Kang-Hoa high official.
Ch'ong, guardian of the prefecture of Kang-Hoa, Corea, ex-officio general and governor, sends a communication to His Excellency the American minister.
In the spring of this year the board of rites, Peking, forwarded a dispatch conveying a letter from the honorable American envoy; to this my government speedily sent a reply, fully discussing the matters referred to, which it was requested might be transmitted through the same channel (board of rites) to your excellency.
We feel that—inasmuch as politeness and deference are held in such general estimation in your honorable country that she has long possessed a fame far beyond all other states—Your Excellency must most probably so clearly comprehend the propriety of things as to take no light or hasty action. Why now do you cross from afar the vast ocean to penetrate another country? Even though you disclaim all purpose of killing or harming us, who can help being puzzled and suspicious?
The barriers of defense of a country are important places, within which it is not allowable for foreign vessels to make their way (without some previous understanding). This is the fixed rule of all nations. Hence it was the ascent (of the river) to the sea-gate by your vessels the other day that brought on the engagement between us, (literally, the affair of mutual firing and alarming,) which, as you say that your intentions in coming (to this country) are good, it is much to be regretted should have occurred. On the arrival of your vessels, the court warned the civil and military authorities along the coast to avoid most carefully anything which should cause trouble or arouse ill feeling, yet when your honorable
vessels, not considering the fixed regulations of another country, penetrated its important pass, how could the officers appointed to guard (the closed portals of) the frontier, whose duty it is to take measures of defense, calmly let it go by as of no consequence? Pray do not then be offended at what occurred.

It is not perhaps because the board of rites at Peking had not yet transmitted our reply, (to your letter to the King of Corea), thus leaving Your Excellency unacquainted with the various circumstances of my country, that (your coming to Corea) has taken place. Therefore, I now have the honor to inclose duplicate of this reply, from the perusal of which you may perhaps derive full and complete information. The non-intercourse of Corea with foreign states is a settled principle, established by our ancestors five centuries ago; a principle of which the whole world has heard, and of which the Emperor of China also is graciously aware. It is precisely because we must not break through the ancient policy (of our ancestors) that we cannot discuss and cannot settle that which the honorable envoy desires to discuss and to settle, whatever it may be. Why do you then wait for a high official to meet you?

The myriad lands and the countless living sustained on the earth, and canopied by the sky, should all act in consonance with the nature originally bestowed upon them, and it is the will of heaven and earth that the states of the East, and the nations of the West, regulating each in its own way, its administration and its doctrines, and governing each its own people, should move on prosperously and concordantly without encroaching upon and taking away what is another's. Surely Your Excellency is acquainted with this truth.

Appreciating the hardships of a voyage of 10,000 li of wind and wave, I send some worthless articles as a trifling assistance to your table, as becomes the host. I trust you will not refuse to receive them, though insignificant. I am aware of the deficiencies of this dispatch.

A necessary communication.
Tung-Chih, 10th year, 4th moon, and 19th day, (June 6, 1871.)

(Notice) —With the foregoing were brought three bullocks, fifty chickens, and one thousand eggs, which were declined.

Inclosure No. 5.

Translation of duplicate of the King of Corea's dispatch to the board of rites, Peking, in reference to his excellency, Mr. Low's letter of 7th March, sent to the king through the board.
A communication in reply. On the 10th of April I received the honorable board's dispatch forwarding copy of the record of its bureau of foreign relations to this effect: "This board on the 22nd March memorialized the Emperor in reference to the transmission of a letter to Corea, and on the
same day the great council returned a minute stating that it had reverently received the imperial will. We have taken due note. This minute being received by the board, its duty is to send copies of its original memorial, the imperial edict, the Tsury-li Yamen's original, and the American letter to the King of Corea for his cognizance in the premises," and accordingly inclosing copies of the Tsury-Li Yamen's memorial, the board's memorial, and the American Envoy's letter.

Besides acknowledging receipt of the board's dispatch, with its several inclosures, I would humbly observe that the service of forwarding the letter is indeed out of the usual course. I ascribe it to the board's anxiety that no mistake should be made in a matter of such delicate concern. The board has performed this special act in respectful intimation of the Emperor's fostering favor toward me; and for such perfect attentiveness I am inexpressibly grateful.

The letter forwarded by the admiral's envoy has reference primarily to two merchant vessels which came to this country in 1866, one of which was wrecked and her crew saved, while the crew of the other was killed, and the cargo destroyed; the American Government not knowing why such very different treatment as this was exhibited, wishes to inquire into the circumstances. Furthermore, it desires that some arrangement be devised for the relief of any American merchant vessel which may in the future meet with disaster on this coast, and that friendly treatment should be accorded, etc.

Our humble country has the sea on three sides, and whenever strange vessels of a foreign nation come to our shores in distress, they are either assisted with food and whatever they require, and enabled to sail away again; or, if the vessel is disabled or lost, her crew are escorted through by land to the supreme capital, (Peking), thence to be sent to their homes; in each case the wishes of those concerned are regarded, and no obstacle is raised. In this we do not fail reverently to give effect to the exceeding benevolence and plenteous virtue of our holy dynasty, (the present dynasty of China), which desires all things without exception, under heaven and upon the earth, to follow out their original nature, and the outpost state (Corea) has held this custom as to vessels in distress as its firm rule and established for a long period. Moreover, there have been from first to last three occasions of American subjects particularly having been rescued in distress, and sent forward under protection, viz, in the 5th year of H'ên Feng, the 4th of Tung-Chih, and the 5th of Tung Chih. (1855, 1865, and 1866.) The dispatches are all in the archives of the honorable board, and as the affairs were comparatively recent, the country in question can hardly fail to have a knowledge of them. When men have come from afar through the dangers of the sea, they are objects of sympathy; how then could any one think it right to maltreat and destroy them.

The statement about a vessel being destroyed, and her crew killed in Corea, has reference, no doubt, to the event of the autumn of 1866, in the
Ping-Yang River, (General Sherman.) The details of that affair were all set forth in the dispatch to the board of the 22nd day, 8th moon, 5th year Tung-Chih, (September 30th, 1866,) and need not now be reiterated. Again, on the 25th day 3rd moon, 7th year of Tung-Chih, I wrote in reply to a dispatch from the board of rites still more explicitly, and inclose copy of the answer of Poo-Cheng-hwuy, intendant of Hwang-Hai province, to the American commander, (of the Wachusett which answer had been prepared and held in readiness for delivery; on this occasion the board was further prayed that the American envoy might be so admonished (by the Emperor of China) as to resolve his doubts and suspicions and prevent further confusion.

Again, in the 3rd moon of the 7th year of Tung-Chih, the American Commander, Febiger, came saying, that he wished to inquire into this affair, and presented dispatches to the different local magistrates of Ping-An and Hwang-Hai. These magistrates answered very clearly, giving the circumstances of a strange vessel having pushed her way in the autumn of 1866, of wounds and injuries inflicted on the inhabitants, of the detention with indignity of an officer, and of the consequent exasperation of the people, resulting in self-provoked disaster and destruction; they made a complete explanation to dispel all doubts, and Captain Febiger on receiving the reply, went away. I ventured to think that thenceforth the people of that country, knowing fully the affair, and understanding the right and wrong of it, there would be no more occasions for coming with doubts and suspicions to make inquiry. Why now does the American minister, in his letter again express ignorance as to the rescue of one of the crews and the destruction of the other.

He says the Government of the United States has so much regard for its sailors and countrymen that it will never permit other countries, as they please, to misuse or destroy them; this, surely, is a point in which all nations are alike. America will not allow its people to be maltreated; nor will this country allow its people to be maltreated. In this respect if we exchange places and reflect, there is surely no difference. Such being the case, the reason for the self provoked destruction of the vessel in the Ping-Yang River is perfectly intelligible without stopping to discuss it. We appeal to the natural public sentiment of justice among men, and to the controlling presence of God and to the spirits. If the American vessel had not abused our people how could the Corean officials and people have wished to maltreat them first?

The letter under consideration expresses the hope that friendly treatment will be accorded. If the strange states of the extreme sea desire a relationship of good will with us, then, in reverent imitation of the virtue of the great dynasty which treats kindly men from afar. We shall prove not to be ignorant of the usages of hospitality. But as to the expression, “consult and arrange about intercourse”, I do not know what is wanted to “consult..."
and arrange", and what the intercourse desired is to be about. "A minister of the Emperor must not have relations with a foreign state."

For kindly commiserating and sending home the crews of foreign ships which have met with disaster, not only has our country a constant rule of its own, but it also imitates, in this regard, the profound benevolence of the heavenly dynasty (of China); then without waiting to "consult and arrange", the minister may feel secure from all apprehension. But supposing he cherish good will, but comes to commit wanton violence, then in keeping them off or destroying them we shall also be discharging our natural duty of shielding the heavenly dynasty. It is quite enough for the American Government to hold in control its own people, and keep them from improper interference with others; why go so far as to discuss whether there shall be intercourse with foreign states or not?

Heretofore foreign nations have been in ignorance of the character and productions of this country, and we have been repeatedly pestered with applications for commercial intercourse; but that is entirely out of the question with this country, and what merchants would not find it profitable was set forth in a communication to the board in the fifth year of Tung-Chih, somewhat as follows: It is universally known that our humble state is a small dependency in a corner of the seas, that the people are poor and the articles of commerce scanty; that the precious metals and precious stones are not found here, while grains and cloth fabrics are not abundant; that the productions of the country are insufficient to meet domestic wants; and if they were permitted to flow out abroad, thus impoverishing us at home, this insignificant land would certainly be in extreme danger, and difficult to protect from ruin; furthermore, that the habits of the people are sparing and plain, the workmanship rude and poor; and that we have not a single article worthy of commerce with foreign nations. The constant wish for commercial intercourse, while the utter impossibility of this country's entering into relations of trade, and the unprofitableness of it also to foreign merchants, are such as above described, is no doubt to be ascribed to the want of full knowledge on the part of the people of remote countries on the subject.

Now, although this letter of the American envoy has not spoken out fully, yet as it asks for an official to consult and arrange (business) affecting both countries, it most likely alludes to this sort of thing, (viz, commercial intercourse.) As the rescue and forwarding home of shipwrecked crews is provided for by existing laws, it is unnecessary to take further trouble to make a fixed arrangement. Besides this subject, there is nothing else to consult and settle, and it not necessary to come and go to and fro to no purpose.

I humbly hope that the honorable board will lay before the throne all the facts connected with this matter, and that the Emperor will send forth a special edict to exhort and instruct the envoy of the nation in question so as
to overcome the doubts and dispel his anxiety, and thus each of us be left to himself without trouble. I then shall be inexpressibly happy. In my insignificance, relying on the Emperor's love and effection, I have emptied my whole heart in extreme fear and reverence.

The contents of the letter of the American envoy do not indicate that a reply is expected; nor should I. The ruler of a colonial state dare not commit such a breach as to trouble the honorable board to forward a reply.

I solicit your intelligent glance and your indulgence.

Inclosure No. 6.

Edward B. Drew to guardian of Kang-Hoa and ex-officio general and governor, June 7th, 1871.

The undersigned has the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter addressed to his excellency the minister, inclosing a copy of one from the government to the board of rites, Peking. The contents therefore have been made known to the minister and admiral; and I am instructed to reply that they do see a disposition on the part of the government to decline all friendly discussion of the business which his excellency is sent to transact; and instead of apologizing for the unprovoked attack upon our vessels, the course of the military authorities is justified.

The admiral hoped that it would prove that the attack was unauthorized, and that when the news of it came to the king, he would disavow it, and send a high official to consult with the minister.

The admiral concluded to allow sufficient time to elapse for this to be done before taking any further steps. Three or four days of the time allowed still remain, and if, at the expiration, no disposition is manifested on the part of His Majesty looking to peaceful consultation and arrangement, the admiral and minister will then feel at liberty to pursue such a course as they may deem proper. In consequence of the shortness of the time now remaining for you to come to a decision, I deem it better to send this short reply rather than to make a full answer to your note.

The minister and admiral direct me to say that while they highly appreciate the kindly disposition manifested in sending the presents, they cannot under existing circumstances, be accepted, and are therefore respectfully declined.
Inclosure 7.
Admiral Rodgers to Commander H. P. Blake,
U. S. S. S. Colorado, Isle Boisée Anchorage.
Corea, June 9th, 1871.

SIR: The attack to be made upon the Corean forts on the Salée River,
which recently treacherously fired on our surveying party, is committed to
you.

The attacking force will consist of the Monocacy, Palos, the four armed
steam-launches, and the armed launches and boats of the fleet; the latter
conveying the landing force detailed from the ships, under the immediate
command of Commander L. A. Kimberly.

The vessels are to approach the point selected for anchorage, shelling
the forts and drawing out the soldiers occupying them, before the boats are
permitted to leave the ships to make the landing.

When the enemy shall have been driven out of their works, the force
under Commander Kimberly will effect a landing, the armed launches sup-
porting and covering the debarkation. The most serious difficulties which I
apprehend, lie in the natural obstacles of rocks, shoal water, furious currents;
and if it should be found impossible to hold the vessels in the position neces-
sary to secure the boats and to cover the force on shore, you will embark
the landing party at your discretion.

The object sought in this expedition being simply to take and destroy
the forts which have fired on our vessels, and to hold them long enough to
demonstrate our ability to punish such offenses at pleasure, it is my present
purpose to withdraw the whole force after a period of about twenty-two
hours has elapsed, or at the last of the flood-tide of the day following the
capture.

Should you decide that the position gained may be held indefinately
long, or that there is a material prospect of any material advantage in doing
so, you will then, by steam-launch, communicate with me.

The only object sought by the expedition to this country is to make such
a treaty as the minister has been instructed by the government to secure if
he may; and you will therefore take advantage of any overtures which may
be made toward peace, if they shall seem to offer a reasonable opportunity of
attaining the ends which the government has in view, or to afford a cover
for the withdrawal of your force should that be desirable; referring, of course,
the matter of terms to be granted to the minister and myself.

All that I have here written has been amply discussed; but should in-
cidents arise giving an unexpected complexion to the aspect of affairs, you
must use your discretion.

Anything you shall decide upon will, I am sure, meet deserved approval.
Wishing you and your command success and a safe return,

I am, etc.

John Rodgers.

A true copy.

H. G. B. Fischer, Secretary.
Inclosure 8.

F. F. Low to Edward B. Drew.

Sir: It is the intention of the admiral to send an expedition tomorrow to Fort du Conde to take and destroy it, if possible. The whole will be under the immediate command of Homer C. Blake, Esquire, U. S. N., who will be furnished with full and explicit instructions by the admiral. I desire you to accompany Captain on the Palos to facilitate communicating with the native officials, if opportunity offers.

As the object of my visit to Corea is to open negotiations with a view to making a treaty, this fact should be kept prominently in view; and the admiral has so instructed Captain Blake. The naval forces are simply a means to an end. If therefore, at any time during the absence of the expedition, overtures should be made by which it would appear that there is a reasonable prospect of a minister being sent to confer and consult with me, and that further offensive operations would be likely to embarrass friendly negotiations, it is my desire that all hostile action should cease as soon as it can be done with safety and honor. The decision touching this latter point will rest with Captain Blake, guided by his instruction; but you are at liberty to make known my views to him if you deem it advisable.

I am, etc.,

Frederick F. Low

True copy: Edward B. Drew.

Inclosure 9.

Translation of dispatch brought by a junk and intercepted by the expedition to Fort Du Conde, on the 10th of June.

Cheng, guardian of Kang-Hoa-su, Corea, ex-officio general and governor, makes a reply to His Excellency the American minister.

I beg to observe that your honorable dispatch contains many things I had not anticipated. I am still (as when writing you before) perplexed and pained. As Your Excellency said you were coming on a peaceful and friendly errand, our court preparing to treat you in a befitting manner, before (receiving from you information of your arrival) sent officials of the third rank to inquire whether your voyage had been prosperous, and further to ask what the business was which you wanted to discuss and arrange.

This was the course of politeness, but contrary to expectation your subordinate officials said that these persons were not of high rank, denied them an interview, (with Your Excellency,) and sent them back. Before the officials who had been sent to inquire of the fatigues of your voyage got back to the capital, your honorable vessels suddenly entered our narrow pass (from the sea). Although you had said that you would inflict no injury, yet, as the vessels on board which you came (up the river) were vessels of war,
and were filled with implements of war, our people and soldiers could not
but be filled with alarm and suspicion, and knew not what to make of it.
Now, I apprehend that the way of concord and the rule of propriety in
entering another country do not justify this. As this place has before been
the scene of battle, it is always strictly guarded. Although I deeply regret
the firing affair—indeed by the sudden sight of an unusual thing—and the
alarming of your people, still, to defend a pass leading into your territory is
what you would do were the case your own.

Your blaming us recently—as is shown by the (demand for an) apology
is truly incomprehensible. Your Excellency's insistence upon meeting a
high official with whom to consult and settle matters, from your letter of
last spring, had reference solely to the affair of two merchant vessels in the
year 1866. Of these, one was destroyed, while the crew of the other was
rescued; and you wished to get at the reason for this difference of treat-
ment, and to make provision for future cases of disaster to American vessels
on our coast. That one of the vessels (alluded to) was a trader of your
country was not known to us; and the violent and lawless Tsuy Lankeen,
who came in her, himself brought on the destruction that occurred—it was
not our people who maliciously commenced it. The dispatches that have
passed first and last to clear up your suspicions (in the case) have not been
few, and it is not now worth while to discuss it further.

As to rescuing American vessels in distress, our country already has a
regulation on this point, and there is, therefore, no necessity for going fur-
ther and laying it down after consultation.

Again, as our country and yours are separated several myriad li, as if
our borders were under a different heaven, we do not interfere with each
other's tranquility; then without waiting to lay it down in a definite com-
 pact peace exists already in the very fact (of our distance and non-inter-
course.)

To go into a lengthy discussion and debate for more or less, while
friendship is what is wished for, will only lead to trouble. With these con-
siderations Your Excellency can clearly decide which course would be advan-
tageous and which the reverse. Instead of taking such steps as you please,
you should rather reflect and consider well what I have said.

Why should you have been so narrow as to decline the trifling presents
offered? I cannot but sustain my regrets at this.

A necessary communication, 10th year of Tung-Chih, 4th moon, 22nd
day, June 9th, 1871.
Inclosure 10.

Mr. Drew to Cheng, guardian of Kang-Hoa prefecture, ex-officio general and governor.

The soldiers and officers of our honorable country who were taken prisoners by us in the fight of the 11th instant, are now held on board our ships, where they are being supplied with food and taken care of. If Your Excellency desires their return, they will be released on requisition by you, accompanied by a distinct understanding that they shall not fight against us again.

A necessary communication.

Tung-Chih, 10th year, 4th moon, 26th day, (13th June.)

A list of prisoners—15 in number, wounded and unwounded—accompanied the above.

Inclosure 11.

Translation of a dispatch received 15th June, 1871, on Guerriére Island, by hand of two messengers, from the magistrate of Foo-Ping prefecture.

We, guardian general of Foo-Ping prefecture, Korea, makes a communication in reply. I have received and read the dispatch handed upon the seashore, viz., that which was to be forwarded to His Excellency the authority of Kang-Hoa. Your honorable ships, coming with professions of friendliness and amity, delayed our military plans and caused us consequent loss. His Excellency the magistrate of Kang-Hoa, has already incurred our court’s severe reprimand. He already is under punishment, but is retained at his post. He is calling out and selecting soldiers and braves, and is steadily preparing picked and keen (men and material) with the purpose of satisfying in the fullest degree his anger; I therefore do not dare to forward your communication for his perusal. The question as to whether or not our soldiers taken prisoners shall be released and returned rests alone with you for decision. At the beginning of the breach between us, the joining of battle was first from your honored part. How then do you now say, “joining battle will not be allowed?” (see note.) If you shall come to join battle then with battle will we meet you, and there’s and end (of the discussion.) He therefore makes this reply.

