Changing Patterns in American Diplomacy: Implications for Korean-American Relations
by Richard L. Walker

On the Centenary of America's First Treaty With Korea
by Harold F. Cook

United States Ministers to Korea, 1882-1905: The Loss of American Innocence
by Robert R. Swartout, Jr.

Paul-Georg von Mollendorff—Scholar and Statesman
by Walter Leifer

The First Century in the Development of Korean Advertising
by In Sup Shin
1982 COUNCIL

THE KOREA BRANCH OF
THE ROYAL ASIATIC SOCIETY

OFFICERS

Dr. James Hoyt                   President
Mr. Boo Wan-hyuk                 Vice President
Mr. Jean Videau                  Treasurer
Mrs. Dusty Knisely               Librarian
Miss Alice L. Snyder             Recording Secretary
Dr. Horace G. Underwood          Corresponding Secretary

HONORARY PRESIDENT

Ambassador John Morgan (British Embassy)

COUNCILLORS

Dr. Alan Barr                     Fr. Josef Platzer
Mr. Thomas P. Crawford            LTC. William Rasco
Dr. (Mrs.) Ruth H. Grayson        Mr. Christopher J. Sigur
Mr. Clifford J. Groen             Rev. M. Delmar Skillingstad (Finance)
Dr. Kim Ho-Soon                   Prof. Helen R. Tieszen (Publications)
Mr. Kim Houngh-Han                Amb. Roland van den Berg
Mr. C. Ferris Miller              Mr. Paul G. Van Weddigen (Memberships)
Mrs. Barbara Mintz (Tours)        Mr. James Wade
Prof. Pae Yang-Seo                Prof. Yoon Chong-hiok
Mr. Mark Peterson (Programs)

STAFF

Ms. Sue J. Bae (Office Manager)
Mr. Sean B. Goldrick (Corresponding Secretary, First ½ Year)
Mr. Dennis G. Lazarus (Assistant Corresponding Secretary Second ½ Year)

Royal Asiatic Society, Korea Branch
C.P.O. Box 255, Seoul, Korea
Tel. 763-9483

Printed in Korea by Seoul Computer Press
Contents

Changing Patterns in American Diplomacy: Implications for Korean-American Relations
by Richard L. Walker  page 1

On the Centenary of America’s First Treaty with Korea
by Harold F. Cook  page 11

United States Ministers to Korea, 1882-1905: The Loss of American Innocence
by Robert R. Swartout, Jr.  page 29

Paul-Georg von Moellendorff—Scholar and Statesman
by Walter Leifer  page 41

The First Century in the Development of Korean Advertising
by In Sup Shin  page 53

Contributors

Richard L. Walker, the United States Ambassador to the Republic of Korea, received a Master’s Degree in Far Eastern and Russian Studies and a Doctorate in International Relations from Yale University. Since 1957, Dr. Walker has been associated with the University of South Carolina. He was instrumental in organizing the University’s Institute of International Studies in 1961 and served as its Director until assuming his ambassadorship in 1981. Dr. Walker has been an advisor and consultant to many educational and professional organizations and has served on the editorial boards of leading journals in the field of Asian and International Relations. He has lectured and traveled extensively in the Far East, authoring 15 books, and contributing to more than 50 others.

Harold F. Cook is a native of Massachusetts who has been variously involved with East Asia since January 1949. He earned his doctorate at Harvard, specializing in Korean history. In 1972 the RAS Korea Branch published a revised version of his doctoral thesis entitled Korea’s 1884 Incident (reprinted in 1982). RAS also published in 1981 his Pioneer American Businessman in Korea. Dr. Cook is a contributor to two earlier Transactions (Vols. 48 and 55). He is a life member of RAS-KB as well as a former member of its Council and Corresponding Secretary. Currently he resides in Tokyo as Far East Representative for Prentice-Hall International.

Robert R. Swartout, Jr., received his B.S. (1969) and M.A. (1974) from Portland State University, and his Ph.D. (1978) from Washington State University. From February 1970 to December 1972, he served as a Peace Corps volunteer in Cheju-do. He is currently Associate Professor of History and Coordinator of the International Relations Program at Carroll College, Helena, Montana USA. His publications include Mandarins, Gunboats, and Power Politics: Owen Nickerson Denny and the International Rivalries in Korea (Honolulu: The University Press of Hawaii, 1980).

Water Leifer studied at the Karluniversitaet at Prague (History, Indological subjects) and served as editor of Westfalenpost-Ruhrnachrichten, Norddeutsche Zeitung, and Die Welt as well as Chief-Editor of Grenzland Kurier. In 1955 he joined the German Foreign Office and has served as press and cultural attaché at the German Embassy in Seoul since September 1979. He is author or contributor to many books, mostly on cultural, political, and Asian subjects.

In Sup Shin graduated with honors in Korean literature from the P’yōngyang Teachers’ College in 1949. When the Korean War broke out in 1950, he fled to South Korea and served in the army as an interpreter officer until 1963. Since then, he has been in the advertising business. He has written several books, including The History of Korean Advertising. He also lectures on advertising at Chung-Ang University.
Changing Patterns in American Diplomacy:  
Implications for Korean-American Relations

by Richard L. Walker.*

In this Centennial year of American-Korean relations, there will be ample opportunity to explore the many ties which make the relations between our two countries unique in breadth and intensity. When your Society's President asked me to make a talk as a part of the centennial program, I delayed giving him a title, because I wondered just how I should approach the subject of Korean-American relations in such a way as to make at least a little contribution toward better understanding. When the deadline for supplying a title rolled around, I still had not made up my mind. Finally pressed, I supplied the title: "Some Desultory Notes on Fluctuating Patterns of American International Intercourse, with Occasional Reference to the Korean Spillover Effects in the World Multi-State System". I then supplied a somewhat bewildered Dr. Hoyt with the translation: "Changing Patterns in American Diplomacy: Implications for Korean-American Relations".

I begin by noting that the job of serving as United States Ambassador during this centennial year is an especially demanding one. There will be many visitors, many ceremonial occasions, many parties, and many requests for speeches. I have accepted your invitation because as a scholar I have been grateful for the many publications of the R.A.S. which have helped me toward some understanding of Korea and its culture.

A major part of my assignment here in the Republic of Korea is to help explain the United States, our policies and their formulation. And, of course, to represent American interests, hopefully discreetly. This is known in common parlance defining a diplomat's job as 'bringing home the bacon without spilling the beans'.

It has occurred to me that I might make a small contribution to our discussion this evening by calling attention to the formidable changes which have taken place in the formulation of American foreign policy, the proliferation of agencies now involved in foreign affairs in Washington, and the manifold pressures now being felt from various interest groups, in contrast with the somewhat more direct and unencumbered style of a century ago.

* United States Ambassador to Korea
We seek better understanding between Korea and the United States, so it is important that our Korean allies understand some of the dynamics of American foreign policy. Our conduct of policy reflects a response to great changes in the world. It must also be associated with the fact that change is accelerating.

I do not refer alone to such matters as population growth, though that has been important. When the United States opened its relations with Korea, our population was about 50 million. The population of the Korean peninsula was only about six million. Today the population of the U.S. is four and one-half times as great, more than 225 million, and North and South Korea together have almost 60 million, more than ten times that of a century ago.

Americans have just watched instantaneously via Telstar the visit of their Vice President to Korea, and Koreans can daily watch events from around the whole world on television. With more than a million foreign tourists coming to the Land of Morning Calm each year, and with a formidable portion of its economy geared to foreign trade and overseas activities, Korea is obviously a far different land and a rapidly changing land.

But I advance one caveat: peoples and customs and habits—that is, cultures—change at the speed of glaciers. Many of the comments which Alexis de Tocqueville made about the Americans in the 1830s are as valid today as when they were written. Early descriptions of Korea, published by the R.A.S., read like descriptions of Korean society today. My study of history has convinced me that the factor of national character must be taken into account as a primary determinant in the international behavior of nations.

I stress this point to assure you that in turning to institutional and scientific changes, I am not ignoring the importance of history and culture in foreign policy. It is essential, though, that Koreans understand the changing patterns, processes, and institutions of American foreign policy if we are to continue our close alliance during our second century of diplomatic relations.

As an aside, but not entirely unrelated, it is worth noting that there has been the same cultural persistence in the other nations with which the United States and Korea must deal. The French nobleman, the Marquis de Custine, journeying to Russia in 1839 in search of a justification for enlightened despotism after the anarchy of the revolutionary times which had beset France and Europe since the French Revolution, wrote a journal whose passages have an all too familiar ring. He noted, for example, "The diplomatic corps and Westerners in general have always been considered by this Government, with its Byzantine spirit, and by Russia as a whole, as malevolent and jealous spies." The implications of such an attitude for today are also aptly described in Custine's words:
If better diplomats are found among the Russians than among highly civilized peoples, it is because our papers warn them of everything that happens and everything that is contemplated in our countries. Instead of disguising our weaknesses with prudence, we reveal them with vehemence every morning; whereas the Russians' Byzantine policy, working in the shadow, carefully conceals from us all that is thought, done, and feared in their country. We proceed in broad daylight; they advance under cover: the game is one-sided.

One might comment that the same applies to North Korea today.

But to get on with my topic: it is rather mundane to observe that patterns of international diplomacy have changed over the past century. There are many more actors on the diplomatic scene; the relations among nations involve much more than the niceties of protocol and simple trade problems; instantaneous visual communication frequently makes the urgent cables already obsolete; the process of diplomatic conduct has become increasingly bureaucratized; international regulatory agencies have multiplied; and public opinion, in the limited number of countries where opinion is actually public, intrudes into the decision-making process.

A century ago when the special United States envoy, Commodore Robert W. Shufeldt, had finally negotiated the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation of May 22nd, life was blessedly simple—blissful, if you will. Could this have been because ignorance is bliss? Neither the United States nor Korea really had much knowledge of each other. Shufeldt labored so hard for the conclusion of the treaty that one account shortly thereafter notes:

The American envoy was so worn out with anxiety and toil by his efforts to have Corea opened... that on landing in San Francisco, he retired to the naval hospital at Mare's Island to recover his exhausted strength.

But Robert W. Shufeldt did not have to deal with skyscrapers of cabled instructions, nor entertain visiting Congressional delegations anxious to have their pet projects included in the treaty, nor conduct protracted negotiations with the Department of Defense, the Department of the Treasury, or with the Office of the Special Trade Representative in Washington. Nor did he need to consult with a Korean Economic Planning Board, a Ministry of National Defense, or a Korea Traders' Association.

A good friend of missionary background, whose name and those of his relatives are well recognized through the many years of publications of the Korea Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, Shannon McCune, delivered a paper last month to a meeting of the Association of Asian Studies in
Cincinnati, Ohio. In his very interesting survey, Professor McCune examined just how much Americans might have known about Korea at the time of the Shufeldt Treaty. His research indicated to him that there were really only three books dealing with Korea published by that time and available at a few major libraries in the United States. In addition, there were only a very few articles in popular magazines and journals which could be considered in any way useful for the understanding of Korea. According to McCune,:

These three books available to the American reader were views by outsiders using generally non-Korean source materials. Unfortunately, no books were written solely from the standpoint of the Koreans and using the extensive Korean source materials which existed in Korea.

He goes on to conclude:

The American image of Korea was a hazy one of a distant, isolated peninsula, caught between China, Japan and Russia, with a quaint people living in an area of considerable geographical diversity under a feeble, autocratic government. This image served America poorly. Inadequate images of Korea continue to persist in the United States even to the present day and hinder a thorough understanding of Korea's problems and potential.

That is a familiar refrain even today, but I believe he would agree that one hundred years after the Shufeldt treaty both Koreans and Americans do have a somewhat better understanding of each other. There are literally hundreds of valuable books on Korea in English and other Western languages, and thousands of important articles.

There are other contrasts between the ability of both countries to deal with each other in international relations at the time of the Shufeldt Treaty and today. Some examples might help to illustrate problems as well as opportunities which will confront us during our second century of diplomatic intercourse. Take the size of the American diplomatic establishment, for instance. In 1880 the Department of State in Washington, D. C. had a grand total of only 51 members on its executive and clerical staff, and only 25 ministers and five Charges d’Affaires abroad. Today the Department employs 10,849 in Washington, and in excess of 33,000 work for our missions overseas. Last year we had 281 posts throughout the world—143 embassies, 12 missions, 67 consulates general, 42 consulates, three branch offices, and 14 consular agencies.

A century ago diplomats could conduct correspondence and write out their reports—which, by the way, they did in polished and logical prose without
resort to acronyms or buzz words—and wait patiently for a couple of months for a reply from Washington to their substantive messages. I hasten to add that despite the resort to jargon occasionally, some of the political and economic reporting coming from our embassy today is every bit as good or even better than that which I have read in the course of my own researches in diplomatic archives.

Today, there is an expectation that an instantaneous "Flash" message will have evoked a cabled reply back to the Department within a matter of hours. One scholar, writing fifteen years ago, noted that the Department of State's cable office handled 4,000 messages a day, a total of 15 million words a month, and 19 million pieces of mail each year. Diplomatic pouches numbered 43,000 and in excess of two million pounds. It should be noted that since then the annual rate of increase in State Department "traffic" has been in excess of fifteen percent.

Meanwhile, we have had to absorb all sorts of strange language into the official vocabulary: LOU is not a young lady's name; it means "Limited Official Use". "Traffic" is not a condition of downtown Seoul; it means incoming and outgoing cables. Come to think of it, maybe it could be the condition in downtown Seoul. "AMPART" is used by the United States International Communications Agency to refer to an "American participant" in our cultural and information exchange program. Sometimes I am tempted to refer to those who have repeatedly performed well in the United States interest abroad as Reliable American Participants, or "RAMPARTS".

Perhaps more significant in the changes of American conduct of diplomacy has been the proliferation of United States government agencies and departments whose personnel function within the framework of our embassies abroad. These representatives are in a better position to work with their counterpart agencies in the government to which they are assigned, but their presence sometimes relegates the tie of the State Department personnel to administrative tasks. It is worth noting that in excess of 78 percent of the people assigned to American missions overseas are not State Department personnel. This results in large measure from the number of items, ranging from atomic energy, natural resources, drug and narcotics problems, military and economic assistance, and commercial matters which have become such an integral part of the relations among nations. In London, for example, there are more than forty agencies or offices with personnel separately assigned to the United States Embassy—ranging from the Smithsonian Institution to the Social Security Administration, from the Atomic Energy Commission to the Internal Revenue Service, and from the Department of Agriculture to the Library of Congress. From the point of view of State Department professionals this is not entirely
good, because many who have been trained as professional diplomats and political and economic reporters find themselves involved in providing administrative support for other agencies. One study published in the mid-1970s estimates that as much as 50 percent of the Department of State’s personnel was engaged in supporting other agencies.

I should note that our Embassy in Seoul in 1982 is not quite so burdened with these people whom one of my predecessors as Ambassador to the Republic of Korea, that great antibureaucrat, Ellis O. Briggs, has described as “Peripheral Performers”. We have only ten non-State Department agencies assigned to the Embassy.

The shorthand for what I have been pointing out so far is, of course, that Koreans have a much more complex Embassy and group of specialists to deal with than a century ago, and all too frequently more than one section of the United States Embassy is involved in even the most simple negotiation with the government in Seoul.

But that is only the beginning of the tale of how the pattern of American diplomacy has changed, because it is in Washington that the greatest changes have taken place.

In 1882, it was quite clear that the American President had full charge of foreign policy, and although U.S. Senate ratification of the Treaty took a year, the pace merely reflected the limited interest which that august body took in matters of foreign affairs. Today such could hardly be said to be the case. The House and Senate have fourteen committees, each with oversight interest in aspects of our foreign affairs, and the proliferation of Congressional committee and subcommittee staffs with foreign affairs specialists whose talents match those within the Department of State has been one of the most remarkable features of bureaucratic development in the United States within the past two decades. For instance, Congressional staffs grew by more than 40 percent between 1972 and 1979.

One of the key questions which missions abroad ask about the governments to which they are assigned is where the individual decision affecting some issue between them is being made. The answer in the United States may perhaps be more difficult than for any government in the world. It is true that as President Harry S. Truman observed, the “buck stops” at the President’s desk, but the threads that lead to the presidential desk are interwoven and intertwined in such a complex manner as seemingly to defy unravelling.

To begin with, there is the Office of the President and the National Security Council and its staff. By our Constitution the President is preeminent in foreign affairs. In addition to the NSC, another White House office has
acquired increasing power over decisions in the foreign policy field, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) with its roughly 600 staff members.

Beyond the office of the President itself, it might be useful to list some of the key Washington organizations where the decision buttons might be pushed: Department of State; Agency for International Development; International Communications Agency; Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Labor, Treasury, Interior, Energy. In addition, NASA, National Science Foundation, Export Import Bank, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, and many more. The Embassy of the Republic of Korea in the United States must, perforce, follow the lines of thinking and the power patterns in all of the executive agencies.

Of special importance, of course, is the Department of Defense. Given the formidable nature of the American defense commitment in Korea, and the crucial importance of our maintaining credibility in this part of the world, practically every issue in Korean-American relations has security overtones, whether the activities of dissidents and their connections with American correspondents or American investment in certain Korean industries. Given the lead time for bringing on line new weapons systems and the rocketing cost of effective defense, State-Defense coordination is of special concern for the Korean Government.

But that is just the start! I have already mentioned Congress and Congressional staffers. A century ago members of the House and Senate were primarily interested in domestic issues. Now, when American foreign trade is almost 18 percent of our GNP, Congress is not only involved but has the necessary specialists. Much of the contest between the Executive and Legislative branches on some foreign policy issues, such as, for example, War Powers Act or Intelligence Oversight, is a result of larger Congressional staffs being able to provide expertise on major international questions, and to question positions of the Executive Board.

Congress has now reinvigorated its traditional role in foreign policy through treaty ratification, appointment confirmation, budgetary control, war powers, and grand investigation. Not surprisingly, therefore, we have witnessed a proliferation of lobbies and political action committees who attempt and sometimes do interject themselves into the foreign policy process as individual issues are addressed by the United States Government. Members of Congress can at times become single issue advocates, if, for instance, they represent a single crop area like the corn belt or a major industrial product area such as Detroit. Registered Political Action Committees in
Washington increased from 600 in 1974 to nearly 1,700 in 1978.

I do not have to tell an audience interested in Korean-American relations what this means. For many of us, including the American Embassy in Seoul as well as the Korean Embassy in Washington, it means a constant attention to the activities and publications of special interest groups. Many prove to be helpful, some worrisome. The range is wide: the Association of the United States Army, the American Legion, the National Council of Churches, the AFL-CIO, the American Friends Service Committee, or the Moral Majority.

It is probably not necessary to mention here a final factor in the equation: the mass media. The major American dailies and the television networks have a profound influence in setting the tone of American approaches to the various areas of the globe. Vietnam demonstrated this only too clearly.

What are the implications of these changes in quantity, actors, style, determination, tempo, and scope of American diplomacy as we enter our second century of relations with Korea? I believe many of the implications have been well understood by the government in Seoul, and that its adjustments to change have shown flexibility and imagination. In some respects, it should be noted, we Americans are also having to adjust to a matching complexity in the Government of Korea as it accommodates to the world of the computer, the transistor, and the jet aircraft.

A first obvious implication is that major far-reaching decisions in foreign policy will take much more time to gain the necessary consensus to sustain them. Patience becomes an even more highly valued commodity in diplomacy by both our nations.

Second, it is important for any government dealing with the United States to realize the value of gaining support from a broad spectrum of the American public. I should note that the Korean Embassy in Washington is increasingly aware of this. The days of what was ineptly called "Koreagate" are behind us, and the Korean Mission in the United States has understood the importance of building understanding and support through activities in the private sector. We are cheered that plans are progressing for the creation of a Korea Society in the United States which will have the backing of the many American scholars and businessmen interested in giving a more balanced understanding of the dynamics of this nation in the United States.

