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Sea Power and Diplomacy

by David (John) Wright

Korea, no less than other parts of the Far East, first felt the influence of foreign penetration in the late 19th Century through the medium of naval power. It was a Japanese squadron, which in 1875 initiated the process towards the Kangwha Treaty in 1876, by sailing from Pusan to Wonsan and subsequently to Inchon – Korea’s three main ports which were then opened for trade with Japan. This process had mirrored the impact which Commodore Perry’s ‘Black Ships’ had had a number of years earlier when they had anchored off Shimoda in Japan, thus precipitating the opening of Japan to the West.

Fifty years ago in December 1941, and thus two generations or more on from the naval sabre-rattling of the 1850s-1870s, the projection of influence by sea power again turned the destiny of the Far East. Japan displayed her naval superiority through the use of carrier-borne aircraft to devastate the US Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbour and the pride of the Royal Navy, HMS Repulse and HMS Prince of Wales, were sunk in waters off Malaya.

Thus Sea Power has had a significant influence in shaping the Far East’s relationships with the West and merits examination. Such an examination may also bear upon future defence relationships in East Asia, with a reunited Korean peninsula, a strongly armed Japan, a China with enhanced economic strength in its littoral regions and a Russia seeking a new role for its blue water navy operating from Pacific ports.

As a result of my present posting here in Seoul I have been fortunate enough to be given an opportunity to extend my interest in the relationship between sea-power and diplomacy in the Far East which began with time served in Japan. I have set myself the following five issues for consideration in this paper:

a) to look briefly at some of the theories and their development about the use of naval power and to consider how this has historically been incorporated into the practice of diplomacy with particular reference to what is
known as gunboat diplomacy;

b) To look at the history of the period between 1853 when Commodore William Perry's Black Ships first appeared off Shimoda in Japan until Japan's ultimate domination of this region by 1910;

c) To look at one or two of the activities of the sea-power of two nations in this region during the Second World War, the US Navy and the Royal Navy;

d) To look also at some of the features of the extension of naval power in North East Asia during the recently ended Cold War;

e) To attempt one or two general judgements about the interlacing of naval power and diplomacy in this region and to consider what this might mean for the medium term future.

And in all this, I have to say that the views I express are entirely private and in no way reflect official views: a necessary disclaimer for all Ambassadors!

**Some General Principles**

Perhaps the first point I should emphasise about sea-power is its limited nature: it cannot be an end in itself. It is an adjunct to other forms of pressure, either diplomatic or military. A 19th Century British naval strategist, Julian Corbett once wrote:

"By maritime strategy we mean principles which govern a war in which the sea is a substantial factor. Naval strategy is but that part of it which determines the movements of the fleet when maritime strategy has determined what part the fleet must play in relation to action of the land forces; for it scarcely needs saying that it is almost impossible that a war can be decided by naval action alone."

In this qualification of the extent of naval power, Corbett was distinguishing slightly his position from that of the preeminent expert in the subject, Captain Alfred Mahan of the US Navy whose seminal work "The Influence of Sea Power upon History 1669-1783" sought to demonstrate that international struggles since classical times had been greatly influenced by sea control, that is "the possession of that overbearing power on the sea which drives the enemy's flag from it, or allows it to appear only as a fugitive." The point about sea-power was that it made artillery mobile: this was a discovery made by the Portuguese in the 16th Century and which was developed in the latter half of that century by England. It allowed a power with access to the sea to
live in contact with the rest of the globe and thus to extend its influence on global events, its trade and its international position. To quote Mahan “England is, and yet more in those days was, wherever her fleet could go.”

It is that quotation which brings us to the British Prime Minister Viscount Palmerston. In 1850 when Palmerston was Foreign Secretary the Don Pacifico incident occurred. Don Pacifico was a Jew with a somewhat unsavoury character but he was none the less a native of a British Territory, Gibraltar. His house in Athens was attacked in broad daylight by a mob headed by the sons of the Greek Minister of War. But as a British subject, that was enough for Palmerston to demand redress of the wrong that had been done to him. And when diplomatic representations had been rebuffed, he ordered the British fleet into the Greek port of Piraeus to seize Greek vessels and hold them until redress was given to Don Pacifico. In the House of Commons debate on the incident on 25 June 1850, Palmerston said

“A British subject, in whatever land he may be, shall feel confidence that a watchful eye and the strong arm of England will protect him against injustice and wrong.”

This was the incident which is thought to have given rise to the concept of ‘Gunboat Diplomacy.’ It encapsulates the concept of the use of maritime power in support of diplomatic objectives. It provided the naval powers operating in North East Asia at the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th Century with many of the justifications for their actions.

The essential point is that the exercise of ‘gunboat diplomacy’ requires two preconditions. First, the existence of conditions of nominal peace. Secondly the use of limited naval forces to threaten hostile governments and thus through intimidation to achieve a political and diplomatic end.

The element of threat in the use of maritime power in the support of diplomacy goes back to a period well before the Don Pacifico incident in the mid 19th Century. As indicated in the earlier quotation from Mahan, it was employed as far back as the 16th and 17th Centuries by the Portuguese, the Dutch and the British who were able to wield an influence through their sea-power out of all proportion to their size, resources and manpower. Indeed, following the development of British sea-power at the end of the 16th Century, Britain was not merely able to control the flow of overseas treasure between the New World and Europe but also to manipulate on the continent of Europe the balance of half a dozen powers, each (France, Spain, and the Holy Roman Empire) intrinsically superior to her in every other respect. The same was true in terms of the protection of British merchant men in the Mediterranean, the
Caribbean and the Baltic in the latter half of the 17th Century and was obviously of fundamental importance in the extension of British influence overseas in the 18th Century into Canada, India and part of Southern Africa. The Seven Years War from 1756 to 1763 saw a succession of international victories by Britain thanks entirely to the paralysing effect of her naval mastery. British naval squadrons prevented France reinforcing her colony in Louisiana; British naval and land force occupied Quebec in Canada; Senegal in Africa was captured from France in 1758; French islands in the Caribbean were captured in 1759; and British reinforcement of her troops in India ensured that the French failed to secure a footing in the sub-continent.

But we should return to the general question of principles in order to concentrate on the essential feature of gunboat diplomacy: its threatening nature rather than its actual employment of force. For gunboat diplomacy is the use of the threat of limited naval force, otherwise than as an act of war, in order to secure advantage, or to avert loss, either in the furtherance of international disputes or else against foreign nationals within the territory or the jurisdiction of their own state. This is well evidenced, for instance, by reference to this region of the world by looking at the relationship between Britain and China between the 1840s and 1949. It was again Lord Palmerston who was in power when a British naval party raised the British flag over Possession Point in Hong Kong in January 1841 thus laying the West's claims to extraterritorial rights in China. And in 1949 it was a British naval vessel, HMS Amethyst which failed in the exercise of gunboat diplomacy when it tried to navigate the Yangtze to guard the British Embassy at Nanking but was driven aground by the Communist batteries and had to withdraw. This brought to an end British influence in China in the face of the Communist Revolution. But within that entire period of just over 100 years, it would be difficult to find a year when British war ships were not employing armed force in China waters in full reflection of the principles of Gunboat Diplomacy.

**Gunboat Diplomacy in the Far East**

For the purposes of this examination we will ignore the Portuguese and Dutch links which were established with the Far East in late 16th and early 17th Centuries and we will turn immediately to that epoch-making day July 8th, 1853 when Commodore Matthew Perry arrived in Tokyo Bay with a fleet of four steamships sent by President Fillmore with instructions to obtain from the Japanese a treaty guaranteeing protection for shipwrecked crews, coaling
facilities and if possible some trade as well. We must not ignore the surprising nature of that event. Four ships, large by local standards arrived in a place where no truly sea-going vessel had been seen for two centuries. The ships bore guns, they were black and belched out black smoke. They moved without recourse to the wind. And as if to make matters worse for those Japanese who were anxious about the black ships, they even had on board sailors with black skins. This was in a sense a true exercise of gunboat diplomacy in so far as it was clear that Perry was not there to use maximum naval force to achieve his objectives. He bore a letter from President Fillmore to the Emperor of Japan seeking friendship and commercial relations with the Government and expected a reaction. Having delivered his Presidential communication, Perry withdrew to Okinawa to return again in February 1854 for his reply. Under the threatening guns of the American ships, the Government in Yedo had no choice but to sign a treaty with the United States opening two ports, Shimoda at the end of the Izu peninsula near to Tokyo and Hakodate in Hokkaido, to the provisioning of American ships. The door had been opened and the first move had been made in the ending of Japanese isolation.

This move was further entrenched on 21 August 1856 when black ships again arrived in Shimoda bearing this time the individual whose arrival the Japanese had been most reluctant to accept, the Consul General of the United States for Japan. The Consul’s name was of course Townsend Harris who had returned with Commodore Perry to assert the rights of the United States according to the original treaty of 1854. Harris’s own journal of his subsequent dealings in both Shimoda and Yedo which provide us with the first evidence of the juxta-position of relations between Japan and the outside world.

It was also Harris who himself confessed to having been brought up to ‘fear God and hate the British,’ who on his way to Japan had called into Hong Kong and had thus expressed anxiety about the potential threat of British influence usurping that of the United States in the opening up of Japan, again thus demonstrating both the perception of competing powers of the effectiveness of Gunboat Diplomacy and the value achieved by Britain’s earlier seizure of Hong Kong.

Perry’s arrival in 1853 and subsequently in 1854 and 1856 was not the first example of the way in which naval power had begun to breach Japanese resistance to the opening of their country but it was the most effective. As early as 1837, a US ship had tried to make contact with the Japanese Shogunate by returning Japanese castaways to their homeland. The Dutch themselves, given their continuing strong links in Nagasaki on the Island of Deshima, had tried to warn the Japanese Emperor in 1844 of the conse-
quences for Japan of what had been happening in China. In 1845 a Royal
Navy survey vessel had called at Nagasaki and similarly in 1894, another
Royal Navy survey vessel had surveyed the approaches to Yedo harbour.

The fact was that the European powers, following the industrial revolu-
tion, were looking for new outlets for their products and would have turned
their attention more quickly to Japan if it had not been for their preoccupa-
tions in China or if they had foreseen more clearly the potential of opportuni-
ties in Japan.

After Perry’s arrival in 1853 and the signature of the Kanagawa Treaty in
March 1854, a British squadron reached Nagasaki in September 1854 and
similarly a Russian squadron in January 1855 and the Dutch in November
1855. All these arrivals led to the conclusion of treaties opening up ports in
Japan for the use of foreign naval vessels. But these treaties were limited in
their scope and it was only the arrival of Townsend Harris in 1856 that
produced the breakthrough in the application of treaty arrangements which
accorded trading rights and extra territorial privileges to Japan’s trading
partners.

The US/Japan Treaty was finally signed in July 1858, The Dutch and the
Russians concluded similar treaties in August 1858 and Lord Elgin led a
British mission to Japan to sign a commercial treaty later that same month.
These treaties of course only opened up certain ports to foreign traders. The
fragility of the arrangements involved was of course particularly demonstrat-
ed by the precarious security experienced by Rutherford Alcock, the first
British Consul General in Japan from June 1859, whose Japanese linguist was
murdered in January 1860 and whose legation on the outskirts of Yedo was
attacked in July 1861 with the wounding of 10 members of his guard. These
attacks continued and they ultimately led to the arrival of a British squadron
in Kagoshima Bay in August 1863 which bombarded and destroyed the town
and extracted compensation, following the murder of a British merchant from
Shanghai, Lennox Charles Richardson in September 1862.

All these events and also subsequent exchanges between Japanese
coastal fortresses and visiting foreign naval squadrons demonstrate vividly
the extent to which Western naval powers sought to apply the influence of
their warships in securing rights for their privileges in Japan, sometimes with
the application of force, and yet without any declaration of war.

This was a lesson which the Japanese themselves learned well in the
aftermath of the conclusive events of 3 January 1868 which led to restoration
of the Emperor. To that let us now turn, given in particular its relevance for
the history of the opening of Korea. These events are important not only
because of the effect which they had on Japanese relations with China, Russia and Korea but also because they led in due course to the chain of events which culminated in the attack on the US fleet in Pearl Harbour on 7 December 1941.

The Japanese had learned early the value of an effective naval force. Admiral Togo had studied in Britain and some of the first Japanese naval ships made in steel were built in British yards. By 1894 Japan was able not only to build major warships but also to produce modern naval armaments. In 1894, the Japanese navy had 28 steampowered warships totalling 57,000 tons. Its longer term intentions were clear and it had already exercised its intentions in the direction of Korea.

Japan had nearly gone to war with Korea in 1873. But by the Treaty of Kangwha in 1876 a modus vivendi between the two countries was reached. Under that Treaty, three Korean ports were open to trade with Japan: Pusan, Wonsan and Inchon. But the point is, reverting to our continuing theme about the use of naval power to extend diplomatic rights, that the Japanese achieved this concession from the Korean Government by menacing those three ports by visits by battleships. As well as the rights to trade, the arrangements with Korea gave Japan the same sort of extraterritorial rights in these ports for her citizens as Japan had itself already accorded in its own ports to Americans, Britains, the French and the Russians. No doubt the Koreans among you will see this correctly as the first step in the installation of Japanese influence in the peninsula which ultimately led to Korean colonisation in 1910.

You would of course be right in that conclusion. The internal difficulties in Korea in 1882 were used by the Japanese and the Chinese as an excuse to established their own military forces in Korea. Rivalries at that time were primarily landbased. But it was of course again in 1884 after the failure of a Japanese-backed coup in Seoul, that the senior Japanese representative in the peninsula escaped by the skin of his teeth by resort to a naval vessel lying off Inchon.

The tragedy of Korea was that for succeeding years, it found itself the unwitting focus of superpower rivalries. These rivalries were largely land-based between China and Japan, and again this fact reminds us of Corbett’s 19th Century principle quoted earlier that naval strategy involves an assessment of the role of the fleet in relation to land forces. At sea, there was no shortage of activity: no shortage again of attempts by the great powers to demonstrate their influence through sea-power. The Russians for instance paid particular attention to the potential of Wonsan. They saw the chance of a warm water port whose occupation by the Russians would act as a useful bal-
ance to the icebound problems they faced in Vladivostok. As if to counter Russian activity, the British navy occupied Komondo in 1885. I do not need to go into the history of Port Hamilton for the RAS. The important point, however, to recall is that Komondo occupies a dominant position in the Korean straights and the presence of British naval forces there assured them, until their withdrawal in 1887, of continuing influence in the area.

But of much greater importance for our theme were the activities which began on the 25th of July 1894 off the West coast of Korea when just before 8 am in the morning three Japanese warships met two Chinese warships beyond the channel which leads from the town of Asan. Movement by one of the Chinese warships encouraged the Japanese to believe they were about to be attacked and the Naniwa opened fire at about 3,000 metres. As the ships closed, the other two Japanese ships opened fire and thus began one of those inconclusive actions which characterised naval engagements in the second half of the 19th Century. Fortuitously an incident then intervened of a perplexing quality for the Japanese; a Chinese warship appeared accompanied by a merchant ship flying the British red ensign. The perplexing nature of this situation for the Japanese was further enhanced by the fact that the Kowsing, as the vessel was called, was indeed British under a British captain but she was carrying ammunition, field guns and 1100 soldiers for the Chinese Army. The Japanese captain on the Naniwa could not let the Kowsing go free and the Japanese captain of the Naniwa decided that a neutral ship could not openly carry enemy men and material and as a result he sank the Kowsing. Regrettably, following the vessel’s sinking, Japanese troops on the Naniwa fired on the Chinese troops in the water with the objective of preventing their rescue.

The Sino-Japanese War had begun. In due course this naval action off the Korean coast near Asan led to the destruction of the Chinese fleet off the shores of Haiyang in the North of the Bay of Korea near the mouth of the Yellow River. 17 December 1894 was a fine day with a clear sky and a calm sea. The vessels sighted each other at 11.40 am. 12 Japanese ships matched by 12 Chinese. At 12.03 the battle began with two fleets converging on each other at a combined speed of 17 knots. It was a battle of nerve as to who would fire first. The Chinese nerve snapped. They opened up from 4 miles away but with this their line fell into disorder. The Japanese on the other hand maintained their order of battle, searched for the best killing range and in due course destroyed 5 of the 12 Chinese ships for no losses of their own. The essential point about this victory, of course, again in the context of our theme is that it provided the Japanese with the freedom they needed to control Korea
and subsequently to enter into China. The Treaty of Shiminoseki in April 1895 led to Chinese concessions over Korea, its accessibility to Japanese influence and the opening of Chinese ports to Japanese trade. The Sino-Japanese War had, therefore, fitted in well to our concept of the exercise of naval power in the support of Japan’s diplomatic objectives in the area. This had not been a case of the exercise of threat, it had rather been the use of Japan’s newly found navy to achieve the dominance in North East Asia which it had sought for many centuries.

Naval power and the conflicting interests of the powers in the North East Asian region were again at the heart of the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-5. And again, Britain played an important if not always benevolent role in the surrounding events, for by concluding the Anglo-Japanese Treaty of 1902, the Japanese had hoped both to provide some assurance against the threat of aggression from Russia and also to ensure some international recognition for their own aspirations in the Northeast Asian region. The Japanese sought to get clear recognition by Britain of Japanese aims in Korea. Britain was not prepared to go as far as that, but Article 1 of the Treaty referred vaguely to Japan being “interested in a peculiar degree politically as well as commercially and industrially in Korea.”