A necessary reply is above communicated to His Excellency the American imperial commissioner, Tung-Chih, 10th year, 4th noon, 27th day, (June 14, 1871.)

Note—He takes the passage of Mr. Drew’s dispatch stating that a condition of the release of the prisoners would be a promise that they shall not again take up arms against us, and making the phrase apply generally to all Korean soldiers, asks “since fighting was at first upon your own motion, with what propriety do you now say “joining battle will not be allowed?”
Inclusion 12.

Translation of dispatch brought on board United States Steamer Colorado; June 12, 1861.

Li, guardian general of Foo-Ping prefecture, makes a communication.

Politeness, of course, characterized our reception of you since your honorable ships came professing friendship and amity. But the course of friendship and amity, where shall we find in your abrupt dismissal of our officials who came with inquiries as to your suffering, (on the voyage;) in your wrongly entering the territory of Kuan-Hai (locality of the 11th) instant,) ignoring your ships short-comings from the right, and only blaming our soldiers for attempting to ward off calamity; in utter unwillingness to listen, and your sole interest upon raising a disturbance. When the affairs had already been completely solved in correspondence.

Looking at it now, one can know this much for certain; under outward professions of friendship you cherish false and deceitful designs. To come to your landing, and thoroughly displaying your force of committing public buildings to the flames, burning cottages, stealing property, sweeping up everything to the veriest trifle. These are the actions of thieves and spies. In your ships you have brought many of our kingdom's outlaws, rebellious brigands who have forfeited life, to connect yourselves with and collect such a following as guides to our neighborhood. This is to become the lair whither pirates flee.

The upshot will be a wild and disorderly discharge of gun and cannon, the battering down of walled town and fort, the slaying and injuring army and people. Where was such unsparing and implacable savagery ever exceeded? You come with professions of friendship and amity, and wishes us to treat you with politeness, and your actions, forsooth, are such as these. Not only will every urchin of our kingdom spit at and curse you, but more yet in the world but will indignantly sympathize with us, and debar you from intercourse, and break off such as you already hold. I had not thought that such as these would have been the actions of one entrusted with his kingdom's commission to bind in friendship another kingdom.

In those sea-ports where your ships shall hereafter arrive, who will be willing again to meet you with politeness, discuss the obligations of good faith and renew friendship. I conceal the shame I feel for your honorable vessels, the shame I feel for your honorable country.

A necessary dispatch is above communicated to the secretary of the American imperial commissioners.

(Dated.) Tung-Chih, 10th year, 4th moon, 26th day, (June 11th, 1871.)
On Tuesday morning, 15th June, a paper was found attached to a pole on Guerrière Island, which read thus:

Messengers from the guardian general of Foo-Ping Prefecture (are in want of reply to the letter brought by them on Monday, June 11th.)

On Wednesday morning, 14th June, a paper was found attached to a pole on Guerrière Island, in which the Fu-Ping Prefect again urges for a reply to his letter of the 12th June. It reads thus:

To His Excellency, Mr. Drew, chief secretary of the minister: On the 25th day of this moon (June 12) I sent Your Excellency a letter. I cannot sustain my anxiety that it has not yet been answered, and again send this to trouble you for a reply.

Sin Wei year, 4th moon, 27th day, (14th June, 1871.)
From Li, guardian general of Foo-Ping Prefecture.

Edw. B. Drew to Guardian of Foo-Ping Prefecture.
I had the honor to receive your note, dated the 12th instant, in which you complained in unbecoming language of the results which necessarily followed the wanton attack upon our vessels.

Correspondence between officials, of whatever rank, should contain none other than respectful and polite language; and as you choose to disregard the rule in this respect, it did not occur to me, until your communication came this morning, that a reply was expected.

The occurrence of the last few days, and the necessary consequences of the evil acts of your officials, of which neither you nor your government have just grounds of complaint. The minister and admiral regret the necessity which compelled this action. They hoped this government would make such reparation as would render forcible redress unnecessary. Ample time was allowed for this to be done; But instead of responding to our overtures for peace the government remained silent, and the officials from whom we heard, yourself among the number, apparently justified the attack upon our vessels. Under these circumstances how could you expect immunity? The operations of the naval forces have been confined to destroying the places from which we were assualted and routing the soldiers that defended them; although you cannot fail to be aware that a large district of country which contains many villages, lies within the reach of the guns of our ships, and which remain unmolested. This ought to afford convincing proof that we had no disposition to make indiscriminate warfare upon your country or your people.

The minister and admiral, as was announced to your government in advance, desire peace. They are ready to treat all friendly overtures in a
reciprocal spirit, and it is to be hoped that your government will adopt a wise and prudent course so that in the future all trouble may be avoided.

It is desired that you will forward the inclosed dispatch to His Majesty, the King of Corea.

The-Chih, 10th year, 4th moon, 2nd day, (June 15, 1971.)

Inclusion 15.

The undersigned, envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary of the United States to China, charged with a special mission to Corea, had the honor to announce by letter, written and sent from Peking in March last, that the Government of the United States desired to come to some definite understanding with that of His Majesty with reference to the protection and rescue of seamen who might be wrecked upon the islands and coasts of Corea, and thus remove in advance all cause of a rupture of friendly relations between the two countries. To carry out this intention and allow an opportunity for all matters to be discussed and settled in a spirit of amity and good will, His Majesty was informed that the undersigned would leave his post in China temporarily and go to Corea; that he would go in a ship of war, accompanied by an admiral, in order to add dignity to his mission, and not with any design of harming the people as long as the vessels and the men on board were treated with consideration and kindness. His Majesty was also informed that as we were animated by friendly motives we should expect to be received and treated in a friendly way, and the undersigned expressed the hope that a minister of suitable rank would be deported to meet him, upon the arrival of the ships on the coast, to whom full particulars of the business could be made known, whom it could be discussed with a view to amicable settlement. Upon his arrival at this point no persons of suitable rank presented themselves, nor were those who came furnished with any evidence of their having been sent by the government. These men were received with politeness by the person next in rank to the envoy. They were informed that the undersigned would remain at this place some days in order that His Majesty might send a suitable person to meet him; in the mean time some of the smaller vessels of the fleet would be engaged in exploring the channels and the island. They were requested to inform the local magistrates and the people of the admiral’s intention, so that no cause or difficulty might arise between the surveying vessels and the people. The views and the intentions of the undersigned were frankly explained to the persons who came, in the full expectation that as soon as His Majesty became aware of them no delay would occur in taking steps to comply with the reasonable requests made.

After a delay of one day to allow the admiral’s intentions to be made known, the surveying vessels started on their errand of humanity, and after proceeding a few miles from the anchorage, they were, without notice,
wantonly fired upon by the forts and masked batteries, to which the vessels replied. No gun was fired from the vessels, or menace made, until after the batteries on shore commenced the attack. After silencing the batteries the vessels returned and reported the outrageous conduct of the military authorities. Even after all this had occurred, so great was the desire of the admiral and the undersigned for peace that it was concluded to allow ten days to elapse before taking any further action, in the hope that it would be found that the attack was unauthorized, and that His Majesty would cause a suitable apology to be sent, and also a minister, as has been suggested. The local magistrate here and the magistrate at Kang-Hoa were informed of our lenient disposition in order that future hostilities might be avoided. These peaceful overtures being declined, or neglected, left no other course open to the admiral than to seek redress by arms, as is usual among all civilized nations, for wrongs and insults which our vessels had suffered. This has been fully done. The forts have been destroyed, and the armies defending them routed and scattered. Many hundreds of the soldiers were killed and wounded, and others are prisoners on board our ships.

The latter will be treated with humanity and kindness, and, upon a proper engagement being entered into that they shall not again take up arms against us, will be released and sent to their homes. It is the custom of my country to treat all prisoners that fall into our hands with humanity, and the undersigned begs to assure His Majesty that those now held captive on board our ships will suffer neither insult nor injury.

The events of the past few days afford convincing proofs of our power whenever we choose to exert it. In the present instance the admiral concluded to go no further than destroying the fortifications that had assaulted his vessels, although well established precedent would sanction the moving of our force against any and all places of the kingdom. Although possessed of the power my government does not seek war or conquest. It does not wish to acquire a single inch of your territory; nor does it seek control over your people. It has no desire to disturb the institutions of the country, or interfere in any matters of local concern. On the contrary, it desires to cultivate friendly relations with His Majesty as the sovereign of an independent nation. My Government wishes to be at peace with all countries, neither giving just grounds for offense, nor allowing unprovoked assaults or insults to its vessels or people to go unredressed. When its citizens offend against the laws and customs of other countries they are duly apprehended and punished. This cannot be done unless some arrangement is made by which they can be arrested and given up for trial and punishment. Arrangements for doing this now exist in China and Japan. Why should not Corea enter into similar engagements? Well not a definite understanding on this point prevent irritation and ill-feeling? To discuss and arrange this question, as well as to provide for the protection and rescue of those who may, by misfortune, be
cast upon the shores of your kingdom, are the chief objects which the undersigned had in view in coming here.

These objects he is still anxious to accomplish and is prepared to exercise patience and forbearance in order that further hostilities may be avoided. It remains for His Majesty to decide whether the ends aimed at shall be attained peaceably in accordance with the earnest desire of the undersigned and his Government, or whether our peaceful overtures will be met in the future, as they have been in the past, by force of arms.

The undersigned trusts that His Majesty will, upon a careful review of the whole question, conclude to meet these advances in a just and friendly spirit, and that a person of suitable rank will soon be sent to consult, with a view of arranging the questions which are likely to disturb amicable relations. The undersigned hopes for a speedy and frank reply to his note.

The undersigned has the honor to wish His Majesty health and happiness.

Tung-Chih, 10th year, 4th moon, and 27th day, (June 14, 1871.)

Frederick F. Low.

Note:—This dispatch was returned by the prefect with a note, saying that he dare not forward it.

Inclosure 16.

Translation of dispatch from the magistrate of Foo-Ping, received from Guerriere Island at 10 A. M. Saturday June, 17th.

Li, guardian general of Foo-Ping prefecture, Korea, makes the following communication in reply to Mr. Drew, acting secretary of legation:

Your dispatch has been attentively read. Its only purport is to place the blame upon the local, civil, and military authorities. It is now unnecessary to multiply elaborate discussions as to who has been in the right and who the reverse, in what has taken place; the duty of us, the local authorities, is that we all, (according to commands of His Majesty) should confine ourselves to defending (the districts committed to our care) or to giving battle, and to these things alone.

I dare not send up to the court the dispatch now to hand from His Excellency, and beg respectfully to return it herewith.

As you must have seen that we have not fired on the men of your honorable ships landing for water, but have let them come on shore, you must, I presume, be aware that we, too, do not pride ourselves on our power to kill and injure people.

A necessary communication in reply.

Tung-Chih 10th year, 6th moon, 30th day. (June 17).
Inclosure 17.

Mr. Drew, acting secretary of legation, makes the following communication to Li, guardian general of Foo-Ping prefecture.

I had the honor to receive, by hand of a messenger yesterday morning, your note of that day, returning a dispatch from His Excellency the minister to His Majesty the King. In your note you say that it is not within your province to forward the dispatch to its destination, and intimate that further correspondence will not be likely to serve any useful purpose.

I am instructed by His Excellency to say in reply, that your refusal to forward his dispatch to the government seems extraordinary, and that he is unwilling to believe your course would have the sanction of His Majesty were he aware of the real facts. It is hardly possible that His Majesty would so far disregard the established rules common among all nations as deliberately to obstruct all channels of communication between an ambassador of a friendly nation and the government of Corea: thus closing the door to all attempts at the settlement of differences that now exist, or that may hereafter arise, by amicable negotiation.

I am further instructed by His Excellency to say that, as he contemplates a prolonged stay in the vicinity of the capital, he has concluded to retain the dispatch until means are found to forward it to its destination; and he indulges the hope that you will, upon reflection, conclude to transmit it, or make known to His Majesty that His Excellency desires to send one. This is especially desirable; for if His Majesty frustrates all efforts to open negotiation the situation will be relieved of embarrassment in case the minister and aduiral are compelled to seek other means to bring the business with which His Excellency is entrusted to the notice of the court. A refusal by order of the government will also show to the nations of Europe, as well as to the United States, that Corea persistently declines to hold communication with an ambassador especially sent on an errand of peace and humanity.

If, however, you conclude to adhere to the determination indicated in your note, I deem it my duty distinctly to inform you that for your refusal to perform a service incumbent upon all officials of every nation, the same responsibility will attach to His Majesty as if the act was done by his express order.

Tung-Chih, 10th year, 5th moon, 1st day, (June 18, 1871.)
Inclosure 18.

Translation of dispatch from the Prefect of Foo-Ping to Drew; received June 20, 1871.

Li, guardian general of Foo-Ping prefecture makes a communication in reply.

To the reply which I had the honor to send you the other day, I had not expected there would be a rejoinder. But I have now to acknowledge your answer, expressing surprise that I do not dare to forward His Excellency's dispatch to the court, and inquiring into the matter. An explanation of my reasons is therefore indispensable.

Although the place where your honored ships came to anchor on their arrival here (either Isle of Boisée or Roze Roads) was amply suitable for intercourse and correspondence, yet you, ascending the tide, entered the narrows, and thus caused those holding the place to open fire upon you. As we had written expressing regret at the infelicity of that affair, you might have passed it over; but no!—on the contrary, you went up a second time and fought a battle, in which many of our people were killed or wounded. Our court is terribly incensed at this, and no longer believes in the (alleged) peaceful nature of your visit. Under these circumstances, although His Excellency wishes a dispatch to be forwarded, yet, in view of utter irreconcilability of a foreign minister's writing our sovereign direct on terms of equality with what is due to rank, dignity, and ceremonial propriety, how could I, an humble official, venture to transmit it? Our court would certainly severely censure and disgrace me for such an act; and how could I escape this punishment? And is this a matter of no concern to His Excellency? It is, after repeatedly and unremittingly revolving the matter in my mind, that, dreading the law and holding to the canons of usage, I dare not recklessly forward the dispatch.

The business which His Excellency has encountered the hardship of a long voyage to consult about and arrange can, in all probability, I presume be nothing else than that he does not fully know why, of two vessels (which came to our shores) one was rescued and the other destroyed; and because he is solicitous for the future, lest in the course of their voyage vessels may perhaps again meet with unforeseen disasters, he therefore desires to make a compact of peace, (treaty) forever preventing the infliction of injury; and this is the way matters stand.

But can this be pronounced other than manifestation of extreme over-anxiety and the taking of unnecessary trouble? As to the case of the vessel which was involved in misfortune by those on board her, who brought the catastrophe upon themselves, this affair was verily of a kind totally unexpected to us. As to vessels losing their course in fogs at sea, or being driven in stress of weather, these, and all similar dangers and disasters, concern human life; that this country will with fidelity rescue mariners and
send them forward by land, as they desire, is recorded as our established law, enduring as the elements. In this we imitate Heaven's fostering care of mankind, and make no discrimination between those nations which are remote and those which are near. Therefore it is that the local officials along the coast are, without exception in a state of anxious concern day and night; and among these officials I am an unworthy one. With the spirits of heaven and earth watching above and about me, how dare I use empty or deceitful expressions? I only hope that His Excellency will no longer be over-solicitous and needlessly trouble himself about these matters.

Although you have not consulted about and settled any business, yet granted that you had done so, the results would have been to the above effect and nothing more. There is no need for a compact of peace, and friendly feeling will be naturally found in what I have above stated.*

Of what the unworthy officer writing has heard of as the discussions of crowded halls of our court he has now made frank disclosure; yet his own proper duties are limited to holding his jurisdiction or doing battle, and to these things only.

A necessary reply, to the American Chief Secretary.
Tung-Chih, 10th year, 5th moon, 2nd day, (June 2th,) 1871.

*The promise to rescue distressed mariners.

Inclosure 36

No. 75.

Mr. Low to Mr. Fish
On Board United States Flag-Ship Colorado,
Harbor of Chefoo, China, July 6, 1871.

Sir: I have the honor to report my arrival at this port on the 5th instant, having left the anchorage near Boisée Island on the 3rd. In my former dispatches I endeavored to furnish you with a succinct narrative of events as they occurred after my arrival and during my stay on the coast of Corea; the efforts that were made to carry out your instructions and provide some adequate measures for the safety and rescue of ship-wrecked mariners; the reasons for the hostile action of the fleet against the Corean government, and the considerations which induced the admiral and myself to confine the operations of the navy within the narrowest limits compatible with the honor of the Government of the United States; the safety of our people navigating these sea, and those residing upon Chinese soil. I now have to inform you that all my efforts failed to induce the government of Corea to enter into negotiation with a view to concluding a treaty, such as my instructions contemplated, or to discuss with me that or any other question. In concluding the history of these proceedings, I deem it not
inappropriate to review the whole question of intercourse with Corea, in which the safety, welfare, and interests of the citizens and subjects of civilized Christian governments are so largely involved; the attitude of the Corean government in the past, and the small probability of any voluntary change in the future. I also deem it proper to offer some observations, which may be of service to the government of the United States in determining the proper course to be pursued to prevent the lives and property of our citizens from being sacrificed. Corea is now the only nation on the earth, claiming to be civilized, that absolutely refuses to hold intercourse with the Christian countries of Europe and America. Up to within a few years Corea has attracted little notice, and it may be presumed that her isolated position and the repeated poverty of her people would continue to afford immunity, notwithstanding her exceptional attitude toward foreign nations, did not considerations of humanity dictate a different course. The opening and rapid increase of trade with Japan, China, and Russian Manchuria, which required vessels to skirt the coasts of Corea in their voyages, brought prominently into view the undesirability of allowing a country lying directly in the track of a great commerce, bounded on three sides by the sea, to remain with its coasts, outlaying islands and dangerous passages, totally unexplored. The Corean government would neither make these surveys itself, nor allow other nations to do it without incurring great risk. The history of all attempts to survey the coasts and islands goes to show that every obstacle was thrown in the way by the officials and the people—objection being made to the landing of surveying parties, to make astronomical observations, while the lives of those engaged in such work were endangered. When these warnings were disregarded. The wreck and total destruction of several foreign vessels and their cargoes, during the past ten years and the massacre by the natives of the crew of one vessel certainly, and perhaps more, brought Corea into more general notice. The circumstances of the loss of the American schooner General Sherman, and the massacre of her crew in 1866, are too well known to require mention of the details here.