Thirdly, in understanding Washington's approach to individual foreign policy problems such as, say, weapons sales or non-tariff trade barriers, other governments must face dealing with a larger array of influence centers, and there is unlikely to be any single person or organization which can push the decision button.
Finally, because there does seem to be one factor of stability in this era of accelerating change—national character—it behooves us more than ever to build on our past century of growth in understanding between our two nations, with an accent on empathy and respect for each other and what we can, even though adhering to our own traditional values, contribute to each other's future. Both the United States and Korea have had basic isolationist impulses in the past. We know that isolation is the refuge of fools in a compressed and interdependent world. In the years ahead, let us demonstrate for the world the great advantages which can come to two disparate cultures by keeping our doors fully open for unfettered interchange of ideas, commerce, art, music, and above all, the friendship which emerges from faith and trust.
Admittedly, adjustments must be made in certain areas of our foreign policy, in light of new realities and changing conditions. However, we must be careful not to abandon our principles. The question of how to balance national interests and international obligations is crucial.

"..."
On The Centenary of America's First Treaty with Korea

by Harold F. Cook

May 22, 1982 marked the 100th anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of Peace, Amity, Commerce and Navigation between the United States of America and the kingdom of Korea. The centenary provides an appropriate occasion to look back on this first treaty between Korea and a Western nation and to review the principal events which led to its signing. The peculiarity of this treaty is that it was composed not on Korean soil by Korean and American negotiators but in China, and in almost total secrecy, by a senior Chinese official, his assistants, and an American naval officer. This brief paper is an attempt to tell the story.

BACKGROUND

Early American interest in Korea stemmed from a desire to expand American trade in East Asia. Edmund Roberts, a special representative of the United States, returned from his explorations in this area in May, 1834, to report to the secretary of state that one advantage in opening trade with Japan was the possibility that it could lead to trade with Korea. Eleven years later, in February 1845, Congressman Zodoc Pratt introduced in the House of Representatives a resolution calling for a mission to both countries to open them to trade. The resolution, however, failed to pass.

American attention was again directed toward Korea after the Civil War. In June 1866 an American trading schooner, the "Surprise," enroute from Chefoo to the Ryukyus, was wrecked off the western coast of present day north Korea. Captain McCaslin and his crew were supplied by the local authorities with necessary comforts and were transported on horseback to the northwestern frontier where they were delivered to some Chinese officials.

In August of the same year another American trading schooner, the "General Sherman," sailed from Chefoo and entered the mouth of the Taedong River with a cargo of cotton goods, glass, tin plates, and other
items likely to prove saleable in Korea. Three Americans were on board: Messrs. W. B. Preston (the owner), Page (the captain), and Wilson (the chief mate). The magistrate of the area dispatched a letter to the captain of the vessel asking why he had come. When the answer came that the vessel intended to enter into trade with the Koreans, the magistrate replied that this was impossible and asked the captain to go away.

Nevertheless the "General Sherman" continued to proceed up the Taedong River. Heavy summer rains had raised the water level, and the vessel was able to reach a point upstream just below P'yŏngyang, the capital of present-day north Korea. When the river suddenly fell, however, the ship became grounded on a sandbar. Further negotiations were unsuccessful, and the crew of the "General Sherman" began to fire at the Koreans along the shore and in small boats nearby. The Koreans in turn prepared rafts loaded with brushwood, set them afire, and floated them down the river toward the "General Sherman." The vessel was soon in flames, and all aboard, attempting to escape, jumped into the water. Some drowned; the rest were killed on shore. There were no survivors.

In January of the following year, i.e., 1867, Commander Robert W. Shufeldt in the U.S.S. "Wachusett" sailed along the Korean coast in the vicinity of the mouth of the Taedong River and dispatched a letter to the king of Korea asking for an explanation of the incident. No reply was forthcoming. Shufeldt departed, but the seed of future events had been planted. In the Commander's own words: "I conceived the idea and considered it possible to make a treaty with this Hermit Nation without the exhibition of force."

In the spring of 1868 Commander John C. Febiger in the U.S.S. " Shenandoah" sailed up the Taedong in response to a rumor that some of the crew of the "General Sherman" were still alive and being held prisoners. Febiger was unable to confirm the rumor but did receive a reply to Shufeldt's letter of a year earlier which gave a version of the "General Sherman" incident favorable to the Koreans.

In the summer of the same year the American secretary of state authorized his nephew, the consul general at Shanghai, to proceed to Korea to negotiate a commercial treaty. For one or more reasons, however, no action was taken.

In April 1870 Frederick F. Low, the American minister to China, was instructed by the secretary of state to go to Korea and to negotiate a commercial treaty as well as a shipwreck convention. It was over a year later, nevertheless, in May 1871, before Low reached the mouth of the Han river just below Kanghwa island. With him were Rear Admiral John Rodgers, a fleet of five steamships, and a complement of 1,200 men.
The Koreans refused to negotiate and after several days fired on a surveying party which had proceeded up the Han river. The Americans made short work of silencing the shore batteries and landed troops on Kanghwa who attacked the fortifications and routed the garrison. Minister Low could get the Koreans neither to negotiate nor to apologize, however, and the Americans finally were forced to withdraw.

In February 1876 Japan succeeded in signing a treaty with Korea and in opening that country to trade. The tactics used by the Japanese were not unlike those employed by American Navy Commodore Matthew C. Perry in opening Japan a little over two decades earlier. Japan’s accomplishment in Korea stimulated the interest of the United States and other Western nations to follow suit.

In April 1878 Senator Aaron A. Sargent, chairman of the Senate committee on naval affairs, introduced a joint resolution authorizing the president to appoint a commission to negotiate a treaty with Korea “with the aid of the friendly offices of Japan.” The resolution was referred to the Senate committee on foreign affairs from which it never emerged.

**Preliminaries**

There seems to have been some connection, nevertheless, between the Sargent resolution and a decision by the navy department to send Sargent’s personal friend, the aforementioned Robert W. Shufeldt, by then promoted to the rank of commodore, on an important commercial and diplomatic mission to several countries including Korea. Shufeldt sailed from Hampton Roads on the U.S.S. “Ticonderoga” in December 1878. After visits to unfrequented parts of Africa and the Persian gulf, he reached Nagasaki on April 15, 1880. In part Shufeldt was instructed by the secretary of the navy to visit “some port of the Corea with the endeavor to reopen by peaceful measures negotiations with that government” and, in all events, to pursue “a moderate and conciliatory course.” John A. Bingham, the American minister at Tokyo, was directed by the secretary of state to solicit Japan’s good offices to facilitate Shufeldt’s mission. Lost in the bureaucracy or the mail, these original instructions never reached Bingham.

Commodore Shufeldt, in passing, was a man of gigantic frame and strong physique who had come to be regarded as one of the most eminent diplomats of the navy and who possessed the confidence of his government to an unusual degree. Born in Red Hook, Dutchess county, New York, in 1822, he entered the navy at the age of 17 and was commissioned in 1845
after cruises in the Brazil and Home squadrons and a year's study at the Philadelphia naval school. After various tours of duty he left the navy nine years later in 1854 with the rank of lieutenant and entered the merchant marine, commanding vessels which sailed between New York and England and later between New York and New Orleans.

In 1860 an article of Shufeldt's on the slave trade between Cuba and the west coast of Africa drew the attention of the government to him and led to his appointment as consul general at Havana. In 1862 the secretary of state sent him on a confidential mission to Mexico at the time of the French invasion. In 1863 he rejoined the navy with the rank of commander and served on blockade duty throughout the remainder of the Civil War. He then spent a tour with the navy's squadron on the China station which, as previously indicated, brought him to the west coast of Korea in early 1867 and to a personal decision to someday successfully negotiate a treaty between the United States and Korea.

Shufeldt was promoted to captain in 1869. He commanded the expedition which surveyed the Isthmus of Tehuantepec canal route, served a tour in the Mediterranean and another at the Brooklyn navy yard, and then became chief of the naval bureau of equipment and recruiting from 1875 to 1878 with promotion to the rank of commodore. In the latter year he published a book entitled "The Relation of the Navy to the Commerce of the United States."

At Nagasaki in April 1880 Commodore Shufeldt received word from Minister Bingham in Tokyo that the Japanese government had declined to commend his mission to the favorable consideration of Korea. In a letter to Bingham, Foreign Minister Inoue Kaoru had explained matters this way:

(A) very few years have elapsed since the conclusion of the Treaty of Friendship between Japan and Corea, and the time has not as yet arrived for putting into full execution the stipulations of the said Treaty; furthermore, the Corean Government not being familiar with foreign intercourse, appears still disinclined to open the country to Foreigners. I beg therefore to say that if the introduction of the Commodore to the Corean officials should be granted according to Your Excellency's request, I fear that it might give rise to some complications whereby the execution of our Treaty with that country might be somewhat prevented. I greatly regret therefore that I am at present unable to comply with Your Excellency's wishes.
Although Japan and Korea had signed their first treaty in February 1876, at the time of Inoue's writing Pusan was still the only open port. Wonsan was scheduled to be opened in three months, and the two countries could reach no agreement on the opening of a third port. The Japanese minister had yet to present his credentials to the Korean king and to secure permission to reside permanently at Seoul. In this context Inoue's reply does not seem unreasonable.

The Japanese foreign minister, nevertheless, did provide Shufeldt with nine charts of the Korean coasts and a letter of introduction to the Japanese consul at Pusan which Shufeldt, accompanied by the American consul at Nagasaki, carried to that port in early May and which stated, in part:

I instruct you that, upon arrival of Commodore Shufeldt at your port you will in no way interfere with his mission, but, having [in mind] the treaty of friendship existing between the U.S. and Japan, you will give him every possible assistance that he may require at your hands during his stay in your port.

Efforts to forward a letter to the king through the Korean authorities at Pusan were unsuccessful, and Shufeldt went directly to Tokyo to confer with Bingham and Inoue. This resulted in a second letter of introduction, this time from Inoue to the Korean minister of rites at Seoul. Although not designated by name, the latter individual was Yun Cha-sung, known personally to Inoue inasmuch as both had been signatories to the Japan-Korea treaty of a little more than four years earlier. Inoue's letter was dispatched from Yokohama to Seoul at the end of May, via the Japanese minister to Korea, with Shufeldt's letter to the Korean king. Shufeldt agreed to wait 60 days at Nagasaki for a reply. In part Inoue's letter stated:

The general state of the world is now greatly different from that of olden times, and we know from our own experience the impossibility of rejecting foreign intercourse, and China also has the same experience.

The best plan, which I recommend you for the interest of your country, is to comply with the request of the United States Government in a friendly sentiment, treating them with sincere benevolence and being guided in intercourse with them by the principle of right and justice. This is the only means of guarding against contempt from abroad, and of securing the right of independency of your country.
By mid-August, and after waiting longer than 60 days, Commodore Shufeldt learned that Yun had returned unopened his letter to the king because it was "improperly addressed" and because: "It is well known to the world that our foreign relations are only with Japan...and that other foreign nations are not only situated far from us, but there has never been any intercourse with them." Yun's reply was carried to Japan by Kim Hong-jip on a mission to Tokyo unrelated to Shufeldt and his treaty overtures. Kim passed through Nagasaki during the first days of August but did not meet Shufeldt, nor did the latter know of Kim's visit.

In the meantime, however, Shufeldt had become acquainted with the Chinese consul at Nagasaki who wrote on his behalf to Li Hung-chang, China's greatest statesman of this period and governor general of the Province of Chihli (modern day Hopei). Under date of July 23 Li wrote to Shufeldt, asking him to come to his summer residence at Tientsin "to talk over matters."

The opening of Korea, the country which ranked first among China's tributaries, had created a whole series of crises for the Ch'ing court, cutting away as it did the foundation stone of the tribute system and coming at a time when China was beset with problems on every side. Imperialist rivalry, nibbling at the periphery of the Chinese world, increased throughout the third quarter of the 19th century. Moreover, as the competition for colonies developed, it became apparent that the Celestial Empire had uncertain or unstable frontiers. Maps were unreliable, historical claims conflicted, and the limits of Ch'ing authority came increasingly into dispute.

To the uncertainties of terrain were added the vagueness and timidity of Peking's claims to suzerainty over tributary states. The tribute system was a defensive more than an imperialistic institution, based less on definitive treaty law than on Confucian ethics, less on tangible military domination than on cultural supremacy. When called upon either to take responsibility for disorders in tributary areas and to recompense aggrieved foreigners, or else to renounce suzerain jurisdiction, China's first impulse was to avoid responsibility so as to escape payment of indemnities. Thus, by the time period under consideration, the Ryukyu Islands, Formosa, Vietnam, areas of Central Asia, and Korea gradually had become fair game for foreign colonial expansion.

By 1880 the main threat to China's interests and to Korea seemed to come from Russia and, to a lesser extent, from Japan. The former was also the power most feared by Great Britain. In this year Sino-Russian hostilities threatened to break out afresh over the Ili region in Chinese Turkestan. Peking massed troops along her northwestern frontier while the Russians
mobilized forces in Central Asia and ships in Far Eastern waters. At the same time China's relations with Korea were removed from the control of the board of rites, which traditionally had handled tribute relations, and placed under the foreign office (tsungli yamen) and, more specifically, Li Hung-chang.

Li hoped to protect Korea against Russian or Japanese absorption by bringing her into treaty relations with all the trading powers, whose commerce would create vested interests in Korea's independence. In a sense this was the ancient strategy of "using barbarians to control barbarians." Li also hoped, through Chinese intervention in Korea's domestic affairs, to foster a program of reform and "self-strengthening" concurrent with China's own development of military and naval power. This policy, while recognizing that Korea's seclusion was finished and that modernization must be pursued, envisioned a Korea modernized under China's tutelage.

It was at this juncture, then, and against this background that Li Hung-chang invited Commodore Shufeldt to come to Tientsin. The two met August 26, 1880 and talked for three hours. Shufeldt's report clearly shows that an American treaty with Korea was not the only topic on the agenda:

After a prolonged discussion, in which the strategic position of the peninsula of Korea with reference to Russia, China and Japan was pointed out, His Excellency told me that I might say to my government that he would use his influence with the government of Corea to accede to the friendly request made by me in behalf of the government of the United States to open negotiations with a view to such a treaty as before mentioned. .

His Excellency then said he had invited me to Tientsin with the view of getting the opinion of a naval officer in whom he had confidence on the result of a war between China and Russia, so far as naval operations on the seacoast of the former were concerned. He begged me to reflect on my answers, because he desired my opinion to have full force and effect not only with himself but in the counsels of the nation. I replied by saying substantially. . . that the result could only be one of disaster to China. . . . His Excellency seemed much impressed and assured me that war would not occur between these two countries if China could possibly avert it. .

In conclusion he expressed the hope that when peace was assured my government would permit me to assist China in
the organization of its navy. This, of course, is a matter to some extent personal in its nature, but if consummated would add very much to American influence in China, and probably end in the construction of ships for that government in American ship yards.

**Negotiations**

Shufeldt returned to the United States in November 1880 with two personal goals in mind: to open Korea to the Western world and to organize the Chinese navy. He urged his government to send him back to China for the purpose of achieving both objectives. The secretary of state entered heartily into Shufeldt’s plans and, with the concurrence of the secretary of the navy, arranged for his assignment as an attaché at the American legation in Peking. The whole matter was handled in a confidential fashion. Even the American minister to China, James B. Angell, was not notified of the true nature of Shufeldt’s appointment until the commodore informed him of it in Peking.

With the official title of attaché to the American legation, therefore, and with his daughter as his secretary, Shufeldt reached China in the latter part of June 1881. On July 1 he again talked with Li Hung-chang at Tientsin. Li told him that he had had a recent conversation about a prospective treaty with a Korean official at Tientsin and that the official was “much impressed with the advantages that his country would derive from such a treaty.” Although not named by Li, this Korean official probably was Cho Yŏng-ha who was in China at this time as a condolence envoy to the Ch’ing court following the death in April of the widow of the Emperor Hsien-feng. Li further stated that he had written to the Korean court on the subject but had not yet received a reply. Cho Yŏng-ha, it may be inferred, carried the letter back to Korea. Li urged Shufeldt to be patient and expressed the opinion that the United States “would realize its wishes.” He appeared less enthusiastic, however, than he had the previous August and less willing to act as an intermediary. Two weeks later he again spoke with Shufeldt and urged him to remain at Tientsin until a reply to his letter came from Seoul. Li suggested a time frame of 90 days for this waiting period.

Li’s apparent change of heart was due at least in part to the satisfactory settlement of the Ili question during the months between Shufeldt’s first and second visits. As early as January 1881 Minister Angell reported that
officials of the foreign office had informally told him that "danger of war with Russia is over." In June Angell reported that the Sino-Russian settlement conceded to China practically the whole province of Ili and that the treaty was "more favorable to China than a few months ago it was supposed she could secure." Finally, in July, after talking with Shufeldt and learning of the results of his meeting with Li Hung-chang, Angell wrote that the real "present temper" of the Chinese government on the Korean question "is not known" but:

If the United States had acted before the fear of a war between Russia and China was fully dispelled, it is very probable that we might have negotiated a treaty with Corea. . . Nothing that I see in the Legations here indicates the intention of the part of any of the Western Powers to press Corea for a treaty just now. They are waiting for us to do it, knowing well that they would soon share in the advantages to be secured.

These developments in China can be brought into sharper focus when supplemented by information that Minister Bingham was reporting from Tokyo. In a conversation at the end of December 1880 the Chinese minister at the Japanese capital, Hê Ju-chang, told Bingham: "[The] Chinese Government had advised Corea to first make a friendly treaty of commerce with the United States before entertaining any treaty proposition from any of the European Powers." At the same time he showed Bingham a draft of a proposed Korean-American commercial treaty which, Bingham commented, was "substantially the same as the United States-Japan treaties of 1857 and 1858." The following day Minister Hê informed Bingham that he had just dispatched the draft to Seoul "by special messenger" for the "consideration" of the Korean government. Hê appears to have been misleading Bingham at this point, however, for his correspondence was directed not to Korea but to Li Hung-chang in Tientsin. Hê suggested that China should either send an envoy to Korea to take care of the negotiations for a Korean-American treaty or should issue an imperial edict ordering Korea to enter into treaty relationships with America and to mention this order in the treaty text. Li rejected both of these suggestions.

Six months later in June 1881, just after Shufeldt passed through Tokyo for the second time on his way to Peking, Minister Hê wrote to Bingham:

I have lately received a private letter from H.E. Chin Hung-chi [Kim Hong-jip], Corean envoy who came to Japan last year, to the effect that the Corean government, being advised
by me, have been very desirous to hold intercourse with the United States of America and other countries, but that the people still have a little doubt about the advantages of foreign relations, so that at present my proposals on that matter cannot be carried out yet.

Other developments in Tokyo in this same time frame, involving Chinese Minister Hê and various visiting Koreans, cannot be disregarded but need not be detailed here. It is possible and probably necessary, nevertheless, to posit a certain element of competition between Li Hung-chang in Tientsin and Hê Ju-chang in Tokyo. The validity of this assumption is enhanced by the abrupt replacement of Hê in the late autumn of 1881. With the benefit of hindsight it would seem that, if Korea was to open her doors to the Western nations, Li Hung-chang intended to permit her to do so only on his terms.

Commodore Shufeldt was kept waiting at Tientsin during the remainder of the summer and throughout the autumn of 1881. He had expected Li Hung-chang to take action regarding his offer of a responsible post in the Chinese navy, but Li avoided the subject. He often consulted Shufeldt about naval matters, however, and the commodore made frequent visits to Chinese ships of war and the Tientsin arsenal.

The period of 90 days suggested by Li as sufficient for the reception of news from Korea came and went, but no news had been received. Shufeldt's position became embarrassing, and the question arose whether or not his dignity would be sacrificed by remaining longer at Tientsin, where to outsiders he appeared as a hanger-on to Li's court and a solicitor of a naval job. The American minister at Peking advised him to depart, but Shufeldt decided to remain until he heard something from Korea.

Finally on December 15 Li Hung-chang sent his naval secretary to Shufeldt with word that a Korean official had reached Tientsin and that Korea was willing to negotiate a treaty with the United States. Li declined to meet personally with Shufeldt, however, or to introduce him to the unnamed Korean official, before leaving for Paoting, the site of his winter residence as governor of the province of Chihli.