Building on this, the Japanese then in 1903 sought to secure agreement from the Russians that, inter alia, Japan had special political and economic interests in Korea. The Russians resisted this, and in February 1904, the Japanese broke off diplomatic relations with Russia and the Japanese fleet under Admiral Togo attacked and trapped the Russian fleet in port Arthur. Once again, therefore, the assertion of naval power in the Northeast Asian region was at the heart of resettlement of diplomatic objectives, and it was from a British built ship, the Mikasa, which had been completed in 1902 that Admiral Togo gave his orders to close on the Russian fleet in Port Arthur. Out of seven Russian battleships at anchor in Port Arthur, three were hit, but it was not the comprehensive victory which the Japanese had sought. (And in this respect, it is worth noting that this surprise attack in February 1904 was no more comprehensively successful than the surprise attack made on Pearl Harbour by the Japanese fleet in December 1941.)

Port Arthur fell, war was declared between Japan and Russia and once again it was Korea that fell victim to the consequences. The war prosecuted by Japan in the North of the Korean peninsula, around the Yellow River and also in Manchuria was successful, with the Japanese capturing Mukden in March 1905. But this land conflict was not without cost and it was again with the application of naval power that the conflict was brought to an end with the
success of Togo's Japanese fleet over the Russians at the Battle of Tsushima on 27-28 May 1905.

The Tsushima battle was epoch making in its own way. In the first place, it nearly never took place. As you may recall, the Russian fleet travelled to the Far East from the Baltic and on its way through the North Sea in October 1904 came within an ace of bringing Britain into the conflict with Japan. They fired on and sank some British trawlers fishing off the Doggar Bank in the belief that they were Japanese torpedo boats. You may ask how on earth the Russians could have believed that Japanese torpedo boats were operating so far from home in the North Sea. The explanation lies in the espionage activities of two Japanese naval Lieutenant Commanders who had worked in shipping offices in St Petersburg to secure information about the imperial Russian navy and subsequently in order to plant disinformation, which the Russians believed, about the possibility of there being an attack on the Russian navy in the North Sea.

The second crucial feature of the battle of Tsushima was that it was the first major sea battle since 1827 when a British, French and Russian fleet had confronted the Turks and Egyptians at Navarino Bay in Greece.

Thirdly, it was the first major naval battle between steamships equipped with the modern armaments which were to characterise naval building in the rest of the 20th Century. It was Tsushima which led the British First Sea Lord, Admiral Jackie Fisher, to come up with two major conclusions about ship building which were at the heart of the revolution inherent in the building of HMS Dreadnought in 1960: first the importance of speed — having the advantage of a few knots over the Russians gave the Japanese an immense element of superiority; secondly the ability to fire a battleship's big guns accurately at long range dispensed with the need for small superfluous guns. It was the epoch-making Fisher who commented after Tsushima “if, as seems probable, the lesson is equally appreciated and acted on by other maritime powers, it is evident that all existing battleships will shortly become obsolescent and our proponderance of vessels in that class will be of little use.” Thus begun an international programme of naval rebuilding and redesign. It was wholly the result of the battle of Tsushima and represented a major turning point in the naval construction of the 20th Century.

Fourthly, and finally, it was Japan's success at Tsushima; it was the inheritance which is the result Togo left for his successors, and it was the realisation of the potential effectiveness of naval power that led to the progressive build-up of Japanese strength in this area and which ultimately saw its apotheosis in December 1941.
Those were of course major naval and international consequences from the battle of Tsushima. There were more local ones which, again, formed part of the tragedy of Korea’s history. It was as a result of the success which their navy had at Tsushima that the Japanese were able to insist in the Treaty of Portsmouth, New Hampshire, of September 1905 on Russian recognition of their predominance in Korea; on the transfer to Japan of leases on Port Arthur and Dairen; and in effect their total dominance in the Northeast Asian region.

Thus began an uneasy peace between Japan and the Western nations with Pacific interests from 1905 to 1941. Countries like Korea suffered of course from oppression during this period and in due course that fate befell Manchuria and the rest of China. It was following the Portsmouth Treaty in November 1905 that Korea was forced to agree to a Japanese protectorate which in due course was to lead to the Treaty of Annexation in August 1910.

KOREA’S ANNEXATION TO 1941

I do not intend to go into as full an analysis of the sea-power diplomacy relationship in this longer and more complex period. To do so, although fascinating, would on the one hand detain us for too long and on the other would take us away from our principle focus which is the North East Asian region. But there are, nevertheless, one or two elements of the operation of sea power in this region during that period on which I should like to dwell.

First, gunboat diplomacy. Let us revert to this aspect of our analysis: the use of naval power to threaten and exert influence. This continued in the Far Eastern region in the inter-war period and was particularly prevalent of course in the struggle for influence by the great powers in China. Just a few examples. In August 1921, the United States navy established an Yangtze River patrol “to protect US interests, lives and property and to maintain and improve friendly relations with the Chinese people.” Needless to say, the first objective was the principal one and as such of course characteristic of the type of pretext so often used for gunboat diplomacy.

In the next year, a British gunboat rescued President Sun Yat sen from Canton after his defeat by Chinese rebels and took him to Shanghai. In 1923, warships from a variety of the great powers (including Japan) were despatched to Canton to protect the Customs House, which was then under foreign administration against seizure by the Chinese government. In 1927, there was a major action in January and February when a British expeditionary force and US Marines landed at Shanghai to protect the international
concession from Chinese aggression. Altogether 25 international warships were concentrated in Shanghai (9 of them were British) and 40,000 troops and marines were landed or held off shore to deter the Chinese revolutionary armies from attacking. In the following month, March 1927, British and US warships bombarded Nanking to cover the evacuation of foreign nationals after attacks by Chinese troops on the foreign consulates.

The examples continue. But what is of particular interest and importance is that in the catalogue of incidents, action by Japanese warships in support of their own interests in China gradually began to occur. Japanese warships landed Japanese Marines in April 1928 to protect Japanese interests against Chiang Kai Shek’s troops. And then in January 1932, Japanese warships including an aircraft carrier bombarded a suburb of Shanghai and landed sailors ashore after attacks on Japanese subjects and a boycott of Japanese goods. This intervention was in fact unsuccessful and the Japanese troops were ultimately obliged to withdraw. The comparative lack of success of this intervention compared with the success of those mounted by the other great power tempts us to reflect upon the over ambitious nature of Japan’s attempts to engage in gunboat diplomacy at this stage. Then later in the period we are considering, as the clouds of war began to gather in the Pacific, it was Japan which became the object of gunboat diplomacy. In May 1939, Britain, France and the United States sent warships to land sailors at Kulangsu in China to protect the international settlement there against incursion by Japanese forces. And in January 1940 the British ship HMS Liverpool stopped a Japanese passenger ship the Sasama Maru 35 miles off Tokyo to remove German passengers who were suspected of being German reservists on their way home to Germany.

Gunboat diplomacy was, therefore, alive and active in the period before the outbreak of the Second World War in the Pacific in 1941. It was an implicit piece of gunboat diplomacy, in spite of the fact that war had already broken out, that produced one of Britain’s major naval disasters in the Pacific area on 10 December 1941. Following the build up of tension in the Pacific in the autumn of 1941, the British government decided to despatch two of its most powerful vessels, HMS Repulse and HMS Prince of Wales, to Singapore as a threat to Japanese troop transports which were thought likely to operate in the Southeast Asian area. Given the threat from Japanese carrier borne aircraft, it was thought essential that these two capital ships not set to sea without the protection of their own air power. The new aircraft carrier HMS Indomitable was earmarked for this purpose but was at the last moment put out of action by accidental grounding. Thus these two great ships — a battle-
cruiser of First World War vintage and on of the newest King George V class of battleships sailed for the Far East without the requisite protection from the one form of Japanese attack, carrier borne aircraft, which only days later was to show itself so effective at Pearl Harbour. On 9 December, after war had broken out, the Prince of Wales and the Repulse were informed that no land based fight protection would be available as they steered in search of the Japanese transports. And then, inexorably at it seemed, attacks on both ships by high level bombers and torpedo bombers from the Japanese fleet began at 11am on 10 December. By 1.20 pm both ships had been sunk with the loss of over 800 officers and men. The efficiency of Japanese air power had again been demonstrated. Two major British capital ships deployed as the most threatening possible demonstration of British naval power in the Pacific had been destroyed at trifling cost to the Japanese.

The second aspect of the relationship between naval power and diplomacy in the inter-war period which I should like briefly to consider concerns the attempts which were made to limit naval building and thus on the one hand reduce the threat to international security and on the other to limit the drain on national exchequers involved in massive naval rebuilding programmes. The process revolved around two naval conferences, one in Washington 1921-22 and one in London in 1930. Both are relevant to the history of this region because of the involvement of Japan.

In Britain, the urge towards restraint in Naval construction was motivated by the wish to save Government expenditure. Social Services took priority over military expenditure in the aftermath of the First World War. In August 1919, the armed services in Britain were given the now famous order to draft their estimates “on the assumption that the British Empire will not be engaged in any great war during the next ten years.” This initiated the ten-year rule which led to massive cuts in naval allocations from, for instance, an annual expenditure of £356 million in 1918-19, to projections for naval expenditure of £80 million in 1921 and £56 million in 1922. By then the manpower, warship strength and purchasing power of Royal Naval allocations was less than in the immediate pre-war years. There were no modern capital ships under construction apart from HMS Hood whereas the Japanese and the Americans were, respectively, bringing 8 and 12 such ships in to service.

It was against this background that the invitation to the Washington Naval Conference was received. It produced the 5-5-3 relationship between the British, American and Japanese navies. There were restrictions on the construction of replacement vessels and the Anglo-Japanese alliance which we will recall of 1902, as revised in 1905, was dissolved to be replaced by a
new agreement to respect the possessions of the main powers in the Far East. The treaty was in effect thrust upon the world by the American administration. It gave them the sort of peaceful assurances required by the post-Versailles isolationist spirit which was spreading in the United States. It removed the Anglo-Japanese Alliance which the US thought destabilising. It aimed to replace it by a settlement of territorial disputes in Northeast Asia which was satisfactory to the Chinese. It was however also very satisfactory to the Japanese. The US Secretary of State gave the Japanese confidential recognition for their extensive railway and industrial interests in China and the doors were opened for further commercial and industrial links. And as China continued to suffer from internal rebellion and regional strife, the Japanese were able to use the existence of these commercial interests to justify the maintenance of military forces for their protection.

The same could indeed be said of Britain and her interests around Shanghai. We have noted earlier the extent to which China became a focus of gunboat diplomacy in the inter-war period. To some extent, the Washington treaty system was more than a naval limitation exercise as far as the Far East was concerned. It provided further justification for inter-power rivalry on the Chinese mainland.

This was the background to the second naval conference in London in 1930 at a time when the original ten-year naval holiday on capital ship construction was ending and the Japanese navy wanted to raise its own battleship strength by 10%. This all meant changing the 5-5-3 ratio of the Washington Conference to a 10-10-7 ratio to improve Japan's position.

The London conference again demonstrated the profound influence of Naval power on the Northeast Asian political scene. The Japanese secured their improvement to a ratio of 7 as opposed to 10 for Britain and the US, but only in respect of cruisers, vessels with smaller than 8 inch guns. They did not secure the improvement in respect of battleships. Failure in this respect was badly received by army factions in Tokyo. This led to protests from imperial navy officers and the shooting of Prime Minister Hamaguchi at Tokyo station on 14 November 1930. It was this shooting which strained to the limit democratic processes in Tokyo and which, with the enhancement of the influence of the military, led to the famous Mukden incident on the night of 18-19 September 1931 when an explosion fabricated by the Japanese army provided the pretext for them to despatch troops into Manchuria.

It is no small irony to us sitting here in Korea reviewing these events that the Mukden incident of 1931, which reflected the swing to militarism in Japan and precipitated the events which led to the Second World War, should
on the one hand have resulted from what were perceived as the unsatisfactory results of a naval conference in London and on the other that the Minister of Home affairs in the Japanese Government who connived in the collapse of democratic government in the face of the Mukden incident was Adachi Kenzo, thought to have been one of those involved on 8 October 1895 in the storming of the Kyongbok Palace and the assassination of Queen Min.

**AFTER THE SECOND WORLD WAR**

We now move to the post-war period and we can again focus briefly on two phenomena: first, the influence of naval activity of the Korean war and secondly, again, the role of gunboat diplomacy in the Far East.

In spite of gunboat activity in relation to China in the late 1940s (which I will outline in a moment), there was nothing in the lead-up to the Korean War which reflected the influence of naval activity and naval power on the politics of the region in the same way as was true of the period before the Second World War. Although the surrender of the Japanese on 2 September 1945 was conducted on the quarterdeck of the USS Missouri in Tokyo Bay in a way which vividly demonstrated the dominant influence of naval power in achieving Allied success in the Pacific, the Far Eastern region in the five years which followed was largely free from naval influence. The process of events which led to the outbreak of the Korean War was in military terms a matter for land forces, but I suppose that Dean Acheson's ill-advised speech in January 1950 when he outlined the US defence perimeter, and in doing so, excluded Korea, implied an area of defence activity in naval terms which included US naval bases in Japan and the Philippines but implied no extension of US military influence through naval activity in the area of the Korean peninsula.

Thus the Korean War started and with it, the early commitment of US naval power through the decision of President Truman and the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 25 June 1950 to deploy the Seventh Fleet northwards from the Philippines towards Japan. Once the conflict had begun, the Korean War again gives us evidence of how naval power was brought to bear in the region.

Most obviously, and in the first place, McArthur's brilliant surprise move in landing his marine assault force at Inchon on 15 September 1950 was a dazzling reminder of the effectiveness of amphibious operations in the Pacific war. That deployment of naval power turned the tide dramatically in the
Korean conflict.

But we should also not forget the importance of naval power elsewhere during the conflict, for throughout the entire Korean conflict, one of the most important assets which the UN Command possessed was its ability to deploy aircraft from carriers close in shore wherever these might be needed. As well as the US Seventh Fleet, the Royal Navy operated in strength in the conflict. The British Far East fleet was situated west of Korea in the Yellow Sea and the American Seventh Fleet in the Sea of Japan and east of Korea, reflecting the concentration in the Korean campaign on the land war, the UN Command had virtually undisputed control of the sea. Britain deployed two aircraft carriers to fly sorties in support of the ground conflict.

Furthermore, cruisers and destroyers often worked close in shore bombarding targets. Royal naval vessels were also joined by Australian, New Zealand and Canadian ships. The ability to deploy aircraft; the bombardment of coastal targets; the interdiction of coastal traffic; and the maintenance of an embargo from the sea - all these tasks fulfilled by naval forces during the Korean War, as well as the preeminent task of mounting and supporting the invasion at Inchon, were crucial to the overall operation. It is also relevant that without such dominant naval power, the successful evacuation of the US First Marine Division from Hungnam after their withdrawal from the bitter privations of the Changjin Reservoir in December 1950 would not have been possible. Without the ability to withdraw the First Marine Division by sea, the near tragedy of the advance to the Changjin Reservoir could have turned into a catastrophe.

Although this brief analysis suggests a limited but important role for naval power in the Korean War, it is also worth considering its larger consequences. For just as the Korean War itself steeled the West to strengthen its own defences, so the weapons systems of the West (particularly naval tactics) were significantly affected by the experience of the Korean War. Aircraft carriers deployed off the Korean coast played such a varied and flexible role in the application of air power that important judgements were made which have affected, in particular, the US Navy ever since. For instance, the Essex class escort carriers which were left over from the Second World War and which were originally deployed in Korea, were gradually re-equipped with the steam catapults and reinforced flight decks needed to handle heavy jet aircraft. In turn the angle decks with which we are familiar in today's aircraft carrier were added. From 1951-57, construction of one carrier a year was begun until the USS Forrestal joined the US fleet in 1955 and thus opened a new era as the first of the attack carriers which are now the backbone of US naval power.
world-wide. And it is worth adding that it was the shift of US naval building in this direction which then provoked the Soviet Union under Admiral Gorshkov to begin the construction programme which shifted the Soviet Navy from the coastal defence force of the 1940s and 1950s to a blue-water navy with carriers, all this an important by-product of the Korean War.

I said that I would also look briefly at the ways in which gun boat diplomacy had been employed in the Far Eastern region in the post-Second World War period. Although, as I have explained already, this was a tactical approach little used in the run-up to the Korean War, this is one area of the world in which, following the Korean War, we have been able to detect more than the region’s fair share of gun boat diplomacy. What is particularly noteworthy and perhaps significant for the future is that this application of gun boat diplomacy has not been restricted to the former international naval powers.

For instance, in 1953 and 1954, the South Korean government used naval vessels to seize Japanese fishing boats to protect their own fishing grounds. South Korean forces were deployed to land troops on Takeshima Island to stake the claim of the Seoul government against that of Japan. Actions against Japanese fishing vessels by Korean warships were repeated in 1955 and in 1959. And then of course on 23 January 1968, the North Koreans engaged in one of the most blatant pieces of gun boat diplomacy seen in this part of the world in recent years with the seizure of the USS Pueblo and the capture of her crew to prevent US naval vessels engaging in electronic surveillance of the coast. The US of course reacted with the deployment of carriers in the Sea of Japan as a threat to North Korea; a move which was repeated in April 1969 following the shooting down of a US surveillance aircraft by the North Koreans. The North again in February 1974 sank what they alleged to be a South Korean spy ship and there were similar incidents later in that year. And then in 1979, the South Koreans retaliated with similar action against a North Korean spy ship.

We can now turn to a brief conclusion: Is gun boat diplomacy and the application of maritime power in support of political and diplomatic objectives likely to be a growth industry in the Northeast Asian region?