The United States steamer Wachuset visited the coast in 1867 to inquire into the circumstances, without obtaining any information whatever, and the visit, by direction of the admiral in command of the fleet in these seas, of the United States steamer Shenandoah, in 1868, resulted in obtaining statements from the Corean local officials in regard to it, the truth of which is not supported by other and more reliable testimony, which I have been able to obtain. The commander of the Shenandoah was prohibited from going to the spot where the Sherman was wrecked to make inquiries and thus learn the real facts, and when her boats attempted to ascend the river they were fired upon from forts commanding its entrance, which compelled the vessel to return without obtaining further intelligence.
During his stay Captain J. C. Febiger desired to correspond with the government in order to obtain an official explanation, but was informed that, as he did not come in obedience to the direct orders of the President, correspondence between him and the court could not be permitted. During the same year another American schooner, the Surprise had been wrecked and become a total loss, but the officers and crew were safely sent through to China by land. This circumstance led many to believe in the truth of the stories told by the Corean officials about the wanton acts of the persons on board the Sherman, which brought down the wrath of the people and caused the destruction of the people and those on board. This opinion was strengthened by a report which came to the Consul-General at Shanghai concerning the anxiety of the Corean government in regard to the Sherman affair, and that it was proposed to send an embassy to the United States to explain the matter, a full account of which was embodied in his dispatches of 24th April, 1868, to the State Department. It is undoubtedly true, that the recommendation of the Consul-General, that an attempt be made to open negotiations with Corea, was based chiefly upon the information before referred to. It is also true, I suspect, that it was this intelligence more than anything else that led the government to anticipate favorable results from the recent attempt at friendly negotiation. It is proper for me to say here that all my experience and information led me to believe that the safety of the crew of the Surprise is due to the fact that the vessel was a total wreck, and therefore the crew could not, if spared, charge the government and the people with robbery and plunder of their property, or cause their Government to make demands for redress and reparation, which would not have been the case with the other vessel. I also feel bound to say that the Consul General’s informant fabricated, for ulterior and baseless purposes, the information embodied in the dispatches before referred to. There is no reason to suppose that it contained the least shadow of truth; on the contrary, the evidence is most conclusive that there was never any intention on the part of the government of Corea to offer an apology or afford the least reparation for what I am now convinced was a great outrage upon the persons and property of citizens of the United States. All the evidence obtainable goes to prove that the government of Corea was and is determined to maintain its original status-non-intercourse with any western nation, and hostile resistance to all attempts of foreign governments to establish relations for whatever purpose.

The considerations which induced the United States to send a special mission to Corea this year are of course more fully known to the Department than to me. It is sufficient for me to say that my instructions appeared to contemplate such action as would be likely to induce the government of Corea to agree to a treaty which would have for its chief, if not only object, the protection and rescue of the lives and property of mariners who might by misfortune be cast upon these shores. In accordance with the
letter and spirit of these instructions, I undertook to carry them out. No
time was designated for carrying them out, this being left to the discretion
of myself and the admiral of the fleet, who was directed to accompany me.

Considerations affecting American interests in China, too important to
be overlooked or disregarded, prevented an early compliance with the
instructions; besides, I deem it better to delay the matter until the Corean
embassy should have visited Peking, which would afford the Chinese govern-
ment an opportunity to explain the peaceful and humane purposes of the
mission. In addition to this, I wrote a dispatch to the King of Corea, frankly
explaining the purpose which I desired to accomplish, and assurance of
our friendly disposition. To forward this letter to its destination, and make
sure that it would reach the King of Corea, I sought and obtained the good
offices of the Chinese government. To further guard against any question
being raised which might furnish a pretext for declining to treat with me as
the accredited agent of my Government. I waited until I could receive a “full
power” before starting on my mission. My previous dispatches will have
made known to you the anxiety I felt in regard to the matter, and scru-
pulous care taken to avoid, if possible, all chance of hostilities, unless forced
upon us in a manner from which there would be no honorable escape.
That hostilities did occur under circumstances exhibiting great treachery and
wantonness you have been fully advised; and also of our failure to obtain any
word of apology or regret, either from the government or the local officials.
It is a noteworthy fact, which should be stated in this connection, that the
copy of the letter from the court to the Peking government, see inclosure 5
in dispatch (No. 74) was not sent to me until the 6th June, five days after
the attack upon our vessels, although the fact of our presence on the coast
was known at the capital several days prior to the arrival of the fleet at the
anchorage at Boisée Island. From this circumstance it would appear that the
government did not desire that any warning should be given of its hostile
intentions; but as soon as defeat had, in their opinion, overtaken us, the
copy of the letter was sent for my information. This view is supported by
documents and official orders found in the captured forts on the 10th and
11th instants.

Everything goes to prove that the government was anxious to entrap
the vessels in a position where great damage could be inflicted without
chance of escape. No intimation was given in advance of their hostile
intent, which would have put the vessels on their guard; on the contrary,
the people who came to see us, upon being informed of the admiral’s inte-
tention to send out the surveying vessels, expressed no dissent, but rather gave
tacit assurance of friendly treatment. Of the first attack, the delay after-
ward allowed the Coreans to afford an opportunity for apology and opera-
tion, the efforts of both the admiral and myself to avoid further hostilities,
with the reasons therefor the engagements of the 11th June and the re-
sults, the attempt to open negotiations afterward, and the repeated refusals
of the local authorities to forward my dispatch to the court, you will have learned from previous dispatches.

In the opinion of the admiral his forces were insufficient to justify an attempt to reach the capital without great risk, and feeling confident that, unless this could be done, any advance would have no effect upon the government, further offensive movements seemed inexpedient. After waiting long enough to demonstrate the fact that there was no probability of the government responding to our overtures, I concluded to withdraw and submit the whole question to the President for his decision. Prior to leaving, I caused a dispatch to be sent to the prefect of Fu-Ping Fu, explaining the cause of my departure, copy of which you will find herewith (enclosure I).

The delicate situation of affairs in China rendered great caution necessary in our proceedings. The news of a defeat of our arms in Korea would be spread throughout China, enlarged and embellished as orientals only can do, and would seriously injure our prestige and endanger our people residing there. This consideration would have led me to point out to the admiral the absolute necessity for the second attack.

It appeared to me indispensable that the fleet should not leave Korea while there remained any reasonable grounds for the Government to believe that we had been defeated by force of arms. As I anticipated would be the case, the Coreans believed that we were defeated on the 1st of June, and so reported it to China. This news spread far and near, causing much excitement among the Chinese and great anxiety to the foreigners.

The same report was very likely sent to Europe and America by telegraph. It remains to be seen what form the native report of the second engagement will take. For the same reason I deem it wise to exercise great caution after the events of the 10th and 11th of June. It did not seem prudent to take the risk of defeat, when any success we might probably achieve would not be likely to accomplish the main object for which I went.

In view of these considerations, and the additional one that hostile operations against a foreign country should not, except under the most peculiar circumstances admitting of no delay, be carried on without the express sanction of the Government previously obtained, I concluded to pursue the course above indicated.

Having exhausted the power in me vested by the instructions of the Department, it now remains for the Government of the United States to decide upon the policy to be pursued in the future. Having had the benefit of some personal experience, and an opportunity to gain considerable information, I deem it not inappropriate to submit some observations upon affairs in Korea, coupled with those in China.

The two are so closely connected that in considering the one the other should not be lost sight of.
So far as the object sought to be attained through the recent expedition to Korea is concerned, no question can, I imagine, be raised as to its importance, or the duty of the Government of the United States in connection therewith.

The narrow limits within which I was instructed to confine negotiations clearly show that it was not the intention of the United States to engage in any operations calculated to disturb the internal relations of Korea, or force upon her any agreement looking to trade. I indulged a hope that it would not be impossible to so impress upon that government the duty of all nations to protect and succor their citizens and subjects wherever they may go in the prosecution of legalized commerce, that it would recognize the propriety of this, and agree to some fixed rule by which it could be done in Korea. I trusted that the objects sought might be gained without the use of even the display of force on either side. These overtures having been rejected in a prepotent, insulting, and hostile manner, no hope remains of accomplishing the result by peaceful means. It now becomes the duty of all civilized and Christian Governments to carefully consider what their rights are, and their duty to their citizens and subjects when these rights are trampled upon by countries which reject and set at defiance the laws of nations as well as the laws of humanity.

It will hardly be contended, I imagine, that the natural law, or the right of self-preservation, will permit any nation occupying territory bordering upon the sea to so far exclude itself from all intercourse that it will neither adopt means to survey its coasts, islands, and channels, nor allow this to be done by others; nor is it consistent with the principles of humanity that an isolated nation shall be allowed to maltreat and massacre without question those whom the perils of the sea cast upon its shores.

On the contrary, the sea is the great highway of nations, which no country is at liberty to obstruct with impunity, and where natural obstacles and dangers exist, all governments have a right to demand that they shall be clearly defined and marked, so that they may be avoided. It is also the right of all countries, which should be jealously guarded, to provide adequate means for the safety and protection of its mariners and the recovery of their property. This no nation can properly deny. That Korea will not voluntarily make any arrangements by which these rights can be secured is settled beyond a doubt. The question now is, whether western nations will permit this unhappy condition of things to continue, or whether active and efficient means will be adopted to correct existing evils. In determining a policy for the future, the influence which the attitude and action of Korea will exert upon China and Japan should not be lost sight of. This consideration engaged my serious attention from the moment your instructions reached me. The unhappy impression which the failure of the French expedition in 1866 created among the Chinese induced me to guard, as far as possible, against similar results in case we failed to accomplish the object sought. As
an important step in its direction, I deemed it advisable to communicate to the Chinese government in substance what the mission was expected to accomplish, and also the spirit of amity and friendliness with which I was instructed to conduct all negotiations with Korea. It is not likely that my statement of the actual facts will be received and accepted as correct by the Imperial Government of China; that while we failed to accomplish what we had a right to hope for and expect in the matter of negotiations, we suffered no defeat at the hands of the Corean armies, but that, on the contrary, we inflicted great injury upon them for their unprovoked assault. But even if successful in this, it will exercise little influence upon the officials that are naturally inimical to foreigners, or the people.

The Corean government will exult over the fact that it is able to keep foreign nations from entering its territory, and prevent their ministers from communicating with its high officers.

This will react upon China, and prevent further concessions being made. It will also furnish additional arguments to the anti-foreign party, who insist upon the right and duty of China to expel all foreigners. Notwithstanding our significant military success, it may be doubted whether even the King of Corea is aware of the real facts in regard to the disaster to his arms. It is so manifestly the disposition and policy of oriental officials to misrepresent misfortunes when their reputation is involved, that the central government is rarely advised of the real truth. If I am correct in this supposition it is not unlikely that the events of the 10th and 11th of June were reported in China as Corean victories, and possibly to the King of Corea also. Nor will the Corean government be made to feel the force of foreign arms until the seat of government is menaced or occupied by foreign troops.

As the case stands, foreign governments should decide either to let Corea alone, and allow her to burn, pillage, destroy, massacre all that come within her reach without question, or demand for redress, or organize and send such a force as will be able to insure success, without unnecessary risk, in breaking down the barriers that stand in the way of intercourse. No further efforts at conciliatory negotiations should be made, nor should demonstrations of force be attempted in the expectation that favorable results will follow.

They will serve no useful purpose, and be likely to end in harm. Every fresh attempt and failure to accomplish practical results in Corea only tend to render the situation in China more insecure.

With reference to the policy which western nations will sooner or later find it their duty to adopt toward Corea, I have decided opinions; and of the necessity for an early decision to prevent great disasters, I am profoundly impressed. Aside from the pressing necessity for immediate action to insure the rescue and protection of mariners, delay only renders the task more difficult of accomplishment. And every year that the Corean government is allowed to continue in its exclusiveness, increases the peril to the lives and
property of foreign residents in China. If no adequate measures be taken to avert the impending storm in the East, the result will, I fear, be disastrous. I write this without haste or passion, guided solely by a sense of duty which cannot be overlooked or evaded. As is well known to the Department I am opposed to making war upon Corea or any other country for the sole purpose of opening them to foreign trade, or extending it when once established. My opinions are based upon facts and considerations of greater importance than mere merchantile advantages, although these should not be overlooked by any government that desires to maintain an honorable and influential place among the nations of the earth. It may not be improper for me to remark in this connection that, in my opinion, the commercial advantages that Corea would offer, if opened to trade, have been greatly underestimated hitherto.

In regard to the means necessary to reasonably assure success, should the United States conclude to continue in its efforts to bring Corea to terms, the reports of Admiral Rodgers to the Navy Department will furnish accurate and trustworthy data. All commercial nations holding intercourse with China and Japan are equally concerned with the United States in the proper solution of this question, and as the interests of all are so inseparably linked together in these countries, perhaps the objections to departing from the traditional policy which governs the United States respecting European affairs would not be found valid when applied to Corea.

In entrusting me with this mission to Corea, you said, The Department relies upon you, in fulfilling these instructions, to exercise prudence and discretion, to maintain firmly the right of the United States to have their seamen protected, to avoid a conflict by force unless it cannot be avoided without dishonor, and to seek in all proper ways the harmonious and friendly assistance of the Chinese government.

These instructions I have, to the best of my ability, endeavored to carry out, and I trust that my action may receive the approval of the President.

I have the honor, etc.

Fredrick F. Low.
No. 1. Edward B. Drew, acting secretary of legation, to Li, guardian general of Foo-Ping prefecture.

No. 2. Telegram.

Inclosure No. 1.

Edward B. Drew, acting secretary of legation, to Li, guardian general Foo-Ping prefecture.

I had the honor to receive your note of June 20th, in which you reiterate your refusal to forward a dispatch from His Excellency the minister to the court. You also decline to inform His Majesty that His Excellency desires to communicate with the government. In reply, I would observe that it is quite beyond my province to enter into a discussion respecting the proprieties of diplomatic correspondence and intercourse; nor does our former correspondence justify the belief that such delicate and responsible powers are referred to you by your government.

With reference to the policy and practices of your government, about which you make positive statements and give voluntary assurances, I have to say that, until better satisfied of your authority, these statements and assurances cannot be accepted by His Excellency as a reply to inquiries he might have made had an opportunity been afforded for him to explain the business in detail; and until this can be done in convenient and proper manner it is quite unnecessary for officials, of whatever rank, to assume to know what his business is, or to gratuitously assign reasons for the action of His Majesty in declining to open communication with a foreign envoy, sent by his government to transact business of the highest importance. His Excellency instructs me to say that coming, as he did, in obedience to the express orders of his Government, in the interest of humanity, without menace or hostile intent, all of which was announced to his Majesty in advance, he had a right to expect a courteous and civil reception, and that he would be allowed to explain in person, either to His Majesty or to a high minister designated for the purpose, the wishes of the Government of the United States preparatory to discussing, and agreeing, if possible, upon some definite mode of conducting affairs between the two countries in the future.

To remove, as far as practicable, the doubts of the local officials and the people, which the presence of the vessels might have raised, and to give assurances of our friendly disposition, you were, by permission of the minister, informed that we desired peace, and that there was no intention, either on the part of His Excellency or the admiral, of interfering with the people, disturbing the government or the local institutions, or seeking control over a foot of your territory. Instead of being received in a manner befitting the dignity of the Government he represents, and afforded an opportunity to make known the business which he was instructed to bring to the notice of your government, the civilities and courtesies due to a minister of his rank have been withheld, and his efforts to open communication with the
government have been frustrated. Your refusal to send the dispatches is quite in keeping with what had preceded, and your reasons for declining to perform the service are, I feel bound to say, frivolous and evasive. While waiting at this anchorage to receive such communication as His Majesty might choose to send, and consult with such persons, of suitable rank, might be designated to meet him, the admiral concluded to render his smaller vessels useful to commerce and humanity, employing them in exploring the difficult and dangerous channels which are so numerous on the coasts of your country. Information was given in advance, of his intention, with the request that the surveying party should not be interfered with. Notwithstanding this timely caution and these assurances of good faith, the vessels were, without notice, wantonly and treacherously assaulted from your forts and masked batteries, and the utmost efforts of the military authorities were used to destroy the vessels and the people on board. Fortunately, the skill and power of the military were not equal to the base and treacherous design of the officers that directed the attack. Instead of making an apology for this outrage, the government maintained silence, and the local officials from whom we heard mildly deprecated the necessity but justified the act. After waiting a reasonable time for apology and reparation, the admiral proceeded to seek redress in the only manner possible, according to the rules and practices of civilized nations. That the punishment inflicted was severe you are all aware. At the same time the moderation of the admiral in confining his measures of redress to the forts and places from which the first attack upon the squadron came, must be as apparent to your government as it will be to the world when the circumstances are made known.

I am directed to say, in conclusion, that in the opinion of His Excellency all reasonable efforts have been put forth to accomplish what his Government desired without the use of force, or even the display of it, further than it became necessary to redress unprovoked wrongs. These friendly overtures having failed to produce any favorable results, he feels that correspondence or delay is alike unnecessary. From what he has seen, he is firmly convinced that the government of Corea has from the first determined to repel all advances toward friendly negotiation, and that the course of moderation and conciliation, which His Excellency adopted and frankly made known, has had no other effect than to enlarge the pretensions and to encourage the hostility of His Majesty and those acting under his authority. That the Government of the United States will be disappointed when it learns all the facts is quite clear. What course it will deem proper to pursue in view of all the circumstances it is not within my province to predict. It can scarcely be expected that the United States or the governments of Europe, will continue to submit tamely to the haughty dictum of His Majesty, or rest content with his persistent refusal to hold direct communication with the ministers that may be sent on public business. Nor will it furnish just grounds for complaint on the part of His Majesty were foreign governments to use the power necessary to force compliance with their reasonable demands. In view of the gravity of the situation, His Excellency deems it expedient to report fully the existing condition of affairs to his Gov-
ernment, and take its instruction before proceeding further. In the meantime he will feel at liberty to withdraw temporarily to some other point on the coast of Corea or China. Some of the vessels may be employed on the coast surveying during his absence, and it is to be hoped they will not be interfered with or molested.

I would further observe that if any of my countrymen should be, unfortunately, wrecked upon the coasts or islands, it is expected that the assurances of His Majesty to the Board of Rites will be made good, and the people be humanely treated and forwarded to their country. Any expenses incurred on this account will be readily paid by the Government of the United States.

July 2, 1871.

Inclosure No. 2.

(Telegram)

Corea, June 22.

Secretary of State, Washington.

Recent demonstration produced no effect upon negotiations. Nothing can be affected short of the capital. Force insufficient to go there without great risk. If peaceful means fail, shall withdraw and wait instructions.

Low.

True copy,

Edward B. Drew.

Mr. Fish to Mr. Low

Department of State,

Washington, September 20th, 1871.

No. 54.

SIR: With reference to your dispatch of the 20th of June last, No. 74 detailing the events connected with the expedition to Corea, I have to inform you that the Department approves your general course of proceeding on the occasion referred to, but thinks that your communication should have been addressed to the principal minister of foreign affairs instead of the King. Their being thus addressed may be appealed to as justification for their not being received.

It is to be regretted that in the communication of June 18th, (Inclosure No. 17) by Mr. Drew, acting secretary of the legation, addressed to Li, Guardian General of Foo-Ping prefecture, the declaration of intention to make a prolonged stay in the vicinity of the capital, was made, and as accompanied by the expression of a determination “to retain the dispatch until means are found to forward it to its destination”. This refers to a dispatch which the Coreans had declined to receive. The declaration was not carried out. The minister left Corea about 16 days after its date without having found means to forward the dispatch to its destination. But for the unfulfilled promise or threat the Coreans would be without justification in alleging that, all that had been contemplated or intended had been accomplished.

Hamilton Fish.
No. 77.
Mr. Low to Mr. Fish.
Legation of the U. S. Peking Jan.
13th, 1872.

No. 123.

SIR: I beg to thank you for your approval of my general course in the conduct of the expedition to Corea, conveyed in your dispatch No. 54.

With reference to the observation that the Department is of the opinion that my communications should have been addressed to the principal minister for foreign affairs instead of the king, I beg to state some of the reasons why a departure from the course usual in such correspondence seemed necessary.

It is proper that I should say in this connection that the mode and manner of approaching the government of Corea engaged my attention from the moment your instructions reached me, and the course pursued was decided on only after mature deliberation.

All the information obtainable, concerning the organization of that government, went to prove that such an official as a minister for foreign affairs did not exist; and it seemed altogether likely that if I addressed a communication to such an official, it would reach a very subordinate board charged with the control of the inhabitants on some of the outlying islands off the coast of that country, over whom the king exercises a military control.