This unnamed Korean official was Ŭ Yun-jung. Ŭ had been in Japan from May to October, as a member of a Korean government study mission. This group was in Tokyo when Shufeldt passed through in June, but there is no evidence that he met any of them in the course of his brief three-day visit. Most likely it was one of the members of this study mission who brought to Chinese Minister Hê the letter from Kim Hong-jip just cited.
The leaders of this Korean study group left Tokyo in August and were back in Seoul by mid-October. Only Ŭ Yun-jung remained in Japan until the end of October and then left, not for Korea but for China. From O’s own travel diary there is no explanation for his China trip, only an inference from a chance meeting in Kobe with other Korean officials enroute from Seoul to Tokyo. From the diary, however, it is clear that Ŭ met Li Hung-chang in Tientsin on December 1, the last day of his eight-day visit to that city. Absent from Seoul since the previous spring on what was basically a study mission to Japan, Ŭ had no authority to officially commit his country to enter into treaty relations with the United States. When Li Hung-chang told Shufeldt that a Korean official had arrived and that Korea was willing to negotiate a treaty, he misled the American commodore. What Li meant was that he had decided that Korea should negotiate a treaty with the United States and that he had told Ŭ Yun-jung to convey this message to the king of Korea. This undoubtedly is what Ŭ did when he finally reached home and was received in royal audience on February 2, 1882, although his diary entry for the audience is silent on this point.

Other treaty-related events, meanwhile, had overtaken Ŭ Yun-jung’s return. To focus properly it is helpful to go back to June 1880 when the king directed that Korean artisans and students be sent to China to learn about military training, weapons manufacture, and other fields. As a result Pyŏn Wŏn-gyu, chief interpreter of the previous winter solstice mission to Peking, was sent to China to discuss these matters with the board of rites. In Peking Pyŏn was instructed to transact his business with Li Hung-chang. From this point in time dates the transferral of responsibility for Korean affairs from the board of rites to the foreign office and, more specifically, to Li Hung-chang.

Pyŏn met Li at Tientsin on October 19, less than two months after Commodore Shufeldt’s first talk with the Chinese statesman. In the days that followed they worked out an agreement by terms of which nearly 90 young Koreans were to be sent to Tientsin for training at the arsenal, at the army barracks, and as language students. It is unlikely, in view of their respective ranks, that Li and Pyŏn actually did any negotiating. Li simply set the terms which China would offer. In the course of their meetings Li also stressed the necessity of opening Korea to foreign commercial intercourse and voiced his concern about the possibility of Russia forcing its way into northeastern Korea.

Pyŏn Won-gyu went back to Seoul and reported to the king on January 4, 1881. Two months later the king directed that necessary steps be taken in order to send young Koreans to China, under the guidance of a responsible
envoy, for training in accordance with Pyŏn’s report. Preparations dragged on throughout the summer, and in September Kim Yun-sik, a respected Confucian scholar, was designated as the envoy to head the student group to China. Kim and his party, including Pyŏn Won-gyu, left Seoul in November and reached Peking on January 6, 1882. Kim then went to Paoting to confer with Li Hung-chang and on to Tientsin to arrange for the placement of his students. Pyŏn returned directly to Seoul from Tientsin to report on the safe arrival of the mission.

While all this was going on, another Korean official and member of the winter solstice mission, Yi Yong-suk, on February 18, 1881 delivered to Li Hung-chang a letter from Chief State Councillor Yi Ch’oe-ung expressing regrets at the rejection of the American letter (from Commodore Shufeldt) in the summer of 1880 and announcing Korea’s readiness to conclude a treaty with the United States. When Yi Yong-suk reported to the king on the results of his mission on May 4, he delivered a copy of a proposed draft treaty which Li Hung-chang had given him.

Later in the year, and shortly before Ŭn-jung’s arrival in Tientsin, Li gave a letter to yet another Korean official, Yi Êng-jun, to be carried to Seoul, urging the dispatch of a plenipotentiary envoy to Tientsin to negotiate a treaty with the United States. Yi met Kim Yun-sik at the border station of Uiju, as Kim was enroute to China with the student mission, and updated him on treaty proposal developments before continuing on to Seoul himself. Both Yi Êng-jun and Ŭn-jung, therefore, carried messages from Li Hung-chang to Korea regarding Li’s wishes for a treaty between Korean and the United States.

By early February 1882, when both Ŭn-jung and Yi Êng-jun had reported to the king on the subject of a treaty with the United States, Kim Yun-sik was back at Paoting meeting with Li Hung-chang on this very topic. Entries in Kim’s travel diary at this time give the impression that his mission to China was as much concerned with making preparations for the treaty as with training the Korean students.

Commodore Shufeldt, of course, had knowledge of none of these happenings and had yet to meet even a single Korean. All he knew was that Li Hung-chang had assured him that Korea would negotiate a treaty, that Li was too busy then see him, and that the post of adviser to the Chinese navy seemed to have evaporated. Some idea of Shufeldt’s personal feeling of disgust at this juncture is apparent from a brief quote from a letter which he wrote to his friend the aforementioned Senator Sargent:

Six months residence in this city [Tientsin], the political center of the Chinese Government, and an intimacy rather ex-
ceptional with the ruling element, has convinced me that deceit and untruthfulness pervade all intercourse with foreigners; that an ineradicable hatred exists, and that any appeal across this barrier...is entirely idle. The only appeal or argument appreciated is force...All sympathy will be construed into weakness, all pity into fear...Our policy, therefore, should be positive and governed, to the extent of the moral law, by American interests alone, and followed up by the argument which they understand: the argument of force, pressure, not persuasion.

The fear of Russia, temporarily dispelled with the settlement of the Ili question, remained ever in the background. American Charge d'Affaires Chester Holcombe, who replaced Minister Angell in October 1881, reported at the end of the year that Li Hung-chang still was interested in opening Korea to friendly Western powers “lest Russia should seize the Corean peninsula and so threaten the integrity of China in a far more serious manner than ever before.” Holcombe also said that Li had already prepared a draft of a treaty and had given it to the Korean government. His source for this statement may have been Shufeldt or it may have been the British Minister, Sir Thomas F. Wade, who had been in Tientsin conferring with Li Hung-chang at the very time that Li was refusing to see Shufeldt. Whatever the source, it was Yi Yong-suk, as mentioned earlier, who carried the treaty draft to Seoul earlier in the year. In February 1882 Holcombe further advised the secretary of state that ministers of the foreign office had informed him that “sooner or later the autonomy of Corea would be threatened by the aggressions of Russia and/or Japan, and that this serious danger could best be met by bringing the peninsula Kingdom into the family of nations.”

After leaving the United States in May 1881, Commodore Shufeldt received no additional guidance from Washington with regard to his mission throughout the remainder of the year. On January 19, 1882, however, he received detailed instructions, dated in the previous November, from the secretary of state as well as a letter of credence from the president appointing him special envoy to Korea and authorizing him to negotiate a treaty. The aura of confidentiality surrounding the beginning of his mission had been removed.

Shufeldt’s new instructions stated that the prime purpose of his mission was to obtain a treaty for the relief of American vessels and crews shipwrecked on the Korean coast. However, should he find the “temper and
disposition of the king favorable," he was to negotiate a treaty of amity and commerce, securing rights of trade, fixing tariffs, establishing consular and diplomatic representation, and granting extraterritorial jurisdiction. Shufeldt was cautioned not to ask for too much and was ordered not to begin negotiations unless there were reasonable prospects of success. In any event his sojourn in Korea was limited to two months. All of this assumed, of course, that Shufeldt would be going to Korea to negotiate the treaty directly with the Koreans, which was not the case at all.

As soon as Shufeldt received these new instructions he wrote to Li Hung-chang at Paoting suggesting a meeting at such time and place as Li might select. Li replied that he would be happy to meet Shufeldt at Paoting if the commodore would come incognito. Shufeldt refused because he did not want to give the negotiations the character of a personal intrigue between Li and himself. It was agreed, therefore, that the meeting would be postponed until Li's return to Tientsin.

In February Shufeldt went to Peking to confer with American Chargé Holcombe. Together they prepared a draft of a treaty with Korea that was not limited to a simple shipwreck convention and was modeled on the 1876 Japan-Korea treaty. Inasmuch as Holcombe had resided in the East for many years and was an accomplished Chinese scholar, the two men agreed that he would attend Shufeldt's next meeting with Li.

Li Hung-chang returned from Paoting to Tientsin in mid-March 1882 and conferred again with Kim Yun-sik. Li then met both Commodore Shufeldt and Chargé Holcombe on March 25 and presented them with a draft treaty, drawn up during the winter by two of Li's closest associates, while receiving their draft in return. Li intended his draft to serve as a model for all future treaties between Korea and Western nations. He stated that he would represent both Korea and his own country in the negotiations and that if an envoy did not come from Korea within thirty days he would send a Chinese official to Korea with Shufeldt. Li made no reference to the Korean envoy already in Tientsin, Kim Yun-sik, whom Shufeldt had never met and never did meet. Shufeldt did suspect, however, that a Korean official was in fact already in Tientsin, as he wrote to the secretary of state on April 10: "I have every reason to believe that there is at this moment in Tientsin a Korean official who is consulted at every step."

On exchanging first drafts of the proposed treaty it was apparent that there were many areas of difference but that the real obstacle to agreement was the form of acknowledgement of the existence of Korea's traditional relations with China. Clarification of this important point, and all other differences, finally was reached after three more negotiating sessions when
Li agreed to eliminate from the treaty text the sentence: "Chosen, being a dependent state of the Chinese empire, has nevertheless heretofore exercised her own sovereignty in all matters of internal administration and foreign relations." In exchange Shufeldt agreed to write a letter to Li, stating that he had requested the assistance of China in making the treaty, and to transmit to the president of the United States a letter from the king of Korea stating that the treaty had been made with China’s consent. While all of this was taking place, Shufeldt sent two telegrams to the secretary of state asking for instructions on the dependency issue and for permission to take Chargé Holcombe to Korea to assist him as an interpreter. He received no reply to either telegram.

It was at this juncture, with Li and Shufeldt finally in agreement but with Shufeldt still never having met a Korean, that Li Hung-chang’s mother died on April 19. Normally he would have gone into mourning for two years, but his services to the empire being so critical at this point, he was granted only one hundred days’ leave of absence to attend the funeral. Shufeldt, without Holcombe, left Tientsin for Shanghai and from there proceeded to Chefoo where the commander of the American navy’s Asiatic squadron had placed the corvette U.S.S. "Swatara" (1,900 tons; 8 guns) at his disposal for Korean service.

In Seoul in the interim, Pyŏn Wŏn-gyu had submitted his report on the safe arrival of the student mission, and the aforementioned Ô Yun-jung had been directed to proceed to Tientsin to check on the training of the students. More importantly, however, Ô bore instructions to convey Korea’s agreement to the proposed American treaty to Kim Yun-sik and Li Hung-chang. Ô and his party left Seoul on April 4. When they reached Tientsin on May 15, all preparatory arrangements for the Korean-American treaty had been completed, Commodore Shufeldt was already at Chemulp’o (Inch’ŏn), and Li Hung-chang was off to Wuchang to attend his mother’s funeral. Ô, et al. might just as well have stayed at home.

Commodore Shufeldt left Chefoo on the morning of May 8 and anchored off Chemulp’o on the afternoon of May 12. He was preceded by two Chinese officials, Admiral Ting Ju-ch’ang (commander of the northern fleet) and Ma Chien-chung (one of Li Hung-chang’s principal assistants in Tientsin and one of the two principal drafters of the original Chinese version of the treaty), and three Chinese gunboats. Ma carried with him copies of the proposed treaty for presentation to Korean officials. A Japanese man-of-war was also in port when Shufeldt arrived, the Japanese minister having just returned from Tokyo.

Ma, who acted as intermediary between the Americans and the
Koreans, called on Shufeldt on May 13 to arrange for a visit by the two Korean officials who had been appointed by the king to "negotiate" the treaty. Shufeldt at long last met a Korean official face to face when these two gentlemen came on board the "Swatara" the following day. The senior of the two was 72-year-old Sin Hŏn, who had been one of the Koreans who negotiated and signed the first treaty with Japan in 1876. The other was Kim Hong-jip, mentioned earlier as the envoy who visited Japan in the summer of 1880 when Shufeldt was waiting at Nagasaki for an answer to his letter sent to Seoul via the Japanese minister. The "Swatara" fired a salute of three guns, and the Koreans were extended the courtesies of the ship. In return they gave Shufeldt presents of rice, eggs, fowl, and beef.

Six days later, on May 20, Shufeldt went ashore and again met the two Korean officials at the office of the magistrate of the district. Credentials were examined and found satisfactory on both sides. The commodore presented Sin and Kim with a letter from the American president to the king of Korea. A disagreement over the question of rice exports was settled by Shufeldt accepting the Korean position. The only other item of business transacted was the agreement to meet again two days later for the purpose of signing and sealing the treaty which had been negotiated in Tientsin.

Concerning this last formality, which took place on May 22, 1882, Commodore Shufeldt made the following memorandum:

At 9:30 a.m. Commodore Shufeldt, accompanied by Commander P.H. Cooper [and then he goes on to name the officers who accompanied him], and preceded by the marine guard of the U.S.S. "Swatara" . . . left the ship and proceeded to the place previously selected for the signing of the treaty between the United States and Corea, which was on the mainland near the town of Sai-mots-fo [Chemulp'o] and in full view of the ship at anchor. . . . he proceeding at once to the tent which had been put up by the Corean authorities, finding there the two commissioners on the part of Chosen, Shin Chen [Sin Hŏn], president of the Royal Cabinet, and Chin Hong Chi [Kim Hong-jip], member of the Royal Cabinet, with their suite, and Ma Taotai, and Admiral Ting and Captain Clayson of the Imperial Chinese Navy. After a little preliminary conversation, the six copies of the treaty, three in English and three in Chinese, were sealed and signed by Commodore Shufeldt on the part of the United States, and by the two commissioners already named on the part of
Chosen. As soon as the signing was completed, at a signal from the shore, the ‘Swatara’ fired a salute of twenty-one guns in honor of the King of Chosen. Commodore Shufeldt and party then returned on board the ‘Swatara.’

When Commodore Shufeldt left Chemulp’o on May 24, he carried with him signed copies of the new treaty together with a friendly letter from the Korean king to the American president in reply to the one from the president which Shufeldt had delivered to the Korean officials on May 20. He also carried a separate letter from the king to the president which stated:

The Chao-hsien country (Korea) is a dependency of China, but the management of her governmental affairs, home and foreign, has always been vested in the Sovereign. . . . In the matter of Korea being a dependency of China any questions that may arise between them in consequence of such dependency, the United States shall in no way interfere.

CONCLUSION

To continue the narration would only be anticlimactic, although too much already has been left out and still more remains to be told. America’s first treaty with Korea, and Korea’s first treaty with a Western nation, was duly signed and sealed one hundred years ago at what is today the city of Inch’on. Advice and consent to ratification were given by the United States Senate on January 9, 1883, and the treaty ratified by President Chester A. Arthur on February 13, 1883. Ratifications were exchanged at Seoul on May 19, 1883, and the treaty was proclaimed by the president on June 4, 1883.

Unquestionably there was some interest on the part of Korea in a treaty with the United States, but there can be no doubt that it was China’s Li Hung-chang who assumed full responsibility for that treaty’s negotiation and with less than altruistic motivation. John Russell Young, who went to Peking in June 1882 as America’s new minister to the Ch’ing court, asked the following not inappropriate question concerning the treaty: “How far should we commit ourselves to a convention which China would regard as protecting her frontiers from some dreaded ultimate danger on the part of Russia or Japan, and which Russia and Japan might deem an unwarranted interference in Asiatic affairs?” And Commodore Shufeldt himself aptly concluded that Li Hung-chang’s object had been “to make an American
Treaty for the benefit of China."

It is the anniversary of the beginning of a century of peace, amity, commerce and navigation between the United States and Korea to which the sands of time have now brought us, and it is the story of that beginning which I have attempted to tell in this paper.

REFERENCES

Ilsongnok. Vols. for the years 1880-1882.
United States. Statutes at Large. XXIII.
_______. National Archives. "Despatches from United States Ministers to China" (File Microcopies of Records in the National Archives: No. 92).
_______. _________. "Despatches from United States Ministers to Japan" (File Microcopies of Records in the National Archives: No. 133).
_______. _________. "Diplomatic Instructions of the Department of State: Japan" (File Microcopies of Records in the National Archives: No. 77).
United States Ministers to Korea, 1882-1905: The Loss of American Innocence*

by Robert R. Swartout, Jr.

Regular diplomatic relations between the United States and Korea began in May 1882 with the signing of the so-called Shufeldt treaty, officially titled the "Treaty of Amity and Commerce between the United States of America and Corea." Diplomatic relations between the two nations would continue until 1905, when the Japanese established their protectorate over Korea and the United States withdrew its legation from Seoul. Official American representation in the peninsula would not return until after the defeat of Japan in the Second World War and the destruction of the Japanese overseas empire.

During the first twenty-three years of Korean-American relations—that is, between 1882 and 1905—a number of critical diplomatic issues arose. Perhaps the most important issue, certainly from the Korean perspective, was that of Korean independence. More specifically, just how far was America prepared to go to help protect the sovereign integrity of the Kingdom of Korea? Koreans often assumed, in part because of the "good offices" clause contained in the Shufeldt treaty, that the government of the United States was committed to maintaining Korean independence. American diplomats of course agreed that the United States, by signing the 1882 treaty, had officially recognized Korea as an independent nation. Yet those same diplomats often disagreed quite strongly over just how far the United States should go to help insure that same independence.

I think it is accurate to say that during this twenty-three-year period a very distinct division arose within the American diplomatic community over this issue. By and large, the United States ministers dispatched to Korea, as America's highest-ranking diplomatic officials in that country, actively supported the continuance of Korean independence. Foreign policy makers back in Washington, on the other hand, proved increasingly reluctant to involve the United States in Korean affairs. Ultimately, the State Department's position in Washington would prevail, thus leading to America's willing acquiescence in the Japanese takeover of Korea in 1905.

* An earlier version of this essay was delivered before the 34th Annual Meeting of the Association for Asian Studies, Chicago, Illinois, April 2-4, 1982.
Let us now turn to a few specific examples of the rift that developed between the policy makers in Washington and the U.S. diplomats in the field. A little later we will get back to the issue of why the Washington view predominated, and what implications that may have for Korean-American relations, as well as for American diplomacy as a whole.

I

America's first regular minister to Korea, Lucius H. Foote, arrived in Seoul in May 1883. Prior to serving in Korea, Foote had been an active member of the Republican party in California and had worked for the American consular service in Latin America. Upon reaching Korea, Foote began working almost immediately with Korean officials, and especially with King Kojong, to strengthen Korean independence. From Foote's various actions and statements, the king inferred that the government of the United States was seriously committed to preserving Korean independence, a notion which was all too often reinforced by the attitudes of Foote's successors in Korea over the next twenty-two years.

It was Foote who suggested to Kojong that Korea dispatch a goodwill embassy to the United States, a suggestion which the king quickly followed. This mission, which spent three months touring the United States during the fall of 1883, would serve to tie Korea and the United States more closely together, while giving to the rest of the world the impression that Korea was indeed a totally independent nation.

Foote also recommended that the State Department make every effort to locate American citizens willing to serve as advisors to the Korean government, an idea close to King Kojong's heart. In supporting the request for advisors, Foote declared that "the influence of Foreigners holding confidential positions in these Oriental countries, seems to add largely to the influence of their respective Governments."

In fact, it was exactly this influence which policy makers back in Washington were none too eager to assume. The United States was willing to sign a treaty with Korea, and recognize the peninsular kingdom as an independent nation, in order to protect shipwrecked American sailors and advance the cause of American commerce. But leaders in Washington were decidedly reluctant to accept the diplomatic, and perhaps even military, responsibilities needed to maintain Korean independence in the face of ever-growing foreign threats—particularly those from China, Japan, and Russia.
The State Department's position was clearly illustrated in July 1883 when Foote's rank in Korea was reduced from minister plenipotentiary to minister resident and consul general. Foote protested against this change by deciding to resign from his post. In a despatch to Secretary of State Frederick T. Frelinghuysen, he declared that "it is impossible to explain the reasons for the change (to the Koreans), without leaving the most unfortunate impression, while the Minister degraded in their estimation by the loss of his rank, is no longer clothed with the same importance and influence." This, of course, was one of Frelinghuysen's main points: Seoul indeed was not as important as Tokyo, Peking or St. Petersburg.