The answer to this question is, I suppose, regrettably yes. The examples which I gave a moment ago of the use to which this naval tactic has been put by both North and South Korea are indicative, and as I outlined earlier in this lecture, there is a strong historical pedigree in this region for the use of naval forces to exploit the pretensions and defend the interests of powers seeking to dominate and influence affairs in such a sensitive region of the world.
The activities at the turn of the century which left Korea at the mercy of Japan, Russia and China, are all geopolitical facts which are bound to remain valid. We also now, of course, face a different situation to that on which the existing US maritime strategy was based when it was developed under the auspices of Secretary of the Navy John Lehman and the Naval Chief of Staff Admiral Watkins in the United States nearly 10 years ago. In Far Eastern terms the threat to the US and the region was seen from Soviet naval power in Vladivostok and the Sea of Okhotsk where Soviet nuclear submarines are based. Dealing with the threat from this area was deemed one of the main objectives of Reagan administration maritime strategy. Indeed, it was John Lehman himself who pointed out in 1986 that "Today the United States has an Asian orientation at least equal to its historic engagements in Europe." With over 30% of total US trade in Asia it was inevitable that the maritime strategy should concentrate upon achieving the freedom of the seas and access to overseas markets. This strategy is heavily dependent on deployment of the carrier battle groups which were integral to the Lehman-Watkins Maritime Strategy. Indeed it has been estimated that under current force levels, the United States may be able to assemble five carriers organised in two battle groups for deployment against the Soviet threat in the Sea of Okhotsk or indeed against any other regional threat to peace.

Now, however, with the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the emphasis which has been laid by both Russia and the Ukraine on ensuring our availability of naval forces in the Arctic Ocean, Baltic and Black Sea areas, the question is raised about the relevance of the Maritime Strategy to the changed threat. Is the carrier battle group the most cost effective way of showing the flag and keeping peace in North East Asia? The answer probably has to be that since the naval build-up under the Reagan Administration has now achieved its results and since battle groups of the size and potency of those now in existence are available, the wide range of roles which they are able to exercise is such as to ensure their continuing relevance particularly at a time when we are entering a decade of uncertain future development.

Indeed, those future uncertain developments can be identified in maritime affairs in the region. Up to now, South Korean maritime security has been directed specifically against North Korean naval operations aimed at the infiltration of agents, small scale amphibious assaults and raids and interdiction of supplies to the South. This is immediately evident from the nature of the North Korean navy with 169 torpedo-equipped fast attack craft, 152 gun-equipped fast attack craft and 157 amphibious craft: a formidable armada of small vessels. North Korea too possesses 64 submarines with a proportion of
2:1 being migdet submarines. South Korea's more balanced forces with 16 destroyers and frigates and 22 corvettes as well as a significant number of fast attack craft have been designed to meet that threat. Clearly the Republic of Korea has to maintain naval forces designed to achieve that limited objective.

At the same time, it is no doubt thinking beyond that immediate and possibly reducing prospect and, like Japan, given its heavy dependence on international trade, wondering what resources it has to deploy in order to ensure a wider zone of maritime security around the peninsula. Korea only has to look at the scale of Japanese naval spending to find the direction in which to move, for Japan already has more destroyers and submarines than many European states, 42 and 14 respectively as well as 16 frigates and 32 mine sweepers. Japan is even committed to the construction of Aegis class air defence ships, of the type now deployed with the US navy which many European nations have considered too expensive for their own needs at a full load of 8900 tonnes. To move forward in the same direction will, of course, be an expensive and formidable undertaking for a country like Korea, but in the words of a British researcher on this subject: "the potential importance of the task to a maritime country like the Republic of Korea is indisputable."
O.N. Denny, Eki Hioki, and Syngman Rhee: Documents from the Papers of Henry Gehard Appenzeller

by Daniel Davies

The letter from O.N. Denny, interview with Eki Hioki, and two letters from Syngman Rhee reprinted below come from the papers of Henry G. Appenzeller (1885-1902).¹

Appenzeller received the letter from O.N. Denny and conducted the interview with Eki Hioki in his capacity as editor of the Korean Repository from 1895-1899. Neither Denny’s letter nor the interview with Hioki ever found their way into print. Appenzeller also founded a mission school for the Methodist mission, Paichai Hakdang in 1886 which he developed into a center for the Independence movement of 1896-1899. Syngman Rhee (Yi Seung-man), the president of the Republic of Korea from 1948 to 1960, studied in Appenzeller’s Paichai from 1895 to 1898, emerging as a leader in the Independence Club during that same period. Rhee wrote the two letters included in this series of documents out of their relationship as student/teacher at Paichai and out of their work together in the Independence Club.

We have reproduced the documents in chronological order—Denny’s reflections on the Kabo Reform movement (1894-1896), HGA’s interview with Japanese embassy official Eki Hioki concerning the assassination of Queen Min on 8 October 1895, and two letters from prison by Syngman Rhee after his arrest in December 1898 for leading Independence Club demonstrations in front of the Palace. Taken together, these documents offer insights into the 1885 to 1900 period of Korean history—the era of Chinese dominance prior to 1894, the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95, the kabо Reforms of 1894-1896, the assassination of Queen Min, the Independencemovement of 1896-1898, and the prison life of Syngman Rhee.
O.N. Denny’s Letter to Henry G. Appenzeller

INTRODUCTION

Denny, a United States citizen, served King Kojong as Vice President of the Korean Home Office and Director of Foreign Affairs from the spring of 1886 until the spring of 1890. Denny had served as the United States consul at Tientsin, China, from 1877 to 1880, and as consul general at Shanghai from 1880 to 1883 prior to serving as an advisor to the Korean government.

When the Dennys arrived in Korea in the spring of 1886, a small Protestant missionary and diplomatic community greeted them, among them Henry and Ella Appenzeller. The Dennys and the Appenzellers developed a warm friendship during the time they resided in Seoul together.

Denny wrote the following letter in reply to a letter and a copy of the Korean Repository (January 1895) that he had received from Appenzeller. Although suitable for publication in the Korean Repository in the Letters-to-the Editor column, Appenzeller never published the letter. Possibly he planned to publish the letter, but the assassination of Queen Min in October 1895 swamped him with articles and he set Denny’s letter aside. In any event, Denny’s letter is an important primary source on Korean history during the period of 1877 to 1890.

Text

[envelope]

The Portland Savings Bank,
Portland, Oregon
O.N. Denny—Receiver

Rev. H.G. Appenzeller
Seoul, Korea

[letter]

H.G. Appenzeller, Esq.,
Seoul, Corea

Portland, Oregon
March 30, 1895
My Dear Mr. Appenseller [sic];

Your short and welcome favor of January 25th [1895] is at hand, and right glad I was to hear from you. I received the *Corean Repository* [sic], and have read it through with much interest. I hope you will consider me a subscriber, and send it to me regularly.

I am very glad to note what you say about the reforms which are beginning to show themselves on the surface in Korea. Nobody knows better than you and other good friends we had in Seoul how hard I labored to bring about a better state of things internally and externally for the King and Corean people, but it was a hard job. I knew, though, my efforts would result in good in the future.

Most of the reforms alluded to in Mr. Hulbert's article I discussed frankly with the King and his advising officers, but the old custom was so deep seated there little can be done at any one time. It must be done gradually, and the changes brought so gently that the people will hardly realize themselves that changes are being made.

In one of my audiences just before I left Corea, the King asked me what would be necessary for him to do in order to make his country as prosperous as America and other western countries. I replied that the first step would be to wipe out all class distinctions and open up official life to competitors based upon energy, study, and efficiency; that it would be necessary also to make labor respectable and honorable, just as it is made honorable in western countries, that in western countries encouragement is given to every man to earn his own living; that it is laudable and honorable, and that Corea is the only country on the face of the earth that offers a premium on idleness.

I referred to the *Yang Ban* class. As you know, that class has been heretofore supported in absolute idleness, and the rule is so inexorable, that the laboring man must give to him out of his own earnings. If he is not able to pay his way he must be supported by the laboring people in absolute idleness.

I alluded to this state of things in two or three audiences which I had with the King. His majesty replied that this was a custom of so long standing that it would be very difficult to over throw it, as the *Yang Ban* were a powerful class in Corea. I then referred to the fact that in Japan at one time the Sameri [sic, *Samurai*], or the warriors of the short and long sword had become offensive in the use of these weapons that the Emperor wished to abolish the distinction. He did not wish to offend this strong and powerful class, and the way he got around it was by issuing a proclamation that it should be lawful for every man in Japan to wear the long and short sword
who chose to do so. That made the custom so common that it did away with
the privilege, and hence this privileged class threw aside the use of these
swords.

So I said to the King that all that would be necessary to be done was the
issuance of a royal proclamation to the effect that labor in Korea from this
time on should be honorable, and that it should be incumbent upon each sub-
ject to earn his own living in some way; that would dispose of the whole
question, and I see in Mr. Hulbert's letter [article] a resolution pointing in that
direction.

I recommended also, as you know, the development of the internal
wealth of Korea, and the establishing diplomatic relations with the western
world; a revision of the laws, or abrogation of customs which Korea's treaties
rendered impracticable of execution, and that other rules which would support
a prosperous course be adopted in their stead.

You know, too, as well as all others in the East, how accurate I was with
reference to the independence of Korea. I pointed out to the Viceroy in my
last audience just as clearly the present status of affairs between China and
Japan as if I had the history of the last eight or nine months to have spoken
from. The victorious march of the Japanese, both on land and water, there-
fore, has been no surprise to me. I knew from Japanese sources that there
was a time coming when the various disturbances between the Japanese and
Chinese would be leveled up, and to that end the Japs were always preparing,
drilling and manoeuvring for the purpose of being masters of the situation
when a critical time came.

I knew the vassal dogma set up by the Chinese was without merit or any-
thing upon which to rest such a condition on the part of China; that after
China had made treaties with Corea and Corea with the leading western coun-
tries, including Japan, they would never consent to give up the valuable con-
cessions acquired, commercial and political, without a desperate struggle to
maintain those treaties with Corea; that to admit vassalage between China and
Corea would be to abrogate all of those treaties.

In that memorable interview lasting from eight o'clock in the evening
until half past three in the morning, I told the Viceroy that what has happened
would be sure to be the result, if China persisted in her then attitude towards
Corea; that it would cost China millions of dollars and thousands of lives, and
the destruction of a great deal of property, as well as lay waste to Corea
herself, if China persisted in maintaining such a doctrine in Corea. A friend of
mine the other day wrote me that the Viceroy expressed to him the opinion
that if my advice had been listened to that China would have been saved the
greatest humiliation that had ever come to any nation, but now it is too late.

I feel very sorry for the poor Viceroy. He was willing enough to give up the idea of reducing Corea to the vassal state, but his government would not let him. Yuan\textsuperscript{11} was determined on this point, and having powerful support at the Court of Peking, was enabled to over rule the Viceroy in this matter.

As a result of that mistaken policy China is disgraced and humiliated in the eyes of the world, and now the Viceroy lies a dangerously wounded man in the country of the enemy as a result of Yuan’s reckless and ill-advised course in Corea. While I was sure that the Japanese would be victorious, I did not dream that it would be so overwhelming and complete as it has been. Just to think of it, not a single reverse in this war has ever come to the arms of the Japanese, either on ships or on land. They have shown themselves to be possessed of a high order of military skill, courage, and patriotism necessary to win battles, and if a satisfactory adjustment is not made by Li at Simonomaki\textsuperscript{12} [sic] Japan will dictate terms of peace from Pekin as the English and French did in 1860.

I cannot say that I regret the controversy, because I believe it will be the means of thoroughly opening up the interior of China to Western inventions and the influences of western civilization. I do, though, from the bottom of my heart feel sorry for Li. He is a man of the highest order of patriotism, thoroughly loyal to his government and his people, and to be wounded nigh unto death in trying to extricate his government from a condition of things resulting from bad advice, and which was in opposition to his own judgment and advice, it is hard indeed. This war, too, will free Corea completely from the blighting influence of Chinese domination in that country. The next thing they will have to fear will be from the ever victorious Japs.

I look, however, to see various reforms introduced and a much more prosperous government in Corea from this time on than had existed heretofore.

I hope that everybody in Seoul of our old friends and acquaintances are in good health, and that they are getting along satisfactorily in their missionary and other work. You will have with you a young medical missionary by the name of Wells about the 1st of May [1895].\textsuperscript{13} The Dr. has been in to see me several times. He seems anxious to get into his new field of labor, and I think will be a conscientious worker with you in relieving the sufferings of the Corean people.

I have not been well for some time, having been attacked again by the grippe while in the Legislature;\textsuperscript{14} although I am much better than I have been, I am not free from the effects of it yet. Mrs. Denny\textsuperscript{15} is very well, and joins
me in love and good will for you all.

Sincerely yours,

P.S. Before Mr. [Franklin] Ohlinger left [the Ohlingers departed Korea in the Fall of 1893] he wrote me concerning my subscription to the stock in the recreation grounds.\(^{16}\) I will be thankful to you if you will write me the present status of that subscription, and whether I will, with the others, receive any consideration for that interest.

Report of Conversation between Mr. E [ki] Hioke [sic, Hioki] and the Rev. Appenzeller (Methodist Episcopal Misson, Seoul) at the Japanese Legation, Seoul, 12th October 1895

INTRODUCTION

The Japanese embassy in Seoul planned and instigated the assassination of Queen Min Myongsong (1851-1895) on 8 October 1895.\(^1\) Appenzeller—accompanied by Alexander Kenmure\(^2\) interviewed one of the Japanese embassy staff, Eki Hioki, on 12 October 1895, four days after the murder of the Queen. Hioki, who spoke and wrote in English, had served as Appenzeller’s source of information at least two times prior to this interview.\(^3\) At the time of Appenzeller’s interview with Hioki, Miura Goro (1846-1926), Lieutenant-General in the Japanese embassy in Seoul, attempted to cast all the blame for Queen Min’s assassination upon factions in the Korean government and military. Appenzeller, outraged by the assassination of Queen Min, wrote and published extensively upon the assassination, and upon the investigation following.\(^4\) But, he never published his interview with Eki Hioki, which follows:

Text

[Hioki]:—The recent troubles between [Seoul Korean] policemen and [Korean] soldiers [in Seoul, 3 October 1895 to 6 October 1895],\(^5\) it is said, comes partly from the jealousies between them, but the real cause is that there
has been intrigues between the factions, and you know that the newly drilled soldiers⁷ have not been liked by the faction.⁷ We have heard from time to time of this friction. The new soldiers wanted to be placed in the place of honor because they think they are better than the old soldiers, that they ought to be taken into the confidence of the King. But the party in the Court [Queen Min] did not like it; they wished to disband the new soldiers.⁸

Appenzeller:—The old soldiers [i.e., Palace guards under col. Hyon] are those trained by General Dye?⁹

Answer [Hioki]:—Yes. The new soldiers wanted to take the place of these old soldiers. Some intrigues have gone on very actively, and the Conservative party in the Court¹⁰ wished to put an end to the new company. At least, such is my impression, and I think it is reasonable. Those factions in the Court wanted to find some pretext for disbanding the new soldiers and in order to create this pretext they gave some plan to the chief of the police (i.e., the son-in-law of the Tai Wan Kun).¹¹ It seems to have given some opportunity for soldiers and the police to come into collision.

I happened to be at hand when the conflict took place. This man went into the court, with a highly exaggerated account of the troubles, and counselled the King to disband the newly drilled soldiers. What the representative of the police said to the King was known to the soldiers and the military people shortly afterwards. And he knew that he was in danger unless he can have his plan carried out in time to prevent anything happening. And so they say that he caused purposely the second trouble [6 October 1895] that happened some days after at night when the soldiers are said to have attacked the police headquarters. At the time of the second trouble the Minister of War (An)¹² came to the place where the Japanese soldiers were and asked them to help him to suppress the second trouble.

At first one of the Japanese officers went to the scene of trouble (he went alone, to the front of the police headquarters). He found nobody—the place perfectly quiet. He went in and made enquiry. He asked what soldiers made the attack, and was told “the 2nd Company.” He went to its place, and found everything quiet. There was no signs of trouble. He went inside, and asked the Captain of the Company, and the Captain said nothing of the kind had taken place. None of his soldiers had broken out.

The Japanese officer looked in and could not understand the matter. The men were in bed asleep. He was satisfied that all the soldiers were there. Now this is said of some people very strange. Early next morning, Mr. Takhsi,¹³ Adviser of Police Department, wrote to Viscount Miura¹⁴ that he received a report that 300 soldiers attacked the head-quarters of police last night (6th
[October 1895]) and he asked the Count to take the matter into serious consideration. The present state of matters could not be allowed to continue.

At the same time he reported that the Police Department had had all their forces gathered in the head-quarters and that upon the attack they opened the gates, met the soldiers with drawn swords, and that the soldiers immediately ran away. This is the strange part of the story. If the soldiers really pre-meditated an attack, why should they run away? And if they did run away, and the police were ready to fight, why did they not arrest some soldiers?

This is interpreted in various ways. Some people say that it was a mere pretext. The morning of the 7th [October 1895], the King sent the Minister of War\(^5\) to Viscount Miursa, and he told the Count that the King wanted the opinion of the Count for disbanding the new soldiers. The Viscount told Mr. An: “Well, they are the Kings subjects and the King’s soldiers and the King can do as he likes,” that is a matter of course, but he said that it would not be advisable to do so at first without establishing some investigations, without have found out the facts, and besides that, these soldiers had been trained by Japanese soldiers by request of the King himself, and and in my opinion are better drilled than any in the country. If the King decided to disband these soldiers under these circumstances and without investigation he thought the King’s action would not be considered friendly to the Japanese. he must take steps to prevent any recurrence of such events and instead of disbanding the soldiers he should try to find out the real circumstances cause of the trouble.

The Minister of War [An Kyung-su] went back. Afterward, from what we heard after the event, the King had already decided to disarm these soldiers (their plan was to disarm them, and by the help of the factions in the Court to kill some of the principal people in the present government, the prime minister,\(^6\) the War Minister and others). This last item, however, is mere rumor, and I do not wish to be understood as stating it for fact.

This decision of the King was smelt-out by the soldiers. In the Evening [7 October 1895] about 6 or 7 o’clock [p.m.] a certain number of soldiers were at work, and a number of the police knowing that their enemies were to be disbanded, it is said that they spoke to the soldiers in a very scandalous manner and said, “You fools, you will be disbanded tomorrow.” This was outside the palace.

Appenzeller,—At this time the order for disbandment had not been issued?