A brief description of the organization of the Chinese government, of which that of Corea is a counterpart, may not prove uninteresting: it will, at the same time, illustrate what I desire to say better than it can be done in any other manner.

The supreme head of the government is the Emperor. He is assisted by several high ministers, who compose what is known as "the Grand Council", whose functions are advisory simply. Subordinate to this head are "six boards"—civil office, rites, war, punishments, and works. They rank in dignity in the order named. Each of these boards has several departments or bureaus, to each of which are confided particular duties.

In addition to the six boards before mentioned there are four inferior ones, viz: colonial office, censorate, judicature, and education. There are also separate departments in each of these. All the business of the imperial government is transacted by and through these ten boards, the particular functions of each being marked with great precision and definitely defined.

Everything connected with the tributary states, such as the reception of their ambassadors and tribute-bearers, is under the control of, and is managed by, a department, in the Board of Rites, which is styled the "Host and Guest Office". The government and regulation of intercourse with "external foreigners" is managed by a department in the Board of Colonial Office.
Included under the head of "external foreigners" are the tribes of Cobdo, Uli, Mongolia, and Koko-nor. It is said that, prior to 1860, this board had also the nominal superintendence of the affairs between China and the "barbarian countries of the west" such as England, the United States etc. The Tsung-li Yamen, or foreign office, had no existence prior to 1861. It was organized in that year by imperial decree, to meet an emergency forced upon the government by the presence of resident foreign ministers in Peking, who were unwilling to transact their business with either of the boards. But even now it is not a department of the government recognized by law, nor is it mentioned in the public list of offices.

The Tsung-li Yamen is composed of seven high ministers, all of whom are presidents or vice-presidents of the six boards before referred to, with Prince Kung at the head as chief secretary for foreign affairs. The ministers' position as members of the foreign office is ex-officio simply, the business intrusted to them being in addition to their legitimate duties as officers of the several boards.

With the exception of the "Grand Council," which has no existence in Korea, the organization of that government is exactly like that of China.

In view of this, it seemed probable that a communication from me, addressed to the minister for foreign affairs, would reach either the Board of Rites or that of the Colonial Office; if the former, it would be considered a tacit acknowledgement that the United States consider themselves vassals of Korea; if the latter, our position would be considered on a par with the semi-savages on the outlying islands. Such an impression would, I thought be likely to prevent direct communication with any but petty officials, and thus defeat the purpose of the mission.

I was the more strongly convinced of the advisability of addressing myself to the King direct, from the fact that the Chinese officials urged no objection to it on the score of propriety. At an interview with the ministers of the Foreign Office, which I sought for the purpose of soliciting their friendly offices, in obedience to your instructions, when I made the proposal that they should send a letter, through the Board of Rites, from me to the King, nothing was said as to the impropriety of such a proceeding, nor could an objection on that score have been properly urged, for it is a well-known fact that the King corresponds on terms of equality with the Board of Rites, a board quite inferior in point of dignity to the Tsung-li Yamen, (leaving out Prince Kung who was the head of foreign affairs), with which the ministers of western nations transact all their business.

In addition to the considerations which might affect the result, so far as Korea was concerned, our standing and prestige in the eyes of the Chinese could not be overlooked.

It would, I thought, be a fatal mistake to assume an attitude of inferiority to Korea, looking only to the success of the expedition; and if it should prove unsuccessful, any semblance of subserviency would seriously
compromise our position here. My dispatches of last spring concerning this subject clearly indicated my solicitude on this latter point; nor did I conceal from myself, from the first, that non-success was possible if not probable.

In view of these considerations I deemed it my duty to address my communications direct to the King until such time as he should designate a minister of appropriate rank with whom I could consult and correspond; nor have I found any evidence since going to prove that a different course in this particular would have had the least influence for good. I may add that no person can be more averse than myself to subordinating essentials of form and ceremony; but when, as is almost invariably the case in oriental countries, essentials are buried out of sight in ceremony and etiquette, a disregard of the latter hinders, if it does not defeat entirely, the accomplishment of practical results.

The foregoing explanations will, I trust, go far to justify my proceedings in this particular in the opinion of the Department.

The statements in Mr. Drew's note to the prefect of Fu-Ping-fu, referred to in your dispatch, may have been ill advised. If so, they can be set down to an over anxiety to accomplish the object for which the mission was sent, and a desire to spare no effort to that end.

Procrastination is the formidable weapon in diplomacy with orientals; every possible device will be resorted to to hinder and obstruct action on disagreeable subjects, hoping by this means to weary their opponents into compliance with their wishes. In view of this characteristic the announcement that we intended to make a protracted stay on the coast, might, I thought, induce the government to send someone to treat with me: and besides, at the date on which the note was written it was not impossible that additional instructions might reach me by telegraph which would detain the fleet there longer than I would feel authorized to do without them, unless a favorable change in the status of affairs should occur in the meantime. The withdrawal of the fleet was not decided upon until all reasonable efforts at peaceful negotiation, warranted by your instructions, had been exhausted, nor until I had become entirely satisfied that further delay and effort would be entirely useless. When that time had arrived I did not feel justified in keeping longer all the available vessels of the fleet on the coast of Corea, when their presence on the coast of China and Japan might be necessary for the protection of our citizens there; to send away a portion of the vessels and remain longer myself appeared useless, and worse than useless, as the weakening of the force might induce the Coreans to commit some assault or other insult which could not honorably be allowed to go unredressed.

In conclusion I beg leave to say that efforts to open intercourse with isolated oriental countries, whose rulers are ignorant, conceited, and exclusive, have universally been surrounded by difficulties and embarrassments, and neither history nor precedence affords a safe guide for action. In these
respects the mission to Korea formed no exception. That mistakes were possible, and even probable, I never for a moment doubted; and it is a source of gratification to me that, according to my present light, so few were committed. And while I feel confident that all was done that could be done, under the circumstances, it is a source of sincere regret and disappointment that the result was not all the Department hoped for and perhaps expected. But while failing to attain the main object for which the mission was sent, the ultimate results arising from it are not, I am happy to say, likely to prove as mischievous as I had feared, and at one time anticipated. The chastisement which the attack upon our vessels by the Coreans rendered necessary, judging from all I can see and hear, has done good; it has convinced the Chinese as well as their vassals that insults and injuries will not be allowed to go unredressed, which has increased the respect of this government for us as a nation. A lesson has at the same time been taught the Corean Government which will prove useful: it will, I feel certain, tend to guarantee humane treatment of shipwrecked people, who may be unfortunatelty thrown upon the mercy of that nation, more certainly than all the voluntary promises of the King heretofore made through the Peking government.

I have, etc.,

Frederick F. Low.
PARTIAL REPORT—REAR ADMIRAL RODGERS

U. S. S. S. "Colorado"

Flagship Asiatic Fleet
Boisée Anchorage, Salée River Corea,
June 6-31st, 1871.

SIR: I have the honor to report to the Department my arrival on the 30th of May at this anchorage, having on board the ship the Honorable Mr. Low, our minister to China, intrusted with the mission to the Corean government.

The fleet under my command sailed from Nagasaki on the 16th, and anchored off the Ferrières islands on the Corean coast, on the 19th of May. Thick fogs delayed further movements, and the anchorage which we are at, Eugenie island, was not reached until the 23rd of May.

I have called this anchorage, Roze Roads, giving the name of the French admiral who directed the first examination made of them. From this position I dispatched on the morning of the 24th of May, the Palos and four steam-launches all under the command of Commander H. C. Blake, to make an examination of the channel up to the anchorage above Boisée Island. Lieut. Commander C. M. Chester and L. H. Baker and Lieut. W. W. Meade, and G. M. Totten, were detailed to command the launches and to make the surveys. Soundings were made of the channel and of the neighboring water, etc. as above and the neighboring waters and shores. The expedition reached its destination without difficulty or molestation from the natives, and returned to Roze Roads on the evening of the 28th of May.

Meantime parties from the ship remaining in Roze Roads were engaged in surveying the vicinity of that anchorage, the soundings taken are given on the chart herewith transmitted, and landing parties had communications with Coreans, who appeared to be of a friendly disposition.

A paper with written Chinese characters was handed to one of the officers, and its contents, being translated conveyed inquiries as to our nation and the purpose of our coming. The paper was without signature or indication of official character. An informal reply was sent to it by the Minister, giving only the information that we were Americans; that our purpose was friendly, and that we had come to seek an interview with the governing authorities.

On Monday, May 29th, the fleet got under way and proceeded, but was compelled to anchor some miles below Boisée Island, owing to a thick fog which came on and hid the land from view. On May 30th the fog being dispersed by a breeze, we proceeded and anchored in the afternoon between Boisée and Guerrière Isles. As soon as our anchorage was made a junk approached having on board people who by signs indicated that they desired to communicate with us. Upon being invited, they came on board this ship without any apparent hesitation. They were the bearers of a letter which
stated that from one former communication it had been learned that we were Americans, and announced that three envoys had been appointed by the Sovereign to confer with us. These messengers were persons of inferior grade, and came merely to announce the approach of the superior officials. They were assured of our desire to preserve peaceful relations and our purpose not to commit any act of violence unless we were first attacked. This assurance was received with apparent satisfaction. The next afternoon, May 31st, the envoys previously announced, made their appearance. The minister deeming it proper not to receive them in person until their positions and powers were ascertained to be such that he could do so without derogation to the dignity of his own rank as minister plenipotentiary, deputed Mr. Drew, his acting secretary, to conduct the interview. Mr. Drew conversed with the envoys in the Peking dialect. The conversation elicited the fact that the Coreans were officials of the 3rd and 5th rank, and that they brought with them no credential letters, and, so far as could be ascertained, that they were not entrusted with any authority to initiate negotiations.

Under these circumstances, Mr. Low determined not to see the envoys, and they were informed that only officials of the 1st rank, who were empowered to conduct negotiations, could be received; and to such alone could full announcement of the object of our coming be made. Their object appeared to be to learn all they could of our purpose and intentions, without committing themselves by the direct expression of assent or disassent to what was said to them; but their manner of non-objection conveyed the impression of actual compliance with our wishes. They were assured of our non-aggressive disposition, and were distinctly told that only to resent assault should we resort to arms. They were informed that we wished to take soundings of their waters, and to make surveys of the shores. To this they made no objection. We expressed the hope that no molestation would be offered to our parties in landing or passing up the rivers, and requested that word be sent to the people; that they might preserve the friendly relations which were desired. It was further stated that twenty-four hours would be given to make this announcement to the people along the river before any movement was made. To all this they made no reply which could indicate dissent. So, believing that we might continue our surveys while further diplomatic negotiations were pending, our expedition was sent to examine and survey the Salée River, which empties into the bay, and leads into the river Seoul which passes near the city of Seoul the capital, and residence of the Sovereign. The force dispatched consisted of Monocacy, Commander McCrea; Palos, Commander Lieut. C. H. Rockwell; Colorado's steam launch, Lieut. W. W. Meade; Colorado's steam-cutter. G. M. Totten; Benicia's steam launch, Master S. S. Schroeder, all under Commander H. C. Blake, who went on board the Palos.

What followed is detailed in Commander Blake's report herewith enclosed. As herein related, at the forts which defends a short bend in the
UNITED STATES KOREAN RELATIONS

river, not far from its mouth, Corean masked batteries, and without any previous intimation of their objection to our approach, or warning of their intention, opened a heavy fire upon our boats and ships. The steam-launches were in advance, and but a few hundred feet from the forts. The first was directed upon them, from cannons and gin-gals arranged in rows, one tier above another on the hill-side, and fired by a train of powder. This sudden and treacherous assault was not expected by our people, but they promptly resented it. The Palos and Monocacy coming up, opened fire with their heavier guns, and the enemy was driven from their works, and sought shelter in the hills. The tide sweeping with great velocity up the river, bore our force rapidly past the batteries and around the point on which they are erected. Here the Monocacy and Palos anchored, and from this position the retreating enemy was shelled again. Unfortunately the Monocacy was carried by the current upon a rock and had a hole broken through her bottom, which caused her to list badly. This being reported to Commander Blake, he deemed it imprudent to proceed, and returned with his command to this anchorage. The Monocacy was temporarily repaired, and her leak stopped without difficulty. It was our good fortune to have but two men slightly wounded, James A. Cochran, and John Somerdyke, ordinary seamen in the Alaska’s launch. Our exemption from serious loss is only attributable to the bad gunnery of the Coreans, whose fire, although very hot for fifteen minutes in which they maintained it, was ill-directed, and consequently without effect. The vessels in their return, received no reply to the fire they directed against the batteries in passing.

In accordance with my instructions not to pursue any advantage which might be obtained in case of an attack upon him, and in view of the small force available for the purpose of landing in the face of the large force of the enemy, Commander Blake did not deem it prudent to send a party on shore to destroy the guns. At once upon return of the expedition, it was determined to equip the available landing force of all the ships, and return to attack and destroy the fortifications. Preparations for this purpose were made, but upon consideration it was concluded to wait for the next neap tide when the currents will be less violent than during the prevalence of the spring tide, which is now running. At the present time the water rises from thirty to thirty-five feet with each flood tide, and the velocity of the stream at the point at which the attack must be made renders the management of vessels extremely difficult. In this affair the greatest gallantry was displayed by all engaged—

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. Rodgers,

Rear-Admiral, Commander-in-Chief of Asiatic-Fleet.

Hon. Geo. M. Roberson
Sec. of the Navy, Washington D. C.
PARTIAL REPORT OF THE ENGAGEMENT

of June 10-11th, 1871

by

Rear Admiral Winfield Scott Schley, U. S. N.

June 10th, the day set for operations, was ushered in without a cloud in the sky, the temperature was that of midsummer. Everybody was astir early. The boats were lowered, the battalion equipped for distant service, was ready to embark after breakfast, and the Palos, with steam up, Commander H. C. Blake, commanding the expedition, on board, was ready for towing the squadron of boats.

A busy scene of activity followed in arranging the order of advance up the river, to be led by the Monocacy, whose heavy guns were to be used upon the lower fort to dislodge the enemy. The strong ebb tide made the progress of the boats slow. Although they got under way by 10:30 A. M., it was towards 8 o'clock, after an hour or two of bombardment by the Monocacy, when they made a dash for the beach in the order arranged, though by some misunderstanding the left of the battalion was landed on a mud flat below the lower fort, and was delayed an hour in gaining solid ground. On the approach of this force a few guns were fired from the lower fort, but it was hastily abandoned by its defenders, who fled and disappeared in the covering of woods beyond a broad morass back of the lower fort. Possession was taken at once of this point, skirmishers were thrown out across a causeway through a morass leading to these woods, and all approaches to the fort and surrounding region were reconnoitered.

These precautions being concluded, it was too late that day to attempt a further advance into a country wholly unknown, and of which there were no maps. The battalion went into bivouac on the high ground back of the fort and posted the artillery in position to sweep the causeway and the road back of the works, which were the only approaches. The flanks were protected by the Monocacy and Palos, and night fell upon the camp. The enemy's cunning and aggressiveness were in no sense under-estimated. Every arrangement had been made before nightfall to give him a warm reception if perchance a night attack should be attempted.

Everything went well until midnight, when word was received from Captain Tilton that shots were being exchanged, and that the enemy was forming in the woods in his front. In accordance with his orders in such an event, his force fell back on the main body so as to be clear of our artillery fire. Some desultory firing by the enemy, the din made by the beating of tom-toms, and the hurrahing of crowds of people were believed to indicate an assault. This challenge was answered by several artillery shells, which checked both the noise and the demonstration. It was fortunate for the enemy that no assault was made that night, for the battalion was alert and fully prepared for work.
Commander Kimberly took advantage of this disturbance to call a midnight council of war, at which it was decided that celerity of movement was to characterize the battalion's operations. The concensus of opinion was that, whenever the enemy was met, the fight should be to the finish. Every advantage was to be followed up relentlessly. No rest was to be given to the enemy, for as long as he could retreat the battalion could be counted upon to pursue; every blow was to be pressed home or followed by one of greater power. In fine, it was decided to make war upon the foe after the most approved modern methods and to spare nothing that could be reached by shot, shell, fire or sword.

The ships were informed of this decision. The pickets were called in as the first golden streaks of dawn shot upward in the skies on that morning of June 11th. The battalion took up its line of march over the road back of the forts, throwing a strong picket force on its left flank to clear the woods and guard against surprise from the foe in this direction. The roads were so narrow and bad that the battalion in column of fours was obliged to have the sappers and miners remove obstacles from its passage. As had been surmised would be the case, the battalion fell upon the second fort, known as the Marine Redoubt, and afterward as Fort Monocacy, about 6:30 A. M., after a furious bombardment by that vessel. The enemy's surprise was complete and his retreat so precipitate that the morning breakfast was found to have been left boiling in the stew-pots. Short work was made in dismounting the guns. Fire was then set to all buildings used for military purposes in or about this fort. This fire later in the day unfortunately reached and destroyed an entire village lying to the north of this fort.

Remembering that celerity of movement when operating against these slow-going Eastern nations would demoralize and confound them quite as much as a battle, the line of march in the same order was taken up without loss of time for the main citadel, named Fort du Conde, at the elbow of the river above, distant several miles. This march was through a dense undergrowth, over steep hills and across morasses which had to be corduroyed to gain higher ground away from the river. After a tedious march in intensely hot weather, under a burning sun, on emerging into clearer ground the enemy was discovered in force on our left and front. The battalion was thrown forward into line by Lieutenant Commander Casey and a strong skirmish line thrown towards the enemy's position, which was on a hill entrenched and apparently awaiting attack.

It was discovered at once that the enemy had made a serious and irreparable blunder in choosing this position. Kimberly threw the right wing forward under Casey, who, after some skirmishing, seized the stronger position on a hill which commanded the line of advance and completely controlled any re-enforcement of the enemy's forces in the forts further along toward Fort du Conde. From this position, which overlooked the entire field
of operations, the military advantages were evident at a glance. Their blunder was hailed as an indication that there was lack of strategy among their officers. How much that encouraged the attacking column can be judged better from the advantage which was taken in the movement made immediately against the upper forts along the river, where the other half of the Corean army had been placed.

It was clear that the Koreans had made an irreparable military mistake in not throwing this part of their army across the line of Kimberly's advance and thus forcing a fight for an advantage which had been gained, it might almost be said, without firing a gun. In other words, the enemy permitted his army to be cut in twain without a serious fight, and worse still, its right wing to be left in the air. Kimberly was quick to move his left up to this position, detailing three companies, supported by three pieces of Snow's artillery, the combined force being under Lieutenant Commander W. K. Wheeler, whose orders were to hold the place at all hazards. To add strength to a position naturally strong, Wheeler quickly threw up entrenchments, and these stood to good purpose in the two assaults the enemy made later in the day.

Kimberly again threw the right wing forward under Casey to assault the citadel, whose defenders were being increased by those who fled from the rifle-pits in front of the right wing as it advanced, and those from the fort lying on the river under the higher ground back, then held by our forces. Kimberly gave the writer orders to represent him in the advance, and at the same time informed him that his headquarters would be on a prominent ridge between his divisions, where all movements would be under his observation.

On Sunday, June 11th, the sky was clear of clouds and the heat consequently intense. But these things were hardly considered when the work ahead promised to be much warmer still. It was 12:35 P. M. when the right wing of the battalion had reached its position behind a slight ridge, where it rested to fill canteens and cartridge boxes, and to be sure that bayonets were all secure and fixed. From this position a road was seen across the ravine leading down from the cliffs on which the citadel was located and then up the river. On the left was a small knoll which commanded this road. It was at once seized and Lieutenant Commander Douglass Cassell was directed to occupy it with a company and one section of artillery.