When Lucius Foote finally departed from Korea in January 1885, he left the U.S. legation in the hands of Naval Attaché George C. Foulk, who was to serve as chargé d'affaires ad interim. While Foulk never officially became the U.S. minister to Korea, he did serve as America's highest-ranking diplomatic representative in Seoul for almost two years. Because of his youth (he was twenty-nine when he took over the legation), his knowledge of the Korean culture and language, and his obvious sympathies toward Korean independence, Foulk has received more attention from historians than perhaps any other American representative in Korea.8

Ultimately, Foulk's pro-Korean stance brought him into conflict with Chinese officials who, during the 1880s, were attempting to dominate Korea. By 1887 the Chinese government put pressure on the Korean Foreign Office and Secretary of State Thomas F. Bayard to have Foulk recalled. This Bayard finally did in June 1887, claiming that he had no choice, since the Korean Foreign Office had declared Foulk persona non grata.9 Yet that was not the whole story, for King Kojong himself had requested that Foulk be reinstated. Bayard's underlying concern was with Sino-American relations. He was unwilling to risk the anger of China by allowing the United States to take sides in the growing controversy over Korean independence.

Bayard further demonstrated his reluctance to be drawn into this issue during the residence of Hugh A. Dinsmore, who served as U.S. minister to Korea from 1887 to 1890. Dinsmore, like his predecessors, pushed actively for Korean independence. At one point in his service, in order to strengthen America's influence in Korea, he requested permission from the State Department to resign from his post so that he might replace Owen N. Denny, an American advisor to King Kojong then serving as Director of Foreign Affairs and Vice-President of the Korean Home Ministry.10 Bayard refused Dinsmore's request, stating that such a move "might make it exceedingly difficult for your successor to conduct business of the legation." However, Bayard's primary opposition had to do with the thorny issue of Korean in-
dependence. "It is to be borne in mind," he wrote, "that this (U.S.) Government has been informed by the Imperial Government of China that they claim suzerainty over Korea and it certainly would be considered a disregard by the United States of the Chinese claim, if we consented to our representative leaving our service in order to assume the position of advisor to the Corean Government." This attitude would dominate America's official policy toward Korea up until the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895.

The American minister to Korea during the Sino-Japanese War was John M. B. Sill, who served in Seoul from 1894 to 1897. As such, Sill witnessed the Tonghak rebellion, the Chinese and Japanese intervention in Korea which that rebellion triggered, the implementation of the Japanese-sponsored Kabo reforms, and the murder of Queen Min by Japanese forces. As Japan's power over the peninsula continued to increase, Sill moved repeatedly to thwart Japanese aggression and preserve Korean independence. During the Sino-Japanese War Sill had strongly supported the offer of American "good offices" to help stop the fighting, an offer the Japanese refused to consider. Following Japan's victory in the war, Sill used the American legation to shelter Korean officials who had opposed the Japanese domination of their country.

When news of Sill's various activities reached Washington, President Grover Cleveland's secretary of state, Richard Olney, sent a direct order to the U.S. minister in Seoul: "Confine yourself strictly (to the) protection of American citizens and interest. You have no concern in internal (Korean) affairs."

However, Sill continued to follow his own policy in Korea. On January 10, 1896, an angry Olney admonished the minister: "Your course in continued intermingling with Korean political affairs in violation of repeated instructions (is) noted with astonishment and disapproval. Cable briefly any explanation you have to make, also answer whether you intend to comply with instructions given."

Clearly, officials in Washington were no more interested in confronting Japan over the issue of Korean independence than they had been in taking on the Chinese a decade earlier. Ultimately Sill was recalled by the McKinley administration which came to power in the spring of 1897, largely because of his continued opposition to Japanese policies in Korea.

The man who replaced Sill as America's minister to Korea was Horace N. Allen, the famed missionary. Allen would hold his post in Seoul until June 1905. On the controversial issue of Korean independence, Allen for the most part attempted to straddle the fence. On the one hand, he was careful not to antagonize his superiors in Washington, who clearly were in
no mood to accept direct American involvement in Korean affairs. At one point he went so far as to state that "I have all along held that Japan should have the paramount influence (in Korea)." Yet on the other hand, he confided in his own diary that "I told him (Kojong) that the United States was his friend and that we were the only people who could speak a strong and disinterested word for him." Whatever Allen’s diplomatic position, he had strong personal feelings toward the Korean people. When he was dumped by the Roosevelt administration in 1905, he convinced himself that one of the primary reasons for his dismissal was his support of Korean rights. And in truth, Theodore Roosevelt was paving the way for the demise of the Kingdom of Korea. Roosevelt’s own attitudes toward Korea are rather well known. For example, in January 1905 he remarked to his secretary of state, John Hay: "We cannot possibly interfere for the Koreans against Japan. They could not strike one blow in their own defence." “It would in fact be best for the Koreans if their country was absorbed into the Japanese empire.” Roosevelt’s attitude toward Korea became a political reality on November 17, 1905, when Japan forced Korean officials to sign the Protectorate Treaty, thus destroying Korean independence for four decades. Just one week later, on November 24, the American secretary of state, then Elihu Root, ordered the immediate withdrawal of the U.S. legation in Seoul. The United States, the first Western nation to sign a treaty with modern Korea, was also the first Western nation to close down its legation. A unique period in Korean-American relations had come to an end.

II

While narrating the events which occurred between 1882 and 1905, historians have also analyzed the forces that helped to bring about these events. In particular, historians of nineteenth-century Korean-American relations have often been forced to consider America’s possible “responsibility” for the loss of Korean independence. Had officials in Washington, with their “hands-off” Korean policy, played a critical role in the eventual destruction of the peninsular kingdom?

Early accounts of Korean-American relations written by trained historians do not seem to be overly critical of America’s official policy. One example would be a little known thesis written in 1934 by Mike Mansfield, currently America’s ambassador to Japan, entitled “American Diplomatic Relations with Korea, 1866-1910.” For the most part,
Mansfield applauded the policy of the State Department, while condemning the actions of individual Americans in Korea, like John Sill, who "seemed to forget that they might be raising issues for which the United States Government would be held responsible. Both Sill and the members of the American colony consistently refused to accept the fact that our government had no interest in the internal affairs of the kingdom." Mansfield took this position, not because he was anti-Korean, but because he felt that extensive American involvement in Korean affairs would have ultimately led the U.S. down the road of imperialism—a road which Mansfield whole-heartedly opposed, and one which he associated with the Great Powers of Europe.

Fred Harvey Harrington, in his path-breaking study of Horace N. Allen, also seemed to play down any major American responsibility for the "fall of Korea." Like many other historians, Dr. Harrington noted that a major reason for the Korean fall was the weakness of the kingdom itself. "The utter impotence, the hideous corruption of her government robbed [Koreans] of their patriotism, made it certain that Chosen would not resist attack, and constituted a standing invitation to foreign states to intervene." When an American diplomat such as Allen "fought China in Seoul [prior to 1894], he did not pave the way for Chosen's freedom. He merely helped to drive out one competitor and make way for another." Thus the American ministers in Seoul were actually playing into the hands of Japanese expansionists by pushing for Korean independence.

In a thesis completed in 1936 entitled "A Study of the Attitude of the United States toward Suzerainty and Independence in Korea," Harold J. Bass stated essentially the same point. "Not yet sufficiently enlightened and unified to maintain true independence," he wrote, "Korea fell prey to the contending intrigues of Japanese, Chinese and Russian diplomats. The country was too suddenly and too artificially torn from its ancient moorings and the result was pathetic." Bass did qualify his comments by stating: "If any criticism of America's policy in Korea may be justly made, it is this, that having encouraged an immature child to walk, the United States should have offered some definite maternal support instead of becoming disgusted with the child's bow-legged efforts."

Occasionally, an historian would find fault with a specific action taken by the State Department. Harold J. Noble, one of the first historians to specialize in Korean-American relations, had this to say about the dismissal of George Foulk in 1887: "Through no fault of his own he was withdrawn under circumstances which could be interpreted by his Korean friends and Chinese enemies only as that of official disgrace." On the other hand, to
balance this view, one may read Charles C. Tansill’s account, The Foreign Policy of Thomas F. Bayard. Tansill, a conservative isolationist prior to World War II, declared: “Foulk permitted his sentiment to cloud his judgment with reference to the strength of the Chosen dynasty. Some of his successors made the same mistake, and they were not supported by the American Government because American interests were too small to warrant military intervention. In Bayard’s time... it would have been the maddest type of folly to support a weak Korean dynasty against vastly superior armaments of nations that were close enough to Korea to have a vital stake in the fate of that kingdom.”

The outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 ushered in a new age of Korean-American relations. It also helped to inspire a renewed interest in the history of American activities in Korea, an interest that has continued down to the present day. One of the first studies to reflect this new interest was that of Philip L. Bridgham, completed in the fall of 1951. Influenced by America’s contemporary involvement in Korea, Bridgham criticized the State Department’s nineteenth-century Korean policy for being inconsistent and ambiguous. The United States during most of that period, according to Bridgham, failed to appreciate the obligations it had incurred by signing the 1882 treaty. When Theodore Roosevelt, in the name of power politics, ultimately supported the Japanese seizure of Korea, the president “sacrificed American ideals, facilitated Japanese expansion upon the Asiatic continent, and lulled the American public to complacency in the face of a formidable opponent whose policy of covert, piecemeal aggression would one day confront the United States with a deadly threat to her own national survival.”

Four years later, in a dissertation on the career of George Foulk, Robert E. Reordan echoed these same sentiments. Reordan also accused the U.S. government, and especially Secretary of State Bayard, of not living up to the commitments contained in the Shufeldt treaty. According to Reordan, “the dismissal of Foulk, signifying the abandonment of American support, was the turning point in Korea’s modern history, for it led to Chinese domination, thence directly to the Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese wars, to the absorption of Korea into the Japanese Empire, and to all the complex aftermath of those events.” In the final analysis, young George Foulk, “inexperienced and somewhat impetuous though he was, exhibited the qualities of a statesman to a greater degree than his distinguished superior in Washington, if statesmanship implies vision of the future and the consideration of more fundamental factors than immediate political expediency.”
As memories of the Korean War began to recede, other opinions of Washington’s policies were offered. In a study completed in 1965 at the University of Michigan, Jongskuk Chay wrote with reference to the period 1894-1905: “In view of the negligible amount of [U.S] interests, it should be declared that the American policy in Korea was a correct one.” After all, it was clear that “the Americans would lend a hand only if the Koreans would help themselves, and that the Koreans could not or would not do.” In 1970 Yong Suk Jung penned a study which attempted to explain the broad sweep of America’s interest in Korea from 1845 to 1950. In summarizing Korean-American relations up to 1905, Jung concluded that this period “was marked by [American] interest in Korea subordinate to that in Japan and China. No active American diplomacy could be expected in Korea under such conditions.” Only after 1945 would Korea be transformed from an area of “subordinate interest” to an area of “core interest” for the United States. Had the U.S. been able to develop serious commercial interests in Korea, perhaps the Americans would have been more willing to stand by an independent Korea. But with no such commercial interests appearing, “no political commitment could be expected from the American government.”

I think that current students of Korean-American diplomatic relations would tend to agree with Dr. Jung’s overall assessments. The broad scope of his study, the passage of time since the first historical events occurred, and the absence of any emotionalism or personal bias all serve to strengthen his interpretation. In the long run the State Department’s Korean policy had been correct; most of America’s ministers to Korea may have been well-intentioned, but they were unfortunately too close to the “action” to offer truly objective opinions of what policy the United States should pursue in East Asia.

III

With all of that being said, I would now like to offer my own opinion, one which in fact is designed to question the validity of America’s official Korean policy up to 1905. Traditionally, U.S. ministers in nineteenth-century Korea were accused of being too involved in day-to-day affairs in Seoul—too personally wrapped up in the plight of the Korean people—to appreciate and understand the larger picture. Yet I would argue that, precisely because they were in the field day in and day out, they often gained special insights into the peculiar problems and needs of the Korean peninsula. One of the tragedies for Korea—and for American diplomacy—
was that these firsthand observations generally had little impact on officials back in Washington who had already predetermined what America’s Korean policy should be.

Nor was this rift between diplomats in the field and policy makers in Washington confined to nineteenth-century Korean-American relations. There have been other occasions in American diplomatic history where a similar lack of communications has resulted in major misunderstandings. For instance, in the 1940s American specialists in China such as John Paton Davies, John Stewart Service, and John Carter Vincent attempted to inform Washington that the Chinese Communist Party had significant popular support within China. But Americans back home had already convinced themselves that Chiang Kai-shek and his Nationalist Party were the only legitimate rulers of China. Thus, Americans were ill-prepared to understand or accept the Communist victory of 1949. By ignoring the internal dynamics of the Chinese revolution, officials in Washington paved the way for a thirty-year split—“The Great Aberration,” as Warren Cohen calls it—in Sino-American diplomatic relations. This misunderstanding of the Chinese revolution also played an important role, at least in part, in America’s extensive and costly involvements in both the Korean War and the Vietnam War.

What, then, does all this signify about nineteenth-century Korean-American relations? In its most basic form, it means that officials in Washington generally paid little attention to the diplomatic reports coming out of Seoul. More specifically, it means that these officials made little attempt to develop or pursue policy options that would have been consistent with both the legal responsibilities and the spirit of the 1882 treaty. But were any such options available? It seems to me that one very strong possibility might have been the support of a neutralized, independent Korea. This in fact was a policy that several American representatives in Korea suggested between 1882 and 1905. Had the United States pursued such a policy in an energetic and imaginative diplomatic fashion—by creating a broad base of international support—Korea could have perhaps become a “Switzerland” of the East. Had that happened, Korea’s modern history certainly would have been far less catastrophic than it turned out to be. Even had such a policy ultimately failed due to the international rivalries in Northeast Asia, Korea’s historical image of America, and perhaps America’s image of itself, would have been brighter. As Robert Reordan put it, “Nations have long memories and do not easily recover a trust once destroyed. Like an individual, a government can make no greater mistake than provide the occasion for a charge of faithlessness.”
1. The treaty, of course, was informally named after Commodore Robert W. Shufeldt, the chief U.S. negotiator for the treaty. For copies of the treaty in both Chinese and English, see *KuHanmal choyak hwich'an* (Seoul: Kukhoe tosogwan, 1965), 26:294-305.


17. Horace N. Allen Diary, June 1, 1903, Horace N. Allen Papers, New York Public Library, New York City, N. Y.
19. This attitude on the part of Roosevelt ultimately led to the famous Taft-Katsura agreement of 1905, in which Roosevelt recognized Japan’s dominance in Korea in return for Japan’s recognition of American control over the Philippine Islands. See Jongsu Chay, “The Taft-Katsura Memorandum Reconsidered,” Pacific Historical Review 37 (August 1968): 321-326.
22. Fred Harvey Harrington, God, Mammon, and the Japanese, pp. 252, 247. A Korean contemporary of Allen’s once stated: “The office-seekers in Korea, both in and out, are almost all rotten to the core. The choice between any two men is not the choice between a rascal and an honest man but between a rascal who is for, and a rascal who is against you.” Yun Ch’i-ho, Yun Ch’i-ho ilgi, 6 vols. (Seoul: Kuksa p’yŏn’ch’an wiwŏnhoe, 1973-76), 6:19.
24. Harold J. Noble, “The United States and Sino-Korean Relations, 1885-1887,” p. 303; see also Noble’s “Korea and Her Relations with the United States before 1895” (Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, 1931).
27. Ibid., p. 160.
29. Ibid., p. 280. See also Yur-Bok Lee, Diplomatic Relations Between the United States and Korea, 1866-1887, pp. 179-186.
(Ph.D. dissertation, Claremont Graduate School and University Center, 1970), pp. 237-239. A revised version of this study has been published in Korea as: Chŏng Yong-sŏk (Yong Suk Jung), Miguk ūi Tae Han chŏngch’aek (Seoul: Ilchoga, 1979).


33. In the fall of 1886 Russia, Great Britain, and even Japan tended to support the idea of neutralizing the Korean peninsula. Unfortunately, China was unwilling at that time to go along with this suggestion, thus helping to stifle possible international cooperation. Needless to say, the United States did not take the lead in any of these discussions regarding neutralization.

34. Concerning the viability of neutrality for a small state such as Korea, see In K. Hwang, The Neutralized Unification of Korea (Cambridge, Mass.: Schenkman Publishing Company, Inc., 1980).

Paul-Georg von Moellendorff—Scholar and Statesman

by Walter Leifer

It is almost one hundred years ago that the first advisor to the Korean King, Kojong, arrived in Seoul, on December 13, 1882. His name was Paul-Georg von Moellendorff. When he came to Korea it was a time marked by nationalistic emotions on the part of the powers. The Romanticism of the early nineteenth century had taken a new turn. The world of the powers had moved from this early Romanticism with ideas of political duties and literary speculations to a world of confrontations.

The upsurge of nationalistic emotions with all the different shades that “imperialism”—the word had not yet the offensive meaning it took on after the First World War—has somewhat marred the image of Moellendorff, who was to participate in Far Eastern developments for three years from his eminent position in Korea. Friedrich von Schiller, one of Germany’s great poets, says of one of his heroes, Wallenstein, that his character and its evaluation is somewhat vacillating in history. A poet’s imagination may help to create a personality, but a historian’s duty is to discover reality by going back to vasic values, to impartiality and modesty. They are necessary when speaking about historical personalities, when discovering their works and elucidating their ideas.

Moellendorff’s arrival in the capital city on the Han River had drawn thousands of Koreans to the streets, who wanted to catch a glimpse of the first stranger from the Far West who was to hold high office in the residential city of the Yi-dynasty. He was granted his first audience in the royal palace only 13 days later, on December 26, 1882. After this ceremony he began his work immediately.

Before taking a closer look at Moellendorff’s activities in Korea I would like to introduce you to the man, his origins, his personal plans, and to the sensational circumstances that led to his tenure of an extraordinary position in the Hermit Kingdom.

Paul-Georg von Moellendorff belonged to that Brandenburg-Prussian class of lower aristocracy called the “Junker” who were loyal servants to Hohenzollern princes, electors, kings and emperors. They were always ready to support their sovereigns. This class existed all over Europe, but had taken on special characteristics throughout Brandenburg and Prussia. Their re-
sponsibilities and functions were similar to those of the yangban in Korea or the samurai in Japan. Whereas in East Asian soldier families respect for the territorial lords and the chief of a clan were the predominant motive for obedience, the Prussian Junker was led by his sense of duty in accepting service for the state or the military.

This past autumn a Moellendorff seminar conducted by historians dealt—among other questions—with the subject of how a member of the German Junker class was able to adapt himself to conditions governing a Confucian state. Personally, I think that for him it was quite easy to accept the spiritual attitudes and the atmosphere that surrounded Korea's king and his servants. But let's rather start with the beginning.

Paul-Georg von Moellendorff was born on February 17, 1847 in the Prussian province of Brandenburg. His family later moved to Görlitz in Silesia, where Paul-Georg and his brother Otto-Franz attended high school. In 1865 Paul-Georg von Moellendorff began his studies at the University of Halle on the Saale. He studied languages and law. After graduating, the young man, who had shown a keen interest in East-Asian culture and in the Chinese language, learned that Robert Hart, the director of the Customs Administration in imperial China, was looking for young Europeans to serve in that office. Moellendorff submitted his application and left his widowed mother and his brother and sisters on September 1st, 1869 to set out on his voyage to the Far East. It became an odyssey full of tragedies.

In China he was assigned to various places, such as the port city of Shanghai, the tea-trading port of Hankow, and the rising city of Kiukiang. All of these were located in the region of the mighty Yang-Tse Kiang.

Contrary to his expectations, his work in the office left him very little time for other activities. He had intended to translate texts from German lawbooks into Chinese, but found himself too occupied by his duties. The texts that he did translate were highly praised but he was too busy with the kind of work that normally took up his time. He therefore tried to find a new assignment. With the help of his brother Franz-Otto, who had just arrived from Germany to work with the German legation in Peking, he handed in an application for the newly-established German Foreign Service, called Deutscher Auswärtiger Dienst. In 1874 he was appointed as the interpreter of the German Consulate in Canton. After that he served in Shanghai, Macao, Peking, Tientsin and again in Shanghai.