Answer [Hioki]—No; the soldiers took the news to their quarters and entered into serious consideration. The officers felt that the matter was serious, and so, knowing that the Tai-Wan-Kun has been dissatisfied and has
been looking for something, they went in a body to his place and asked him to help them make an appeal to the King. Thereupon the Tai-Wan-Kun said: "Escort me to the palace and I will appeal for you."

Appenzeller—Where was the Tai-Wan-Kun?

Answer [Hioki]—At the river. That is one story we hear. I cannot say, but one can imagine that the matter was in the knowledge of the Tai-Won-Kun. I should think that this is only one side of the story.

Appenzeller—As to the entrance into the palace—when did they enter?—how did they get in?

answer [Hioki]—Between 4 and 5 o’clock [a.m., 8 October 1895].

Appenzeller—Of course, the soldiers in the palace knew what was going on. Were the soshi [i.e., Japanese civilians] with them?

Answer [Hioki]—Some Japanese were there, but whether they went in with them I cannot say.

Answer [Hioki]—They went in to pacify matters, and had only a small company of 25 or 30 men with them.

Appenzeller—How many soshi were arrested?

Answer [Hioki]—Some fifteen.

Appenzeller—In the palace?

Answer [Hioki]—No; coming out.

Appenzeller—They will be tried here by the Consul [Miura Goro]?

Answer [Hioki]—Yes; he has jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance and will act. The Foreign Office sent out Mr. J. Komura, President of the Diplomatic Bureau, for the special object of investigating this matter. He left Tokio on the 10th [October 1895] and is expected in a very short time. He was charge d’affaire at Pekin when the war broke out. He is a lawyer, educated at Harvard. He will have general charge.

Appenzeller—The points which trouble me most are the attack on the Queen, presence of the soshi, and the presence of Japanese officers during the indignities on the King and the Queen. It seems to me that Japan would not do any such thing.

[unrecorded dialogue]

Appenzeller.—Has the Minister [unidentified] a full beard?

Answer [Hioki].—[unrecorded reply]

Appenzeller.—Did Mr. Waber come here before he went into the palace? As was the idea?

Answer [Hioki]—Yes: I do not know.

Appenzeller.—It is said that the Japanese went in and were seen in civilian dress and that they made the assault upon the Queen, and that four ladies
were killed, including the Queen, and that the Crown Princess had been assaulted and pulled about by the hair of the head. How comes it that Japanese soldiers were there?

Answer [Hioki]—Until investigated, we cannot give any authoritative statement, but what we hear is that some soshi have been hired by the Tai-Won-Kun and at the same time some Koreans have been disguised in Japanese dress, and the idea was that as the Koreans are afraid of the Japanese unless they appeared the body guard of the King may resist, and so they think that the Tai-Won-Kun had a number of Koreans disguised.

Appenzeller—You don’t think any good will come if the Tai-Won-Kun and the Japanese working together?

Answer [Hioki]—The trouble is we have so many soshi who are mere adventurers. For instance, the attack upon the Crown Prince of Russia, although by a policeman, was really the work of a soshi, probably living on somebody’s private purse.

Appenzeller—Don’t you think that the Japanese are likely to be charged by Western powers with the murder of the Queen? The Queen was murdered before the foreign ministers arrived, but Japanese officers were present and saw the murder without interfering.

Answer [Hioki]—Some Japanese people are charged with not performing their proper duty. If they did not actually do any harm, at least they did not do their duty. We are waiting for instruction from home. They will probably be court-martialed and strictly punished.

Appenzeller—To my mind the presence of Japanese officers is damaging to the Japanese.

Answer [Hioki]—This is a very serious thing, and it must be the object of the government to show that it had nothing to do with the business. It must take the most public and open proceedings to prove that it had nothing to do with it. This is my private opinion. I think Mr. Komura will have full powers. Meantime, the consul is acting.

Appenzeller—The feeling among Korean people is very great. I suppose you know that many of the people do not want you. Of course you do not ask them about that. There are thousands of people who believe that the Japanese did this business, so that I should like to keep in touch with the work that goes on. Of course, we should not work for one party nor the other, but we shall be called to publish what we can. If we can be kept in touch with the investigations we should be very glad.

Answer [Hioki]—The matter is very grave and the charge against the Japanese cannot be overlooked.
Appenzeller—I heard outside that the Japanese Minister [Miura Goro] was in the palace when the butchery was going on. I do not think that it is true.

Answer [Hioki]—He left here about 5 o’clock [a.m., 8 October 1895].

Alex Kenmure. [signed] [agent of the British and Foreign Bible Society]

The Japanese embassy in Seoul, circa 1890.

Aftermath of the Battle of Pyongyang, 15 September 1894.
Syngman Rhee’s Letter to Henry G. Appenzeller

INTRODUCTION


After Kojong terminated Jaisohn’s contract as advisor to the throne and as editor of the Independent newspaper in April 1898, Jaisohn departed Korea for the United States. He left the Independence Club under the leadership of Yun Chi-ho (1865-1945). Rhee, and other Paichai students, moved into a prominent role in the Independence Club at that time, working closely with Yun.

From October to December 1898, the Independence Club demonstrated for a constitutional government and to protest the arrest of Independence Club leaders. Kojong had Rhee arrested for his leadership role in those demonstrations. Rhee wrote the two letters to Henry G. Appenzeller reproduced below during his imprisonment. They provide a rare glimpse into Rhee’s life in prison from 1899 to 1904.

Text

December 28, 1899¹

This day I received the following letter from Ye Sung Man [Syngman Rhee] who was arrested eleven months or so ago [9 January 1899]² while walking with Dr. [Harry C.] Sherman³ in Seoul. Ye was prominent in the People’s Meeting,⁴ made himself offensive to the people in power and was arrested by private detectives [9 January 1899].⁵ His arrest created considerable interest on the part of foreigners and just as he was on the point of getting out he was persuaded to break jail, failed to escape and returned to his cell. He was tried and sentenced to the chain-gang for life.⁶

In Christmas [1899] I sent him a little bedding and the following letter is his reply [Appenzeller recorded Ye’s letter below with errors uncorrected]:

December 28, 1899
My dear teacher, Sir:—

As we have forgotten all about the European calendar, I cannot remember that which of these days is the great Holy Christmas day. Although I believe it should be about [blank] days. I beg you to accept and consider my letter as a Christmas present as I extend you all my best wishes for the New Year with this paper instead of valuable gift. happiness, good health, bless, and prosperity in all things for all the time.

I cannot say how graceful and thankful I feel to you for sending me the costly blankets and rice and fuel to my poor family! At the same time I thank God with all my heart for saving so miserable and sinful body as I from such unpromising conditions like this in jail, and moreover, for giving provision to my helpless family to live on. How wonderfully God has blessed upon me! My father expressed me, in his letter, his heartily thanks toward you for your great help, just when needed.

And here the dark and damp cells of dungeon is exceedingly chilly during the late days, as it is dead of winter. The most imprisonmenters are suffering from destitude of clothes, food, and everything. but I, partially through the grace of God and your mercy, am now in sufficiency of clothes, so that no cold can torment me. Please accept my thinks once more for all these cares.

Expecting to write again some other day. I stop saying any more now.

Your beloved pupil
Ye Seungman

Received February 6, 1900

My Dear Teacher, sir:—

Now both of the foreign and national New Year’s days are over and the spring season is already commenced. I pray to God to give prosperity, bless and happiness, specially to you and all over Christian families throughout this year.

I respectfully beg you to remember me to Mrs. Appenzeller\(^7\) for the New Year greeting. Through my father’s letter I have often heard about you and also that you were making every effort to get me out of this bondage. It really made me feel thankful to you with all my heart and, of course, I intended to send you a letter expressing my feeling toward you, but I suppose that it is
useless for one to say thank, thank, thank all the time.

About six weeks ago, when the Ex-Prime Minister Mr. Yun Yong Sun was holding his office, he helped me a great deal, directly or indirectly and issued it publicly in the So-called Government Gazzattee by the edict stating that all the imprisoners beside six criminals should be released. You know that six criminals mean such as conspirators, murderers, high-way-man, thieves, adulterers, and humbuggers.

According to this edict, all the people believed that I should be free out once, but unfortunately before this idea was carried out, Mr. Yun was disappointed and resigned from his position. Then all the small back-biters got their opportunity and made great harm to me as their usual habit.

Accordingly within three days after the Gazzette was published the Edict was changed. There is no one could say anything about me in the official class. The present condition of the Government is going worse and worse that there is not a bit hope of getting better. Now, I do not wait for getting out, but deeply believe that even though all the powerful people in the world stand against me, but God's will will be done. And this belief makes me comfortable and happy in this miserable place.

Thus I spend my time in reading books and making some poetries. But only thing, which I cannot forget, is the unspeakable suffering of my old father and all my family.

[Syngman rhee]
NOTES

Introduction


O.N. Denny Letter


6. The Denny’s departed Korea permanently January 1891.

7. The Korean King Yi Kojong (1852-1919), the last king (also the first and last emperor of the Yi dynasty (1392-1907), who ruled from 1864-1907.

8. i.e., The Korean aristocracy. An hereditary title, initially gained through winning a top government or military post by royal examination. In the later stage of the Yi dynasty, numerous out-of-office yangban refused to labor manually to earn a living believing such work below their aristocratic position.

9. Li Hung-chang (1823-1901), the chief Chinese statesman of the era. Denny developed a close personal relationship with Li while serving as American consul in China (1877-1883. Li directed China’s foreign policy toward Korea during the 1880s and 1890s. See Swartout, *Mandarins*, pp. 1-22.

11. Yuan Shih-k’ai (1859-1916), resident Chinese ambassador in Korea while Denny served the Korean throne. Yuan became the president of China from 1912 until his death in 1916.


14. Denny served as a receiver at the Portland Savings Bank from 1891 until his death in 1900, and as a senator in the Oregon state senate from 1892-1896. Swartout, Mandarins, pp. 146, 152 note 1.


Appenzeller-Hioki Interview

1. For a recent investigative work on the Japanese role in Queen Min’s assassination see Fusako Tsunoda, Min Bi Ansatsu (The Assassination of Queen Min) (tokyo: Shinchosha Publishers, 1988).

2. Alexander Kenmure, agent of the British and Foreign Bible Society, arrived from Japan on October 7, 1895, the day before Queen Min’s assassination. HGA, “Notes and Comments,” KR (October 1895): 399. Kenmure, who understood Japanese, assisted Appenzeller by recording the conversation and by translating statements Hioki had difficulty saying in English.

3. Appenzeller corresponded with Eki Hioki at least two times prior to this interview; Eki Hioki to HGA, 19 July 1895 UTS #64, and idem., 9 September 1895 UTS #66.


9. William McEntyre Dye (1831-1899) received citations for braver during the Vicksburg and Red River campaigns during the Civil War. He served as a staff officer for the Egyptian army from 1873 to 1878. Upon General Sheridan’s recommendation, Dye accepted King Kojong’s offer of the post of chief military advisor to the Korean government, serving from 1888 to 1896.
10. i.e., Queen Min and her relatives.
11. The Taewon’gun (personal name, Yi Ha-ung, 1820-98 in Lew 1894-96, pp. 40, 55-56), father and regent for his son, Kojong, during Kojong’s minority. The Taewon’gun’s son-in-law bitterly opposed the Taewon’gun. Horace Allen, five days after the assassination of Queen Min, wrote: “This morning the Inspector of Police and the Minister of Education, friends of the Queen and now refugees at this Legation, have been officially pardoned. The Inspector of Police is the son-in-law of the Tai Won Khun, but they are bitter enemies. The Minister of Education is his brother.” Horace N. Allen to U.S.A Secretary of State, 13 October 1895, in Palmer, Relations, p. 364.
15. An Kyung-su
18. Karl Waeber, Russian ambassador in Seoul at the time of the assassination of Queen Min.
19. Although a Japanese court of inquiry in Hiroshima, Japan, found Viscount and others directly implicated in the 8 October 1895 murder of Queen Min, on 20 January 1896 the court released all the accused on the grounds of insufficient evidence, Yi Pomchin, “Official,” KR 3 (March 1896): 122-125.

Rhee/Appenzeller Letters

1. HGA, 28 December 1899 and 6 February 1900, UTS Diary #3:92-95.
2. Yun Chi-ho, 9 January 1899. Diary, vol. 5, (Seoul: National History Compilation Committee, 1975) p. 198: “This afternoon about 3 [p.m.], Yi Sung Man was arrested in the Japanese settlement and carried to the police station. It is believed that his name was mentioned in the confession, so called, of Yun Sei Yong. Jung Hang Mo came near being caught in front of Dr. Sherman’s hospital. Fortunately he escaped.
Yi went out after having seen Jung, so that Yi had nobody to blame so much as his own foolhardiness."


4. For the best accounts of the People's Meeting, held between October 1898 to December 1898, see Yun Tchi-ho (the President of the Independence Club during that period), Diary, vol. 5, 31 October 1898 through 27 December 1898, pp. 171-192.; and Idem., "Popular Movements in Korea," KR 5 (December 1898): 465-469.

5. For a brief treatment of Rhee's part in the Independence Club and in the People's Meeting see Robert T. Oliver, Syngman Rhee: The Man Behind the Myth (New York: Dodd Mead & Co., 1954), pp. 36-45 (Oliver, Rhee in further citations).

6. For Appenzeller's unsuccessful attempts to gain Rhee's release from prison, his attempts to restore the ailing Rhee's health, and his attempts to provide Rhee with work while in prison see HGa to Kwon Chai Hyeng, Minister of Law, 10 January 1900, UTS #14:30; HGA to Miss Wambold, 14 July 1900, UTS #14:142; HGA to Dr. A.R. Avison, 7 November 1901, UTS #14:429; HGA, A.R. Avison, H.B. Hulbert, and D.A. Bunker to Ye Pong Nai, Vice Minister Imperial Household, 9 November 1901, UTS # 14:431; HGA to Ye Pong Nai, 16 November 1901, UTS #14:445. See Oliver, Rhee, pp. 45-68 an account of Rhee's arrest, failed escape attempt, and imprisonment from January 1899 to August 1904.

South Korean-Japanese Relations 1969-1979: Is There More Beyond Emotionalism?

by Victor D. Cha

INTRODUCTION

Japan and the Republic of Korea (ROK) exhibit one of the more enigmatic relationships in East Asian international relations. Despite a commonality of interests, conflict has persistently marred this relationship since its normalization in 1965. This study addresses the need to develop a systematic model for explaining the puzzlesome interaction between these two key states in the Asia-Pacific region. It looks at the historical enmity that has pervaded Japanese and Korean attitudes toward one another, and questions whether these basic human emotions can actually determine the behavior of states. As an alternative explanation, this study tests the relevance of a strain of international relations theory, known as alliance theory, to the dynamics of the relationship.¹ Modification of this theory gives rise to a model of “quasi-alliance structures” for explaining contentious and cooperative foreign policy behavior in Seoul-Tokyo relations. “Quasi-alliance structures” is defined as:

The relationship between two states that remain non-allied but share a third party as a common ally.

Framing the relationship in this manner yields two basic findings. First, despite the fact that Japan and the ROK are not allied, the friction they exhibit is typical of an asymmetrically dependent alliance. And second, the degree to which the two states allow this friction to dominate their relations is not only a function of bilateral interaction and issues, but also a function of each state’s alliance with the United States.
OVERVIEW OF THE ENIGMA

There is a basic puzzle in the Japan-ROK relationship. The two states have generally similar domestic-political systems and ideologies, as well as generally complementary economic needs. In addition, as a result of geographic proximity and a common alliance with the U.S. the two states share convergent security objectives in the region. Given these similarities, one would logically conjecture that cooperative relations should ensue. This has however, been far from the case. The Japan-ROK relationship has undergone periods of intense friction. Instances of this friction have surfaced in all aspects of the relationship.

For example, it took fourteen years of protracted and caustic negotiations before the two government signed a normalization treaty in June 1965. Despite this treaty, there was a conspicuous absence of executive-level diplomatic summits for nineteen years until the meetings between President Chun and Prime Minister Nakasone in 1983 and 1984. The main channel of official political dialogue in Japan-ROK relations—the annual joint ministerial conference—has either been suspended or postponed on numerous occasions. Furthermore, diplomatic relations since 1965 nearly ruptured on three separate occasions. In August 1973, the two governments clashed over the abduction from Japan of South Korean opposition politician Kim Dae Jung. In August 1974, an assassination attempt on President Park Chung Hee by a pro-North Korean resident of Japan brought the two governments close to permanently recalling their ambassadors. And in September 1980, the Chun Doo Hwan regime’s levying of an execution order on Kim Dae Jung again took relations to the brink. Moreover, in the security arena, despite their prominence and proximity in the region, the two states are not party to a bilateral defense treaty. In addition, there was virtually no contact between defense ministries until 1978. Polemics also surround the economic aspect of the relationship over such issues as the trade imbalance, transfer of technology, and foreign aid and investment programs. The above observations, therefore, beg the following question: If cooperation better serves the interests of Japan and the ROK (as well as the U.S.), why does conflict persistently mar the relationship?

HISTORICAL ANIMOSITY

The prevailing explanation for these difficult relations has focused on the historical enmity and psychological barriers that separate Koreans and
Japanese as the primary causal variable. This mutual animosity is largely the product of the negative images and attitudes cultivated during Japan’s 36-year occupation of Korea. For Koreans, this negative attitude is manifested in a direct association of Korean nationalism with anti-Japaneseism. At a deeper, psychological level, it is also manifested in a victim’s complex prevalent within the South Korean psyche known as “Hahn,” or “unredeemed resentment for past injustices.” For Japanese, these negative attitudes surface in a superiority complex toward Koreans. Augmenting this is a general uneasiness among Japanese in contending with their nation’s past aggressive actions, and a general annoyance at Korean attempts to hold the Japanese eternally responsible for their history.