The Monocacy, in compliance with signals, had maintained a vigorous and murderous cannonade of the forts as the battalion advanced, driving the enemy from them like rats. It was these troops that momentarily augmented those in the citadel. Upon this last fortification Commander McCrea opened a merciless cannonade, until signaled to cease firing so that the battalion could make a charge upon this work.

In the citadel across the ravine the enemy chanted a solemn dirge, but whether it was a battle song of defiance or a dirge or death was never learned. Some of the men to whom this battle was to be a sort of baptism
of fire were a little disturbed by the solemnity of the weird song, but when reminded that "barking dogs rarely bite," took new determination for the fight which followed, desperate as it proved.

Open order was directed by Casey, the rear rank some six feet in the rear opposite the interval of the front rank. At 12:40 P.M. the order "Charge at double quick" was given. The battalion rose over the ridge and passed down the hill across the ravine and up to the parapets of the citadel amid a storm of projectiles. There were a number of casualties, but at close range the wonder was that they were not more numerous. The fighting inside the citadel was severe and stubborn.

It was here that Lieutenant Hugh W. McKee fell mortally wounded. He was among the first to reach the parapet and fell under an avalanche of projectiles into the fortification, shot through the stomach and spine. In falling he fell against the writer, but in the smoke and noise of the conflict it was thought he had stumbled only. In the rifts of smoke a moment later, he was seen lying upon his back in the fort, with two spearsmen apparently in the act of dispatching him. The writer hastened to his side, and this led to a desperate hand-to-hand conflict with a native soldier, which ended unfortunately for the poor fellow, though not until he had sent his spear through the writer's left sleeve, pinning it to his coat.

It seemed a long time before the battalion reached the fort, but in reality it was only a few moments, when the work of carnage began in earnest. Captain McLane Tilton's marines, being on the right of the battalion, in closing in on the fort, gained the enemy's left flank, as did the company of Lieutenant Thomas C. McLean on his right. With Lieutenant Commander Casey in front, Captain Tilton on the right and Lieutenant McLean on the left, the enemy's ranks were enfiladed, but it was fully thirty minutes before their lines broke. Frequent charges were made and repulsed on both sides, but it was not until their men had been piled up after several bayonet charges and their quarters within the parapets had taken fire that the stampede began for the cliffs and the road leading down to the river. Many were killed in this rout, some jumped over the cliffs to the river bank, sixty or eighty feet below, and more made for the road only to meet the fire of Cassell's men and the artillery directly in their faces, which piled them up two and three deep. Many jumped into the river, where they were shot or drowned in attempting to escape.

The force confronting Wheeler, seeing the disaster to their brothers in the citadel, fled in the utmost confusion from his front, throwing away guns, gun-proof armor, clothing and all impedimenta which could have retarded their flight. It is hardly possible to comprehend at this time how tremendously demoralized this army was, but remembering that the part of it in front of the right wing of our battalion had been practically annihilated, while that in Wheeler's front had suffered two bitter repulses, it is doubtful
if better organized forces anywhere could have maintained a better morale after such sweeping defeats and destruction. The battle ended, leaving many dead and wounded on our hands, whose suffering was painful to look upon. The surgeons were busy the rest of the day in administering relief to those who were injured. The dead were buried in the trenches inside the citadel, and the scene of conflict was then tidied up as well as fire and funerals could effect it. Wheeler’s men were ordered to join the main body, and before nightfall a strong picket-line had been thrown out to the west of the ravine. News of the complete success of the battalion was dispatched to the Commander-in-chief, with a succinct report of its losses, and then the camp settled down into quiet for the night, in bivouac upon the field of battle won by the valor of our men. There were no alarms during the night, not even any excitement on the picket-lines. Indeed, it was a question in some minds whether there was any army left in the land willing to contest another field with our victorious force.

Careful examination of the dead revealed the fact that the larger percentage of wounds were above the hips, and it spoke volumes for the superior accuracy of our marksmen, who were armed with Remington breech-loading rifles. Contrary to all rumors before the expedition sailed, there was not a modern gun of any description found in the hands of the Coreans, who attempted with gingalls and such-like super-annuated arms to face modern artillery successfully. They fought, however, with desperate courage, until they were overwhelmed, and died at their posts of duty heroically and without fear. The men of no nation could have done more for home and country. The officers and men composing our battalion fought as Americans always have fought whenever and wherever they are required to fight for the flag. They sustained, in every matter of discipline, endurance, readiness and steadiness in battle, the highest traditions of their comrades in arms from Bunker Hill to Appomattox. They deserved there in Korea the highest confidence, and praise of their countrymen as their comrades before them had done on other fields of honor.

The morning following, June 12th, orders were received from Admiral Rodgers to withdraw, as the object of the expedition had been fully accomplished and the insult to the flag had been fully avenged. Re-embarkation was begun after breakfast and was effected without incident or accident, but before doing so every gun in the forts was dismounted, every storehouse destroyed, and every magazine blown up, which left behind the appearance of utter devastation in every direction. The punishment inflicted was great and the lesson it impressed upon that Hermit Kingdom ultimately brought it into fellowship with our Western civilization and made for friendship.

Unfortunately, on the night of June 10th, the Palos, in taking position to guard the left flank of the battalion, anchored at high water over an unknown ledge of rocks, upon which she grounded with the ebbing tide. She sustained grave injury from a large jagged hole in her bottom plating which
involved her safety. It limited her participation to guarding the boats, and
deprived her commander and his crew of the opportunities to engage in the
work of the day following. It was an unfortunate accident, but wholly
unavoidable.

Excerpt from the Diary of Lieutenant Snow of the American Ex-
pedition to Korea in 1871 on the U. S. S. "Alaska". Edited by
E. M. Cable.

(About May 14th). During our stay at Nagasaki the weather has been
warm and rainy most of the time. We have had much exercising in order
that the men might be well drilled together, in case landing with a force
should be necessary in Corea. During our stay here we have been over-
hauling boats etc. and getting the ships in complete readiness for our expedition
to Corea. The American Minister to China, Hon. Fredrick Low, with a
staff of interpreters, and our old friend E. B. Drew of Kiukiang and a Mr.
Cowles will accompany the expedition.

Expedition to Korea, May 1871

At 6:30 A. M. of the 16th inst. the fleet got under way and steamed out
of Nagasaki, the Colorado leading, our ship (Alaska) and the Monocacy on
the starboard quarter line, Benicia and (Palos) on the port side. We found
a smooth sea and light wind from S. W. outside the harbor. We then got a
fresh breeze from the N. W. and on the next day a very rough sea in which
the Monocacy was somewhat damaged and on the following day, the 18th,
she obtained permission to make the best of her way to anchorage and bore
up under the land for smoother water. At 6:00 P. M. of the 19th inst. the
fleet came to anchor off the Ferrières Islands which had been appointed as a
rendezvous in case we should be obliged to separate. We found the Monoca-
cacy at anchor here. On the 21st we got under way again and steamed up
for the mouth of the Han Kang River in line ahead, Monocacy leading, fol-
lowed by the Palos, Benicia, Alaska, and Colorado, each vessel signalling
the soundings which we found not to vary much from those of the French
survey. At 3:15 P. M., it being very foggy, the Colorado fired a gun as a
signal to anchor, and we anchored in 27 fathoms of water. On the 23rd
inst. the fleet again got under way at 9:15 A. M. and moved slowly up the
river, taking soundings every five minutes. At 12:20 we steamed into the
eastern side of the fairway and came to anchor on the following bearings.
Chapeau Id. N. W. 4° and N; Olivier Id. S. W. 4° W. We hauled the fires inten-
ding to remain here until the boats made a further survey of the river. On
the 24th the Palos, with all the steam-launches of the fleet (Captain Blake
in Charge of the party) led the fleet on surveying duty. In our launch were
Chester and myself and we were given the channels inside the islands to ex-
plore. The Benicia's steam-launch with Baker and Schroeder took the
same route. The Talos with the Colorado's launches (Meade and Totten in
charge) took the main channel and we were to join them after making the
detour of the islands. We found that the French charts were only accurate in describing the channels on either end of the main channel, as we found many of them not laid down. We passed very near to some of the islands especially in going through one narrow channel and saw a number of natives, but they were evidently only fishermen and gave us no trouble—perhaps due to our little twelve pounder which was mounted very conspicuously in the bows. On the afternoon of this day we were left high and dry on the flats for several hours, the Benicia's launch waiting for us in the channel, only a few yards distant. Towards dusk we steamed into the main channel where we found the Palos at anchor with the other launches and put up on board of her for the night. We had to stow close but enjoyed the novelty none the less for that reason. All hands were plentifully supplied with pipes and tobacco and Rockwell gave us plenty of "chow" so our resting spells on the Palos are regarded as among the most pleasant hours of the cruise. We continued surveying on the 25th, 26th and 27th inst. returning to the Palos each night. We encountered some very rough weather for the launches, but succeeded in finishing the main channel as far as Boisée Island where it was intended to bring the fleet for anchorage during the negotiations for a treaty. We passed one small fort just before reaching Boisée Island but to all appearances it was not manned and made no opposition to our progress. On the 28th the Palos got under way taking the launches in tow and returned to the fleet where we arrived at 9:30 P. M. and were the lions of the evening until we had related our adventures. At 11:00 A. M. on the 29th inst. the fleet got under way and moved up river in inverse order, signalling soundings, but were obliged to come to anchor about 2:30 P. M. on account of fog. At 2.00 P. M. on the 30th the fleet again got under way and this time succeeded in reaching the Boisée anchorage where we finally moored about 6:00 P. M. having been obliged to shift anchorage once; the Colorado just below us, Benicia above and Monocacy and Palos in toward Boisée Island.

June

On the 1st of June the four launches with the Monocacy and Palos got under way about 12:15 P. M. and started up the Han Kang River surveying. For a day or two previous, negotiations had been carried on with some of the officials ashore principally by means of correspondence taken ashore opposite the fleet and left in a certain spot where were also found the letters from the Corean officials. Our objects in visiting their country were stated in the usual diplomatic language, but their replies were even more diplomatic, as we could not learn whether we could get a treaty from them or even whether we would be allowed to ascend the river further than a certain point which they designated the "Key" to their country, without molestation. Only the day before, a party of Korean officials who came aboard the Colorado expressed their satisfaction when assured that our aims were
peaceful but gave us no intimation of their own intentions if we persisted in surveying the river higher up. However, we left the fleet fully prepared for hostilities should they attack us and felt no doubt about the result should there be a collision. We ran lines of soundings across the channel during the day, the steamers keeping a little in the rear of the boats, and passed several forts without molestation, but when we arrived at Fort du Conde we saw the walls of the citadel and the water batteries on both sides of the river strongly manned, and came to the conclusion that they intended to oppose our further progress. However, we went on until our boat had just arrived at the bend of the river (an exceedingly dangerous place, filled as it is with jagged ledges and the tides running at six and seven knots at springs) when, at a given signal, they opened on us and for a short time the air seemed literally alive with whistling projectiles. Fortunately for us, the rude manner in which their guns were placed and their imperfect ammunition prevented much harm to us, and John Somerdyke, a man belonging to my boat, was the only one on our side that was hit, being slightly wounded in the shoulder at the first discharge. But the Koreans had a different story to tell, as we afterward learned from them. Steaming up almost to the beach each launch would send a shell of our shrapnel with the utmost precision into the fort and then, when swept away by the tide, would load again to return and repeat the operation. Finally the Palos and Monocacy ran by (the latter striking a rock when just opposite the fort) where they were joined by the launches. Here we remained while the two steamers poured an effective fire from their heavy guns into the citadel, dislodging huge fragments of the wall and sending the defenders flying into the woods. At last the fire of the forts was completely silenced and they were seemingly deserted although many of the banners were still flying. These we were not allowed to capture, as Captain Blake's instructions were to act only on the defensive. Soon after their fire ceased the steamers got under way and taking the launches in tow returned to the fleet meeting with no further hostilities from the natives. We reached the ships at 5:30 P. M. and found all the fellows who had been left behind in a great state of excitement, as they had heard the guns and could see the smoke from aloft, Fort du Conde being only about ten miles from Boisée anchorage.

On the 2nd inst. we went ashore on Boisée Island to bury Thomas Driver who died very suddenly this morning of brain fever. We had the launch "armed and equipped" but there were apparently no natives on the island to oppose our landing. From the 2nd to the 10th inst. all hands were busily engaged in organizing an expedition to ascend the river and punish the natives who had fired upon us while surveying. On the 4th inst. the Palos got under way form Chefoo taking dispatches from the Admiral and Minister Low to the Navy and State Departments and also taking our mail. On the 8th inst. she returned bringing our mail.
About 10:00 A.M. of the 10th inst. steam-launhes first, second, cutters, barge and whale-boats with a landing-party from the ships pulled up to the *Palos* and made fast astern in the position assigned them. The officers of the *Palos* connected with the expedition were: Captain H. C. Blake U. S. N. who had charge of the whole force, Cassel in command of the artillery, myself in command of one battery, Brown in command of a company of marines, Wadham's commanding a section of the artillery, Roosevelt on a steam-launch, Houston signal officer, Dr. Latta hospital force, Cooper in steam-launch and the three mates, Calendar in Brown's company, Jennings on the steam-launch and in charge of the pioneers. About 10:30 the *Palos* and Monocacy got under way, the latter towing all the boats of the landing party. We met a junk bearing dispatches when we were several miles from the fleet, but as the dispatch contained nothing more definite than we had received every day or so from their officials, we continued on our way. About Twelve the *Monocacy* opened fire on some of the lower forts but they made no reply and soon after, all the boats of the fleet with the landing party put ashore and landed just below the first fort of any pretensions on the river. The howitzers gave us a good deal of trouble as we had to drag them at least a mile through deep mud, but the infantry, took possession of the fort without opposition, and when we arrived the men were busily engaged in destroying the guns (of which there were a great many of small calibre) and ammunition. The walls of the fort had been very much demolished by the heavy guns of the *Monocacy*. We encamped for the night in the rear of this fort receiving two alarms before day-break by the enemy opening fire from a hill opposite our position, but a few shells from the rifled howitzers soon silenced them. The *Palos* got ashore on a ledge of rocks in mid-channel. The next morning (Sunday) all hands were up at day-break and after a hasty breakfast set fire to the buildings and the trees about the fort and commenced our march over a very rough road for Fort du Conde which was the principal object of our expedition. After a march of several miles during which we took possession of one fort which the enemy had hastily evacuated. We were fired upon by the natives and from that time a brisk skirmish was kept up. Several companies, with my battery, were left in charge of a commanding ridge while the rest of the battalion pushed on for Fort du Conde.

From our position we could easily keep any number of the enemy from attacking our people in the rear and could also see the movements of our own men. There seemed to be a desperate hand-to-hand fight at the citadel, but our men charged up the steep hill with the greatest enthusiasm and in a short time we were gratified by the sight of the Stars and Stripes waving where the large flag of the Coreans had been flying. We were soon ordered by signal to join the main body and after an arduous tramp of half an hour reached the fort where we found everything in possession of our men, but learned with much regret that the price had been great, as poor McKee and
several men were killed in the assault. The work of demolition was still going on when we reached the fort and all hands were busily employed till dark, when the pickets were posted and the force placed in the best position in case of a midnight assault. But the natives evidently had enough and I slept within the walls of their stronghold quite undisturbed. In the morning we completed the demolition of the forts and then embarked on the Monocacy and Palos to join the squadron which we reached about noon the 12th and received a hearty welcome from those who had been left behind. Our loss in the fight was but three killed and five wounded whilst at least several hundred of the natives were killed and many wounded. Of course the fighting put an end to all prospects of a treaty for the present and although there was some further correspondence with the Coreans the remainder of our stay proved very monotonous, varied only by drills, and watching the Koreans as they threw up breastworks on the surrounding hills. The Prussian frigate Hertha came over from Chefoo to look for us, having heard that we were getting much the worst of it, which to us was very amusing.

About 6:00 A. M. on July 3rd we got under way and steamed down the river leaving the Corean in undisputed possession of their country.
UNOFFICIAL HISTORY OF KOREA (朝鮮野史)

Selection of Memorials and the King’s Instructions from the 4th month, 8th day (May 27) to 5th month, 25th day (July 13 of Sinyu 1871.)

On the 8th day of the 4th month of Sinyu (May 27, 1871) the governor of Kyŏnggi province memorialized the King to the effect that, in the report of the magistrate of Chemulpo he discovered on the 6th instant (May 25) five strange ships anchored in the Tori Sea (道里海) and one of them sailed to the sea in front of P’almi do (八尾島).

On the same day, the governor sent a second memorial to the King to the effect that, according to the report made by Sin Ch’ŏngu (申繼求) the Magistrate of Namyang District, on the afternoon of the same day between three and five in the afternoon, five strange ships appeared and anchored between Chemul do (濟物島) and Pung-do (繩島) Islands. Three of the ships had three masts each and two had two masts each. Early this morning one of them appeared off Yönghŭng (靈興島), Namyang. Two of our small boats put out to search for them but when they had reached the sea in front of Wangju Island (汪佳島) the ships could nowhere be seen.

At the same time an officer in Kojan (古棈村) village reported that he had seen two strange ships sail between Sŏngam (仙甘島) and Pul Islands (佛島) charting the depth of the sea and they had gone to the north, passing the end of Ul-do (乙島).

Sin Ch’ŏngu, the magistrate of Namyang District, sent an inquiry and received the following reply concerning the strange ships: “Yesterday while we were resting on the motor-ship we received a letter which inquired as to whom we were, from what country, and for what purpose we had come” and we replied that “We had come from the United States of America with the Envoy of the United States who had matters to negotiate with the Korean government which would require several days; that the ship would remain until all the business was completed.”

The magistrate of Inch’ŏn (仁川) city reported that between 5 and 7 P. M. of the 12th instant (May 31) five strange ships anchored in the sea in front of Ho-do (虎島) and the offing of Pup’yŏng (富平). Two of the ships had three masts each and two two masts each. The largest one had four stories (decks) and the width of each story was fifteen kan (about 90 feet) and the height was more than four chang (about forty feet). Three of the ship’s interpreters communicated with the city officers by means of Chinese letters. The latter also received some gifts from the ships. The letter and the gifts were sent up to the capital and presented to the government at the Unhyŏn (震現宮) Palace.
Reply of the American Envoy to the magistrate's communication:

"We received your letter of inquiry a few days ago and in reply would say in regard to the presence of our ships here that, in addition to what I have already said, our Admiral has very serious matters to negotiate with your Government and he strongly requests that the Korean government send an envoy to meet him and discuss these important questions. We will wait for him several days, and it will be well if you inform the Coreans living along the coast not to be frightened by our presence because we will do them no harm, or injure any of their property."

Presents from the ships. The three Chinese interpreters who had gone with the Korean officials to present the gifts carried the following: two white wax candles, three looking glasses, and to the boatmen they gave Japanese and Chinese coins to the value of twenty sen.

The Army Department memorialized the government asking it to appoint Ō Chaeyŏn (魚在鱻) Lieutenant as that post was now vacant and it was very urgent that it be filled at once.

Again, the Army Department memorialized the government to the effect, that inasmuch as the Western ships were near to Simdo (泌都) and their purpose was not known, that the defenses on the borders of the country be strengthened; that soldiers and provisions be provided by Kyŏnggi province and sent down at once. Therefore, the King ordered that Ō Chaeyŏn be made lieutenant and the Kangwha auxiliary magistrate Officer, Yi Ch'anghoe, should be stationed at their places at once.