In the meantime he and his brother had compiled their first book: *A Manual of Chinese Bibliography*. One year after the publication of this book, which has remained a valuable source of information to the present day, he went on home-leave in 1877 and brought back with him his wife,
Rosalie nee Holtzhausen, daughter of a protestant minister in Werden, whom he had married immediately after his arrival in Germany, and who would become his biographer.

After his return from Europe, Moellendorff was sent again to Tientsin. Here he met with Viceroy Li Hung Chang who was to influence his career most decisively. Li was the most prominent Chinese statesman of his time and, as Viceroy of Chihli, he was also responsible for Chinese relations with Korea. In Tientsin the German consulate interpreter very soon was on friendly terms with the Chinese statesman, who was his senior by 24 years. Now Moellendorff made another important decision. As the German legation in Peking had not taken into consideration any of Moellendorff’s professional aspirations, he resigned after long hesitation. This step proved to be the beginning of the short-lived height of his career. Moellendorff spent three years in Korea. He had arrived in December 1882 and returned to China in December 1885. From then on he lived in Ningpo near Shanghai, where he died in 1901.

This is only a brief outline of Paul-Georg von Moellendorff’s life. The short and brilliant period he spent in Korea as a statesman certainly was the climax of his career, despite the humiliation and setbacks he experienced at the end. In my opinion, however, Moellendorff’s character was above all marked by his enthusiasm for all of his duties, especially for academic research. Therefore I consider it my task to point out, at first, Moellendorff’s merits in this field.

Even as a student, Moellendorff had conducted linguistic research in a way that gives proof of the universality of linguistics in the 19th century. Above all, he admired Professor August Friedrich Pott who had taught general linguistics in Halle since 1839. This scholar dealt with a variety of linguistic subjects with great universality. As we known from Frau von Moellendorff’s biography of her husband, Pott was Moellendorff’s admired mentor. This universality in philological research as advocated by Professor Pott was handed down to his student von Moellendorff, 45 years his junior. Pott conducted etymological research within the Indo-Germanic language group and dealt with linguistic problems concerning the numerical method, Gipsy dialects, etc. In a similar way Moellendorff was active in the field of philology and worldwide etymology, and also wrote papers ranging from subjects like Pali (the language of Buddha) to Pehlevi (a Middle-Persian language spoken after the Achaemenid dynasty and before the onset of Islam against Iran).

On my visit to the Foundation for the Preservation of Prussian Cultural Property (Preussischer Kulturbesitz), where I examined
Moellendorff's remaining documents and manuscripts, I was especially looking for these unpublished papers. They were proof of Moellendorff's linguistic efforts concerning the Iranian and Northern Indian languages in the field of Indo-Germanic Studies. But Moellendorff also studied Hebrew, besides the classical languages of Europe like Ancient Greek and Latin. He was fluent in English and French, while he was able to read Italian, Spanish and Portuguese—which was nothing unusual for someone knowing Latin well. Later on he learnt Manchu, Korean and some Chinese dialects. Chinese, however, would become his special field of interest.

In the documents mentioned above I found manuscripts pertaining to many Sinological subjects, for instance a dictionary of Chinese radical words. This was planned to be the first volume of a collection of handbooks for the study of the Chinese language in 16 volumes. Unfortunately the dictionary has never been edited. In the same collection a "Practical Guide for Learning High-Chinese"—he meant Mandarin—was to be published. It was printed several times in Shanghai as an individual book.

Moellendorff wrote numerous papers on special philological questions, namely on method, various dialects, etymology, comparative philology, etc. For a certain period he served as the president of the Royal Asiatic Society, China Branch. One of the subjects he treated in a Royal Asiatic Society lecture was "On the Limitations of Comparative Philology". This lecture was impressive, and dealt with all fields of worldwide etymology.

Later on there was a discussion between Moellendorff and Dr. Joseph Edkins about a special etymological problem. Moellendorff had criticized a recently published paper in which Edkins had compared the roots of the Mongolian word "murun" or river, the Manchu "muke", the Korean "mul"—water, on the one hand—or with Latin "mare" and English "mere"—lake or pond, on the other hand. Moellendorff had refused to accept an etymological link between the Asian words and the European ones. This discussion at the end of the nineteenth century between a German-Chinese customs director and the British missionary and Sinologist was clear indication that this was still the age of etymology and comparative philology in the search for new linguistic discoveries. Only a few decades later there were not many traces left. Etymology as the once most rewarding field of philology was replaced by new scientific and logical methods now accepted as the highest form of linguistic research. Fortunately Moellendorff and his contemporary fellow scholars did not live to see this drastic change.

In another article published in the China Review (Vol. XXI, 1894, p. 141—146) Moellendorff wrote on the language of the Gilyaks. He located
this Siberian tribe between the Tunguses and the Samoyeds. Today a strong group of scholars say that this Arctic tribe is more closely related to the Ainu in Japan. Moellendorff’s statements, however, are said to be quite convincing.

Unfortunately, I cannot present you with more material published by the Royal Asiatic Society, China Branch. They could perhaps testify to his prolific work in Ningpo. Moellendorff’s abundant scholarly work also contains translations from Chinese, Japanese, and English. Nobody has ever taken the trouble to list Moellendorff’s contributions to various fields. So far, I myself may give the titles of books I found in some of the most important libraries:

_Essay on Manchu Literature_ (Journal of the RAS China Branch, New Series, Vol. XXIV, Shanghai 1890)

_The Family Law of the Chinese_, Shanghai 1890

_A Manchu Grammar_, Shanghai 1892

_Ningpo Colloquial Handbook_, ed. by G.W. Sheppard, Shanghai 1910

_Catalogue of Manchu Library_


_Die Juden in China_, 327 pages, o.O.

_Die Weltliteratur—eine Liste mit Einleitung_, Shanghai 1894

In the face of Moellendorff’s prolific work on languages, law and literature one can hardly understand that this man did not become one of the most outstanding scholars in a limited field of linguistics. But after making his choice to come to the Far East Moellendorff must have been aware that this demanded complete devotion to the tasks assigned to him. And totally devoted he really was!

Paul Georg von Moellendorff began his second Lebensaufgabe, another task of life, that of a statesman, on the abovementioned important day of his first audience with Korea’s King Kojong on December 26, 1882. He had arrived with great ideas, full of plans for his adopted country. There came now a time that allowed him to rise to the position of the most important and powerful personality in the period of Korea’s opening to foreign powers.

In a proper sense this opening took place only on May 19, 1883 when the American-Korean treaty concluded a year earlier, on May 22, 1882, was ratified. Moellendorff’s presence made itself felt for the first time on the day of the ratification of this treaty, which had been signed at the port of
Chemulpo (now part of the big city of Inchon) by the American Commodore Robert Wilson Shufeldt who, at first, wanted to expand trade in Korea with the help of the Japanese, but failed.

At the invitation of Li Hung-Chang, Shufeldt now negotiated with the Chinese. The discussions were held in Tientsin. One of the great problems was the status of Korea. To this Shufeldt Convention, as it first was called, or Chemulpo Treaty, was attached "A Despatch from the King of Korea to the President of the United States of America," in which the king said that his country was a tributary state to China, but independent in internal and also in foreign affairs. These two words "tributary" and "independent" expressed two different intellectual and political attitudes and situations for the American side, but Chinese and Koreans as children of the Sino-Asian cultural sphere could combine both terms. Also Western law has the possibility to harmonize the terms—suzerainty is the magic word. About these questions Moellendorff started a political treatise after O.N. Denny, his successor, had published a pamphlet entitled "China and Korea." The two small books are the first examples of a politco-scientific discussion about the status of Korea.

Another treaty with a foreign country existed already, namely the Japanese-Korean treaty of Kangwha, concluded on February 26, 1876. However, there had always been a Japanese settlement in Pusan since the Hideyoshi invasion of 1592 to 1598. Pusan, therefore, had served as a juncture between Nippon and Korea.

One of Moellendorff's first official acts had been to give orders that any future treaties had to be signed in Seoul. With this measure he intended to protect Korean diplomacy from the gunboats, and to give a new status to the capital, and to Korean foreign politics that were still in the infant stage and taking shape.

The first treaties that can really be attributed to Moellendorff were those with Great Britain and with Germany, both signed on November 16, 1883. Earlier treaties with Britain and Germany, signed on June 6 and June 30, 1882, were never ratified. Therefore, new treaties had to be drawn up in November of the next year. These November treaties were ratified in the British case on April 28, 1884, and in the German case on November 18, 1884.

One episode that took place after the conclusion of the Korean-German treaty may be amusing: Moellendorff asked the German representative, Consul General Zappe, whether it was possible to provide some entertainment, and to have the military band of the man-of-war "Leipzig" that brought Zappe to Chemulpo to perform in public. Zappe complied
with Moellendorff’s wish and the German band was the talk of the town. This was the first time that modern European music was played in Seoul. Korean scholars doing research on the last years of the Yi Dynasty say that the band’s performance was probably the reason for King Kojong (who at that time had adopted the title of Emperor) to invite the German musician Franz von Eckert to become Imperial Musikmeister. Von Eckert even composed a Korean national Anthem, even though it was played for a few weeks only, because it was too difficult.

The next two treaties brought about with Moellendorff’s help were the Korean-Italian treaty of June 26, 1884, and the Korean-Russian treaty of June 25, 1884. This treaty with Russia was looked upon with a lot of suspicion by some members of the Diplomatic Corps. Especially the Japanese and British criticized it.

The Americans in Seoul watched the situation. So did the Germans. The French were not yet represented in Korea, though eventually they built up an Indochinese Empire between Cochin China and Tongking. The Annam Crisis, when at first Cochin China became a French colony, later on Tongking was occupied, and Annam changed status to a French protectorate, was a hard blow against the old Chinese order in East Asia, in the Sino-Asiatic world. At the same period the Ryu Kyu Islands became part of Japan, while Siam, today Thailand, found more and more its own identity, and Laos—in Chinese Nan-chang—was protected by Western treaties as a state of its own. Sula was occupied by Spanish soldiers to become part of the Philippines, and Burma became a colonial country eventually, British India holding a protective hand over this Buddhist country.

All these countries mentioned, including Korea, belonged up to the second half of the 19th century to the Shu-pang, the nations or countries dependent on China. They belonged to the family of the Celestial Empire. Membership was the defined by voluntary linkage to China and its capital, not by acts, not by treaties. It is therefore not surprising that all the vital affairs of these countries were handled by the Chinese Department of Rites. Proper conduct in the true Confucian way was more important than bilateral political relations at that time.

There were also certain rules for the missions bearing tribute and congratulatory messages to China: Korea had to submit these gifts four times a year, the Ryukyus every other year, Siam every three, Annam once in four, Sula every five and Laos and also Burma every ten years. One has to look at all these countries to understand what it meant when the glacis of China was broken up, was disrupted. I take the liberty to use the notion glacis more in the politco-cultural sense. Moellendorff knew that this world
was in danger, attacked more and more under the slogan of progress and reform.

It should be mentioned here that during the period of about two years when Moellendorff was the strongman behind Korean foreign politics, one treaty was ratified and four other bilateral treaties were signed and ratified. This means that in Moellendorff’s time diplomatic relations were established with five countries. In the twenty years following that found Korea free to take decisions in foreign politics—that is from the end of the year 1885 to November 17, 1905, when Japan made Korea agree to the Convention for Transfer of Korean Foreign Relations to Japan—Korea concluded only four new treaties, and opened diplomatic relations with the following countries:

- with France (June 4, 1886)
- with Austria, Hungary (July 23, 1892)
- with Belgium (May 23, 1901)
- and with Denmark (June 15, 1902).

If one is objective, one must admit that a lot of diplomatic work for Korea was achieved during Moellendorff’s stay in the country.

Moellendorff was trusted by King Kojong, who was a well-meaning if rather weak personality, which would become a major problem for Moellendorff. King Kojong had made Moellendorff vice minister of foreign affairs—a position that made him responsible for organizing and managing one of the most important Korean offices. The fact alone that the Korean King commissioned him to act in his name was enough to arouse jealousy in others. Moreover, Moellendorff was in charge of another important post. Even before his arrival in Korea he had been appointed inspector general of the Marine Customs Department.

To make matters worse, he became the director of the national mint office on March 14, 1884. For a short time he was also vice minister in the Office of Labor (from April 24 to June 13, 1884) and vice minister of defense (from December 15, 1884 to February 6, 1885). These nominations certainly were an expression of King Kojong’s special trust in Moellendorff, and at the same time they were the highlight of his career as a royal adviser and statesman. One cannot say that he was overburdened by the variety of tasks. In a way, he was a titanic figure who accepted and accomplished the tasks assigned to him.

One must not forget, however, that Korea in those days had been a hermit kingdom for centuries that did not—and could not—muster the personnel necessary to play an equal part in the power ploys of those days. The King—who respected and esteemed Moellendorff, and therefore
endowed him with an amount of power that nobody had ever been entrusted with before in Korea—needed a man whom he could also completely trust. Moellendorff was charged with such delicate missions as to ask China for credit, or to get into contact with people who might be willing to help build a modern Korea. Thus, Moellendorff inspected silk spinning factories in China during a brief visit there, and was briefed on their methods. He ordered 100,000 winter-resisting mulberry trees in China and had them shipped to Korea in order to improve silk production. He contacted the firm Jardine Matheson for opening of a regular shipping line between Shanghai or Tientsin and Chemulpo. At the same time he discussed with them about general trade relations, and even about mining concessions. He also tried to get Korea connected to the international cable network, held discussions with specialists on reforestation, and with physicians who wanted to come to Korea to introduce modern medicine and hospitals to the former hermit kingdom. When during a party in the newly-opened Post Office the Kapsin Rebellion broke out when the so-called reformers tried to take over the government and officials were attacked and killed, Moellendorff bandaged the first victim, Min Yong-Ik, and sent for the American missionary, Dr. Allen, asking him to take this opportunity to practice medicine, which he had not done so far in Korea.

It can be read in the annals of Yonsei University’s Medical Center that modern medicine in Korea started exactly on that date at 10 p.m., when the party given by Hong Yong-Sik, the minister in charge of postal affairs, was almost over. Almost all the erratic reports about the incident contain Moellendorff’s name as one who kept cool and did what was necessary at the time.

Apart from his daily routine, Moellendorff contributed to Korea’s modernization in many different ways. Moellendorff, for example, invited Professor Dr. Gottsche of the University of Kiel to come to Korea. He was a geologist and was to do research for the Korean government. In the beginning of one of his travel accounts he notes: “Thanks to the kindness of our compatriot Mr. P.G. von Moellendorff who officially served as under-secretary of state in the Foreign Office, but whose real influence surpassed his position by far, I had the opportunity to travel a lot on this noteworthy peninsula. After a brief visit to Korea I came back for another stay of 8 months in the following year which unfortunately was cut short by the Japanese uprising (vulgo ‘rebellion’) on December 4, 1884.”

Apart from research, Moellendorff also felt responsible for transmitting Western technical know-how (to use a modern term) to young Koreans. Although Moellendorff must have felt pretty soon the jealousy,
suspicions and egoistic motives of people surrounding him, he tried to overlook them. His aim was cooperation, much in the same way as modern assistance to developing countries is understood today. So he employed harbor-masters and tax and customs commissioners for the ports, like the German captain Schulz and the Englishman Stripling. He also employed a specialist for silkworm raising, a mint-master and a coining specialist, manufacturers of glass, ceramics and porcelain—to revive old techniques that had been lost due to the Hideyoshi invasion in 1598.

Moellendorff also thought about the writing system that might be best for Korea. He came from the country of Gutenberg and was now living in the country of King Sejong. Reading should be the common aim. Maybe that was why he was strongly in favor of using the Korean alphabet Hangul. It is remarkable in a way that Moellendorff as a Sinologist wanted to admit Chinese characters only for scientific research. In his plans for general education, dating back to early 1883 and published later in revised form, Moellendorff intended to established about 800 elementary schools, 24 middle schools and one educational institution on the university level each for sciences, languages and crafts. These plans were based on total population of 10 million.

According to Moellendorff’s universal plan for education, the English department of the Language School was founded first, in September 1883. After Moellendorff had left, matters slowed down and the newly-founded departments were considered as foundations by the respective nations. This can partly be understood, considering the political pressure that Korea had to sustain. On various occasions, however, endeavors were made to implement Moellendorff’s plans.

These plans fully showed Moellendorff’s potential as a scholar and a statesman. Martina Deuchler, historian at the University of Zurich, introduced Moellendorff’s efforts for the introduction of modern languages in Korea with the following statement: “Driven by his determination to accelerate Korea’s entry in the modern age, Moellendorff also ventured into the field of education.” The years 1883/84 also climaxed Moellendorff’s activities in Korea. As mentioned above, a treaty with Russia was concluded in 1884. This, however, brought animosity from certain foreign representatives, and the Chinese felt betrayed. Moellendorff was temporarily dismissed from his post as vice-minister of foreign affairs. He was ordered to come to Tientsin to report to Li Hung Chang, and stayed there for over one month. After his return to Korea, he proceeded with his many other tasks. Li Hung Chang himself seemed satisfied with Moellendorff’s explanations. They seem to have had a frank discussion of the geopolitical situation in
East Asia.

Moellendorff was remembered as a specialist on foreign policy when there was need to solve the problems of the abovementioned Kapsin Rebellion. It was Moellendorff who urged the Korean government to seek reconciliation, and he was sent over to Japan with a small delegation. The governments of Korea, China and Japan had asked Moellendorff to come to Tokyo to mediate. His aim always had been that political harmony might unite the three countries. But immediately the picture changed. It was during this stay there that the Russians asked for a consultation with him. Moellendorff granted it, and rumors had it that he had concluded a secret treaty with them. This was the beginning of his downfall.

Things got worse when parts of the British Far Eastern fleet occupied Komun-Do (the Hamilton Islands) without prior notice. Many foreign representatives beseeched the King to dismiss Moellendorff. Moellendorff’s career ended, although he had been successful in Tokyo in coming to a compromise between China, Korea and Japan. He had been Korea’s strongman for two years. At the end of 1885 Moellendorff returned home—to China, that is. He was well received, even by Li Hung Chang, who tried in vain to send him back to Korea in 1888.

Moellendorff was an unselfish and critical scholar and statesman. His activities were meant to strengthen Korea’s independent position in a balanced Far East. His political game was always connected with the problem of security. His actions were never motivated by activism for its own sake, yet he was persistent in his endeavors. He was struggling alone, pressed against the wall. When he finished his work, he had lost. Had he really lost?

When his mysterious death in Ningpo (there were rumors about poison) became known in Korea there was a thoughtful and reflective obituary. I quote only some characteristic remarks here. The American editor H.B. Hulbert wrote in the June 1901 edition of the Korean Review: “The year 1883 which marked the height of von Moellendorff’s power in Korea witnessed more advance in Korea than any other either before nor after . . . .

“The Government needed ten men all as strong as von Moellendorff in these multifarious works, but it had—one. . . .

“The foreign Representatives desired to deal more directly with the Korean government. . . .

“The Koreans got the notion that he was working in the interest of Russia. Such a report, however unfounded, could not but prove detrimental to his influence among Koreans. . . .

“That much of that work was highly beneficial to Korea is as true as that
the extremely broad field he endeavored to cover made it impossible to achieve success in every part..."13

To sum up Moellendorff's importance for Korea, let me repeat one of these statements: "The Government needed ten men as strong as von Moellendorff in these multifarious works, but it had—one."

BIBLIOGRAPHY

5. Moellendorff was elected President of the Royal Asiatic Society, China Branch, in 1896 and again in 1897. He had formerly been a Vice-President for a number of years.
6. Read at the meeting of the Royal Asiatic Society—China Branch, Jan. 19, 1897.
8. R. von Moellendorff, p. 66.
10. R. von Moellendorff, pp. 103-104.
The First Century in the Development of Korean Advertising

by In Sup Shin

The history of modern Korean advertising is actually a bit less than 100 years because the first advertisement appeared in the *Hansŏng Chubō*, a government gazette in 1886.

The development of Korean advertising can be broken down into five periods:

1886-1900, an early developing stage for modern Korean advertising, which lasted until Korea was annexed by Japan in 1910.

1910-1920, a decade that may be called a dark age because all Korean-language newspapers were shut down except for one, the government organ. The fate of Korean advertising was not any better.