The clash of these negative attitudes gives rise to the “han-il ung-orri” (Korea-Japan Knot)—an atmosphere between Koreans and Japanese characterized by distrust, contempt, and a lack of mutual understanding (“sangho ihaeshim”). This lack of understanding becomes particularly severe whenever bilateral issues arise that invoke memories of the colonial past.

Friction over such issues abound. For example, constant bickering between the two governments continues to this day over the sincerity of Japan’s apology for past aggressions against Korea. South Koreans have been generally dissatisfied with the text of the 1965 normalization treaty as it omits any reference to Japanese repentance for the occupation period. Moreover, the ambiguous wording of the late Emperor Showa’s apology in 1984 did little to quell resentment. Japan’s historical recollection of the occupation period has also been a source of contention. One illustration of this is the Monbusho’s alleged revision of Japanese history textbooks in 1982 to reflect a more conservative interpretation of past Japanese aggression in Asia. This issue not only raised emotional protests from the South Korean government, but also stalled concurrent bilateral loan negotiations. Moreover, statements by Japanese leaders that hint even slightly at justification for the occupation period illicit strong protests from the South. For example, in 1953, Japan’s chief delegate to the normalization negotiations, Kubota Kanichiro, responded to South Korean demands for colonial reparations by stating that Japan’s occupation policies provided many benefits to Korea. This statement precipitated a four-year rupture in normalization talks. Finally, the revelations in January 1992 regarding the Imperial Japanese government’s involvement in the conscription of Korean “comfort women” (chongsintae) during the Second World War are sure to re-ignite memories of the colonial past between the two governments and peoples.

In each of the above cases, dialogue reverts to polemics, and resolution
becomes infinitely more difficult because of the historical-emotional baggage attached to these issues. In sum, a systematic rendering of this "psycho-historical" explanation for Japan-Korea friction could be expressed as follows: Historical animosity gives rise to systematic biases (of a cognitive or affective nature) on the part of the Japanese and Korean government leadership as well as the general public. These biases essentially make compromise or concession in bilateral relations synonymous with treason (particularly for the Koreans), which in turn, precludes the possibility of amiable or rationally-based negotiations.

THE PSYCHO-HISTORICAL ARGUMENT: NECESSARY BUT NOT SUFFICIENT

The "psycho-historical" (or historical animosity) argument is undoubtedly integral to an understanding of Japan-Korea relations. Indeed, many Koreans and Japanese still carry vivid memories of having lived through this period of Japanese colonization from 1910 to 1945. As a systematic explanation of foreign policy behavior between the two states, however, this argument exhibits some severe faults.

One glaring shortcoming of the historical animosity argument is its inability to account for change in the Japan-Korea relationship. In the terminology of International Relations theory, systematic explanations of behavior among states must be capable of explaining not only one type, but variable types of foreign policy outcomes. While the historical animosity argument may be useful in explaining instances of conflict between Japan and Korea, it does not prove useful in explaining instances of cooperative behavior. As a result the argument is essentially static—it suffers from the use of a constant, i.e. mutual enmity, to explain a variable i.e. cooperation/friction.

Those who advocate the historical animosity argument have tried to circumvent this criticism by embedding these negative images and psychological barriers in the belief systems of the key individuals who compose the leadership of each government. In this manner, they can then account for changes in foreign policy outcomes (i.e. cooperation/friction) by citing changes in the leadership. A brief look at the 1965 normalization treaty provides an illustration of this argument. As stated earlier, this treaty came into effect only after fourteen years of difficult negotiations. Advocates of the historical animosity argument attribute the inability to normalize relations, particularly during the period from 1951 to 1960, to the negative images and atti-
tudes held by the leadership in Tokyo and Seoul at the time. For example, South Korean president Syngman Rhee held strongly negative images of Japan. Intensely nationalist, Rhee’s entire political career before attaining the presidency was devoted to liberating Korea from the colonial yoke of Japan. Similarly, Japanese Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru (1948-1954) held not only negative images of Korea, but also an intense personal dislike of Rhee. Mutual enmity held at the highest levels of government consequently precluded the possibility of amiable or rationally-based normalization negotiations.

Similarly, advocates of this argument attribute the ability to normalize relations in 1965 to the more pragmatic and positive attitudes that accompanied a change in leadership. In particular, the Park Chung Hee government held images of the Japanese directly contrasting with those of its predecessor. Park himself had been raised during the Japanese occupation, spoke Japanese, and attended a Japanese military academy. As interviews with some of Park’s personal secretaries have confirmed, the former president, although strongly nationalistic, held an affinity and respect for Japan manifest in his belief that South Korean economic growth could best be accomplished by following the Japanese model of development. As a result, the relatively less severe psychological barriers during the Park regime compared with that of the Rhee period facilitated the signing of a normalization agreement in 1965.

This seems like a plausible explanation, but if one tests the argument more stringently, it leads to some implausible propositions. For example, if one accepts the psycho-historical argument for Japan-Korea normalization as true, then one would expect that if a leader other than Park had been in power—particularly one with negative images of Japan—then normalization would not have occurred in 1965. A cursory review of this period, however, finds such a proposition highly unlikely. By the mid-1960’s, American policy makers viewed the Cold War environment in the Northeast Asian region to be quite intense. The situation in Indochina was rapidly deteriorating and the Chinese communist threat loomed large. As a result, the immediate need for a stable relationship between America’s two major allies in the region, Japan and Korea, became a priority in the U.S. strategy of establishing an anti-communist defense network in the region. Secretary of State Rusk and Assistant Secretary Bundy made numerous trips to Tokyo and Seoul specifically for this purpose from 1961 to 1964. Within Korea, the Park government was confronted with a near-desperate economic situation. On the one hand, it was in dire need of foreign capital to implement its Second Five-Year Development Plan; on the other hand, U.S. foreign economic assistance to South Korean was steadily declining. These factors made Japan an increasingly
attractive and indispensable source of capital and investment.\textsuperscript{14} Within Japan, there was increasing pressure on the Sato government by the U.S. to burden-share in the region by providing economic support to the ROK. Premier Sato faced additional pressure from the powerful Japanese business lobby for access to the South Korean market. Voices within the Gaimusho also saw Park’s need for foreign capital and domestic legitimacy as an opportune time to extract a normalization agreement at the lowest cost to Japan. Given these trends and factors, one is led to believe that normalization between Japan and Korea would have occurred during this period regardless of the leadership.\textsuperscript{15} The historical animosity argument, therefore, is integral to an understanding of Japan-Korea relations, but as a systematic explanation of state behavior, it alone is not sufficient.

**QUASI-ALLIANCE MODEL OF JAPAN-KOREA RELATIONS**

As stated at the outset, “quasi-allies” is defined as the relationship between two states that remain non-allied but share a third party as a common ally. In order to understand the application of this concept to Japan-Korea relations, it is first necessary to introduce some basic elements of alliance theory.\textsuperscript{16}

Alliance theory frames foreign policy behavior between states within the context of a “game.” The degree to which each state “cooperates” or “defects”, i.e. shows a stronger or weaker commitment to the alliance, depends on its relative assessment of its “abandonment” and “entrapment” concerns. “Abandonment” is the fear that the ally may leave the alliance or may not fulfill obligations to it. In the extreme case, abandonment means dealignment or realignment, but it generally occurs when the ally:

...may fail to make good on his explicit commitments; or may fail to provide support in contingencies where support is expected. In both of the latter two variants, the alliance remains intact but the expectations of support which underlie it are weakened.\textsuperscript{17}

“Entrapment” generally occurs when a commitment to an alliance ends up being detrimental to one’s interests:

Entrapment means being dragged into a conflict over an ally’s interests that one does not share, or shares only partially. The interests of allies are generally not identical; to the extent they are shared, they may be valued in different degree.\textsuperscript{18}
These anxieties constitute the twin horns of the security dilemma in alliance politics. The two are inversely related as a high fear of one usually means a lower fear of the other with regard to a particular ally and adversarial threat. Two types of behavior generally emerge from these anxieties of abandonment and entrapment. First, if a state experiences a high fear of abandonment relative to its ally, then one of the responses it will choose to alleviate this fear is to show a stronger commitment to the alliance in order to get the ally to reciprocate. Conversely, if a state experiences a high fear of entrapment with respect to an ally, then it will generally show a weaker commitment to the alliance in order to avoid further entanglement.

The final element of the alliance game is the strategy. The optimal strategy is to maximize one's benefits and minimize one's costs. Within the terms of the alliance game, this means states aim to maximize their security from the alliance while minimizing their obligations to it.

Based on these elements, we can deduce two hypotheses for explaining conflictual and cooperative behavior between states:

**Hypothesis A:** If relations between states X and Y reflect an asymmetrical structure of abandonment and entrapment concerns, then there will be friction between X and Y.

This is because the asymmetry or imbalance of abandonment/entrapment concerns gives rise to the employment of opposite strategies in the game. For example, if state X has a higher fear of abandonment relative to state Y, then X will show a stronger commitment to the alliance in order to get Y to reciprocate. This lowers Y's abandonment fear, but it also increases Y's incentive to defect. Since Y desires maximum security at minimum obligation, Y's rational option is to show a weaker commitment—it can still preserve its interests due to X's assured commitment; it can also minimize its entrapment fears by minimizing obligations to the alliance. X, therefore, remains unsatisfied, and friction results.

**Hypothesis B:** If relations between states X and Y reflect a symmetrical structure of abandonment concerns, with respect to each other or with respect to a third party Z, then cooperative relations should ensue.

By "symmetry" we mean that the two states share the same or mutual fear of abandonment. Two variants of this dynamic are possible. First, states X and Y may share abandonment fears with respect to each other. This mutual fear of abandonment causes each state to show a stronger commitment to the
alliance; moreover it will expect, and receive, a similar commitment from its ally. As a result, relations run relatively smoothly. Second, states X and Y may share abandonment fears with respect to a third party Z. In this case, X and Y will each show a stronger commitment to Z to alleviate this fear. However, an additional option X and Y will exercise, particularly if Z does not show reciprocation, is to show a stronger commitment to another. As a result, abandonment fears with respect to Z can give rise to more cohesive relations between X and Y.

APPLICATION OF THE MODEL TO JAPAN-KOREA RELATIONS

In order to tests these two hypotheses against the Japan-Korea case study, it is first necessary to define and assess abandonment and entrapment fears for the two governments. Research of the 1969-1979 period in Japan-Korea relations, as well as interviews with policy makers intimately involved in decision making at this time, have found that the ROK generally experiences a higher fear of abandonment while Japan experiences a higher fear of entrapment across bilateral issues.

A survey of issues in the bilateral security arena well illustrates this point. As previously stated, Japan and Korea are not party to a mutual defense treaty; as a result of geographic proximity, however, their prominence in the region, and their common alliance with the U.S., the two states exhibit de facto bilateral security ties and these play an important part in the overall relationship.

Within this security relationship, South Korea generally fears abandonment when Japan does not acknowledge the severity of the North Korean security threat. These fears become particularly acute whenever the Japanese government permits trade with North Korea in goods deemed security-sensitive by the South or when Tokyo engages in "flirting" political relations with Pyongyang which imply de facto recognition of the Kim Il Sung regime as a legitimate government on the peninsula. Seoul also fears abandonment when Japan does not admit to a direct security link between the two countries as originally stated in the 1969 Korea Clause. First appearing in the Nixon-Sato summit conference joint communiqué of November 1969, this clause stated that the security of the ROK was essential to Japan's own.

Minimizing these abandonment fears serves two basic interests for the ROK. First, it enhances the containment of the North Korean security threat. Second, by getting Japan to admit to a direct security link with the ROK,
Seoul ensures U.S. access to American bases in Okinawa for South Korean defense. Moreover, Japanese acknowledgement of the Korea Clause affords Seoul bargaining leverage over Tokyo with regard to certain forms of economic aid. The logic behind this leverage is known as the “bulwark of defense” argument. This essentially states that Japan should provide economic aid as a form of “security rent” to the ROK as the latter bears the burden of undergirding stability on the peninsula and in the region.

Japan fears of entrapment center on similar issues. An overcommitment to Japan-ROK security ties could lead to an acknowledged dependence on South Korea for Japan’s national defense. In addition, although the region is relatively stable, an overcommitment to Japan-ROK defense ties could actually create a more volatile situation on the peninsula by increasing North Korean fears of encirclement.

Minimizing these entrapment fears serves two Japanese interests. First, Tokyo avoids becoming vulnerable to the “bulwark of defense” argument and ROK demands for Japanese “security rent.” Second, by maintaining the status quo on the peninsula, Japan avoids having to contend with politically difficult domestic issues associated with increased security concerns.

An analysis of the alliance dynamics in the Japan-ROK relationship would be incomplete without brief consideration of the adversary game. The alliance and adversary games are interconnected. Strategies in one necessarily affect the other. In Japan-ROK relations, strategies in the adversary game reinforce the asymmetry of abandonment/entrapment fears in the alliance game. For example, the ROK strategy in the adversary game (vis a vis North Korea) is to “stand firm.” This reinforces abandonment fears regarding Japan as it increases the value that the ROK places on strong support from Japan in opposing the North. On the other hand, Japan’s strategy in the adversary game has been less hard line. An illustrative example of this attitude is the Japanese government’s “equidistance” policy toward Korea. This policy aims to promote relations with the two Koreas rather than siding solely with the regime in the South. In this manner, Japan preserves its own security by maintaining the continued balance of power on the peninsula, which in turn, promotes regional stability. Such a policy reinforces the Japanese entrapment desire to avoid entanglement in strong ties with the ROK.

1972-1974: PERIOD OF FRICTION

Japan-ROK relations, therefore, reflect an asymmetrical structure of
abandonment and entrapment concerns. According to Hypothesis A, this imbalance should result in friction between the two states. The 1972-1974 period in Japan-ROK relations confirms this. Abandonment fears experienced by members of the Park government caused them to push for closer defense ties with Tokyo; moreover, reciprocity was expected. Despite the relaxation of Cold War tensions in the region occasioned by the rapprochement between the U.S. and China, U.S.-Soviet detente, Japan-China normalization and the opening of North-South Korean dialogue, the Park government persistently pressed Japan to reaffirm its commitment to defend against and isolate the North Korean security threat. For example, Seoul vehemently opposed the expanding volume of Japanese-North Korean trade during this period. The South Korean Foreign Ministry also filed numerous protests with the Tanaka government over visits by various Japanese politicians to Pyongyang.

On the other hand, the Japanese government’s fears of entrapment caused it to show weaker support for strong security ties with its neighbor. In 1972, Prime Minister Sato declared that the 1969 Korea Clause was not to be interpreted as a bilateral defense treaty. His successor, Tanaka Kakuei, went one step further and reinterpreted the Korea Clause to read that it was the security of the entire Korean peninsula (not just that of the ROK) that was essential for Japan’s security. This reinterpretation in turn cast doubt on whether Japan would allow American access to the bases in Okinawa for South Korean defense. Finally, in August and September 1974, Foreign Minister Kimura Toshio made statements to the effect that the ROK was not necessarily the only legitimate government on the peninsula. In addition, he stated that Japan did not perceive a security threat from the North. As explained earlier, these statements were reflective of an “equidistance” policy being implemented by the Tanaka government. This aimed to provide for Japan’s security by maintaining a balance of power between the two Koreas rather than siding solely with the South.

Therefore, during the 1972-1974 period, the asymmetrical structure of abandonment and entrapment concerns caused each state to employ opposite strategies in the game. The natural result was contentious Japan-ROK interaction. Nowhere was this friction arising from the juxtaposition of strategies more apparent than in three major instances of Japan-ROK friction during this period. In August 1973, South Korean intelligence operatives forcibly abducted opposition politician Kim Dae jung from a hotel room in Tokyo and placed him under house arrest in Seoul. In April 1974, the Park government arrested and sentenced two Japanese nationals to 20 years imprisonment in Korea. And in August 1974, Mun Se Kwang, a Korean resident of Japan, attempted
to assassinate President Park. Each of these incidents caused a major breakdown in relations. The two governments recalled their ambassadors during these crises, delayed the 1973 annual joint ministerial conference for four months, and outright cancelled the 1974 ministerial conference. Japanese economic aid to South Korea dramatically dropped during this period, and public protests in both countries over the incidents resulted in the ransacking of each government’s embassy compounds in Seoul and Tokyo.

The underlying conditions that gave rise to this unprecedentedly caustic period in Japan-ROK relations can be traced to asymmetrical abandonment/entrapment concerns and differing strategies in the alliance and adversary games. At the center of each dispute was the South Korean government’s demand that Japanese authorities monitor and curb political activities in Japan by pro-North Korean groups in Japan aimed at subverting the Park regime. For example, in the Kim Dae Jung incident, the justification for the abduction was Kim’s unrestricted conducting of anti-government activities from Japan. Similarly, the two Japanese nationals were arrested for acting as operatives for the pro-North Korean Chosorens organization in Japan, and for conspiring with radical South Korean student elements. Finally, in the case of Mun Se Kwang, the ROK government vehemently criticized the Japanese government as Mun had received instructions for the assassination from North Korea through elements of the Chosorens in Japan; had entered South Korea posing as a Japanese national; and had killed President Park’s wife with a gun stolen from an Osaka police box. These differing attitudes toward the North Korean security threat exacerbated South Korean abandonment fears and caused them to denounce the Japanese government as a “relay station” for North Korean aggression.

1969-1971: Period of Cooperation

Instances of Japan-Korea cooperation can also be explained by this theoretical framework. While Japan and Korea have asymmetrical fears of abandonment and entrapment with respect to each other, they also share the same or mutual fear of abandonment regarding the U.S. defense commitment to the region. As interviews with current and former policy makers have confirmed, it is in the supreme interests of Tokyo and Seoul to keep the U.S. actively engaged in the region. Without this U.S. presence, the ROK would carry the burden as the primary deterrent force in the region. Japan would also be forced into either massive remilitarization or extreme dependence on the
ROK for security. Therefore, when this fear is salient—i.e., when Tokyo and Seoul perceive U.S. policies of disengagement from the region—the two governments are more willing to put aside friction arising from conflicting abandonment/entrapment concerns and show greater cooperation in bilateral relations.