Memorial of the Governor of Kyonggi province:

The magistrate of Namyang district reported on the 9th inst. (May 28) that on the previous day some local officials took a small boat to visit the ships, but meeting a rough sea before reaching the vessels, were compelled to return. However, three of the foreign ships braving the high sea waited near the coast so the Korean officials went to them at once. Three of the Americans launched a small boat and tried to speak to the Koreans but the latter could not understand so they handed them a letter. Then the Americans asked the Koreans if they had any Chinese with them and they said, "None". The Americans said they had come for the purpose of exchanging commodities and that they had no intention of harming any Koreans or their property. Then the Koreans asked how many ships had come and they were told, five. The Koreans next asked how many days the ships expected to remain and the Americans said that in a few days they intended to sail to the north. Being curious, the Koreans asked to what place in the north the ships expected to go. The Americans then asked the Koreans where they could purchase chickens, eggs, pork, fish, and were told that they could not be secured. Then, just as the Korean officials were on the point of asking further questions, the Americans rowed away. During the conversation with the Americans the Korean officials discovered that there were 47
Chinese on the vessels and that the vessels were able to sail around as they pleased.

**Report of Yongjong Naval Post:**

On the 12th inst. the five American vessels weighed anchor all at one time and belching out black smoke passed the Naval Post. A close examination showed that the two-masted ship in the lead had forty oars, and that the second two-masted ship, the one which had come to the coast, and the third which was a three-masted ship had fifty oars each. The ships were about 4 kil (24 feet) out of the water, but one was a little higher than the other. The total number on board the ships could not be ascertained. The vessels were flying various flags which fluttered in the breeze. They first anchored in front of Hodo (虎島) Island, in the offing of Pup'yŏng. The vessels anchored in a line which was about two li long and when the last ship anchored she fired one shot.

Some Korean officials, impersonating officers of high rank, went out to the vessels to make inquiries, but the Americans refused to receive them, saying that they did not care to see minor but only high officials. The Koreans returned on the 14th inst. unable to secure any information from the Americans.

**Memorial of the Governor of Kyonggi Province:**

The Governor of Kangwha sent a memorial to the government asking that a man be appointed in the place of Mid General Yi Hūigap (李熙甲) since the latter had left his post to visit his sick father and the position could not be left vacant even for a short time. The King issued an order that the place should be filled and that the officer appointed should leave for the place on the same day.

Again the Governor memorialized the King that since the narrow strait at Sondolmok (孫גול) was the gateway to the capital and that it was too bad that the foreign ships were allowed to enter it, and since the official at Tougjin (通津) had neglected his duty he should be dismissed at once. However, the King forgave the official and allowed him to retain his post.

**4th month, 15th day (June 3):**

By order of the King three men were appointed Lieutenant Generals of Kyŏnggi province: Kim Sŏng'il, Ku Chŏughūi, and Chŏng Wanmuk.

The King reported that a few days ago, when the American ships had unlawfully entered Tŏkp'o (德浦) an artillery-man by the name of O Samnok (吳三祿) had been killed by the Americans, but he had not been informed where the man had been buried or of the condition of his family. Also, he wanted to know the condition of the soldiers in the field who were on guard night and day and ordered that help should be given to the family of O Samnok and an abundance of supplies to the army; the supplies to be sent from the Army Department of Kyŏnggi province. Further, the King sent a royal messenger, Sŏnjŏn'gwan, to console the troops.
The Army Department memorialized the government to the effect that the Ch'ŏmsa, Lieutenant of the Guard, Myŏng Sŏkkhun, was too young and inexperienced and that Lieutenant Pak Chong-hwan was too old and weak to perform their duties and should be forced to resign. The positions they held were too important and strategic to the army and since the officers could not be appointed in the regular way, the army requested that the former Ch'ŏmsa, Yi Chŏn, should be appointed to fill the place of Myong Sŏkkhun, and Ch'oe Kyŏngsŏn should be appointed to the post of Tŏkp'o port. Both of these men were staying in Kangwha at the time and were notified and requested to assume their duties at once by the “Three Bell Messenger”.

The Department of the Interior also memorialized the government requesting that since the magistrate of Chaeryŏng district had been away from his post for some time on account of sickness that it be filled by Han Kyowon.

The King issued an order to the effect that the soldiers of Kyŏnggi province should be well supplied with rice and meat from the army storehouse and that the infantry in the field should be supplied with the above mentioned provisions by the towns.

The Army Department also memorialized the government to the effect that P'ungdŏk (蓬嶼) being a very strategic post in the defence of Kangwha, Han Chiuon should be appointed to take the place of the man there as the latter was too old and weak; that Han Chinon should be ordered by the department to assume his duty at once in order to assist in the defence of the country as occasion demanded.

Communication from General Chong of Kangwha:

Chŏng, Guardian of the prefecture of Kangwha, ex-official General and Governor, sends a communication to His Excellency, the American minister. (For this note see U. S. Diplomatic Correspondence.)

Mr. Tu (E. B. Drew) was instructed by the American envoy to reply to the note of the Guardian of Kangwha and a translation of this is found in the U. S. Foreign Relations Correspondence, (Enclosure 4).

The reply to the above communication by the Guardian General of Foo-Ping Prefecture is found in the U. S. Foreign Relations Correspondence, (Enclosure 2).

Memorial of the Governor of Kyŏnggi (京畿) Province.

The Magistrate of Tongjin (通津) made a report as follows:

“Two of the speedy small ships of the enemy started up the river, while two two-masted ships and a small vessel had already arrived at Iwango Island (尾山島) in the mouth of the bay before the city. They were accompanied by two small vessels which discharged their guns in the direction of Kangwha and Tongjin. Then a three-masted ship, accompanying four other vessels, begun to ascend the river.”

“The magistrate further reported that he climbed a small hill from where he could see a large vessel approaching and soon it
stopped. Of the two small vessels, one of them sailed to an island below Ch'ō-ji-jin (草芝津) and the other anchored in the sea in front of Hangsan Island. Both of these vessels fired at random in the direction of Kangwha and Tongchin. It was difficult to estimate the number of shots they fired. About midnight, several hundred of the enemy, loaded in ten boats, landed on the southern beach of Ch'ojj (草芝) and proceeded to the naval station. It appears that they were attacking the small embankments with gunpowder."

The report continues:

"These angry pigs are painfully surprising; separated by the sea it is very difficult to send assistance. I have given orders for the city to do its best to oppose the enemy and hope that the city of Kangwha will lend all the help it can to the garrison."

In the report of the Magistrate of Tongjin district, dated at 5 P. M. of the 24th instant, we have the following descriptions:

"The foreigners in the ten accompanying ships disembarked at Ch'ojjin (草芝) and entered the city. They robbed, dumped some things into the sea, and took others with them to their ships. The small vessel which anchored in the sea in front of Hangsan Island (項山島) moved up nearer to it, and the other vessels anchored to the north of the island moved up to Taemyōng village (大明村) and anchored. The next vessel anchored a little above Tōkpo-jin (德浦津). Large cannon were fired from the ships on Tongjin and Kangwha until after sunset. Twenty-four of the boats which accompanied the ships were continually sailing back and forth on the sea in front of Ch'ojj-jin. After dusk the enemy set fire to the fort and many of the enemy could be seen here and there by the light of the burning fort. About nine o'clock at night the sound of the firing of small and large cannon was heard near the mountain of Chōnglok (鼎足山). It must be that our soldiers are engaging the enemy."

The Memorial of the Commander of Pacification (鎮撫使) which arrived at the palace on the night of the 24th inst:

In the report of the 2nd Lieutenant which arrived between 8 and 10 P. M. of the 23rd instant, we have the following; "After the engagement of Ch'ojji-jin, one of the foreign ships, belching out black smoke, came up about five o'clock in the afternoon. We began to arrange our cannon and prepared to fight."
In the report of the Lieutenant which arrived at the same time as the other it says:

"He is making speedy reports continually concerning the movements of the strange vessels. The two two-masted ships and the two bamboo vessels of the enemy are anchored and do not appear to move. The Westerners who landed at Ch’oji-jin number more than one hundred persons and not one of them has left the place. At dusk fires burned up in all directions and it looks like the enemy are burning up the place. Observing the present condition of the enemy, all care should be taken and we shall be compelled to force an enlistment in order to increase the number of soldiers." The general of the guard at Chŏngjok mountain fortress, Han Sŏnggŭn (韓聖根) reports; "The fight at Ch’oji (草坵) was very disadvantageous for us. The distance of the mountain fortress from Ch’oji is not more than 10 li and even this place cannot be outside the operations of the enemy. I make haste to report that our intention is to remove the golden box and the King’s letters, the Annals and the books in Sŏnwŏn Building, (儒宗殿) together with the Annals and the books in the Historical Library, to a secret and quiet place, etc."

The Memorial of the General of Pacification arrived on the same evening. The Lieutenant of our headquarters reports:

"At the fall of the tide two foreign ships anchored in front of Ch’oji and he also heard that the eight accompanying vessels came up and passed by turn. We are, therefore, preparing to fire the cannon and are ready for any emergency."

"The report of the Lieutenant further said; “According to the report of Kim Tujun of Tŏkchin the guards at the naval fort of Tŏkchin forsook the Chŏngok Fortress (鼎足山城) because of the dangerous situation of the engagement at Ch’oji-jin. This act of theirs should be severely punished. Although the Lieutenant at the fort did not escape he left his place of duty when there was fighting at the next fort. He therefore must be imprisoned, and Kim Wŏnsun (金元淳) must be appointed in his place as the lieutenant of defense, etc.”

In the report of the Colonel of Ch’oji, Yi Yom (李讃) and the Colonel of the guard, Kim Sokkyu (金錫圭), dated between 11 A. M. and 1 P. M. on the 23rd instant, they announced:

"We are unable to withstand the fierce fighting of the Western enemy. Leading the soldiers of Seoul and the country we moved our position and pitched our camp at a place 3 li from the fort, etc. The defeat of our soldiers, the retreat of the guard, and the forsaking of his position by the colonel are not only painful but most
surprising. The vacancy made by the departure of the colonel must be filled at once.

It is our duty to enforce the defence of our country, and since the enemy easily landed at Ch'oji, we await the punishment for our guilt."

The Memorial of the General of Pacification which arrived on the 25th instant:

"At noon on the 24th inst. the officer in command of the commissary at Kwangsŏng (廣城) arrived in great bewilderment and reported that about four or five hundred Westerners had invaded Kwangsŏng (廣城) from Tŏkchin at about six o'clock on the morning of the same day, and the soldiers of the defense and those of the head-quarters were sent midway to fight against them. The shells of the foreign ships fell like rain and the bullets from the foreign guns on land came down like hail. Being flanked on the right and left by the enemy, our soldiers were unable to hold them back and those in the front fled while those in the rear were badly defeated. They enemy taking advantage of our confusion, climbed up and surrounded the Chu battery like an iron tub. Finally the roar of the cannon in the camp stopped. We are now in great danger of losing our soldiers in a minute."

The Memorial of the General of Pacification which came on the same day:

"About 4 o'clock on the afternoon of the 24th instant, some of the defeated and wounded soldiers came and reported that they had fought with the Western enemy about half way between Tŏkchin (德津) and Kwangsŏng (廣城) about six o'clock in the morning, but were unable to make any defense against them. Seeing that the condition of our troops was hopeless and surrounded like an iron tub, we could not learn the condition of the fort or the soldiers and officers in it. The enemy has surrounded Kwaagsŏng and there is no way to get news from it. Kwangsŏng is already lost. Kapkwan-ji (甲串津) is also in immediate danger of being attacked by the enemy. After a more careful examination we will make a report concerning the detailed fate of the head-quarters and the soldiers. The place of the central corps must not be left vacant for one minute and a new corps should be appointed and sent down during the night."
The Report of Kyonggi (京畿) Camp that arrived the same day

"The report of the Prefect of Tongjin Prefecture (通津道) gives the following data:

"About 8 o'clock on the morning of the 24th inst. the enemy assembled in Tōkchin and the sound of the breaking of iron vessels was loud and confusing and they stole and carried them away to their ships. They also destroyed the citadel and continual fires arose to the rear of Chŏngch'ok mountain citadel (鼎足山城) while the enemy continued to shell Sŏndolmok and the Kwangsŏng naval fort. We have grave fear that the enemy will land in our district so our soldiers are lined up in the mouths of every strait of all the islands and are prepared to fight. The enemy continues to shell Kangwha so they cannot be reached by the shells of the enemy's guns. Three of the three-masted ships are still anchored at Ho-do (虎島) as before. We are preparing to oppose them at the barriers and in the narrow strait, having plenty of guns and cannon.

The Report of the same Camp on the 20th inst.

"About 2 o'clock on the afternoon of the 24th. inst. the enemy entered Kwangsŏng and surrounded both the citadel and the fort. From the naval fortress of Kwangjin, our soldiers began to fire upon the enemy and fought with all the strength they had, but were defeated. The enemy finally took the upper and lower forts of Kwangsŏng, and their ships anchored at Tōkchin moved up to Kwangsŏng. Our soldiers began to fire at them from the southern citadel of Sŏndolmok; then the enemy began to pour an unceasing fire into the fortress and the whole citadel was destroyed. The enemy also took the Kwangsŏng fort and garrisoned it with their troops. They burned the powder magazines in the fort and carried much of the equipment away. We are attacked by land and sea and with our small number of soldiers we find it difficult to fight and we have no means left to defend the position. We are inevitably forced to move our camp to Tŏkp'o(jin (德浦津) etc."
The Meeting in the Palace Concerning the Incident of the 25th, inst.

"The King said the invasion of the country by a foreign enemy was a most painful thing."

"The minister replied, the barbarians are fierce and bold. Although we hear that the number of the enemy is not large, but they are very powerful in their action. All the reports from the coast inform us that our position is very disadvantageous to us and it is very painful to receive such news."

The King says:

"The barbarians said they wanted peace and we do not know what they want to do with us. Our country has been a country of courtesy and justice for a thousand years. How can there be peace with the dogs and the lambs? Even though peace might be established for a number of years it would eventually be broken. If anyone mentions peace he ought to be condemned by the law of treason."

The Minister says:

"The world understands that our country is one of good manners and lauds justice, but we see a kind of evil and poisonous disposition in every direction. The reason for this is that, of all the countries in the world, our country alone preserves purity of manner and justice. Since the exclusion of the Westerners after the year of Pyongin (平壤) 1866, public opinion ought to have been made. If we permit them to do what they want, on account of their superior strength, how can we maintain our country and man be a man. The sacred instruction of our king should be maintained with the dignity of an ax, a battle ax. All men will respond to the great justice of our King and the enemy will tremble when it hears the right determination of His Majesty."

The King says:

"Our determination should be proclaimed by writing it in the official record."
The Memorial of the General of Pacification

"The general of the Pongdae (fire fortress) of Namsan (南山) of our camp reports at 8 o'clock on the morning of the 25th instant that numerous Western enemies filled Kwangşŏng and all through the night they burned the place. The firing of their cannon never ceased. About 8 o'clock of the same day, the two double-masted ships weighed anchor and sailed down the river. Three of the three-masted ships returned and anchored in the sea in front of Hoŏng Island (虎鷹島).

The Letter of our Country

"On the coming of your ships to our country, you claimed your purpose to be that of peace and we courteously welcomed you and sent an officer to console you on your visit. You are invading the fortified zone of our coast and you are unmindful of your incivility only blaming us in the defense of our coast. We have already exchanged our letters and there is nothing more to be discussed. You do not heed what we say and only wish to make a disturbance. Where is the desire for the peace you speak of? Seeing now your actions, we know you have suspicious plans, though outwardly speaking the words of friendship. Your landing and firing our store-houses and magazines, your robbing our properties and pillaging the things you can get hold of exposes your intention. It is an act of robbery."

"On your ships you have many exiles of our country who are rebels. Conniving with them, you use them as guides on the land and give refuge to these robbers on your vessels. Finally, you fired cannons and rifles destroying the citadels and killing many soldiers and civilians. Can there be anyone more brutal than you? Contradictory to your outspoken terms of peace your actions expose the cruelty you have done to us. Not accomplishing the thing you were ordered to do by your country, you practice the most horrible things on another country. Wherever your ships go, will they welcome you with courtesy and make amicable treaties with you?"

The Reply from the American Ships

"At noon of the 24th of the fourth month, our forces captured several of your soldiers and brought them to our ships. We are supplying them with food and everything necessary. If you wish them back you must first assure us that they will not fight against us again. If you will guarantee this in writing we will allow them to return."

The Reply of our Country

"Seeing the letter which was thrown by you on the coast, we know it was addressed to the General of Pacification of Kangwha. The purpose of the coming of your ships is cunningly said to be that of peace and you have
misunderstood the strategy of our army. The General of Pacification has already been severely reproved and although punished by our government remains at his post to mobilize courageous soldiers and efficiently prepare them to get revenge on you. Regarding our captured soldiers, you may do with them as you like. What do you mean in saying that we must not resist you since the war was first started by you? You came to fight. We will also fight to drive you out.”

Memorial of the Department of the Three Troops

“Seeing the report of the General of Pacification, the Western Barbarians are becoming more furious. Kwangsŏng is already lost. There is no place safe on Kangwha. The central troops of Kyŏnggi Province commanded by Kim Sŏnpil (金善弼) should be ordered to go down on the same day to fight.”

Communication of Yongjjong Prefecture, on the 27th of the 4th Month:

“About 4 P.M. on the 26th, one of our boats was seized and taken to the large ship of the foreigners (probably the Colorado). I was very anxious to know the particulars so sent an official to the ship at once. About 8 P.M. on the same day a number of soldiers were brought from the same vessels. They were cavalry officers from Kangwha Prefect; General Yu Yejun (劉載俊) and the soldiers Yi Tohyŏn (李道賢), Hwang Manyŏng (黃萬用) and three other men, Cho Illok (曹一祿), Ko Satal (高士達), Kim Ch'unjin (金春辰) together with Kim Tašgil (金大吉), Kim Wuhyŏn (金禹鎬) and Ch'a Insik (車仁植), nine persons altogether.”

“I was very happy to hear the news and I invited them in order to interview them. Yu Yejun had been badly wounded in the right leg by a bullet which passed clear through the leg. Even though he was still breathing, he was more dead than alive. Yi Tohyŏn and others had been severely wounded by bullets. Cho Illok had a part of his hip shot away. Ch'a Insik, though not struck by bullets, was severely beaten by the soldiers. Fifteen of them surrounded him and took turns in beating him into unconsciousness. When these men had somewhat calmed themselves I asked them how they had been treated by the enemy. Yu Yejun said, “I was shot and then knocked down. Then the enemy grabbed me by the beard and surrounding me, they beat me.” I saw fifteen men who had been captured as prisoners, taken and placed on the foreign ship. After they were nearly dead they released them. Yi Am (李巖) died yesterday and he was buried by the enemy in the territory of Pup'yŏng. It was impossible to communicate with the foreigners because we could not understand their language. There were three or four traitors of our country mixed with the enemy and we called to them, but they turned their heads and refused to listen to us. The upper part of the right leg of Cho Illok was struck by a bullet and it still remained
there. The foreign enemies administered an anesthetic through the nose and amputated his leg with a silver knife. A little later he regained consciousness. Mun Kéan (文啓安), Yi Taegil (李大吉), Kim Uido (金宜道), Ȏm Wonchol (嚴元哲) and Kim Yun’gil (金允吉), these five are still imprisoned. According to reports it seems that there are more than one thousand enemy soldiers on the ships. The nine who came back alive were hurried to the barracks of the Pacification, according to their desire.”