1910-1945, the colonial period. Japanese colonial policy switched to what was called the "cultural" policy after the March 1st uprising of 1919. Two Korean-language newspapers, the *Chosun Ilbo* and the *Dong-A Ilbo*, were permitted to publish from 1920. These two newspapers, however, had to close in 1940, leaving only the Korean-language government organ until World War II ended.

1945-1968, the Korean liberation and resumption of advertising in the Korean language.

1968 to the present, a period of internationalization for the Korean advertising business.

Let us look at all five in turn to see what characterized them.

Research by Professor Lee Kwang-rin, a noted scholar on modern Korean history and the vice-president of Sogang University, and another study by Professor Yoo Jae-chun, Chairman of the Mass Communication Department of Sogang University, proved that the advertisement placed by Edward Meyer & Company, known as the Sechang Yanghaeng in Korean, a German trading firm active in Korea, was indeed the first modern Korean advertisement. This ad, appearing on the 15th and 16th pages of the *Hansŏng Chubō* on February 22, 1886, was entirely in Chinese characters. It was a straight statement of what Edward Meyer & Company imported to and exported from Korea. Among the goods it wanted to buy in Korea were such items as animal skins, horns and old coins. The company imported and sold clothing, dyes, matches, lamps and wire among others.
To be literally correct, this was not a Korean ad. Written in Chinese characters and placed by a foreign company, it was an international ad even though the publication itself was Korean. No further research was done as to how much it cost the advertiser, who wrote the copy, what the rate was, why the government organ accepted the ad, etc. These things would require further study.

Korea’s first modern ad: Hansŏng Chubo, Feb. 22, 1886

As for terminology, it seems to me that the term “advertisement,” as we use it today, was not generally used. Edward Meyer’s ad can be translated as “announcement” rather than advertisement. Following the German trader’s ad, some Japanese and Chinese advertised in this government gazette.

It took another 10 years for Korean advertising to really take off from its infancy. Dr. Philip Jaisohn, a Korean-born medical doctor who had become a U.S. citizen, returned to Korea and established the newspaper called *The Independent* in 1896. This was the first commercial newspaper, published three times a week. It was a bilingual paper of four pages per issue. Its Korean name was *Tongnip Shinmun*. His first issue was published on April 7, 1896, with three of its four pages in Korean and one in English. Page three of the first issue carried a few ads in English and Korean. In the following year the newspaper split into two
separate publications—one in Korean and the other in English. The size of The Independent changed from 1896 to 1897, but it was about 10½" by 16", or slightly larger than the tabloid papers of today.

The Korean version did not carry many ads, but the English version is full of ads both on the front and back pages. In its January 5, 1897 issue, the publisher had the following to say:

"The Independent is the only English newspaper in Korea and, having unique opportunities for obtaining reliable news, it offers the public fairly accurate information on all Korean topics. It has correspondents in the various ports and proposes to represent not only Seoul but all Korea in
its columns.
We solicit for it the same generous patronage which it has enjoyed in the past and on our part we engage to do our utmost to represent Korea fairly, impartially and sympathetically. As an advertising medium, of course, The Independent offers unsurpassed opportunities to those who wish to secure a share of the rapidly growing Korean trade. The advertising rates are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ad Size</th>
<th>Cost</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>One column per year</td>
<td>$125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Half column per year</td>
<td>$ 80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/3 column per year</td>
<td>$ 50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/4 column per year</td>
<td>$ 30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Space on the front page 10 per cent extra."

If they had had an advertising copywriters' club in those days, they could well have given Dr. Jaisohn an award for coming up with such powerful copy to sell not only his paper but also his advertising space. Some of his ads can be seen in the Korean Repository issues for 1897. Besides The Independent, there were a number of newspapers at the turn of the century. The Independent eventually had to close in 1899.

Since Dr. Jaisohn was so respected and April 7, the day when his newspaper was first published, is still commemorated as the Newspaper Day in Korea, we may explain a little more about him.

Dr. Jaisohn, or Suh Jae Pil in Korean, was born on January 7, 1864 in Nonsan where an army recruit training center is now located. He passed the Kwago, Korea's national examination to become a civil servant, in 1882 at the age of 18. Instead of becoming a civil servant, he switched to the military and was selected to take Japanese military training in Toyama, Japan. He went to the language institute at Keio University for six months from May 1883. He did not complete the military training as planned, but had to return to Korea in July 1884. In December of the same year, he participated in the so-called Three-Day Coup, which failed in three days. Jaisohn took refuge at the Japanese Legation and escaped to the United States in April 1885. Tragedy befell his family when the coup failed. His parents, wife, brother and sister-in-law were either killed or took poison as the family of a traitor.

In September of 1886, he entered the Harry Hilman Academy, graduating in June 1889. Four years later, he graduated from the Columbia Medical College, the present George Washington University. Jaisohn became an assistant professor of that college. He also married the daughter of a Colonel Armstrong in June 1894.
Now a medical doctor in America, Jaisohn had no intention whatsoever of returning to Korea. However, history took an ironic turn and a new progressive government was established in Korea in 1894, 10 years after the coup. The new prime minister urged him to return and eventually Dr. Jaisohn, a U.S. citizen, accepted the offer and came back to Seoul in December 1895 at the age of 32.

During his turbulent three-and-one-half-year stay in Korea, he not only established *The Independent* but also erected the Independence Gate which now stands near Sōdaemun intersection. He died in the U.S. in 1951.

Another bi-lingual newspaper that warrants mention here is *The Korea Daily News*, established in 1904, which lasted until 1910 when Japan annexed Korea. The publisher was a Britisher named Ernest T. Bethell, who eventually died in Korea. The six-page-per-issue daily paper had two pages of editorial matter in Korean and another page and a half in English. The remaining two pages were advertisements. Just like *The Independent*, *The Korea Daily News* became two newspapers—one in Korean and the other in English—and later expanded into a third newspaper, a daily published in Hangul, the Korean alphabet.

According to what it published under the mast head of the English title, the advertising rates in the bi-lingual *Korea Daily News* in 1904 were as follows:

- 50 yen per day per column inch
- 5 yen per month per column inch
- 50 yen per year per column inch

However, there were generally no published advertising rates for Korean papers, probably because not many Koreans knew what advertisements meant then. Nevertheless, Bethell’s Korean version carried the following notice in every issue until the newspaper expanded into a separate Korean version in August 1905: "Advertising rates are subject to the length of period and the number of lines. However, they are very reasonable. It will not be very long before Koreans start to read this newspaper. If you wish to advertise, please come to this newspaper for an appointment."

The advertising rates were published in Korean when the paper became two separate versions in August 1905. As an example, the daily insertion rate for a column/inch was 25 sen in Japanese currency, or around a quarter of a dollar. The size of the newspaper was around 8½" wide and a little over 13" from top to bottom, divided into six horizontal columns in the Korean version.
By 1910, there were so many ads that over 50% of the total space per issue was taken up by advertisements, predominantly of pharmaceutical products, books and schools. In addition to the advertisements, the mail-order business was also introduced. By 1910, advertising had so prospered that an advertising agency handling ads for newspapers and magazines advertised its services in the newspaper.

As advertising increased, so did the criticism of this business. But, all in all, the 15 years from 1886 to 1910 saw tremendous development not only in the volume but also in the sophistication of early advertising in Korea. The business seems to have settled in as a part of life. Of course, there were a few other newspapers published in Seoul. At any rate, Western advertising practices prevailed as far as the rate structure is concerned.

In August 1910, Korea experienced what it calls the National Humiliation Day, the annexation of Korea by Japan. General Terauchi, the first Japanese governor-general, imposed a stringent military dictatorship and all Korean-language dailies with a single exception were shut down. Korean advertising fared no better as it lost the largest and most influential advertising media published in its own language. A dark age settled over Korean advertising.

Following the nationwide uprising against the Japanese colonial rule in 1919, Japan switched to what is called the cultural policy. Two Korean-language newspapers were given permission to publish in Seoul—the Chosun Ilbo and the Dong-A Ilbo—which naturally became media for advertising. Not only the rate structure but also all the advertising practices became Japanese style. There was no volume or frequency discount such as had prevailed in the pre-annexation period. Each advertiser had its secretly arranged rate with the media, and this became an accepted practice. Dentsu, the Japanese advertising agency, started to show its power on the Korean media scene.

By 1925, Japanese advertisements exceeded 50% of the total space of these two vernacular dailies, reaching around 65% by 1935. Reliance on Japanese advertisements became so important that the newspapers established their respective branches in both Osaka and Tokyo. Advertising revenue varied from 31% to 45% of the total income of the Dong-A Ilbo between 1920 and 1940. In terms of types of advertisements, and taking 1927 as an example, pharmaceutical products represented around 17%, followed by 16% for cosmetics, 9% for foods, 8% for miscellaneous products, 7% for machines and 5% for books and garments respectively.

Classified ads were introduced in 1921. A media-sponsored advertising
contest was held for the first time in 1926. A seminar on advertising was held in 1937. Naturally, the lecturers were all Japanese. What amounts to a design contest was held in 1938. No study on advertising per se was available back then, although the Chosun Ilbo carried a series of articles on the Introduction of Advertising in 1932.

In 1940, the two Korean-language dailies were forced to shut down upon “advice” by the authorities, leaving only Japanese-language newspapers and one Korean daily, the government organ.

Advertising under Japanese colonial rule between 1910 and 1945 did, however, prosper in Korea. The Dong-A Ilbo alone had an annual advertising revenue of around ¥250,000 by the 1930s. There were hosts of Japanese-language dailies also published in Korea then. It would be a fair guess that the total advertising volume in Korea reached a few million Japanese yen by the mid-30s. However, no serious study of advertising in colonial Korea has been made. The only formal education in advertising seems to have been given at commercial high schools where commercial art was taught. Other than that, there was no formal advertising education in Korea. No Korean seemed to care about advertising as a serious subject to study in pre-war Korea. There was not one single book published
in Korean on advertising, as far as my own research indicates.

Korea was liberated in 1945, but the economy after four years of war was in a sad state. In addition, Korea was divided, and the Korean War broke out in 1950, lasting until 1953. There was nothing much to advertise in the period right after the Korean War. It was not until the mid-50s that the newspapers published four pages per issue.

On August 11, 1957, an advertising supplement was published in the New York Times with President Syngman Rhee on the cover. The first of its kind, it was followed by a dozen or more up to the late 1970’s. Korean businesses bought ads and the government information office provided editorial text. Though marked “Advertisement” in small letters, the supplements were intended to be read as “news” by unwary readers.

In 1957, Korea saw the birth of a commercial television station and, along with it, television commercials, although they were slides. The
station was better known as RCA-TV because all its equipment and assistance came from RCA. The station caught fire and burned down two years later.

Commercial radio came into being in 1959. The electronic age had begun in Korea by the mid-60s. KBS-TV, which started to accept commercials in 1961, discontinued advertising in 1969 when MBC-TV was born. Of course, there were TBC-TV and radio. There were a couple other commercial radio stations, too.

In addition to these changes in media, other significant developments had occurred in Korea. The two soft drink giants, Coke and Pepsi, found their way into Korea in 1969. With them, Korea saw the coming of such sophisticated marketing tools as route sales and advertising campaigns per se, utilizing the services of advertising agencies and research.

Caltex Petroleum Corporation formed a joint venture with the Lucky Group to establish the Honam Oil Refinery Company and started to produce petroleum products in 1969. The monopoly by the Korea Oil Corporation was ended by this move, and the fight for market shares developed. Union Oil, of course, joined later to intensify the competition. Advertising flourishes on competition. The birth of Manbosa, the advertising agency in 1969 is directly attributable to the market entry by
Coke. Impact, established by Karl Bruce in the early 60's, provided agency services to the Korea Oil Corporation after the market entry by Caltex. Impact was later bought out by MBC-TV/radio, eventually to become the present Union Advertising Agency.

The International Advertising Association, the only international organization of such nature, established its Korea Chapter in 1968 largely through the efforts of John C. Stickler. Nine advertising people from Korea formed a delegation to participate in the Asian Advertising Congress in Kuala Lumpur and Singapore in 1968. ACC, the Japanese television and radio commercial festival, had its presentation of award-winners in Seoul in 1968. The World Congress of IAA took place in Tokyo in 1969 and a dozen or so Korean advertising people had a chance to attend the international convention. Hapdong Advertising, an advertising journal, was born in 1969, although it did not last long.

The Seoul-Inchon Expressway, originally named the Apollo Highway in commemoration of the landing on the moon, provided a golden location for billboards since its completion in 1970. Clio, the American-based and world-renowned commercial festival, had its presentation of
awards in Seoul for the first time the same year. ABC, which in this case stands for “Audit Bureau of Circulations,” formed a study group and conducted a media survey here in 1968 and 1970. Until then, nobody had ever dared ask the circulation figures of newspapers. ABC, however did not succeed. Hapdong Advertising, a bureau under the old Hapdong Press, conducted a survey on the advertising volume in Korea for the first time and the results were published in the IAA-sponsored “World Advertising Expenditures” in 1968. Nobody outside Korea knew what the advertising expenditures of this country really were until the survey was published. The advertising expenditures survey is now an accepted industry practice here.

The Korea Advertising Association was formed in 1971. In short,
developments since 1968/1969 clearly show a drastic change in Korean advertising, and I have called it an era of internationalization.

Let me briefly review developments thereafter. Two large agencies, Korea First and Union, were established in 1973 and 1974 respectively. The Maeil Economic Daily established the Man of the Year Award for the advertising industry in 1974. The first subway line in Seoul was completed in 1974, providing another important advertising medium. A monitoring service for television commercials was established in 1975.

Those of you who have been in Seoul during the Christmas season in 1974 will recall what happens to a newspaper when it does not have advertisements. The Dong-A Ilbo, an evening daily established in 1920, was without regular commercial advertisements due, it was claimed, to an undercover government boycott. Instead, its advertising space was full of small ads which sounded like political slogans, paid for by sympathetic readers from all walks of life.

The World Advertising Exhibition was sponsored by the Joong-Ang Daily in 1975. The Seoul Copywriters’ Club was formed in 1976. International advertisements placed by Korean corporations started to increase.

A monthly magazine, The Deep-Rooted Tree, placed this ad with the controversial headline, "Why Should Women Be Treated as Equals?"
from 1978 to reach a level close to $10 million in 1981.

Major mergers and reshuffling of mass media took place in December 1980. Korean TV broadcasting has been in color only since 1981 and commercials went to color at that time. The Korean government in 1981 established the Korea Broadcasting Advertising Corporation (KOBACO), which is the central clearing house for all the commercials. KOBACO is empowered to recognize agency commission for TV and radio. It also previews all the television commercials.

KBS-TV 1 now has what is called the block system of airing commercials, while KBS-TV 2 and MBC both have a system similar to that of the U.S. and Japan.

Current advertising expenditures in Korea stand at around $450 million, which makes it the second among all Asian countries as far as advertising expenditures are concerned.

What does the future of Korean advertising hold? I personally feel it will continue to grow in volume and creative sophistication. Advertising as a percent of GNP will probably reach around one percent within the next few years. This figure currently stands at 0.77%. By around 1986, the expenditures will reach one billion U.S. dollars. Creativity has made significant progress within a relatively short period of time. This is an indication of how fast Koreans can learn to create better advertising.
Advertising in Korea, of course, is not without problems. The foremost is what I call internationalization or modernization. There are some practices that remain from pre-war days. Newspaper rate structures are one such example. Lack of honest statements of circulation figures by publishers is another. The only audited circulation is of *The Readers' Digest*, Korea edition. It is a member of British ABC. Internationalization is needed in every facet of the industry, including the government agencies which make decisions related to advertising. The agency commission for TV and radio will gradually have to be increased to reach the internationally prevailing rate of 15%.

Another problem area is the lack of correct recognition of advertising and its role in the whole marketing process by people in management, especially in its relations with mass media.

As the old saying goes, “Where there is a problem there is a solution” —and I believe the problems the Korean advertising industry faces will be eventually solved, as we see from past history.
Annual Report of the Korea Branch
of the Royal Asiatic Society for 1982

The Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland was established by King George IV in 1824 for "the purpose of investigation of subjects connected with or for the encouragement of science, literature and arts in relation to Asia." The Korea Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society was founded on June 16, 1900 by a small group of foreigners who were concerned with the promotion of scholarly investigation of Korea and her neighbors.

The Korea Branch has continued over the years to sponsor lecture meetings, tours, film showings and publications in support of its objectives. The size of the membership has consistently grown from its initial 17 members in 1900 to over 1,500 in 1982, meeting regularly in Taegu as well as Seoul. Organizational meetings have been held during the year in Pusan and Kwangju as well and it is expected that active chapters will shortly be constituted in those cities.

The membership increased this year from a total of 1486 members in January to a total of 1591 as of the end of November. This included 61 life members, 459 overseas members and 1,071 regular members residing in Korea.

During the year the Society has sponsored 20 meetings in Seoul and 10 meetings in Taegu. The largest turnout was about 320 at Ambassador Richard Walker’s lecture on April 28.

In 1982, 1,948 persons participated in R.A.S. tours to sites of historic and cultural importance. Eight of these tours were of more than one-day duration. The annual garden party was held June 12 at the residence of the American ambassador with an estimated 320 in attendance.

During the year, the Korea Branch published Volume 56 of the Transactions for 1981. The following titles were reprinted to accommodate continuing demands: Taegu Guide, I Married a Korean, Korea's 1884 Incident, History of the Korean People, and Korean Political Tradition and Law.