The 1969-1971 period in Japan-Korea relations exhibited such dynamics. The American intention to reduce defense commitments to the region was manifest in several policies. The Guam Doctrine (July 1969) clearly stated that the U.S. would no longer bear the primary defense burden of its Asian allies. The Nixon administration followed through on this policy with troop reduction and reorientation programs at bases in Japan as well as a massive drawdown of ground troops in the Vietnam conflict. Regarding Korea, in July 1970, the U.S. announced the decision to withdraw the 7th Infantry Division from the peninsula. In addition, Washington responded relatively passively to a number of North Korean provocations, most notably the attempted commando raid on the Blue House in January 1968, the seizure of the USS Pueblo in January 1968, and the shooting down of a U.S. EC-121 reconnaissance plane in April 1969.

All of these policies instituted acute fears of U.S. abandonment in Tokyo and Seoul. These concerns prompted both governments to improve bilateral relations. Japan acknowledged a direct security link with the ROK in the 1969 Korea Clause. In addition, Prime Minister Sato agreed to grant the U.S. unconditional access to bases in Okinawa for South Korean defense. Japan also extended massive amounts of economic aid to the ROK during this period. Termed “positive economic cooperation,” these funds were largely to promote the development of South Korean heavy industry and infrastructure. In August 1970, the two governments also agreed on the assignment of a second Japanese defense attache to the ROK. This decision came not only one year ahead of schedule, but also made the ROK the only Asian country with two Japanese attaches.

Cooperation between the two governments was also exhibited at the annual ministerial conferences during this period. The joint communiques and press conference statements for the 3rd (1969) and 4th (1970) ministerial conferences both stressed the strong defense link between Japan and Korea. In addition, the communiques included clauses specifically designating North Korea as a security threat, and jointly opposing U.S. withdrawal from the region. These conferences directly contrast with those that took place during the more contentious 1972-1974 period. For example, the joint communiques and press statements released after the 5th and 6th ministerial conferences
make no mention of a Japan-ROK defense link, nor did they refer to North Korea as a security threat.\textsuperscript{43} Moreover, the negotiations over these communiqués were marked by contention as the Japanese delegation argued strongly for a clause stating the need for improved Japan-North Korea relations.\textsuperscript{44}

Additional evidence of Japan-Korea cooperation during this period takes the form of “non-events.” This term refers to the absence of friction despite the existence of potentially contentious issues. Research and interviews have found numerous instances of these non-events during the 1969-1971 period; for brevity’s sake, two incidents suffice as clear illustrations. In 1969, protests by political activists in Japan against the unconstitutionality of Park’s bid for a third consecutive presidential term resulted in a storming of the South Korean embassy in Tokyo. In spite of the severity of this act, the South Korean government remained conspicuously silent and deliberately avoided allowing this incident to cloud relations. It neither lodged a protest with the Gaimusho, nor publically denounced the act. Similarly in 1971, South Korean protests against Premier Sato’s scheduled attendance at Park’s inauguration ceremony resulted in substantial damage to the Japanese embassy in Seoul and burning of the Japanese flag. Again, in the interests of maintaining cooperation, the Japanese government did not lodge a protest over the issue.\textsuperscript{45} This behavior starkly contrasts with the acerbics that followed similar incidents at the two embassies in the 1972-1974 period.\textsuperscript{46}

1975-1979: PERIOD OF COOPERATION

American policies of disengagement from Asia again influenced Japan-ROK state behavior during the 1975-1979 period. In particular, the US pull-out from Vietnam, and President Carter’s plan for total troop withdrawal from Korea raised acute concerns in both Tokyo and Seoul about the integrity of U.S. defense commitments. In addition, the large scale Soviet naval exercises (OKEAN) in April 1975 demonstrating the saliency of the Soviet threat, and statements by Secretary Vance in the summer of 1977 affirming U.S. intentions to withdraw from Korea reinforced anxieties about the reliability of America’s future role as the security guarantor in the region.\textsuperscript{47} These mutually-held fears of US abandonment prompted both states to improve bilateral relations markedly from the less cooperative 1972-1974 period.

For example in 1975, Prime Minister Miki discarded Tanaka’s reinterpretation of the Korea Clause, and reaffirmed the importance of South Korean security to Japan. In line with this policy, Miki also confirmed that the U.S.
would have access to bases in Okinawa for South Korean defense. In order to promote greater bilateral coordination over security issues, the two governments in 1978 also established a joint consultative defense council; in addition, they began a program of exchange visits among middle-level defense officials.

Both governments also expressed strong opposition to Carter's plan for troop withdrawal from Korea. In particular, Tokyo officials lobbied adamantly against the plan. The Japanese leadership expressed great apprehension through various U.S.-Japan bilateral channels, and urged the Carter Administration to consider a reduction of troops rather than a full-scale withdrawal. To express their opposition, Diet members in 1977 presented Vice President Mondale with an anti-pullout petition. These efforts by the Japanese were particularly appreciated by Seoul officials as South Korea's lobbying efforts at this time were largely emasculated by revelations regarding the Koreagate scandal.

CONCLUSION: QUASI-ALLIANCE MODEL FOR JAPAN-ROK RELATIONS

Should research and interviews continue to confirm this argument, this study arrives at a two-step quasi-alliance model for analyzing Japan-Korea relations. The model consists of an "inner core" and an "outer layer." The inner core is the purely bilateral aspect of the relationship. At this level, the relationship is characterized by asymmetrical abandonment/entrapment concerns and friction (1972-1974 period and Hypothesis A). The outer layer is the multilateral aspect of the relationship. This layer highlights Japan and the ROK's common alliance with the U.S. At this level, the relationship is characterized by symmetrical abandonment fears and cooperation (Hypothesis B and 1969-1971, 1975-1979 periods). The primary determinant of the relationship is the fear of US abandonment. If this fear is high, i.e., perception of a weak U.S. defense commitment, then there is cooperation. If this fear is low, then Japan and the ROK are more likely to allow contentious issues at the "inner core" to dominate their bilateral interaction.

An essential criterion for theoretical models of state behavior is the ability to determine the causal forces that underlie foreign policy outcomes. In this manner, models of International Relations (IR) theory aim to explain systematically, rather than historically describe, the policies of nation-states. In analyzing the causes of conflict and cooperation in Japan-Korea relations from 1969 to 1979, this model has attempted to fulfill such criteria. It has
deliberately avoided a historical chronology of the relationship; instead, it has drawn attention to the underlying structure of the Japan-ROK bilateral relationship, as well as the role of the U.S., as key causal variables in explaining Japan-ROK interaction. While not denying the importance of the history that has passed between the two nations and the emotionalism that continues to plague interaction, it does challenge the view that such variables are the sole determinant of Japan-ROK behavior. This quasi-alliance model does not profess to explain each and every idiosyncratic wrinkle in Japan-ROK state behavior, but as a systematic, generalizable model that makes a theoretical first-cut at analyzing foreign policy outcomes in the relationship, it might prove useful.

NOTES:

2. “Friction” is defined as a breakdown in the normal functioning of relations, or the absence of relations that would be beneficial to both parties.
3. See Kil Soong-hoom, “Han-il kukkyo chongsanghwa 20-nyon ui pansong,” (Reflections on 20 Years of Normalization Between Korea and Japan) Sin Tong-A (June 1985), 146.


10. Syngman Rhee held extremely negative biases against Japan. His hatred was so severe that during the Korean War, when the U.S. broached the idea of Japanese military assistance in fighting the North Koreans, Rhee retorted that he would rather conclude a truce with the communists than allow the Japanese to land on Korean soil. See Ibid., 34.

11. Fuccello, South Korean-Japanese Relations in the Cold War, 102. Yoshida's distaste for Koreans was so great that he once referred to Koreans living in Japan as "...insects in the stomach of a lion with the potential to kill the lion itself if not checked...", see Lee Jung-Hoon, "Korean-Japanese Relations: The Past, Present, and Future," Korea Observer 21.2 (Summer 1990), 176. In 1953, UN Commander Mark Clark and U.S. Ambassador to Japan Robert Murphy were unsuccessful in arranging meetings between Rhee and Yoshida largely due to the latter's confessed inability to conceal his dislike for Rhee even at a brief luncheon. See Lee Chae-Jin and Sato Hideo, US Policy Toward Japan and Korea: A Changing Influence Partnership (New York: Praeger, 1982), 28.

12. Park's cabinet was staffed with younger, foreign-educated, and cosmopolitan thinkers who were able to distinguish Korean nationalism from anti-Japaneseism. For a comparison of the personalities that made up the Rhee and Park governments, see Fuccello, South Korean-Japanese Relations in the Cold War, 92-121.

13. Interviews with former Japanese and Korean Foreign Ministry officials involved in the events of this period confirmed that the U.S. emphasized the urgency of an early normalization settlement in various economic and political bilateral meetings with the two governments. The Rusk and Bundy visits in 1964 were particularly important; Warmubu interviews (ROK Foreign Ministry), May 19, 1992, March 30, 1992; and Gaimusho interviews (Japanese Foreign Ministry), July 10, 1992. Also see Lee Tong Won and Takeo Fukuda, "Han-il kukkyo chongsanghwa," 251-253; and Lee and Sato, US Foreign Policy Toward Japan and Korea, 29-31. At the request of the interviewees, the author is not at liberty to reveal the identities of those interviewed. However, over a two-year period, the author conducted approximately 70 interviews in the U.S., Japan, and South Korea with current and former government officials, journalists, and scholars knowledgeable on this period in Japan-Korea relations. The government officials were largely stationed at the foreign ministries and embassies of the three governments during the period concerned.


15. One author, who emphasizes such factors in the achievement of normalization, is Kil Soong-hoon, "Han-Il kukkyo chongsanghwa 20-nyon u pansong."

16. A review of the literature on alliance theory is beyond the scope of this paper. Alliance theory as used here is largely derived from the work of Glenn Snyder. In


18. Ibid.

19. For example, in June 1969, South Korean authorities found that speedboats used by North Korea to infiltrate the Southern coastline were purchased from Japan (*Tong-A Ilbo* July 3, 1969). In addition, in February 1970, Japanese trading companies were found to have exported COCOM-restricted goods on a private basis to North Korea. For this incident, see *Japan Times* February 2-20, 1970; *Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS): Asia* February 2-20, 1970; and *Far Eastern Economic Review* February 4-March 5, 1970.

20. Although Tokyo does not have formal diplomatic relations with Pyongyang, it has often hinted at informally recognizing the regime. A representative example is when Tanaka re-interpreted a clause in the 1965 Japan-Korea normalization treaty to read that South Korea was not necessarily the only legitimate government on the peninsula. Numerous LDP officials have also made visits to Pyongyang on a "private" basis. For example in 1986, Tani Yoichi met with North Korean Foreign Minister Ho Dam. Although the visit was unofficial, Tani Yoichi was both a member of Prime Minister Nakasone's faction and a Gaimusho official.

21. The particular clause read:

"The President and the Prime Minister specifically noted the continuing tension over the Korean peninsula. The Prime Minister deeply appreciated the peacekeeping efforts of the United Nations in the area and stated that the security of the Republic of Korea was essential to Japan's own security." (emphasis added)

See *Joint Communiqué Between President Richard Nixon and Prime Minister Eisaku Sato*, November 21, 1969, US Embassy transcript, Section 4. This "Korea Clause" was subsequently stated in various forms in annual joint ministerial conference communiqués and other bilateral statements between Seoul and Tokyo.

22. This understanding among the three governments came to be known as the Okinawa Base Agreement. This essentially stated that after the reversion of Okinawa to Japanese sovereignty, the U.S. would be permitted unconditional access to its bases in Okinawa for the defense of South Korea in the event of a second North Korean offensive. This unofficial agreement was originally stated in Prime Minister Sato's address at the National Press Club in Washington after release of the Nixon-Sato joint communiqué. For the text, see *Transcript of Proceedings: The Japanese Embassy, Press Conference of the Honorable Eisaku Sato, Prime Minister, November 21, 1969*, Washington DC (Ace-Federal Reporters, Inc., Washington DC), 13. Also see, Eisaku Sato, "New Pacific Age," transcript of National Press Club speech of November 21, 1969 in *Pacific Quarterly* 1.2 (January 1970), 333-340, especially 335.

23. The most well-known and recent example of South Korean attempts to exercise this leverage is the Chun regime's request in 1981 for $6 billion in loans from the
Japanese government. See Lee Chong-Sik, Japan and Korea: The Political Dimension, 115-120.

24. For this reason, the Sato government in January 1972 and the Tanaka government in August 1973 stated publically that the Korea Clause should not be interpreted as a bilateral defense treaty between Japan and the ROK. See Korea Herald January 9-11, 1972 and August 4, 1973.

25. For example, during the 1981-83 loan negotiations, Japan adamantly stated that it would not negotiate any loan agreement if the funds were to be classified as security-related. See Lee Chong-Sik, Japan and Korea: The Political Dimension, 118.

26. These issues include the stigma attached to any modification of Article IX of the Japanese constitution, and the Chosonren opposition to monitoring of North Korean residents’ activities in Japan.


28. Japan-North Korean bilateral trade increased from $58.9 million in 1971 to $360.7 million in 1974 (see Lee Chong-Sik, Japan and Korea: The Political Dimension, 78). There were numerous trips by private Japanese economic missions to Pyongyang as well as the signing of a quasi-official trade memorandum agreement in January 1972 (see Japan Times January 24, 1972). In addition, in December 1973, Japan approved the use of Export-Import bank loans to Japanese companies to finance trade with North Korea (Korea Herald December 29, 1973).

29. For example, Tokyo Mayor Minobe made a two-week trip to Pyongyang in October-November 1971 and became the first Japanese official to meet with North Korean leaders (Japan Times November 27, 1971 and Korea Herald November 18, 1971). In addition, during this period, the Dietmen’s League for the Promotion of Friendship with North Korea was formed in November 1971, and this group made a visit to Pyongyang in January 1972 (Japan Times January 18, 1972 and Korea Herald January 15, 1972).


31. Ibid., August 1-5, 1973; also see Lee Chong-Sik, Japan and Korea: The Political Dimension, 80.


33. A full discussion of each of these incidents is beyond the scope of this study. We focus only on the basic causes of these events and the debilitating effect they had on diplomatic relations.

34. For the government’s view on this event, see Korea-Japan Relations and the Attempt on the Life of Korea’s President (Seoul: Pan-National Council for the Probe into the August 15 Incident, n.d.).


39. Although the Korea Clause and the Okinawa base agreement were originally stated within the context of a US-Japan summit, they were reiterated in the Japan-ROK Annual Joint Ministerial Conference communiques of 1969 and 1970. See Han-il kwangye charyojip (Collected Materials on Korea-Japan Relations) vol. 2 (Seoul: Asiatic Research Center, Korea University, 1977), 639-642 and 653-657.

40. The best known of these was a commitment of $123 million in 1969 for development of the Pohang steel complex. See Han-il Kwnagye charyojip, 646-647. Interviews with former Gaimusho officials (July 10, 1992) involved in the negotiation of these agreements confirmed that the Japanese government saw these not only as economic agreements, but also as symbols of increased cooperation between Japan and the ROK in the face of U.S. disengagement policies.

41. Interviews with Gaimusho officials (July 8, 1992) involved in this decision agreed that the addition of a second defense attache was related to desires to step up Japan-ROK cooperation and dialogue over security matters. Also see, Tokyo Kyodo August 1, 1970 in FBIS August 4, 1970, C4-5; and Japan Times January 3, 1971.

42. For the 3rd Joint Ministerial Conference communiqué, see Taehan minkuk waegyonyon pyo: bu juyomunhon: 1969 (Republic of Korea Major and Minor Foreign Documents Annual) (Seoul: Ministry of Foreign Affairs), 390-400; for the 4th joint ministerial conference communiqué, see Taehan minkuk waegyonyonpyo: 1970, 243-248.


44. For examples, see Korea Herald August 11, 1971 and Japan Times August 11, 1971 for accounts of the 5th ministerial conference.


46. See for example, the polemics following the South Korean ransacking of the Japanese Embassy in September 1974, Korea Herald September 7, 1974.


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Today). In Sin Tong-A (June 1985).

Kim was born in Seoul—Yonpyeong-gu, Yongsan-eup—on June 29, 1947. But years before the Korean War, the Japanese occupied Korea in 1910. At the age of six, Kim was separated from his parents and received an education in Japanese. In 1941, the family left for China to escape the Korean War. After the Korean War, his father took a government job and died soon after. Kim continued his education in Japan and eventually moved to the United States to study at Stanford University. He later returned to South Korea and became involved in politics. In 1967, he was elected to the National Assembly, where he served as a member of the ruling Democrat Party. He went on to become a member of the International Olympic Committee and was appointed as the Minister of Culture, Sports, and Tourism in 2000.

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Kosan Yun Son-do (1587-1671)
The Man and His Island

by Kim Yong-dok

THE MAN

Kosan Yun Son-do\(^1\) was born in Seoul—Yonji-dong near Changgyong-gung, Palace—in 1587, five years before the Imjin-waeran, the Japanese invasions of 1592-1598. At age eight he was adopted by his father’s eldest and childless brother and moved to his uncle’s home near Myongdong Cathedral.

Kosan’s ancestors came from Kaesong, the capital of the Koryo Kingdom (918-1392). In 1471 the family moved to Cholla-do to what is now in Chollanam-do, Haenam-gun, Haenam-up. There they established a home that has remained the clan seat. Its remoteness spared the house and artifacts from the ravages of the Imjin-waeran and the Korean War.