April 29th, a man by the name of U Ch’angmo (禹昌模) who was living near the bay made the following report:

“I took a boat from Yul Island (栗島) and went to visit the foreign ships. When I reached the one which had three sails I attempted to go on board, but was met by a man named Ka (Cowles) who prevented me. This man spoke Chinese very well. He asked me why I had come and I told him I had come bringing a letter from the Pup’yōng prefect. Mr. Cowles then told me that they had buried a Korean soldier who had died of wounds on Much’i Island and that eight who were badly wounded had been sent to Yōngjōng prefecture. He asked me whether I had seen them and I told him I was very greatful for that even though I had not seen them. Mr. Cowles asked me “Is there no letter from your government?” I said that “No letter had come because at first my government had thought the ships on peaceful and friendly mission, but since they had gone to Kangwha and killed so many people, burned many houses, robbed and carried away so many military machines and equipment, there remained no reason why the government should send a communication.” I again asked Mr. Cowles “How many Koreans there were on the ships?” He said, “The seriously wounded were treated and then sent back, and that the prisoners that were not wounded were chained hand and feet, but well kept. I hope you will inform your government about them.” I replied, “You report that you treated the Koreans well, but why did you bind their feet and hands?” He said, “Because your countrymen wanted to jump overboard so we had to bind them by their hands and feet.” I said, “Why were they taken prisoners?” He replied, “You must surely know the reason already and if your Court will send a minister we will inform him of the cause.” I said, “I would like very much to meet the American minister on board. I have come to the ship several times to see him but was refused every time.” He said, “Please wait a moment and I will go and see whether he will interview you.” I said, “Every time I came to this ship you treated me politely, but why is it that you are so unfriendly this time?” He said, “It is none of your concern.” He then went away taking the letter I had brought. I anchored my small boat near the big vessel and waited almost half a day for a reply. Finally Mr. Cowles returned and said, “When we went up to Kangwha your country first fired upon our vessels, but our Minister ordered us to be calm and not to retaliate. However, when your forts fired upon us we were forced to reply.
The responsibility for this unfortunate affair lies entirely with your people. Many were wounded and killed on both sides." I said, "When your ships entered our fortified zone without permission it was the duty of the soldiers guarding that section to fire upon your vessels. Since your ships entered so deeply into this zone the Court lays the entire blame for the incident upon the General of Pacification. He has been declared guilty so he naturally intends to revenge you." Mr. Cowles listened and smiled. I then said, "I have come out here in spite of wind and waves to interview your Minister, but he most discourteously refuses to see me and I consider it a most inhuman act." Mr. Cowles replied, "We intend to go to Kangwha again in a few days and will your forts fire upon us again? When we went up the first time your forts fired upon our vessels and a number of our people were wounded and some killed, but there was no way of escape for us. In all sincerity our ships came with no desire to do you or your country any harm, but you first began to insult our ships which has resulted badly for both sides." I angrily replied, "We have several tens of thousands of cannon and several tens of thousands of soldiers already well prepared to defend our country. If you go up to Kangwha a hundred times you will be shelled a hundred times. Please understand this very clearly. According to the law of our country the high officials cannot leave the capital. The best thing for you to do is to return to your native country at once. Please repeat these words to your Minister, and allow me to return with our prisoners which are now kept on your ships." Mr. Cowles said, "The matter of releasing or not releasing prisoners is a question for the Minister to decide. Without his order it cannot be done." He further said "We noticed that you had two kinds of cannon, medium and large ones. Were they made in Korea or did you buy them from foreign countries?" I replied "The small ones are very old and the larger ones were made recently. There are several tens of thousands larger than these in Seoul." Mr. Cowles said, "We have heard that there are only two or three thousand soldiers in Seoul. Is this really true?" I replied, "Even though Korea is a small country there are 50,000 cavalry and 100,000 infantry in Seoul, besides millions of soldiers in the country."

Mr. Cowles said, "Has your country good horses?" I replied, "Without horses how could there be any cavalry?" Mr. Cowles said, "When you burnt our ship in the P'yŏngyang river a year ago, did you kill all our people on the ship or do some of them still remain there?" I said, "At that time the crew on your ship killed many of our people and robbed so many of them that they burned the vessel. They saw the harmful actions of your countrymen and sought to revenge them. They brought the calamity upon themselves." "Truly, we have no intention of doing you any harm and if there are any of the crew remaining I hope your people will treat them well. Please report to your government that we bear only good will and we trust that it will soon send a high officer to negotiate with us." I then asked for an answer to the letter I had brought. Mr. Cowles then brought out more
than ten pieces of bread and gave them to our men and asked them to eat and wait. He once more returned to the cabin and did not come out until six o'clock with the answer. Receiving his reply I returned."

The Reply from the Ship on the Fifth Visit of U Ch'angmo:

"In your letter received on the 26th, you spoke of our rash attack upon your ships and the subsequent calamity. According to the polite and reasonable letters of the various officers of your country already received, your present communication is out of order. The incident of the previous day must really be charged to the high officials of your country. The American envoy feels sorry that your prefecture did not report to the government, but resorted to firing upon our ships. Our admiral fully expected to be politely welcomed and to make an amicable treaty. Although we waited long enough to dispel misunderstanding, your government has made no reply while all your district officers declare it is their duty to defend their country and have opposed us. Can you expect peace upon such terms? Your prefect should know that the guns on our ships have a long range and hit their target accurately. Our ships did not damage any fortress or village along the sea-coast where the vessels have anchored except those: forts and soldiers who formally attacked our vessels. You must know, then, that our country does not wish to damage or destroy either natives or villages. We repeat once more that we came with the purpose of peace and we trust nothing will happen to destroy that relation between us. We enclose an official document with this letter and beg of you to convey it to your central government."

The Sixth Answer from Pup'yong Prefecture on the 29th:

"A careful reading of your letter indicates that you rebuke the local officials and attempt to state what is wrong and what is right. It will not be necessary to discuss long. We, in this district, have received the order from the government and according to that it is impossible for us to do other than defend and to fight. We understand that the letter of your envoy has been brought here, and we dare not convey it to the King's palace so we return it to you. You must also realize that we are not bent on killing since we have not fired upon your men who have landed to get water for the ships."

The Memorial of the General of Pacification:

"After the retreat of the enemy ships I sent the Colonel, Cho Sangjun (曹倉俊), to examine the place where the enemy had camped. Upon his return Cho Sangjun reported, as follows: "On the same day I quickly went to the encampment of Kwangsong. It was a sad sight to see the ruin of the walls of the fort. Here and there were heads of soldiers and what appeared to be their clothes. The moat below the citadel was covered with earth. We therefore ordered the villagers to dig out the moat and we discovered the bloody bodies of General O Chaeyǒn (魚在淵), his brother,
Chaesun (趙在淳), the Colonels Yi Hyŏnhwak (李玄鶴), Im Chibang (林之彪), and Kim Hyŏngyŏng (金玄鴻). The bodies of the other soldiers were burned by the enemy and it is impossible to distinguish them. The dead body of the Vice-General of Kwangsŏng, Pak Chi'sŏng (朴致誠) was exposed after the fall of the tide. His seal was still on his body and it was recovered. The body of Colonel Yu Yejun (劉德俊) was not found. The wounded Colonel, Yi Hwaksŏng (李錫成), reported that Colonel Yu fought on the front line, encouraging his troops fearing not the enemies sword and gun. Yi Hyŏnkwak fought and shouted at the enemy until he was wounded and fell to the ground. After dark he recovered and escaped to camp. The loyalty and bravery of General Chaeyŏn and his brother Chaesun shines like the sun and moon. Kim Hyŏngyŏng (金玄鴻) and Pak Chi'sŏng and Yi Hyŏnhwak without any fear of death fought with great bravery and should be commended in some way for their loyalty and bravery. The names of the dead soldiers with that of their families were collected, carefully examined, recorded in a booklet and presented to the Army Department. The life and death of Kim Tuju (金斗準), the former district official of Tŏkch'ın, is totally unknown and no report could be made, etc.

The Reply of the Pup'pyong Prefect:

This was a very brief communication which reads as follows: "I, as the provincial officer, have no other course to follow than to defend the country. If your vessels fight and kill, then it is proper for our country to fight and kill."

Report of the Commanding Officer of the Fort:

From the report of the artillery officer, Kim Tongjŏn, it was said that the enemy caught him by the beard at Kwangsŏng and took him to their vessels where they placed him between two planks, while a number of the enemy stood around him, torturing him with their drawn swords and their rifles. The next morning they brought in four bodies of their own men, who were already dead, and later six more. I am sure many of the enemy must have been killed.

The Inspector of the mountain Taemo, reported that "On the 28th instant the five ships of the enemy anchored at Eagle Island were still there at 12 o'clock and seemed to be making no preparations to leave."

Communication from the Court to the Commander:

"The Court ordered that a book be prepared to record the names of all those killed in the engagement with the enemy at Kwangsŏng Fortress. Having seen your report we can well understand the conditions there. The men killed there bravely fighting for their country deserve recognition and the Court has decided to promote the late Chaeyŏn to the position of Minister of the Army and his brother Chaesun to Adjutant of the Finance Department, and all expenses of their funeral to be borne by the
Court. Yu P'ungno (柳豊魯), Yi Hyŏnhwak (李玄鶴) will be promoted to higher rank, and Kim Hyŏngyŏng (金亨鴻), Pak Ch'isong (朴致誠) will receive honorable recognition. The families of all these will receive aid. The spirits of the dead are to be consoled and those wounded must be taken care of by the Court."

Suggestion from the Office of the Ministers of State:

"The patriot, Yi P'ungno died loyally for his country. We have discovered that he has an old mother ninety years old. The family is really very poor and it will be difficult for the old mother to care for the family. The Government should grant her aid. When the King heard this he readily agreed to the suggestion."

Instruction of the King, April 30:

"During the successful attack of the enemy upon the Kwangsŏng Fortress our soldiers fought with great courage and enthusiasm, but many of them were wounded. It is our duty to see that these are medically cared for and also that all the soldiers who fought against the enemy to be especially considered. During the engagement they were forced to sleep in the fields, without proper food, and water, so that there must naturally be much sickness and dire want among the troops. This causes me great anxiety; these must be carefully looked after."

Another Order from the King:

"After careful investigation, we have discovered that there were soldiers who refused to obey the orders of the commanding officers, and a few who attempted to allure the people by superstition. These must be apprehended and properly punished."

May 1st:

Ô Chaeyŏn was awarded the posthumous title of Ch'ung-jang-gong, which means loyalty and strength, for his meritorious service in defending the Kwangsŏng Fortress. Also the late Prefect of Yonghae, Yi Chŏng (李鍾), was awarded the posthumous title of Ch'ung-min-gong (忠愍公) which means a man of loyalty and mercy.

Reply from the Ship to the Communication of the Pup'yong prefect:

(The translation of this letter is to be found in the U. S. Foreign Relations Correspondence on page 68.)

Reply of the Prefect of Pup'yong to the Communication from the U. S. Ships.

(A translation of this communication is found in the U. S. Foreign Relations Correspondence on page, 17.)
Report of the Commander of Kwangsong Fort, (fifth
month), June 4th, 1871:

The five captured soldiers were taken to the enemy's ship: they were Mun Kéan (文啓安), Yi Taegil (李大吉), Kim Uido (金義道), Ŭm Wŏnch'ŏl (嚴元哲), and Cho'e Un'gil (崔云吉). After their release on the 2nd inst. and return to Puy'ŏng, they were asked to make statements regarding all that had happened since their capture." Kim Uido made the following statement: "When the enemy attacked the fort the assault was so violent and swift that the Koreans were very quickly defeated. I hid behind a rock back of the fort. However, I was soon discovered, bound hand and foot by the enemy and taken to the ship which had two masts" (this must have been the Palos). He also said that," The Captain of the Cavalry Guards, Yu Yejun and another metropolitan officer were also seized and taken to the same vessel. Here they were kept one night and then transferred to the vessel with the large masts (this must have been the Colorado). They were placed in the hold of the fifth deck and given water and tea and only two pieces of bread three times a day. They refused to eat and only wanted to jump overboard, but the enemy bound their hands and feet so they could not do this. I was asked by one of the enemy who I was and I told him I was a water-bearer for the troops in the fort. The enemy said no one fired on their ships until they entered the fortified zone. I replied that, insomuch as their ships entered the inner harbor the only thing we could do was to fire upon the ships. The enemy then asked why did you fire upon our vessels and try to kill and injure us? I replied, “Because you entered the inner harbor without permission so it was the only thing for us to do.” Then the enemy smiled and asked me how many soldiers we had. I told him we were short of ammunition and arms. Again he said, “If you fire upon our ships again we shall be compelled to return the fire. If you use small arms we will use the same but if you use large guns we will do the same.” When the Captain of the cavalry started to return I attempted to go with him but the enemy prevented me with a drawn sword.

Report of Ŭm Wonch’ŏl:

“When the enemy began the storming of Kwangsong Fort it was so fierce and rapid that there was no way of escaping. I hid under the castle but was eventually discovered, seized, bound, and taken to the small vessel with the other prisoners where we passed one night and then we were transferred to the large vessel with three masts and placed in the hold of the fifth deck. We couldn't see the sky and it was very dark. The number of the enemy must have been more than a thousand. I noticed that one of them had something in his hand which he threw down at my feet. It was a piece of Chinese money called Ch’ŏnbot’’ongbo (天保通寶). It did not have a hole in it but the picture of a man on the front and back. Then we were asked our names.”
Report of Ch'oe Un'gil:

"I attempted to go aboard the vessel but the enemy prevented me. I observed that there were cannon on the first and second decks; about twenty or thirty on a side, and there must have been fully ninety in all."

"Mun Keun and Yi Taegil went to the capital direct from Pup'yong and we could not examine them. The soldiers who had been examined had no trace of anything by which they could be suspicioned. They are in prison and we wait the instruction of the government in regard to them."

Report from the Kangwha Commander, May 7th, 1871:

"Ch'oe Myongch'il, the sentinel officer, while on duty reported that a ship with two masts was seen proceeding down the river toward Yongjong Island. The Prefect of Pup'yong made a similar report on the same day, saying that a ship with two masts was proceeding down the river in the direction of P'almi Island."

Report from the Prefect of Pup'yong:

"The ship with two masts, which arrived on the 30th of last month, proceeded to the sea in front of P'almi Island on the 7th inst."

Report of the Commander of Kangwha, May 7th, 1871:

The officer on sentinel duty reported that the six ships which had been anchored there for some time were now moving toward P'almi Island.

On May 10th, 1871, the anti-foreign tablets which had been prepared in 1866, after the French invasion, were erected on the main roads. They read as follows:

"The Western Barbarians invaded our land. If we do not fight, we must make peace with them. To insist on peace means selling the country. We warn in the interests of our sons of the coming generations."

According to the last letter the American ships left on the 15th of the 5th month (July 2nd) 1871.

Original copy.
Report of the ... the enemy, during the day.
Corbett Missionary to China who acted as Chinese Interpreter on the visit of U. S. S. Wachusett to Korea.

Dennis Private on U. S. S. Benicia who was killed in action at Kwangsong, June 11th, 1871.


Febiger J. C. Commander U. S. S. Shenandoah, sent to Korea to investigate loss of General Sherman.

Fish Hamilton Secretary of State, Washington D. C. 1869-77.

Gillié Père French Catholic Father at Mukden who assisted the refugees from the wrecked Schooner Surprise.

Hogarth Schroff on General Sherman

Low Frederick F. U. S. Minister to Peking, China, and head of the Mission to Korea in 1871.

Meadows and Co. British Merchantile Firm in Tientsin, China.

McCaslin Captain of the wrecked American Schooner Surprise.

McKee H. W. Lieut. U. S. N.—wounded in attack on Fort Kwangsong and died later.

Morgan U. S. Consul at Chefoo, China.

Page Master of American Schooner, General Sherman.

Preston Owner of American Schooner, General Sherman.

Rodgers John Rear Admiral U. S. N. in command of the Punitive Expedition to Korea in 1871.

Rowan S. C. Admiral U. S. N. and Commander of the U. S. Asiatic Fleet before Admiral Rodgers.

Sanford E. U. S. Consul at Chefoo, China.

Seward William Secretary of State, Washington D. C.

Seward Geo. F. U. S. Consul General at Shanghai, China.

Shufeldt Commodore in U. S. N. on U. S. S. Wachusett.

Snow A. S. Lieutenant in U. S. N., on U. S. S. S. Benicia.


Wilson 2nd Mate on American Schooner, General Sherman.

Williams S. Wells U. S. Chargé d’Affaires ad interim.
NAMES OF IMPORTANT PLACES

Asan Gulf (牙山湾)  Name of the inlet of the sea running into Asan-bu and named Prince Jerome Gulf by the French.

Boisée Island
(Chagyaktto 荟蘭島)  This is a small island a short distance to the north from Chemulpo in the strait and was made the rendezvous of the U. S. Fleet.

Changyŏn (長閑)  A prominent magistracy in western Hwanghae Province.

Chemul Id.  An Island in the Yellow Sea off the coast of Namyang-bu.

Ch’öji  A village off the lower end of Kangwha where the U. S. troops first landed in order to storm the forts.

Ch’öjjin  Near Ch’öji and called Ft. DuConde by the French and Marine Redoubt by the U. S. Forces.

Chŏngjok  The famous Mt. Fortress to the rear of Ch’öji—10 li.

Eagle Id. (Ungodo)  Island in the Estuary off Kangwha.

Eugenie Id. (Ipp’a-do)  Island in the Gulf of Jerome where the U. S. Fleet made its rendezvous during the surveying operations and called Roze Roads by the French.

Ferrières Ids. (Northwest Id. Taeyŏngdo), Guerriére Id. (Yuldo)  Northeast Id. Totokdo, South Id. Moktokdo. So named by the French Squadron in 1866.

Hodo (Tiger Id. 虎島)  Island in the Estuary off Kangwha. Name of two islands, outer and inner, in the Estuary off Kangwha between Ch’öji and Kwangsŏng.

Hwangsando  Island in the sea off the coast of Namyang-bu.

Hwangdo  The prefecture of Inch’on near Chemulpo.

Inch’on-bu (仁川府)  Small village between Ch’öji and Kwangsŏng.

Kojan  Strong citadel taken by U. S. forces and named Fort McKee after Lieut. McKee who was mortally wounded and died on a U. S. warship the same day.

Kwangsŏngchin  Capital Province.

Kyŏnggido (京畿道) Island off the coast of Pup’pyŏng-bu where the Americans buried the Korean soldier who died aboard one of their vessels.

Muchido  Island off the coast of Pup’pyŏng-bu.

Euldo  Prefecture about 30 miles south and west of Seoul.

Namyang-bu  Island off the coast of Namyang-bu.

Palmido  "  "  "

Puldо  Prefecture off the central west coast of Korea.

Pup’pyŏng-bu  The anchorage in the Gulf of Jerome (Ansan) used by Admiral Roze as a rendezvous for his Fleet in 1866. Name given by the French to the Estuary between Kangwha and the main-land because the water was salty—They thought it to be the Han River.

Roze Roads

Salée River
Sondolmok — Point where the Estuary takes a very sharp turn and on which the Koreans had a fort. It was named Fort Palos by the American forces after its capture in honor of the U. S. S. Palos.

Sonwon Building — The Room at Chongjok where the Annals of the Yi Dynasty were kept.

Taedong River — Important river in northern Korea which the General Sherman went up as far as Pyengyang.

Tŏkchin — A small village above Ch'ŏji and from which two forts received their name-re named Forts Monocacy after the U. S. S. Monocacy.

Tori Sea — Probably a part of the Asan Gulf.

Unhyŏn Palace — Famous palace in the Capital.

Yŏnghungdo — Large Island in the sea to the west of Namyang-bu.

Yŏngjungdo — Large Island to the west of Chemulpo.