Because of increased book sales and the continuing growth of the membership, the Society’s finances are in a healthy state.
## Seoul Programs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Attendance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>January 13</td>
<td>The Korea of 1900 (Dr. Honrace G. Underwood)</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 27</td>
<td>Fact into Fiction: How One Writer Does It (Mr. Richard E. Kim)</td>
<td>170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 10</td>
<td>Tibet: 1981 (Ms. Lori Clause)</td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 24</td>
<td>The Hyun Chong Non: A Buddhist Response to Neo-Confucian Critiques (Mr. John Goulde)</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 10</td>
<td>Mu-ka: The Ritual Songs of the Korean Shamans (Mr. Alan Heyman)</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 24</td>
<td>Paul-Georg Moellendorf: Scholar and Statesman (Mr. Walter Leifer)</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 14</td>
<td>Development of Korean Advertising over the Past 100 Years (Mr. Shin In-sup)</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 28</td>
<td>Changing Patterns in American Diplomacy: Implications for Korean-American Relations (Amb. Richard L. Walker)</td>
<td>320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 12</td>
<td>Korean Perception of America (Dr. Hahm Pyong-Choon)</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 26</td>
<td>Underwater Sojourn—A Fleeting Look (Capt. A. G. Sandy Amacher)</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 9</td>
<td>Aspects of Korean Folk Art: Based on the Collection of the Smithsonian Institution (Dr. Evelyn McCune)</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 23</td>
<td>A Naturalist in India (Mr. Terry Mills)</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 28</td>
<td>Film Showing of &quot;The Story of the Double Red Gates&quot; (Korea Motion Picture Promotion Corp.)</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 25</td>
<td>Traditional Royal Court Dance</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 8</td>
<td>Traditional Economy Under Pressure: The Late Yi Dynasty Economy and the Opening of Overseas Trade (Dr. Tony Michell)</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
September 22  Power from Our Afflictions: Korean Women and Infertility
(Dr. Soon Young Yoon)  100

October 6  Film Showing of “The Story of a Shaman”
(Korea Motion Picture Promotion Corp.)  50

October 13  Premiere Showing of Dr. Ryland Hill’s Two Films on Korea (16 mm)
A) Village & Farm (45 min.)
B) Palace & Pageant (45 min.)  150

October 27  American Missionaries and 100 Years of Korean Protestantism
(Dr. David Kwang-sun Suh)  80

November 10  Squaring the Circle: Confessions of a Translator
(Dr. Edward W. Poitras)  90

November 24  Psychiatric Treatment in Korean Culture
(Dr. Sang-chan Paek, MD, Ph.D.)  85

December 8  A Western Painter Meets Korean Painting:
The Spoken and the Unspoken in Pictures
(Mr. William Simpson)  100

1982 Tours

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Place</th>
<th>Participants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>February 6</td>
<td>Yong P’yŏng Ski Tour</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 27</td>
<td>Kyŏnghyang Restaurant &amp; Insa-dong</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 3-5</td>
<td>Cheju-do</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 10</td>
<td>Kiln</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 17</td>
<td>Kanghwa-do</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 18</td>
<td>Yŏngwŏl</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 24</td>
<td>Kingdom of Paikjae</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 25</td>
<td>Naksŏnjae and Piwŏn</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 1</td>
<td>Emille Museum and Pŏpchusa on Buddha’s Birthday</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 8</td>
<td>North Han River Valley</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 15-16</td>
<td>Kŭmyŏng-sa in Kyŏngsang-do</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 22</td>
<td>Inch’ŏn</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 29-30</td>
<td>Keryongsan</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 5</td>
<td>Yi Dynasty Architecture in Seoul</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 12</td>
<td>Garden Party (U.S. Embassy)</td>
<td>320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 19</td>
<td>Sudŏk-sa, Haemi and Hongsong</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Activity</td>
<td>Cost</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 26-27</td>
<td>Kangnūng during Tano Festival</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 31-Aug. 1</td>
<td>Ch’ōllip’o</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 5</td>
<td>Ch’ōng-P’yŏng</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 3-6</td>
<td>Wando (Island)</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 11</td>
<td>Silk Tour</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 18</td>
<td>Kangwha-do</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 25</td>
<td>Museum Tour</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 26</td>
<td>Temples North of Seoul</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct. 3</td>
<td>Mami-san</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct. 9</td>
<td>Yōju and King Sejong’s Tomb</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct. 16</td>
<td>Hwayang-dong</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct. 23</td>
<td>Magok-sa</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct. 28-31</td>
<td>Chŏlla-namdo Teahouses</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov. 6</td>
<td>Wŏlchŏng-sa</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov. 7</td>
<td>Taedun-san</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov. 20</td>
<td>Factory Tour</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov. 21</td>
<td>Kimjang Tour</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec. 3-5</td>
<td>Bird Watching Tour</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,948</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Taegu Chapter Committee Members**

Whang Kee-suk, President  
Julie Moyles, Secretary  
Fr. Josel Platzer, Treasurer and Councillor  
Sylvia Broderick, Membership Committee Chairman  
James Hayden, Books Committee Chairman (first ½ year)  
Yoo Kwang-gil, Books Committee Chairman (second ½ year)  
Ahn Joon-sang, Member-at-Large  
David C. Davies, Member-at-Large  
David N. Cohen, Member-at-Large (first ½ year)  
Maureen S. Taylor, Member-at-Large (second ½ year)
### Montly Meetings, Taegu Chapter
#### 1982

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Attendance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>13 Jan.</td>
<td>Films: Korean Mask Dances (Dr. James H. Grayson)</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Feb.</td>
<td>Lecture: The Murder of the Boy King Tangjong (Dr. James Hoyt)</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Mar.</td>
<td>Lecture: Major Themes of Korean Confucianism (Dr. So Mung-Sang)</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 Apr.</td>
<td>Lecture: The Korean Educational System (Mr. An Chun-Sang)</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 May</td>
<td>Kyemyŏng University Mask Dance Troupe Performance</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 June</td>
<td>Lecture: Diffusion of Buddhism into Korea (Dr. James H. Grayson)</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Sept.</td>
<td>Slide Presentation: Eskimos in Alaska (Dr. James Hayden)</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Oct.</td>
<td>Lecture: Introduction to Korea (Dr. Playzidus Berger)</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Nov.</td>
<td>Lecture: Korean Buddhist Painting (Dr. Kim Mi-Na)</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Dec.</td>
<td>Lecture: Korean Traditional Music (Dr. Cho Je-Sun)</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Members
(as of December 31, 1982)

LIFE MEMBERS
Adams, Edward B.
Bartz, Carl F., Jr.
Bertuccioli, Giuliano
Boo, Wan Hyuk
Bridges, Ronald C.
Bunger, Karl
Clark, Allen D.
Crane, Paul S.
Cook, Dr. & Mrs. Harold F.
Curll, Daniei B. III
Daniels, Mamie M.
de Vries, Mr. & Mrs. W. Ch. E.A.
Dines, Frank E.
Folkestad, Tor D.
Goodwin, Charles
Goodwin, James J.
Gordon, Douglas H.
Hahm, Pyong Choon
Henderson, Gregory
Hoyt, James
Kinney, Robert A.
Koll, Gertrude
Landy, Pierre
Leavitt, Richard P.
Ledyard, Gari
Lim, Sandra A.
MacDougall, Alan M.
Mattielli, Sandra
Mill, Charles S., Jr.
Miller, C. Ferris.
Moffett, Dr. & Mrs. Samuel H.
Murphy, Burchell
Pai, Inez Kong
Palmer, Dr. & Mrs. Spencer J.
Park, Sang-cho
Peterson, Mark
Quizon, Ronald P.
Rasmussen, Glen C.
Rucker, Robert D.
Rutt, Richard
Sleph, Gerald
Smith, Warren W., Jr.
Steinberg, David I.
Strauss, William
Terrel, Charles L.

Tieszen, Helen R.
Underwood, Dr. & Mrs. Horace G.
Underwood, Horace H.
Underwood, Peter
van den Berg, Amb. & Mrs. Roland
Wade, James
Williams, Von C.
Wright, Edward R., Jr.
Yoon, Prof. & Mrs. Chongs-hiok
Yoon, Prof. & Mrs. Young Il

REGULAR MEMBERS
Abasolo, Rafael
Adams, Dr. & Mrs. Daniel J.
Ahn, Joon-Sang
Ambrosie, Linda
Anderson, James L.
Anderson, Rebecca A.
Angelini, Mr. & Mrs. Giovanni
Arnold, Mr. & Mrs. Harry E.
Asorey, Enrique
Atkinson, Timothy
Aylward, Mr. & Mrs. Thomas J.
Baier, Michael J.
Baker, Mr. & Mrs. Richard J.
Banks, Dolly V.
Bantle, Paul J.
Barilka, Mr. & Mrs. William
Barker, Joan H.
Barr, Dr. & Mrs. William Alan
Bartholomew, Peter
Baskerville, Mr. & Mrs. Robert A.
Beardsley, Bruce A.
Becker, Jonathan L.
Beebe, Mr. & Mrs. Larry L.
Behringer, Roberta A.
Bennett, Becky
Bennett, Mr. Mark
Bennett, Mr. & Mrs. Michael J.
Berger, Egon P.
Bergholz, Mr. & Mrs. Joachim A.
Bernard, Mr. & Mrs. Jean-Marc
Bins, Mr. & Mrs. Dirk
Biolsi, George
Birnbaum, Roy B.
Blanks, Dr. & Mrs. George A.
Boardman, James R.
Bobsin, Mr. & Mrs. John
Bodenstein, Maria C.
Body, Col. & Mrs. L. S.
Boegner, Mr. & Mrs. K. Dieter
Boley, Silvia M.
Bond, Mr. & Mrs. Michael W.
Boo, Chung-Nam
Borden, Mr. & Mrs. Jonathan
Broderick, Mr. & Mrs. John
Brokaw, John P.
Brotherton, Dennis O.
Brown, Mr. & Mrs. Peter B.
Buck, Leslie J.
Bushyager, Margeret A.
Butler, Laura S.
Cabral, Mr. & Mrs. David
Cain, James M.
Campbell, Mr. & Mrs. Robert E.
Carlin, Mary B.
Cain, Mr. & Mrs. Kevin H.
Carmone, Antonio M.
Carpenter, Col. & Mrs. Max B., Jr.
Casler, Mr. & Mrs. Robert R.
Caswell, Joseph J.
Cefola, Maj. & Mrs. Richard A.
Chapman, Barbara L.
Charest, Mr. & Mrs. Donald S.
Charters, Mr. & Mrs. Thomas J.
Chedoux, Micheline
Cheesman, W. Gifford
Cherry, Judith Ann
Cho, Maria
Cho, Min-ha
Cho, Lt. Col. & Mrs. Nam Guk
Choi, Bang Won
Choi, Jin Sook
Choi, Moon-hi
Choi, Uhn Kyung
Chowdhury, Mr. & Mrs. Arun
Choy, Cornelius E.
Christian, De Visscher
Chun, Chae Ok
Chung, Moon Ja
Chung, Young On
Claus, Mr. & Mrs. Fred R.
Clause, Lori
Clayton, William L.
Cleveland, Mr. & Mrs. Paul
Coffron, Mr. & Mrs. William J.
Cohen, Leslie H.
Cohen, Rena
Coleman, Craig Shearer
Cook, Dr. & Mrs. T. Edwin
Cook, Mr. & Mrs. G. A.
Cooke, Joyce
Cope, Martha H.
Corbett, William G.
Costello, Jerome T.
Covell, Dr. Jon C.
Craig, Mr. & Mrs. Blair
Crane, Kathleen J.
Crawford, Mr. & Mrs. Thomas P.
Crooks, Karen
Curtis, Rhoda P.
Daniels, Michael J.
Daryanani, Ram D.
David, Eli
Davidson, Duane C.
Dawson, Tony
Deckardt, Dr. & Mrs. Gunter
de Dolodot, Mr. & Mrs. Loues
de Man, Mr. & Mrs. A. M.
Denda, Richard D.
De Quincey, Mr. & Mrs. Paul
Desoto, Glenn M.
Dewerd, Gregory J.
Diaconale, Wanda L.
Dickens, James A.
Dickie, Mr. & Mrs. Richard H.
Dictus, Mr. & Mrs. Frank J.
Dercks, Col. & Mrs. John W.
Dodds, Col. & Mrs. Jack A.
Dong, Duk-mo
Donovan, Joseph R., Jr.
Dorow, Rev. & Mrs. Maynard
Dreger, Rev. & Mrs. Clement R.
Dreikorn, Mr. & Mrs. Bernhard
Duff, Mr. & Mrs. John
Dunlavey, Mary E.
Dustin, Frederic H.
Dutilleul, Isabelle
Dyar, Karen A.
Eaton, Mr. & Mrs. William F.
Edwards, Donald
Edwards, Mr. & Mrs. Maurice
Elliott, Mr. & Mrs. John
Elliott, Margaret J.
Engel, Mr. & Mrs. David A.
Eszenyi, Maj. & Mrs. Steven A.
Eulert, Mr. & Mrs. Pierre-Henri
Fahn, Jay
Farrar, Mr. & Mrs. John A.
Faul, Mr. & Mrs. John
Faulkner, John
Ferrar, Gertrude F.
Field, Mr. & Mrs. David L.
Field, Mr. & Mrs. John
Fish, Mr. & Mrs. Jan T.
Fisher, Dr. & Mrs. Robert E.
Fitzgerald, Mr. & Mrs. David F.
Fleischhauer, Mr. & Mrs. Klaus
Fleming, Peter J.
Fletcher, Mr. & Mrs. Malcolm R.
Foong, Goh Lai
Foster-Kemp, Mr. & Mrs. Richard R.
Frank, Ted
Franz, Mr. & Mrs. Wolfgang
Frederick, Mr. & Mrs. Henry
Frei, Urs
Gannon, Mr. & Mrs. Anthony T.
Garwood, Mr. & Mrs. Lon Gene
Garland, Mr. & Mrs.
Garrigues, Steve
Geddes, John M.
Geier, Dolores C.
Gerardi, Michael A.
Gilbert, Mr. & Mrs. Robert
Giltrap, Margaret
Giraud, Bertrand M.
Good, Mr. & Mrs. Michael
Grant, Mr. & Mrs. Bruce K.
Grayson, Dr. & Mrs. James H.
Green, Barry P.
Greimann, Mr. & Mrs. Garth H.
Grenfell, Mr. & Mrs. Neil
Griehaber, Raymond W.
Griffin, Mr. & Mrs. Roger F. R.
Groen, Mr. & Mrs. Clifford J.
Grubb, Mrs. William A.
Gunton, Mr. & Mrs. Joseph
Haffner, Mr. & Mrs. Donald R.
Hagaman, Mr. & Mrs. J. L.
Hahn, Changgi
Hahn, Melanie M.
Hall, Soledad S.
Hamilton, Rev. & Mrs. Ian
Hampton, Marcia W.
Han, Pyo-Wook
Han, Seung Soo
Hanley, Paul Vincent Noel
Hansen, Glenn A.
Harbor, Fran
Hart, Mr. & Mrs. Ramon R.
Hartmann, Mr. & Mrs. Ruediger
Hatch, Mr. & Mrs. Richard
Hayes, Jenny L.
Healy, John E.
Heeb, Mr. & Mrs. Marcus
Henry, Mary E.
Herold, Mr. & Mrs. Robert F.
Hill, Nancy-Lee W.
Higa, Hatsue H.
Higgins, Janet K.
Hitt, Col. & Mrs. William R.
Hoar, Mr. & Mrs. Thomas J.
Hoare, Dr. & Mrs. J. E.
Hoare, Margaret V.
Hoelzlein, Mr. & Mrs. Horst H.
Hofer, Dr. & Mrs. Paul
Hoffmann, Hannelore
Holland, Barron
Holstein, John
Holtsbaum, Mr. & Mrs. Keith U.
Hourcade, Mr. & Mrs. Jean
Howard, Keith D.
Hughes, Mary B.
Hunt, Betty J.
Hunter, Sylvia V.
Huntley, Martha
Hunziker, Mr. & Mrs. Benjamin J.
Huse, Angelia
Hutchings, Mr. & Mrs. David
Ischinger, Lt.Col. & Mrs. M.
Jagoe, Mr. & Mrs. Leo J.
Janes, Mr. & Mrs. Donald B.
Jang, Mr. & Mrs. Song Hyon
Jeandel, Col. & Mrs. Paul
Jeffs, Mr. & Mrs. Letitia
Jeglum, Dale H.
Jenkins, Charles M., Jr.
Joe, Wanne J.
Jones, Mr. & Mrs. Cassius
Jones, Mr. & Mrs. Hayden H.
Jones, Mr. & Mrs. Jeffrey D.
Jongbloed, Mr. & Mrs. Donald
Jordan Recreation Center
Judy, Dr. & Mrs. Carl W.
Kang, Heidi
Karlen, Helena
Keasey, Virginia R.
Keene, Lucille
Keithly, Mr. & Mrs. John L.
Kenway, Mr. & Mrs. Cecil H.
Kidder, Mr. & Mrs. Alan
Kil, Chung Hwan
Kiljan van Heuven, Mr. & Mrs. Alex F.
Killoren, Mr. & Mrs. Ken
Kim, Chan Won
Kim, Mr. & Mrs. Chang Soo
Kim, Chong Nan
Kim, Eun Sook
Kim, Ho Soon
Kim, Houngh Han
Kim, Jae Ho
Kim, Jai Hiun
Kim, Mr. & Mrs. Jin Wang
Kim, Jong Uk
Kim, Joo-Hyon
Kim, Kee-Chang
Kim, Ke-Sook
Kim, Ki Sou
Kim, Kyung Hee
Kim, Mee Jeong
Kim, Myun Sun
Kim, Yong-duk
Kim, Yong Han
Kim, Young Sick
Kim, Yung Min
Kind, Mr. & Mrs. Peter
Kirk, Mr. & Mrs. Robert D.
Klein, Dr. & Mrs. Edward F.
Klein, Sander
Kloth, Mr. & Mrs. Edward
Knisely, Mr. & Mrs. Jay G.
Knutson, Mr. & Mrs. Robert
Koh, Jae Woo
Koh, Kyung Shin
Koh, Pum Joon
Kranzlein, Mr. & Mrs. K. F.
Kreisel, Wilfried E.
Kwun, Chung Sik
Lake, Henry F.
Lake, Grace P.
Lamont, Mr. & Mrs. Barry W.
Lamut, Bany W.
Langeveld, Loes H. M.
Langford, Dr. & Mrs. Roland E.
Lapham, Mr. & Mrs. Nicholas S.
Laset, Mr. & Mrs. Rogelio C.
Lavin, Mr. & Mrs. Bernard J.
Lee, Hung-tak
Lee, In-ho
Lee, Jesu
Lee, Joyce C.
Lee, Julia
Lee, Dr. & Mrs. Kook
Lee, Mr. & Mrs. Kun-il
Lee, Misop Song
Lee, See Woo
Lee, Soon-ja
Leifer, Walter
Lepparen, Liisa
Lew, Young I.
Liimatainen, Robert C.
Lim, Bo Wha
Lis, Mr. & Mrs. Tom
Little, Janet
Lloyd, Richard A.
Lohoff, Mr. & Mrs. Gustav H.
Lombardi, Ann V.
Loon, Mr. & Mrs. Helmut
Luketic, Dorothy A.
Lundy, Mr. & Mrs. Thomas L.
Luthi, Mr. & Mrs. Hans K.
Mackiewicz, Mr. & Mrs. Joseph K.
Mackinnon, Mr. & Mrs. Philip
MacPherson, Robert W.
Maguiro, Lt. Col. & Mrs. Michel
Mahnccke, Mr. & Mrs. Hans-Eberhard
Mailhot, Mr. & Mrs. P. H. N.
Main, Kathleen
Maksimyadis, Mr. & Mrs. Niko
Malki, Mr. & Mrs. Elliott A.
Man, David
Marker, Mr. & Mrs. Phillip W.
Martin, Randall A.
Mathus, Roger C.
Matthews, George
Mattelli, Robert E.
Mattlet, Bruno F.
Maurer, Mr. & Mrs. William H., Jr.
McAvoy, Raymond J.
McCann, Frances R.
McFarland, Maj. & Mrs. Owen B.
McGowan, Mr. & Mrs. Thomas H.
McKinney, Wm. R.
McLean, Mary Jo
McTaggart, Arthur Joseph
Meakin, Mr. & Mrs. T. S.
Meaney, Mr. & Mrs. E. Robert
Medico, Bonnie P.
Meili, William C.
Melrose, Marie
Melton, Mr. & Mrs. Kenneth
Menk, Dr. & Mrs. Karl F.
Meraw, Mr. & Mrs. Daniel F.
Mercer, Joyce A.
Meyer, Mr. & Mrs. Robert
Miklasz, Maj. & Mrs. Ted
Mills, Mr. & Mrs. Terry R.
Mintz, Barbara
Mitchell, June B.
Moon, Chae-Shik
Morgan, Betty
Morgan, Amb. & Mrs. John
Morgan, Loretta
Morgan, Rae Carol
Morris, Mr. & Mrs. Donald A.
Moskowitz, Karl
Muir, Mr. & Mrs. Neville
Muller, Mr. & Mrs. Laurent
Murayama, Mr. & Mrs. Ryoichi
Murphy, Carol A.
Musladin, James P.
Myers, Charlotte E.
Nadeau, Kathleen M.
Nam, Yong Woo
Nelson, Charles Norman
Neukirchen, Mr. & Mrs. Matthias H.
Neveau, Beverly E.
New, Janet T.
Newbery, Brenda J.
Newman, Cindy J.
Nicolay, Mr. & Mrs. Fons
Nielsen, Juanita M.
Niemann, Mr. & Mrs. William H.
Northern, Marc E.
O'Brien, Mr. & Mrs. Michael F.
O'Connor, Thomas P.
Ofner, Anton, G.
Oh, Ok-Sun
Ojerholm, Mr. & Mrs. David S.
O'Neil, Mr. & Mrs. Eugene
O'Rourke, Mr. & Mrs. Paul
Overholt, Kay M.
Pae, Yang Seo
Paalsson, Mr. & Mrs. Dicky
Paik, Nak Choon
Pak, Barbara R.
Palmer, Col. & Mrs. John A.
Pang, Yong-pil
Papallo, Angeia
Park, Mr. & Mrs. Ki-Nam
Park, Seong Rae
Park, Tong Soo
Park, Young Mi
Parker, Mr. & Mrs. Richard
Parker, Barbara G.
Partington, Mr. & Mrs. Ross
Partosch, Ros witha
Pascoe, Mr. & Mrs. Howard S.
Pates, Bonnie J.
Perron, Mr. & Mrs. John E.
Peper, Mr. & Mrs. Helmut M.
Peterson, Bill
Pickens, Lt. Col. & Mrs. Richard H.
Platzker, Josef
Plotteck, Mr. & Mrs. Dietrich M.
Pocock, Amb. & Mrs. E.R.
Poitras, Dr. & Mrs. Edward W.
Poole, Mr. & Mrs. Keith B.
Pyrczak, Stephen
Raimist, Mr. & Mrs. Jerome
Rankin, Lois V.
Rasco, Lt. Col. & Mrs. William D.
Rawn, Mr. & Mrs. James L.
Ready, Maria
Reckert, Mr. & Mrs. Robert
Rector, Gary
Reditt, Mr. & Mrs. D. Allan
Reed, Mr. & Mrs. Greg
Rees, Mr. William H.
Rehfuss, Mr. & Mrs. David P.
Reid, Dee J.
Res, John
Rex, Sara Kate
Rhee, Sung-Hon
Rhoads, Mr. & Mrs. Paul A.
Rice, Eber H.
Riemer, Hilbert W.
Ring, Henry E.
Ritze, Dr. & Mrs. Frederick H.
Ro, Eileen
Roberts, Daphne M.
Roberts, Agnes J.
Roest, Mr. & Mrs. Johan A.
Roman, Ronald G.
Rosenberg, Mr. & Mrs. Mark D.
Ross, Elaine
Rucci, Richard B.
Runnebaum, Mr. & Mrs. B. F.
Ruocco, Mr. & Mrs. Peter A.
Rush, Mr. & Mrs. Melvin L.
Ryselberghe, Marc Van
Ryu, Dr. & Mrs. Jai Poong
Sandy, Mr. & Mrs. Paul
Sauer, Prof. & Mrs. Robert G.
Savage, Mr. & Mrs. Raymond W.
Schakmundes, Jean-Jacques
Schikorr, Wolfgang Y.
Schmidt, Lt. Col. & Mrs. Ardon O.
Schmidt, Mr. & Mrs. Jorgen T.
Schmitt, Mr. & Mrs. Reinhard
Schroer, George H.
Schuffner, Florian
Schumacher, Mr. & Mrs. Ramon, Jr.
Seo, Jung Ae
Sevelius, Sae E.
Sharp, Mr. & Mrs. Jere W.
Shaw, Marion A.
Shults, Mr. & Mrs. Richard
Shultz, Mr. & Mrs. Edward
Silva Delgado, H. E. & Mrs. Adolfo
Sibley, Mr. & Mrs. Norman
Sigmon, Gary R.
Sigur, Mr. & Mrs. Christopher J.
Silva, Jack P.
Silverstein, Ch. & Mrs. Philip
Simmonds, Mr. & Mrs. Andrew W.
Simpson, Mr. & Mrs. William A.
Sjogren, Mr. & Mrs. Bengt
Skarshaug, Elizabeth A.
Skillingstad, M. Delmar
Skinner, Lou A.
Shuse, Kenneth P.
Smart, Rev. & Mrs. Clifford E.
Smith, Mr. & Mrs. Howard F.
Smith, Mr. & Mrs. Leonard P.
Snyder, Alice L.
Song, Mr. Do
Song, Jae-sam
Spencer, Mr. & Mrs. Kelmore W.
Staempfli, Mr. & Mrs. W. A.
Stanley, Sharon
Steiner, Dr. & Mrs. Henry-York
Stephan, Margarita L.
Stevens, Mr. & Mrs. Steven
Stevenson, John A.
Stewart, Ruth G.
Stone, Mr. & Mrs. W. Bartol
Straub, Mr. & Mrs. W. David
Suh, David Kwang-son
Suh, Jae Kun
Suh, Ji-Moon
Sull, Mr. & Mrs. Yee-Byung
Sullinger, Mr. & Mrs. Weldon O.
Sullivan, Raymond F.
Susan, Rev. & Mrs. David J.
Suter, Mr. & Mrs. Emil
Suter, Mr. & Mrs. Hansruedi
Sylva, Mr. & Mrs. J.P.
Tahk, K. S.
Taylor, Maureen S.
Tedesco, Mr. & Mrs. Michael F.
Tedrow, Ruth M.
Townsend, Anne
Torp, Mr. & Mrs. John
Tracy, Wesley S., Jr.
Troy, Thomas A.
Tscharrig, Emil P.
Underwood, Richard F.
Uno, Tadaaki
Urquhart, Betty A.
Valenti, Mr. & Mrs. William L.
Van De Voorde, Mr. & Mrs. W. G.
Van Weddigen, Mr. & Mrs. Paul G.
Velazquez-Suarez, Alice H.
Verougstraete, Mr. & Mrs. Leon
Videau, Mr. & Mrs. Jean
Videla, Mr. & Mrs. Richardo H.
Vinson, Mr. & Mrs. Jean-Francois
Wade, Mr. & Mrs. Eugene H.
Wade, Margaret S.
Waldron, Mr. & Mrs. William J.
Walker, Amb. & Mrs. Richard L.
Wallner, Karl
Warnberg, Amb. & Mrs. Karl J.
Weems, Dr. & Mrs. Benjamin B.
Wells, Mr. & Mrs. Donald E.
Whalen, Diana
Whang, Kee Suk
Whitaker, Maj. & Mrs. Gary
Wickham, Mr. & Mrs. Wesley
Wilkinson, Mr. & Mrs. Alan
Willett, Bonny P.
Williams, Mr. & Mrs. Richard E.
Wilson, Rebecca Jo
Winterebeek, Charles
Wipper, Mr. & Mrs. Dieter W.
Wissinger, Uwe
Wolek, Janice L.
Wood, Mr. & Mrs. S. A.
Worth, Mr. & Mrs. George
Yang, Eun-Sook
Yasuda, Utako
Yi, Kae-Seok
Yi, Yoon Hee
Yirchott, Mr. & Mrs. Chuck R.
Yoo, Kwang-Gil
Yoon, Ki-Ho
Zlatareff, Mr. & Mrs. Vasco