Kosan’s life was typically stormy for men such as he, with innate intelligence and integrity who, in addition, were undeniably outspoken. The point is made that he had no special mentor, was more or less self-taught, yet passed the ChinSA, the first official examination, in first place at age twenty-six. At thirty he was exiled for the first time for criticizing the powerful Minister Yi I-ch’om.

As a result, his father lost his government job and died soon after. Kosan was sent to Hamgyong-do, the northernmost province of north Korea but later was moved to Kyongsang-do. After eight years he was released when the evil Kwanghae-gun was deposed and King Injo (r. 1623-1649) ascended the throne.

Five years after that, he passed the Mungwa-ch’oshi, the advanced civil service examination, again in first place. For this he was recommended as tutor to the two sons of Injo: Pongnim, who succeeded his father as King Hyojong, and Inp’yong.
Later, Kosan served on the Board of Rites. In 1635, a victim of factional squabbling, he was demoted, but in the same year resigned and returned to Haenam.

In 1636 the Manchus attacked Korea for the second time. Kosan gathered together followers, family members and servants and set sail for Kanghwa-do. This is the same island west of Seoul where the Koryo government had moved during the Mongol invasions, and where the royal family had again sought refuge. By the time Kosan arrived, the enemy had already captured the island.

The king, unable to accompany his family, had escaped to Namhan-sansong, the fortress east of Seoul. There, after a forty-five day siege, he was forced to surrender. This was one of the darkest days of Korean history.

Kosan was so devastated that he wanted to isolate himself far from the peninsula under control of the enemy. He set sail for Cheju-do but bad weather forced him to interrupt his voyage on an island nearer the mainland which we now know as Pogil-do. He was so enamored of its natural beauty, he decided to make it his home and lived there, on and off, for a total of fourteen years out of his remaining thirty-four. But even though living in such a remote location, Kosan’s bouts with the government were not over.

In 1638, offered a government position in Seoul which he refused, he was exiled from Pogil-do to Yongdok, Kyongsangpuk-do. The following year he was released, visited Haenam, where he left affairs of the family to his son, and returned to his island to continue improving his ponds and gardens.

In 1649 King Injo died and Kosan, in response to King Hyojong, his former student, accepted a position at Songkyunkwan—the prestigious Confucian academy from which all civil servants had to pass examinations. In 1652 he refused another position on the Board of Rites and the following year sailed back to Pogil-do.

Duty called again, however, and in 1657 he assumed a new posting in Seoul. When Hyojong died two years later, Kosan became embroiled in a dispute over an auspicious burial site and the length of the mourning period for the Dowager Queen Cho, stepmother of the deceased king.

Rites were used less to honor the dead than as tools to dislodge opponents: dominance and power were the real issues. In this case, Kosan was on the losing side. Instead of death, which was often the punishment for such “crimes”, Kosan was exiled for the third and last time, between 1659 and 1667, to Samsu in Pyonganpuk-do then to Kwangyang. He was in his seventies during this period! When released, he returned to Pogil-do where he lived until his death in 1671 at age eighty-four by western count, as previous ages
have been given; eighty-five by Korean count.

At age twenty, Kosan had come into possession of a then forbidden book: *Sohak*—the primer for traditional Confucianists. This book had been edited and amplified by Chu Shi (Chu Tzu, Chinese; Chuja, Korean). He combined the natural philosophy of Yin and Yang of Taoism and the conventional moral teaching of Confucianism to develop Neo-Confucianism. His philosophy not only emphasizes traditional moral values but places great importance on poetry and music. This seems to be source of Kosan’s lofty ideals and his passion for poetry and music.

Kosan had begun writing Chinese poetry when he was only fifteen and *sijo* during his first exile. He is considered one of the greatest *sijo* poets of Korea. Kim writes that “...as a poet he attained a monumental height as the greatest master in the history of Korean literature.” Two of his *sijo* are especially outstanding and have been translated countless times: “Five Friends” was composed in a retreat near Haenam and “Four Seasons of the Fishermen” on Pogil-do.

**OTHER FAMILY MEMBERS**

Kosan was not the only member of his family to reach the pinnacle of success. His grandson, Kongjae Yun Tu-so (1668-1715), was one of the three most famous painters of the Choson Period. In addition to traditional black and white literati paintings, he made a self-portrait in color, maps of Japan and Korea, and wrote and illustrated books on astronomy.

Another descendant, famous or infamous, depending on your point of view, was Paul Yun Chi-ch’ung (1959-1791). Paul, as his Christian name indicates, adopted Catholicism. He and his cousin, James Kwon Song-yu, have the distinction of being the first Catholic martyrs. The church, without trying to understand local mores, had summarily banned ancestral rites as idolatrous. For failing to carry out these rites, the xenophobic Choson government, fearing an erosion of Confucian values, found Pau and James guilty of jeopardizing the foundation of society and dishonoring their parents. With the signed consent of King Chong-jo, who later regretted having done so, but not for humane reasons, the two men were condemned to be beheaded. This order was carried out on December 8, 1790 near P’ungnam-mun in Chonju.

The family register lists Paul as having “died in sin.” Ironically, this is an expression sometimes used by Catholics to describe people who have died without baptism!
Another illustrious man, Tasan Chong Yak-yong, was related by marriage. His mother was a Haenam Yun. Tasan (1762-1836) had become Catholic and recanted, nevertheless, in the persecutions of 1801 he was exiled to Kangjin for eighteen years. During his time there, virtually alone, he made himself the most prolific writer of Korea. His future adherence to the faith continues to be a topic of controversy.

In the early 1980s the current head of the clan, Yun Hyong-shik, had embarked on the formidable task of sorting through an estimated 2,000 documents, records, pictures and artifacts dating as far back as the Koryo period when the family lived in Kaesong. The home is not open to the public, but an adjacent museum displays paintings and writings, mostly copies, of members of this distinguished family.

**Kosan’s Island**

After deciding to make Pogil-do his home, Kosan first chose a site for shelter, later made a hillside retreat, and in 1640 began to develop his famous gardens. Altogether, he built twenty-five structures or beautifications. He called this entire area Puyong-dong, Lotus Flower Village.

Seventy-seven years after Kosan’s death, his great-great-grandson, Yun Wi, visited Pogil-do and left a detailed description of the gardens and Kosan’s life style there.

**His Home Complex**

He built his home below Kyongja Peak in the autumn of 1637 and named it Nakso-jae (樂書齋), Enjoy Writing/Reading Pavilion. In 1653, to the right of it, he built a one-kan 

house, Mumin-dang (無悶堂) No Agony/Melancholy Pavilion. Did he choose this name to imply he had no regrets about leaving his family, friends and former life to begin anew on Pogil-do? Or could he have meant there was no agony for him here, such as there had been in Seoul?

There is almost always such hidden significance, and so much reference to ancient Chinese literature, that it is extremely difficult to interpret any such names. Even though there is controversy, not to try, with caution, seems to deprive the reader of some added insight into the sensitivity of the era.

Later Kosan dug a lotus pond next to Mumin-dang and two more one-
kan buildings between it and Nakso-jae. After Kosan’s death, his son, Hak-kwan, repaired the site and tiled the roofs. Today the site of Mumin-dang is littered with tile shards. Other than these shards and part of the stone retaining wall, all that remains of the complex are parts of the two peripheral walls that enclosed the 1500-2000 p’yong (4,950-6,600 square meter) compound.

Behind where the houses sat is a rock named So-un-byong (小隱屏). Byong means folding screen so the rock is described as like a folding screen and gave the area a cozy, secluded feeling” (Pogil-do Sightseeing, p. 21). Kosan and his friends are said to have sat there to visit or to drink tea or liquor.

**KOKSU-DANG COMPLEX**

Farther down the hill, on the right, was another complex that was built, presumably, by Kosan’s son, Hak-kwan, while his father was alive. Today the ponds are distinguishable but with rice being grown in them. The other remains are the leveled land where Koksu-dang (曲水堂) Bent Stream Pavilion sat, a wall behind it, and, through the underbrush and bushes, parts of other stonework.

Two other names for these pavilions were: Ch’wijok, (取遙) Be At Ease With Yourself and Ikch’ong (益清) Increase Virtue/Purity.

There are also three bridges on this complex. One called Ilsam-gyo (日三橋) Literally, Day Three Bridge, but meaning that three times a day Hak-kwan crossed it to visit his father. Yu-ui-gyo (有意橋) Have Purpose-Bridge, was built and named with significance and symbolism. Erected in the midst of peach and plum trees, the name was taken from a poem comparing the dropping of spring petals to the end of a life that had been lived with purpose.

Yet a third, in this relatively small area, was named Mujigae-dari (무지개 다리) Rainbow-bridge; dari is Korean for bridge. From the description, which is not at all clear, it sounds more like an “overpass”, not over water, but connecting a lotus pond with the western side of the pavilion.

**SOKSHIL COMPLEX**

Across the valley from Kosan’s home, over a hundred meters up a steep-sided hill, is an outcrop of bare rock protruding conspicuously through the otherwise heavily forested slope. This outcrop so attracted Kosan that he
spent a great deal of time and effort developing it. He excavated two ponds on a ledge beneath one of the steep, high rocks on which he sat to drink tea. Thus we, if not Kosan, call it Ch’a-pawi, (茶바위) Tea-rock: Ch’a is Chinese, pawi is Korean. At the base of Ch’a-pawi he built stairs that lead down to his “shower.” This is a slightly tilted rock on which he lay while water from an opening at the bottom of the adjacent pond poured over his reclining body.

At the opposite side of the ponds are more stairs leading up to a path by which to reach the top of Ch’a-pawi. The path continues to a small open area where one can still see the four cornerstones that supported the pillars of Tongch’on-sokshil, (洞天石室) another one-room pavilion. Tongch’on refers to an area where Taoists roam or to an especially spiritual place; literally sokshil means rock room and here refers to a room among the rocky outcrops.

Near the pavilion, at the edge of a nearly vertical drop, is a narrow, less than half a meter, rock slab on which Kosan used to sit to watch the moon rise. Obviously he was not a man who suffered from acrophobia. Kosan designed a pulley between two large upright rocks with which, on a silk cord, he could haul up supplies from the base of the hill.

Think of the enormous amount of time and energy that had to be expended to create these three complexes, especially with the primitive tools available at the time. And all were fashioned for pleasure and self-cultivation, not for any commercial purpose, but as elaborate and impressive as they were, they do not compare to Kosan’s first love—his gardens.

**GARDEN COMPLEX**

The best known and most visited site on the island, and the one of greatest interest to Kosan, is that of his ponds and gardens. This must have been an especially auspicious site for him as it is two kilometers east of his home.

Kosan began work on this complex in 1640 and enhanced the 5000 p’yong site for over fourteen years. In addition to the two ponds and all their refinements, there were two dancing platforms, one major pavilion; according to one writer, a total of five but they were not identified by name or location. At one end of the gardens is a ponghwa-dae, a beacon hill, from which he communicated with smoke signals with his home. On the slope of this mound is a grave for one of his horses.

The name of the first pond, Seyo-ji, reflects Kosan’s reverence for nature and this area in particular: seyon means as if washed or purified; ji is pond. This one has a sloping, natural basin with an average depth of 1.2
meters, and is filled with stream water trapped by Rattling Bridge at the north end.

The “story” of Rattling Bridge is that a loose stone rattled when anyone crossed the walkway. First of all, the structure is not a bridge but an eleven-meter long, one-meter wide levee to hold back water for Seyon-ji. The guide said the rattling came from water rushing over it when the stream overflowed. A diagram of a side view shows that only the lower two-thirds of the interior is solid and above that are loose stones which could well have been “rattled around” by water rushing through cracks between the support stones. Since all the exterior rocks have been cemented together recently there is likely to be no such effect in the future.

In the south, stones were placed strategically to deflect the rushing waters of the swollen stream in flood periods.

This pond was large enough for a row boat in which Kosan glided about. He had placed other stones of various shapes and sizes in the pond, one at least ten meters long with a rounded end raised from the water almost like a bow of a ship. It was given the appropriate name of Hokyak-am (或巖岩) Maybe Will Spring rock because it looks as if it is ready to leap out of the water. Sometimes Kosan sat on this rock to chat and drink with friends or to write poetry. It was here he wrote Obu-sashi-sa, “Four Seasons of the Fisherman.” (See note 2 for one source of a translation of its forty verses.)

There is another rock from which archery was practiced. Traces of where the arrows were stored can be seen.

The second pond is artificial, nearly square and with vertical sides. It is called Hoesu-dam (団水潭) Returning Water Pond because water entered through five under-surface holes in a narrow divider separating Hoewu from Seyon-ji and exited from three openings on the opposite side. The path of flow caused it to swirl around a rock, placed for that purpose, apparently, so that the movement took place beneath a calm surface while keeping the water from becoming stagnant. Both ji and dam, pronounced “dahm” with a soft “a”, are Chinese for pond or pool: dam, by definition, is a deeper body of water.

Another rock, rectangular and flat-topped, was placed in the pond and served as a stage on which kisaeng, in bright colored dresses, danced to entertain Kosan. Also in Haesu-dam was a square, artificial island with trees and bushes. One juniper that Kosan supposedly planted died only twenty years ago.

North of the ponds were Tong-dae and So-dae, (東/西壇), East and West Platforms, on which both young girls and young men danced.
In between the two ponds, on a twelve by thirteen meter foundation, was Seyon-jong, a pavilion, in the form of a squared cross with an ondol room in the center. On each side was a different name: Seyon-jong (洗然亭), Nakki-gwan (樂飢館), Enjoy Meager Life Pavilion; Tongha-gak (同何閣) Tong means equal or identical⁶ and Tongha is a quote from Mencius that everyone is born equal in morality and justice; Ho-gwang-nu⁷ (呼光樓) Beckoning Light Pavilion. We are told repeatedly of Kosan’s enjoyment of the reflections of sky and scenery and particularly of the colorful dancing girls, whether he was in the boat with them or watching from various pavilions or sites. The name, Beckoning Light Pavilion, would seem to reflect this pleasure.

If reports are correct, Kosan did not lack for attention or amusement. According to the Kajang-yusak documents quoted in the Choson Ilbo, a Korean language newspaper, of November 5, 1991 “[...][Kosan] woke up with the roosters... had a cup of kyongok-ju, [liquor] combed his hair neatly...After breakfast he rode his four-wheeled cart which he invented...followed by kisaeng with musical instruments...” he carried liquor and food on another cart!” To his credit, the article goes on to say he was “[...not only a man of self-indulgence, but looked after the welfare of others... a moral pillar of the community.”

Reading descriptions of Kosan’s life here, the word sybaritic comes to mind! Accurate or not, such talented individuals are entitled to special lifestyles.

THE PEOPLE’S ISLAND

A visit to Pogil-do will confirm the beauty that captured Kosan’s heart. Pogil-do is one of Korea’s over 3,300 islands, most of them in the southwest where the peninsula literally sank and the hills became islands as water inundated the valleys. In Wando-gun alone there are 206 islands; 57, including Pogil-do, are inhabited and 149 uninhabited as of 1983.

Pogil-do is twelve kilometers east-west and eight kilometers north-south, but because of its bulbous shape in the west and narrow extension to the east, is only 3,670 hectares (9,000 acres). As hilly as the island appears, its highest point is only 435 meters. There are approximately 5,300 people in thirteen villages; over 20 kilometers of road; nine to the east are paved but eleven of the northwest coastal road are rather rough. Car ferries run from Wando-up and Land’s End in Haenam-gun; taxis and buses are available on the island.

There are at least six hiking trails over the hills and a number of swim-
ming beaches, one of black, water smoothed stones that emit an eerie, hollow sound when rolled by the waves. Fishing villages dot the coast. In the surrounding sea are white and pastel floats that mark beds of cultivated seaweed: the black seaweed used for *kimbop* or eaten in squares and the long, wide kelp.

The black stone beach is in Yesong-ni, about five kilometers to the east, or to the left, from the ferry landing. Also at this village is a 740 by 30 meter wind break woods of fifteen species of evergreens and eight of deciduous trees. Together with the beach this is Natural Monument 40. especially prominent are the camellias, the county-flower of Wando, that bloom from November to May.

A side road goes to T’ong-ni and Chung-ni, both with white sand beaches and the latter with an interesting assemblage of houses, some with elaborate roof decorations made of tin.

Turning right from the ferry landing one goes to the areas inhabited by Kosan, an unusual shrine, and the only *yogwan*, but *minbak*, homes with rooms for rent are everywhere.

The shrine was erected by neighbors about 100 years ago to honor a woman who was so devoted to her husband that she starved herself to death within twenty-eight days of his dying. Ironically, what makes the shrine unique is the architecture that was copied from Ching China—country of the Manchu enemy that drove Kosan to Pogil-do!

Even during our November visit the island is colorful with wild flowers and late-falling leaves decorating the roadsides and hillsides. The rugged coast and the seascapes are always bewitching. An added benefit at that time of year is the scarcity of tourists. Minimum temperatures of seven or eight degrees Celsius (about forty-four or forty-seven Fahrenheit) give more incentive to a late fall or winter visit there. Remember, it was winter when Kosan found the island irresistibly attractive.

**REFLECTION**

Kosan was named the Cultural Person of the Month for November of 1991. On January 23, 1992, the areas he developed on Pogil-do were designated Historical Site 368.

Kosan, who took himself off the beaten path, as did others during the factional turbulence of the Choson Period, could not have envisioned that hundreds of years later he would, in contrast to his reclusive life on his island, be featured in the historical limelight.
NOTES:

1. *Ho*, is generally translated as “pen name” but it is different. It is a name, adopted by a person or more often given by a mentor, by which a man is addressed. In Korean literature, when both *ho* and birth-names are given they are written in that order: Kosan Yun Son-do. Kosan means “Lonely Mountain.”

2. Kevin O’Rourke in *Tilting the Jar, Spilling the Moon*, writes, from another reference, that Kosan” ... got into trouble again during the Manchu Invasion for failing to accompany the king...” If Kosan was in Haenam, as the other story indicates but does not make clear, he would have been unable to return to Seoul in time to accompany the king.