Roze Island — Island between Chemulpo and Yŏngjungdo, so named after Admiral Roze.
NAMES OF PROMINENT ORIENTALS MENTIONED IN PAPER

Ch’ा Insik (車仁植) Vice-General killed in action at Kwangsŏng.
Cho Illok (曹一祿) " "
Cho Sangjun (曹尚俊) Colonel in Korean Army.
Chŏng Wanmuk (鄭完默) Lieutenant in Korean Army.
Ch’ŏe Ungil (崔云吉) Korean soldier taken prisoner by Americans at Kwangsŏng.
Ch’ŏe Kyŏngsŏn (崔敬善) Lieutenant in Korean Army at Tŏkp’o.
Ch’ŏe Myŏngch’ŏl (崔明哲) Sentinel officer.
Han Chinon (Han Ch‘in’yon) Magistrate at P’ŭngdŏk.
Hong Chaejin (洪在禎) Magistrate of Tongjin.
Han Kyo-won (韓鎔溫) Magistrate at P’ŭngdŏk.
Han Sŏng-gŭn (韓聖根) General at Chongjok Mt. Fortress.
Hyŏn Kesung (金承成) Interpreter at Pup’yŏng.
Hwang Manyŏng (黄萬胄) Soldier in the Korean Army.
Im Chibang (林之邦) Colonel killed in action at Kwangsŏng.
Ko Sadal (高士達) Cavalryman from Kangwha.
Ku Ch’un-hŭi (具春喜) Lieut. General of troops of Kyŏnggi Province.
Kim Ch’un-jin (金春辰) Cavalryman from Kangwha at Kwongsŏng.
Kim Hyŏng-gŏng (金亨敬) Col. killed in action at Kwangsŏng.
Kim Sŏn’p’iľ (金善弼) Commander General Kyŏnggi province.
Kim Sŏkk’ŏ (金錫圭) Colonel of the Guard at Ch’ŏ-ji.
Kim Taegil (金大吉) Cavalryman from Kangwha at Kwangsŏng.
Kim Tongjin (金東振) Artillery officer.
Kim Tu-jun (金斗準) District officer at Tŏkch’in.
Kim Tohyŏn (金道鉉) Soldier at Kwangŏng.
Kim Wuhŏn (金禹鎬) Cavalryman from Kangwha at Kwangsŏng.
Kim Uido (金宜濬) Prisoner on U. S. man-of-war.
Kim Wŏnsun (金元淳) Lieut. in Korean Army at Kwangsŏng.
Kim Yŏngli (金允吉) Prisoner on U. S. man-of-war.
Mun Kean (文啓安) Prisoner on U. S. man-of-war.
Myŏng Sŏkch’un (明錫俊) Lieutenant of the Guard.
ŏ Chaeyon (魚在順) General killed in action at Kwangsŏng.
ŏ Chaesaun (魚在淳) Brother of ŏ Chaeyon
O Samnok (吳三緱) Artilleryman killed at Tŏkp’o.
O Kyŏngsŏk (吳景錫) Interpreter at Pup’yŏng.
O Yongok (吳永逵) Editor of Oriental History.
ŏm Wŏnc’ŏl (嚴元哲) Prisoner on U. S. man-of-war.
Pak Ch’isŏng (朴致誠) Soldier killed in action at Kwanggsŏng.
Pak Ch’un’gwŏn (朴元構) Colonel who went out to investigate the General Sherman.
Pak Hyŏngch’o (朴洪壽) Korean who made report on General Sherman.
Pak Kyusu (朴圭壽) Governor of Pyengyang Province.
Pak Nagyŏn (朴樂淵) Military official at Chulsan.
Pai Kh Nagyŏn (白樂淵) Col. at Pyengyang at time of destruction of General Sherman.
Sin Ch'olgu (申澈求) Prefect at Namyang-bu.
Sin Taejong (申泰豊) Mayor of Pyengyang at time of the General Sherman affair.
Yi Ch'anghoe (李昌會) Auxiliary officer to Ŭ Chaeyón.
Yi Am (李 崴) Prisoner on U. S. man-of-war who died.
Yi Chŏn (李 嚴) Korean army officer.
Yi Chŏng (李 嚴) The late Prefect of Tonghae.
Yi Huigap (李熙甲) Mid-Lieutenant in Korean Army.
Yi Hyŏnhwak (李玄鹤) Colonel in Korean Army killed at Kwangŏng.
Yi Hyŏnik (李玄璧) Colonel who was forcibly taken on General Sherman.
Yi Kijo (李基鎬) Water guardian who reported on General Sherman.
Yi Tŏnyŏn (李道賢) Soldier at Kwangŏng engagement.
Yi Yŏm (李 潤) Colonel at Ch'oji.
Yi Yongsuk (李容錫) One who went to see the General Sherman.
Yi Minsang (李敏相) Military officer who made reports on General Sherman.
Yi Hwaksŏng (李獾成) Officer badly wounded at Kwangŏng.
Yu Changmo (禹昌鎬) Korean who visited the U. S. S. S. Colorado.
Yu P'ungno (禹洪模) Korean patriot killed at Kangŏng.
Yu Yejun (劉禮俊) Cavalry officer killed at Kwangŏng.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Office</th>
<th>Ship</th>
<th>State</th>
<th>Date of Enlistment</th>
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<td>Robert Anderson</td>
<td>Boatswain</td>
<td>Colorado</td>
<td>Pa.</td>
<td>June 1862</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William Burwell</td>
<td>Lieut.</td>
<td>Monocacy</td>
<td>Mo.</td>
<td>Sept. 1863</td>
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<tr>
<td>Robert M. G. Brown</td>
<td>Master</td>
<td>Alaska</td>
<td>Va.</td>
<td>July 1864</td>
</tr>
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<td>Edward Bousall</td>
<td>Boatswain</td>
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<td>Penn.</td>
<td>June 1869</td>
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<td>Homer C. Blake</td>
<td>Commander</td>
<td>Alaska</td>
<td>Ohio</td>
<td>May 1840</td>
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<td>A.K. Baylor</td>
<td>Mate</td>
<td>Benicia</td>
<td>Ky.</td>
<td>Dec. 1869</td>
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<td>Jesse C. Bryan</td>
<td>Mate</td>
<td>Colorado</td>
<td>Penn.</td>
<td>Jan. 1870</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William S. Bond</td>
<td>Boatswain</td>
<td>Alaska (Ire.)</td>
<td>Mass</td>
<td>Jan. 1865</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jas. N. Carpenter</td>
<td>Pay Master</td>
<td>As. Fleet</td>
<td>Ky.</td>
<td>Sept. 1860</td>
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<tr>
<td>Douglas Cassie</td>
<td>Lieut. Com.</td>
<td>As. Fleet</td>
<td>Ohio</td>
<td>Sept. 1860</td>
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<tr>
<td>Wm. A. Corwin</td>
<td>A. M. Surgeon</td>
<td>Benicia</td>
<td>N. J.</td>
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<td>A. F. Callander</td>
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<td>Europe</td>
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<td>Chas. W. Chipp</td>
<td>2nd Asst. Eng.</td>
<td>Alaska</td>
<td>N. Y.</td>
<td>July 1863</td>
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<tr>
<td>Frank Clark</td>
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<td>Benicia</td>
<td>R. I.</td>
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<td>Henry C. Fuller</td>
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<td>Isaac S. Finney</td>
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<td>Chas. T. Forse</td>
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<td>Mass.</td>
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<td>Alex. Henderson</td>
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<td>Wm. H. King</td>
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<td>Benicia</td>
<td>Ill.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Name</td>
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<td>Chas. D. Mansfield</td>
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<td>Monocacy</td>
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<td>Hugh W. McKee</td>
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<td>Edw. T. Nichols</td>
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<td>John Rodgers</td>
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<td>Nicholas L. Roosevelt</td>
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<td>Wm. K. Richards</td>
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<td>Master</td>
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<td>Ind.</td>
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<td>Albion W. Wadhams</td>
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<td>Geo. F. Wilkins</td>
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<td>Richard Wainwright</td>
<td>Master</td>
<td>Colorado</td>
<td>O.</td>
<td>Sept. 1864</td>
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</table>
The total force organized to operate against the forts on June 11, 1871, was 618 officers and men. The total force to operate on the river against the water-front on board the “Monocacy” and “Palo,” was 190 officers and men. The following officers took part:

Commanding Expedition  Commander H. C. Blake, U. S. N.
Commanding Land Forces  Commander L. A. Kimberley, U. S. N.
Adjutant Land Forces  Lieut. Commander W. S. Schley, U. S. N.
Signal Officer Land Forces  Ensign N. T. Houston, U. S. N.
Aid to Commander of Land Forces  Mate A. K. Baylor, U. S. N.
Commanding Right Wing  Lieut. Comdr. Silas Casey, U. S. N.
Commanding Company A.  Lieut. Comdr. O. F. Heyerman, U. S. N.
1st Lieut. Co. A.  Ensign C. A. Clark, U. S. N.
Commanding Co. B.  Master F. J. Drake, U. S. N.
Commanding Co. C.  Lieut. G. M. Totten, U. S. N.
Commanding Co. D.  Lieut. Hugh W. McKee, U. S. N.
1st Lieut. Co. D  Master C. W. Chipp, U. S. N.
Commanding Co. E.  Lieut. Bloomfield McIlvaine, U. S. N.
Commanding Co. F.  Master J. E. Pillsbury, U. S. N.
Commanding Co. G.  Master T. C. McLean, U. S. N.
Commanding Co. H.  Master R. M. G. Brown, U. S. N.
1st Lieut. Co. H.  Mate Collender, U. S. N.
Commanding Co. I.  Captain McLane Tilton, U. S. M. C.
1st Lieut. Co. I.  2nd Lieut. W. J. McDonald, U. S. M. C.
Commanding Co. K.  1st Lieut. J. B. Breese, U. S. M. C.
1st Lieut. Co. K.  1st Lieut. F. M. Mullany, U. S. M. C.

Division of Artillery

Commanding Division  Lieut. Commander Douglas Cassel, U. S. N.
Commanding Right Battery  Lieut. A. S. Snow, U. S. N.
Commanding Left Battery  Lieut. W. W. Mead, U. S. N.
Chief Right Section  Ensign Seaton Schroeder, U. S. N.
Chief Right Center Section  Ensign F. S. Bassett, U. S. N.
Chief Left Section  Mate N. Greenway, U. S. N.
Chief Left Center Section  Master A. V. Wadhams, U. S. N.

Pioneer Division

Mate Quinn, U. S. N.

Hospital Division

P. A. Surgeon, C. J. S. Wells, U. S. N.
Asst. Surgeon, Latta, U. S. N.
Asst. Surgeon, W. A. Corwin, U. S. N.
Captian's Clerk, D. Holland, U. S. N.
Chief Engineer, A. Henderson, U. S. N.
Steam-Launch Division

Commanding ... ... Lieut. Commander F. H. Picking, U. S. N.
2nd Asst. Engineer, H. L. Slosson, U. S. F.
Commanding Weehawken Mate L. P. Gallagher, U. S. N.
Commanding Benicia Launch. Mate S. Gee, U. S. N.
2nd Asst. Eng. G. H. Kerney, U. S. N.
Commanding Alaska Launch. Master N. Roosevelt, U. S. N.
2nd Asst. Eng. F. L. Cooper, U. S. N.

Officers of the Monocacy

Commander ... ... E. P. McCrea, U. S. N.
Lieut. T. J. Gardener, U. S. N.
Master J. B. Smith, U. S. N.
Master T. C. Force, U. S. N.
2nd Asst. Engineer H. D. Potts, U. S. N.
2nd Asst. Engineer L. R. Harmony, U. S. N.
Surgeon Somerset Robinson, U. S. N.
Paymaster, C. D. Mansfield.

Officers of the Palos

Lieut. C. H. Rockwell, U. S. N.
Lieut. J. E. Jones, U. S. N.
Ensign James Franklin, U. S. N.
Mate C. H. Fuller, U. S. N.
Mate J. C. Howard, U. S. N.
Mate T. M. Nelson, U. S. N.
Mate P. C. VanBuskirk, U. S. N.
Asst. Surgeon F. H. Hartwell, U. S. N.
Asst. Paymaster R. K. Paulding, U. S. N.
1st Asst. Engineer John Lowe, U. S. A.
### SOLAR AND LUNAR CALENDAR DATES FOR 1871

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ROYAL ASIATIC SOCIETY

Cash Statement

June 1/37—May 31/38

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<td>Fixed Deposits</td>
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<td>¥ 77.06</td>
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LIBRARY ACCOUNT:

|                             |                                   |
| Rebinding                  | ¥ 37.50                           |
| Books Purchased             | ¥ 36.40                           |
|                             | ¥ 73.90                           |

SUNDRIES:

| Notices of meetings        | ¥ 6.35                            |
| Clerical work              | ¥ 47.41                           |

STATIONERY:

|                             |                                   |
|                             | ¥ 10.53                           |

BALANCE ON HAND:

| Reserve account            | ¥ 1,500.00                        |
| Current account            | ¥ 883.55                          |
|                             | ¥ 2,383.55                        |

¥ 2,969.73

¥ 2,969.73

Audited and found correct.

Alex. A. Pieters

C. A. SAUER.

May 20, 1938

Respectfully submitted

THOMAS HOBBS

Hon. Treasurer
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Dr. H. H. Underwood

Vice-President
Dr. E. M. Cable

Recording Secretary
Rev. Wm. C. Kerr

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Rev. A. A. Pieters
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*Arnold, Rev. E. H. ... ... ... ... English Church Mission, Seoul
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Block, Miss B., M. D. ... ... ... ... ... ... U. S. A.
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Dolby, Miss H. E. ... ... ... ... ... ... Seoul
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Davies, Miss M. S. ... ... ... ... ... ... Tongnai
Davis, Mrs. J. D. ... ... ... ... ... ... Takezoe-Cho, Seoul
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DeCamp, Rev. Otto ... ... ... ... ... ... Chungju
Delmarter, Miss J. ... ... ... ... ... ... Seoul
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Emmerich, Rev. E. B. ... ... ... ... ... ... Osyka, Miss.
Engel, Rev. G., D. D. ... ... ... c/o 159 Collins St. Melbourne, Australia
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Foreign Missions Library, Secty. ... ... ... ... ... ... 156 Fifth Ave, New York
Genso, Mr. J. F. ... ... ... ... ... ... Seoul
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Gill Miss E. ... ... ... ... ... ... S. D A. Mission, Seoul
*Gompertz, Mr. G. ... ... ... ... ... ... P. O. Box 401, Yokohama
*Gompertz, Mrs. G. ... ... ... ... ... ... P. O. Box 401, Yokohama
Grosjean, Miss V. C. ... ... ... ... ... ... English Church Mission, Seoul
Hall, Miss A. B. ... ... ... ... ... ... 13 Teido, Seoul
Hardie, Rev. R. A., M. B. ... ... 117 East Barnes Ave., Lansing, Mich.
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Hobbs, Mrs. Thomas ... ... ... ... ... ... Seoul
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Hulbert, Miss J. C. ... ... ... ... ... ... Ewha College, Seoul
Hulbert, Miss E. L. ... ... ... ... ... ... Pyongyang
Hunt, Rev. B. F. ... ... ... ... ... ... 435 Sansinskaya, Harbin
*Hunt, Rev. Charles ... ... ... ... ... ... English Church Mission, Seoul
Ingerson, Miss V. F. ... ... ... ... ... ... S. A., Seoul
Irwin, Miss A. J. (Adjutant) ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... Syenchun
Jackson, Miss C. U. ... ... ... ... ... ... Wonsan
Jensen, Rev. A. K., D. D. ... ... ... ... ... ... Seoul
Keen, Mr. J. H. ... ... ... ... ... ... Acupan, Balaboc Mfc. Co., Baguio, Mit Prov., P. I.
Kerr, Rev. Wm. C. ... ... ... ... ... ... 32 Hitsuuncho, Seoul
Kim, Miss Helen, Ph. D. ... ... ... ... ... ... Ewha College, Seoul
Kim, Mr. T. Y. ... ... ... ... ... 250 33 Takeoecho, 3 chome, Soro Dori, Seoul
Kim, Mr. Pung Su ... ... Resurrection Book Store, East Gate, 5 chome, Seoul
Kirkwood, K. P., Esq. ... ... ... ... ... ... Canadian Legation, Tokyo
Knox, Rev. R., D. D. ... ... ... ... ... ... Kwangju
Knechtel, Rev. E. A. ... ... ... ... ... ... Hamheung
Koons, Miss B. ... ... ... ... ... ... c/o Dr. Koons, Seoul
*Koons, Rev. E. W., D. D. ... ... ... ... ... ... Seoul
Lane, Rev. H. W. ... ... ... ... ... ... Tongyung
Lee, Prof. C. H. ... ... ... ... ... ... C. C. C., Seoul
Lee, Prof. D. W., Ph. D. ... ... ... ... ... ... C. C. C., Seoul
Lee, Prof. M. M., Ph. D. ... ... ... ... ... ... C. C. C., Seoul
Lee, Miss Ruby ... ... ... ... ... ... Paiwha, Seoul
Lord, Brigadier ... ... ... ... ... ... P. O. Box 545, Singapore
Lowe, D. S., M. D. ... ... ... ... ... ... Chungju
Lyon, Rev. W. B. ... ... ... ... ... ... Taiku
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Address/Location</th>
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<tr>
<td>Macrae, Rev. F. J. L.</td>
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<td>Matthew, Rev. H. C.</td>
<td>159 Collins St., Melbourne, Aust.</td>
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<td>Maynor, Mrs. V. H.</td>
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<tr>
<td>McKee, Miss A. M.</td>
<td>521 South Oxford St., Los Angeles, Cal.</td>
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<td>608 East Armour Boulevard, Kansas City, Mo., U. S. A.</td>
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<td>Pollard, Miss H. E.</td>
<td>Taiku</td>
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<td>Preston, Rev. J. F., D. D.</td>
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<td>Reiner, Mr. R. O.</td>
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<td>Roberts, Miss E. S.</td>
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<td>*Rufus, Rev. W. C., Ph. D.</td>
<td>Univ. Observatory, Ann Arbor, Mich.</td>
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<td>Ryang, Rev. J. S., D. D.</td>
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<td>Sandell, Miss A.</td>
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<td>Longview 1419 22nd Ave. Wash. U. S. A.</td>
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<td>*Yamaguchi Mr.</td>
<td>Japanese Higher Common School, Keijo</td>
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**NOTE**—Those having an Asterisk (*) before their names have read Papers at meetings of the Society.
EXCHANGES

Transactions of the Royal Asiatic Society
74 Grosvenor Street,
London, W. I., England

Journal Asiatique
13 Rue Jacob, Paris VI.
France

Journal of the American Oriental Society
c/o Yale University Press,
New Haven, Conn., U. S. A.

Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society
104 South Fifth Street,
Philadelphia, Pa., U. S. A.

Geographical Journal
Royal Geographical Society,
Kensington Gore,

Geographical Review
American Geographical Society of
New York, Broadway at 156th St.
New York City, U. S. A.

Bulletin of the Geological Institute of Sweden
University of Upsala, Sweden

Journal of the Ceylon Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society
Ceylon Branch of R. A. S.,
Colombo, Ceylon.

Journal of the Bombay Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society
Bombay, India.

Annual Report of the Smithsonian Institution
Washington, D. C., U. S. A.

Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan
Osaka Building, 3 Uchisaiwai Cho,
1-Chome, Kojimachi-Ku, Tokyo.

Journal of the North China Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society
20 Museum Road, Shanghai, China.

Archiu Orientalni, Orientalni Uslav N. Praze
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Prague, Praha, III-347
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