OVERSEAS MEMBERS

Aebersold, Jack
Aebi, Doris
Aherin, Darrell J.
Ahn, Chung Hyun
Albrecht, Mr. & Mrs. Ronald L.
Alford, Thomas M.
Allen, J. Michael
Alteirac, Roze
Anderson, Robert K.
Andreasen, Bryon C.
Apollo, Book Co., Ltd.
Asiatic Society of Japan, The
Audet, Dr. & Mrs. Harold H.
Auillemoz, Alexandre
Bahng, Won-jeung
Baier, Michael J.
Baker, Mr. & Mrs. Donald L.
Baker, Mr. & Mrs. Robert H.
Baldwin, Dr. & Mrs. Frank C., Jr.
Ball, Mary Alice
Balswick, Mr. & Mrs. Jack
Bannan, Daniel E., Jr.
Bardis, Panos D.
Bark, Mr. & Mrs. Th. J.
Basinger, Mr. & Mrs. Bill
Beach, Chuck
Beasley, Mavrine
Beebe, Mr. & Mrs. Herbert A.
Belbutowski, Paul M.
Bemis, Nancy M.
Bennison, Mr. & Mrs. Larry L.
Bishop, Mr. & Mrs. Donald M.
Black, Andrews D.
Black, Kay E.
Boice, Ruth L.
Boose, Lt.Col. & Mrs. Donald W., Jr.
Bowie, Mr. & Mrs. Nigel John G.
Boyd, Wayne C.
Boyer, Delores R.
Braun, Jae S.
Brezavar, Sarah
Browne, Mr. & Mrs. Allen C.
Bucholtz, Norman J.
Burchett, Robert B.
Burgess, Frederick M.
Burkholder, Ruth
Burnett, Scott S.
Buzo, Mr. & Mrs. Adrian
Cambridge University Library
Chamberlain, Gordon B.
Chambers, James K.
Chase, Larry E.
Choi, Soo-Young
Choi, Woonsang
Chung, In-Yup
Clark, Douglas A.
Clarke, Hugh D. B.
Clauser, Dr. & Mrs. Jerome K.
Cleveland Museum of Art Library
Cohn, Fritz L.
Collins, Mr. & Mrs. Walter J.
Comber, Leon
Compton, Dorothy C.
Conard, Dr. & Mrs. George P.
Cotton, James
Courtney, Mr. & Mrs. James R.
Cowell, William J., Jr.
Crawshaw, Marguerite J.
Dayton, Nancy
Dean, Harold L.
De Andrade, Pedro M.
de Haan-Couzy, S. L.
Dege, Dr. & Mrs. Eckart
Delacoste, Mr. & Mrs. Jules
Deuchler, Martina
Diacopoulos, John P.
De Wave, Evans
Diltz, Mr. & Mrs. Donald O.
Dix, Griffin
Douglas, Dr. & Mrs. William A.
Driscoll, Mr. & Mrs. David J.
Du Bois, Mr. & Mrs. Ron P.
Duchene, Mr. & Mrs. Christiane
Dugger, Jerry
Eddy, Ann
Eikemeier, Dr. & Mrs. Dieter
Elliott, Tim L.
Ellis, R. L.
Erickson, Mr. & Mrs. Frans V.
Eshelman, Mary L.
Eskanazi, Victor
Feehan, Frances J.
Fisher, J. Earnest
Ford, B. C. P.
Fotion, Mr. & Mrs. Nicholas
Fowler, H. Seymour
Frank, William S.
Franklin, Mr. & Mrs. Richard W.
Freshley, Mary J.
Friberg, Mr. & Mrs. James
Frost, Dr. Dorothy M.
Gannon, Philip J.
Gardner, Arthur L.
Gardner, Mr. & Mrs. Frank A.
Gault, N. L., Jr.
Gompertz, Mr. & Mrs. Godfrey M.
Gompertz, Mr. & Mrs. Richard F.
Gould, John H.
Goulde, John J.
Graf, Horst E.
Graves, Mr. & Mrs. John C.
Gray, Dr. & Mrs. Paul W., Jr.
Gray, Dr. & Mrs. Paul W.
Griffith, Mr. & Mrs. Raymond
Guillemoz, Mr. & Mrs. A.
Grosjean, Glen M.
Gustafson, Martha F.
Haack, Mr. & Mrs. Dennis G.
Hach, Ronald
Hackett, David R.
Hall, Dr. & Mrs. Newman A.
Halpin, Dennis P.
Hanley, Paul V. N.
Hanlon, Esther S.
Harvard-Yenching Library
Harvey, Young-sook Kim
Hawley, Rev. & Mrs. Morley M.
Hazard, Benjamin H., Jr.
Healey, Graham H.
Heggland, Stanley E., Jr.
Hejtmanek, Milan
Held, Marilyn L.
Herrington, William S.
Hielscher, Gebhard
Hlawatsch, George O.
Hobbs, Charles A.
Hobbs, Mr. & Mrs. Michael
Hoffman, Michael H.
Hooker, John H.
Hoover, Raleigh R.
Horowitz, Harold
Hostettler, James C.
Huber, Dr. & Mrs. Frederick R.
Huston, John T.
Huwe, Albrecht
Ilse, Regina
Institut fur Japanologie
Jackson, Roger P.
Jameson, Gloria R.
Jameson, Sam
Janelli, Dr. & Mrs. Roger L.
Johnson, Mr. & Mrs. Kenneth W.
Johnson, Thomas W.
Jones, Dennis
Jordan, David K.
Josset, Patrice
Kahl, Hans-Jurgen
Kass, Mr. & Mrs. Thomas B.
Keim, Willard D.
Keller, Dr. & Mrs. Robert J.
Keltie, Patricia E.
Kennel, Nancy Lee
Kentwell, Mr. & Mrs. Alister J.
Kim, Claire K.
Kim, Dong Yol
Kim, Harold U.
Kim, Mi-jo
Kim, Sam-Woo
Kleck, Gary
Knappman, Mr. & Mrs. Edward
Klem, Mr. & Mrs. Charles
Knez, Dr. & Mrs. Eugene J.
Koedding, Mr. & Mrs. Albert W.
Koene, Mr. & Mrs. Arie
Koh, Dr. & Mrs. Kwang Lim
Kosciusko, Mr. & Mrs. Jacques
Kowalczyk, Robert
Kremenak, Mr. & Mrs. Ben
Kucera, Carol
Kunkel, Peter H.
Kurata, Mary F.
Kuzma, Dr. & Mrs. David J.
Kuznets, Prof. & Mrs. Paul W.
Labrecque, Joseph A.
Lady, Elaine S.
Lancaster, Lewis
Laursen, Benedicte
Latta, Thomas A.
Lebra, William P.
le Carpentier, Thomas
Lee, Prof. & Mrs. Chong Sik
Lee, Jung Young
Lein, Albrecht
Lepine, Mr. & Mrs. Melvin E.
Leuteritz, Dr. & Mrs. Karl
Levin, Mr. & Mrs. Ronald S.
Lewis, Michael F.
Loken-Kim, Mr. & Mrs. Christine J.
Library of Leiden University
Linn, Kurt Kelly
Loosli, Silvia
Macdonald, Dr. & Mrs. Donald S.
Macmillan, Michael E.
Manley, Ruth
Mann, Charles L.
Martin, Virginia S.
Mary, Christopher
Mattson, Marlin R. A
Matusche, Petra
Max, Frederic
McCling, David H.
McCune, Dr. & Mrs. Shannon B.
McCutcheon, Richard
McGovern, Melvin P.
McKenna, Geraldine L.
McLellon, Mr. & Mrs. John W.
Meech-Pekarik, Julia
Meeker, Mr. & Mrs. Virgil W.
Meier, Walter
Mercer, A. E. E.
Merritt, Richard S.
Meyer, Mr. & Mrs. Donald R.
Michell, Anthony R.
Miller, David E.
Miller, Roy A.
Moek, John
Moe, Lt. Col. & Mrs. Gary S.
Moon, Seung Gyu
Moore, Mr. & Mrs. Geoffrey H.
Moore, William
Mori, Barbara L.
Mueller, Ilse
Mulliken, John B.
Mullin, William E.
Murray, Bruce C.
Neil, Mr. & Mrs. Desmond
Neil, Mr. & Mrs. John M.
Nelson, Sarah M.
Nemeth, David
Nervik, Rut
Newman, Pam A.
Nicol, Mr. & Mrs. Donald J.
Ninteman, Mr. & Mrs. Mildred M.
Nishiguchi, Ann
Nolden, Detlef
O’Brien, Sybil A.
Olof, Mr. & Mrs. Allard Maarten
Oosterbroek, E.
Orange, Marc
Oriental Section, Durham Univ. Library
Ormes, Ashton H.
Parrott, William B.
Patterson, Earl F.
Pearson, Darel M.
Perkins, Dwight H.
Peters, Mr. & Mrs. Paul
Pettengill, Sandra M.
Phillips, Leo H., Jr.
Piltz, Arne C. G.
Pinto, Mr. & Mrs. Arthur A. F.
Pore, William F.
Porges, Mr. & Mrs. George W.
Post, Mr. & Mrs. Ronald J.
Poussard, Wendy
Princeton University Library
Pritchett, M. J.
Proctor, Mr. & Mrs. Bruce B.
Provine, Mr. & Mrs. Robert C., Jr.
Rathbone, Charles P.
Rice, Roberta G.
Rickabaugh, Homer T.
Rijksuniversiteit
Rinzler, Ralph
Robinson, Michael
Rockwell, Coralie J.
Roelse, C. D.
Rogers, Michael C.
Rondinelli, Dennis A.
Roscarn, Mr. & Mrs. Moens R.
Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain & Ireland
Royal Asiatic Society, Hong Kong Branch
Rudiger, Gerhard
Rummel, Charles W.
Runyan, Jon Thomas
Russell, Mr. & Mrs. James
Salem, Ellen
Salmon-Iki, Patricia
Sanders, Margaret J.
Sasse, Werner
Sayers, Robert
Scherbacker, Marcus W.
Schoenfeld, Margie V.
Schulze, Mr. & Mrs. Raymond C. R.
Schwarz, Henry G.
Scoggins, Mr. & Mrs. Glenn
Selth, Andrew W.
Seros, Mr. & Mrs. Michael J.
Seyfried, Dr. & Mrs. Warren R.
Sharpsteen, Catherine J.
Sherwood, Mr. & Mrs. Robert J.
Shields, Steven L.
Shin, Susan S.
Shoemaker, D. J.
Short, Nancy D.
Shryock, Prof. & Mrs. Henry S., Jr.
Shuler, John M.
Sich, Dorothea H. E.
Silverman, Joel A.
Silvola, Andre K.
Simon, Scott P.
Skillend, Dr. & Mrs. W. E.
Solf, Waldemar A.
South Baylor University
Spencer, Robert F.
Sperl, Barbara M.
Stankiewicz, Paul R.
Stark, Jeffrey
Stewart, Mr. & Mrs. Robert B.
Stewart, Warren A.
Stickler, Mr. & Mrs. John C.
Stieeler, George A.
Stoll, Irwin D.
Strout, John E.
Stubbe, Mr. & Mrs. Clifford M.
Suh, Mark
Sull, Mary
Sullivan, Helen B.
Sutherland, Laurie
Suzuki, Mr. & Mrs. Mitsuo
Swanson, Jennifer T.
Swartout, Robert R., Jr.
Sweeney, Tisha D.
Sveezy, William L.
Taylor, Mildred D.
Teele, Nicholas
Tegemann, Mr. & Mrs. Detmar
Tellier, Raymond E.
Thiem, Mr. & Mrs. Klaus
Thomas, Holcombe H.
Thompson, Laurence G.
Tierney, Lennox
Towne, Allen E.
Towne, Larry E.
Travis, Mr. & Mrs. Richard D.
Tuanquist, Susan
University of Southern California
Valenti, William L.
Van Hoeve, J. P.
Van Zile, Juoy A.
Vliet, Rodney M.
von Borstel, Uwe
Voran, Dallas
Vos, Frits
Wagner, Prof. & Mrs. Edward W.
Wallenbo, Kjell-Ake
Walraven, Mr. & Mrs. B. C. A.
Walter, Dr. & Mrs. Louie W.
Ware, Helen
Warner, Mr. & Mrs. Denis A.
Warner, Gordon
Weist, Katherine M.
Weiss, Dr. & Mrs. Ernest W.
Williams, Edith W.
Wilson, Brian A.
Wilson, Mr. & Mrs. Jan H.
Wilson, Dr. & Mrs. Stanton R.
Wraith, Desmond C.
Yale University Library
Yoon, Kyong-Cheol
Young, Alfred B.

Yu, Eui-Young
Yutaka, Inaba
Zaborowski, Dr. & Mrs. Hans-Juergen
Zahrly, Jan
Notes for Authors

All editorial communications should be addressed in the first instance to the Publications Committee, Royal Asiatic Society, CPO Box 255, Seoul 100, Korea. Two copies of prospective articles should be enclosed.

Contributions submitted for consideration of publication in the Society’s Transactions should be typed double spaced, with a 1½” left-hand margin. Hand-written or incomplete manuscripts cannot be accepted for consideration. Pages should be typed on one side of the sheet only, and should be numbered consecutively. Notes and references should be typed on a separate sheet (or sheets) and not at the foot of each page. Prospective contributors are advised to consult recent editions of the Transactions to ascertain the style used for references and citations. The same general format should be observed for book typescripts.

All tables, illustrations, and other graphic material should be clearly labelled. Tables should appear at the appropriate point in the accompanying text or, when this is not possible, on a separate sheet as close as practicable to the relevant passage. In this case the text should contain a clear indication of the existence of related graphic material. Lists of words such as names should be treated in a similar manner. It is editorial policy that tables and lists printed in the Transactions should not spread over more than one page, unless the tabular material is unusually long. Illustrations and figures should be large-size originals. Figures should each be drawn on a separate sheet in India ink and their presence should be clearly indicated at the appropriate point in the text. All tables, figures and illustrations should have individual captions.

Korean words and names should be Romanized and underlined according to the McCune—Reischauer system. Authors should refer to the Simplified Table of McCune—Reischauer Romanization of Korean, which is available from the society’s office in Seoul.

Authors whose contributions are accepted for publication in the Transactions will receive one copy of the galley proofs for correction and return. They will be notified of the date by which corrected proofs should be returned to the Editor. Later corrections, together with amendments or additions to the accepted text, will be authorized only at the Editor’s discretion and may incur a charge to the author. Authors will receive only galley proofs; page proofs will not normally be sent to journal contributors.

Authors of published articles will be supplied with 20 copies of offprints free of charge. Additional copies may be obtained on request at moderate cost. Authors are asked to notify the Editor of their requirements for copies when returning corrected proofs.