3. *Sijo* is a poetic form born in the late Koryo (pre 1392) and developed in the Choson to the point that statesmen, scholars and military men were all writing *sijo*. Jaihuin Joyce Kim (Joyce [adopted from Joyce Kilmer] Kim Jae-hyon [official transliteration]) describes *sijo* in *Master Sijo Poems from Korea—Classical and Modern*. “The *sijo* is a traditional lyric of three lines or verses averaging 44 syllables in a stanza, each line made up of four phrase-groupings with a major pause after each grouping... elastic in form... it does not adhere to a strict syllable count...”.


5. A *kan* is an inexact measurement that refers to the space between two supporting pillars. Mumin-dang would have had four supports, one at each corner, thus one *kan* in either direction.

6. *Ha* means who, what, which, where, how, why... does the reader see a problem here?

7. *Chong/jong, kwan/gwan, ru/nu/lu*, and *kak/gak* can all be translated “pavilion” and in usage, at least, are interchangeable.

Sources of Information on Pogil-do

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Samguk Sagi Volume 48*
Biographies Book 8

by Mark E. Byington

HYANGDŎK

Hyangdŏk was a native of P’anjŏk-hyang Village in Silla’s Ungch’ŏn-ju Province (Kongju). His father was called Sŏn, and his given name was Pan’gil. His mother’s name has not come down to us. Hyangdŏk was gentle and meek by nature, and his department was praised in his native village.

Hyangdŏk also received the admiration of the people of his time for his filial service to his parents. In the fourteenth year of the Tian-bao reign of the Tang emperor Xuanzong (755), there was an extremely poor harvest so the people went hungry. In addition to this, a terrible epidemic circulated, and as a result, Hyangdŏk’s parents suffered from hunger and illness. His mother developed a carbuncle and drew close upon the verge of death, so Hyangdŏk exerted his strength and devotion in nursing her day and night without even taking the time to change his own clothing. However, he was not able to support his parents sufficiently, so he cut the flesh from his own thigh and gave it to them to eat. Then he sucked out his mother’s carbuncle with his mouth, thereby healing her illness and making her well again.

A village gentleman reported these events to the provincial officials, who in turn notified the king. The king issued an instruction rewarding Hyangdŏk with 300 ten-peck bags of tax grain, a mansion and several fields of pension land. He also commanded his officials to raise a stone monument in Hyangdŏk’s honor and to engrave these facts upon it. Even to this day, people

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*Editor’s note: Samguk Sagi, written by Kim Bu-Shik, is a history of the Three Kingdoms period, published in 1145.
call this place “Hyoga-ri”, or Filial Family Village.

Sŏnggak

Sŏnggak was a man of Silla’s Chŏng-ju Province (Chinju). His clan’s history has been lost to us. Sŏnggak took no pleasure in his own title and post, so he gave himself the name Kŏsa and went to Illi-hyŏn County (Sŏngju) to stay at Pŏpchŏng Temple. He later returned to his home to support his aged mother. Due to decrepitude and sickness, his mother found it difficult to eat vegetables, so Sŏnggak cut the flesh from his own leg for her to eat.

After his mother died, Sŏnggak displayed devout sincerity in offering up food at her Buddhist funeral ceremony. News of these events reached the ears of the ministers Kakkan Kyŏngsın and I-ch’ an Chuwŏn, who in turn related the news to the king. Based upon the precedent of Hyangdŏk of Ungch’ŏn-ju Province, the king rewarded Sŏnggak with 300 bags of tax grain from a nearby village.

A treatise: Song Qi wrote in the Tang Shu, “How superb the commentary of Han Yu! It was he who wrote, ‘It has been said that the preparing and administering of medicine to one’s sick parents is filial, but I have not yet heard of anyone injuring the flesh of his own body in performance of his filial duty. Indeed, if such acts would do no damage to one’s sense of morality, would not the Sages have already demonstrated them? If one should die as a result of such a misfortune, then one would bear the sins of wounding his body and of severing his family line. How then could citations be hung at his gate to commend him? Even so, although scholarship and decorum have not been adopted in the tenements of the poor, such places are overflowing with the sincerity of those disregarding their own bodies for the sake of their parents. And because the praise lauded upon such individuals has been considerable, their names have found their ways into the annals.’”

For this reason, people such as Hyangdŏk have come to have their names recorded in the histories.

Silhye

Silhye was the son of Taesa Sundŏk of Silla. He was upright by nature and did not yield in the least when faced with injustice.

Silhye became a Superior Chamberlain during the reign of King
Chinp'yŏng (579-632). At this time the king’s favor had been won by the Subordinate Chamberlain, Chinje—a man of capricious and wicked nature. Though he was Silhye’s colleague, Chinje often disputed matters with him. Silhye was never wanting in straightforwardness and honesty, so Chinje bore a jealous resentment against him. On several occasions Chinje slandered Silhye before the king, saying, “Silhye lacks wisdom but excels in nerve. He is rash and impetuous, and even though the words he hears should be spoken by the Great King himself, if they did not accord with his own will, he would not lay aside his indignation. If he is not disciplined, he may yet throw the country into chaos. Why not expel him now? If later he repents his behavior, it will not be too late to restore him to his position.” The king believed his words and thought them proper, so he immediately stripped Silhye of his position and banished him to Yŏngnim on the fringes of the country.

Hereupon, someone said to Silhye, “You have served your country with loyalty since the time of our departed grandfathers, and your talent has become well known. But now you have suffered the slander of a fawning minister and have been exiled to the desolate remote regions beyond Chungnyŏng Pass. Do you not resent this? Why do you not defend yourself and set the matter straight?” To this Silhye replied, “In ancient times, Qu Yuan stood alone in his upright honesty, yet Chu rejected and expelled him. Li Si carried out his duties with fidelity, but Qin rewarded him with the death penalty. We are, therefore, not unfamiliar with cases of fawning ministers misguiding their lords and of loyal gentlemen being ousted from their positions. Considering these precedents from the old times, how can I grieve over this?”

In the end, Silhye left without saying a word in his own defense. He spent his time in exile writing long songs to express his feelings.

**Mulgyeja**

Mulgyeja was a man of humble ancestry who lived in the time of Naehae Nisagŭm of Silla (196–230). He had an uncommon disposition, and from childhood he had held fast to admirable principles.

At one time, the eight states of P’osang conspired together to launch a campaign against Ara-guk (Haman), so an envoy came from Ara-guk to Silla to request military reinforcement. Hereupon, Naehae Nisagŭm had his grandson Naenŏm lead the soldiers of the Six Districts of Silla and neighboring provinces forth to reinforce Araguk. In the end, Silla defeated the soldiers of the eight states, and in this battle Mulgyeja acquired considerable merit. How-
ever, Naeūm detested Mulgyeja, so his merits went unrecorded. Someone said to Mulgyeja, “Your meritorious deeds were exceptional and yet they go unrecognized. Do you not resent this? Why is it that you do not bring this to the attention of the king?” Mulgyeja replied, “What kind of resentment am I to harbor? To revere honor while seeking a name for oneself is not the way of the patriot. He should make the performance of his duty be his mind’s only concern and simply wait for later days.”

Later, when three years had passed, the people of the three states of Kolp’o, Ch’ilp’o and Kosap’o came to attack the fortress town of Kalhwa-sŏng. The king led soldiers forth to rescue Kalhwa and completely defeated the soldiers of the three states. In this battle Mulgyeja struck down the enemy in dozens, yet when the time came to recognize merit, there were once again no rewards for him. He returned home and said to his wife, “I have heard that the duty of a loyal subject is to lay down his life when he encounters peril and to sacrifice his body in times of national difficulty. The battles of P’osang and Kalhwa were both perilous and difficult; however, I was able neither to lay down my life nor to sacrifice my body. With what kind of dignity can I now walk the streets? How can I now look people in the face?” At last, he untied his hair and, carrying a kŏmun’go, wandered off to Sach’e Mountain never to return.

**PAEKKYŏL SŏNSAENG**

It is not known from whence he came, but he lived below Nangsan (Kyŏngju) and he was exceedingly poor. The clothes he wore were patched in a hundred places, and he was so bedraggled that he looked like a quail hung upside-down. The people of this time called him Paekkyŏl Sŏnsaeng, or Master One Hundred Knots, of the Eastern Village. Paekkyŏl came to admire the Chinese musician, Rong Qiqi, so he taught himself to play the kŏmun’go. Any time he felt joy, anger, sorrow or pleasure, or anytime something made him discontented, he would console himself by playing the kŏmun’go.

One year as the New Year approached, Paekkyŏl’s neighbors began pounding rice in their mills. His wife heard the sounds of the rice mills and said, “Everyone else is busy pounding their rice. We alone have none to pound. How shall we make it through this year to greet the next?” Paekkyŏl turned his eyes to the heavens and lamented, Life and death are preordained, and wealth and position depend on the heavens…. You cannot avoid that which will come and you cannot pursue that which has passed. How can you
grieve over this? To console your sadness, I will play the sounds of the rice mill. This song has been passed down to us through the ages and is called the “Tae-ak”, or The Song of the Pestle.

KÖMGUN

Kömgun was the son of Taesa Kumun of Silla, and he served as a secretary at the Saryang Palace.

In the eighth month of the forty-fourth year of Kön-bok (627), there was a heavy frost and all the crops suffered damage. In Spring and Summer of the following year there was severe famine, and the people were reduced to such miserable straits that they were forced to sell their own children in order to eat. At this time, a group of palace secretaries schemed together and secretly stole grain from the storehouse reserves and divided it amongst themselves. Only Kömgun refused to accept any of this grain, so the suspicious secretaries said to him, “Everyone has taken a share except for you. What is the reason for this?” and they asked him once again to accept a share of the stolen grain. Kömgun merely smiled and said, “As a follower of the hwarang, Kullang, I am practicing the Way of the Wind and the Moon. If a deed is improper, I would not act upon it, even if by doing so I should profit by one thousand pieces of gold,” and he firmly refused to accept the grain.

Kömgun then parted the secretaries’ company and proceeded to the home of Kullang, the son of I-ch’an Taeil. The secretaries plotted covertly and said, “If we do not kill Kömgun, he will undoubtedly reveal the matter of our thievery,” and they presently summoned Kömgun to meet them.

Kömgun knew that the palace secretaries were plotting to murder him, so he told Kullang, “You and I shall not meet after this day,” and though Kullang pressed him for an explanation, Kömgun would not reply. However, after Kullang had solicited an explanation three times, Kömgun gave him a brief account of his predicament. Kullang asked him, “Why have you not brought this matter to the attention of the officials?” and Kömgun replied, “I feared for my life, and I furthermore could not bear to bring about the punishment of so many people.” Kullang asked him, “If so, then why do you not flee and escape them?” to which Kömgun replied, “Their hearts are twisted whereas mine is straight. To flee from them is not the course a gentleman would take.” So saying, he left forthwith to meet the palace secretaries.

The secretaries had prepared a banquet in Kömgun’s honor. Their ostensible intent was to apologize to Kömgun; however, their real intent was to poi-
son him. Kŏmgun knew that his food had been poisoned, but he ate it without hesitation and immediately fell dead. A gentleman has since said, “Kŏmgun need not have died, but he chose death to preserve his sense of righteousness. One may well say that, by comparison, Mount Tai is a trivial thing!”

**Kim Saeng and Yo Kūg’il**

Kim Saeng’s parents were of humble origins, so we do not know his family lineage, but he was born in the second year of the Jing-yun reign of the Tang Emperor Ruizong (711). From his early childhood he was skilled at calligraphy, and though he never mastered any other skills, he did not rest his calligraphy brush until he was past the age of 80. His seal characters, as well as his cursive and semicursive styles, were marvelously executed. Even today his works surface from time to time, and scholars uphold them as precious treasures.

During the Chong-ning reign of the Song Emperor Huizong (1102-1106), the Koryŏ Academician, Honggwan, went to Song in the company of envoys and lodged in the guest accommodations at the capital Bianjing (Kaifeng). At this time, the Song Academicians, Yang Qiu and Li Ge, went to the guest lodgings under imperial orders to paint a hanging scroll there. When Honggwan met these men, he showed them a volume of Kim Saeng’s cursive and semicursive calligraphy. The men were surprised and said, “How is it that we have today chanced to behold the brushwork of Wang Youjun?” and Honggwan replied, “This is not the work of Wang Youjun. This is the hand of Kim Saeng of Silla.” The two men laughed at this and said, “How could there exist in this world such excellent brushwork as this, except for that drawn by the hand of Wang Youjun?” and despite Honggwan’s insistence to the contrary, the two men would not believe him.

There was also a calligrapher named Yo Kūg’il who held the combined ranks of Chief Minister and Attendant Academician. His brush strokes were forcefully executed, and he adapted the technique of Ouyang Shuai. Although he did not attain to the status of Kim Saeng, the refinement of his work was praised nevertheless.

**Solgŏ**

Solgŏ was a man of Silla. His origins were humble and indistinct, so his family lineage was not set down in the records.
Since his early youth, Solgō displayed great skill at painting. He once painted a picture of an old pine tree on a wall at Hwangnyong Temple. He made the trunk of the tree chapped so that it appeared rough and textured, and he made the branches and leaves realistically twisted and winding. From time to time ravens, kites, swallows and sparrows would see this painting and come flying, only to fall to the ground when they tried to light upon it.

As time passed, however, the painted colors faded, so a monk from the temple restored them, but hereafter the birds no longer tried to land on the tree.

The Kwanŭm Posal (Avalokiteshvara) of Punhwang Temple in Kyŏngju and the image of Yuma (Vimalakirti) of Tansok-sa Temple in Ch'ŏnju were both works of art executed by Solgō’s hand. These paintings have come down to us through the ages and are considered to be divine portraits.

CHIŬN, THE FILIAL DAUGHTER

Chiŭn was the daughter of Yŏn’gwan of Han’gi-bu (Kyŏngju), and she had a remarkably filial character. She lost her father at an early age so she cared for her mother by herself. Even at the age of 32 she still had not taken a husband, but she remained by her mother’s side day and night. As they were destitute, she was not able to support her mother adequately. She sometimes worked for others or went door to door to beg rice which she would then bring home for her mother to eat. But as the days went by, she found that she could not overcome their poverty, so she went to the house of a wealthy man and sold herself into bondage in exchange for ten and more bags of rice. Hereafter, she worked at this house all day long, returning home only at sundown with food which she had prepared for her mother.

After three or four days had passed in this manner, Chiŭn’s mother said, “The rice of former days, though coarse, tasted very good. But the rice of today, though of fine quality, does not taste as good. I feel as though my heart had been pierced with a knife. Why is this?” Chiŭn told her mother the truth of the matter, and her mother exclaimed, “You became the slave of another for my sake? You would have been better off if I had died early!” and she began to wail loudly. Her daughter began to cry as well, and the passers-by outside heard their sobs and felt a profound pity for them.

A man named Hyojong-nang had been out roaming and happened to witness this. He returned to his home and asked his parents for 100 bags of grain and some clothing which he then gave to Chiŭn and her mother. He also repaid Chiŭn’s master in grain and thereby bought back her freedom. Some
1,000 of Hyojong’s hwarang followers heard of this, so each of them sent a bag of grain to Chi’un and her mother. Even Queen Chinsŏng heard of these events and bestowed upon them 500 bags of grain and a house. She also exempted both of them from taxes and labor requirements. Since Chi’un and her mother now had so much food, they grew concerned about thieves, so the queen commanded the local officials to dispatch soldiers to maintain a guard on them. The village itself was honored with a plaque bearing the name “Hyoyang-bang”, or Filial Support Village. The tale of these noble deeds was committed to writing and sent to Tang.

Hyojong was the son of Prime Minister Sŏbal-han In’gyŏng, and in his youth he was called Hwadal. The queen once said that although Hyojong was young at the time, he nevertheless showed himself to be mature well past his years. She therefore gave Hyojong the daughter of her own elder brother, King Hŏn’gang, to take as a wife.

Sŏl-ssi

Sŏl-ssi (Miss Sŏl) was a daughter of the house of Yulli Village. Her family was poor and friendless, but her features were beautifully formed and her principles and conduct were well refined. Of those men who beheld her, there were none who did not admire her beauty and none who dared to violate her.

In the time of King Chinp’yŏng (579-632), Sŏl-ssi’s aged father was called upon to serve in the defense of Chŏng-gok Valley (on the Koguryŏ border). Sŏl-ssi could not endure the thought of her aged, infirm and weak father being sent off alone far from home, and she hated that, as a woman, she could not accompany him. She was left with no recourse but to bury herself in her own grief.

There was at this time a poor and humble young man of Saryang-bu named Kasil, who had always cherished noble aspirations. He was delighted with the beautiful Sŏl-ssi, but he had never found the courage to speak to her. When he heard of Sŏl-ssi’s old father being sent off for military duty, however, he finally went to her and said, “Though I am a coward, I consider myself to be determined and ambitious. Unworthy as I am, I would like to take your father’s duty upon myself.” Sŏl-ssi was overjoyed upon hearing this so she rushed off to inform her father of the news. Her father presently ushered Kasil into his room and said, “I have heard that you, sir, intend to perform the duties of this old man in his stead. I cannot overcome my own joy and gratitude. I wonder how I shall ever repay your kindness. Perhaps, sir, if you do
not think her too foolish and rude, you might wish to take my young daughter as your wife." Kasil bowed twice before him and said, "I had not dared to wish for this, but this is truly what I would desire."

Kasil withdrew and went to ask Sŏl-ssi to name a wedding date. Here-upon Sŏl-ssi said, "Marriage is a very important event in one's life and should not be rushed. Once I have given my heart to someone, I shall not give up my devotion even though he should die. Therefore, when you have returned home after performing your military duties, then we may select a date to complete the wedding ceremony," and so saying, she pulled out her mirror and broke it in half. She kept one half for herself and gave the other to Kasil, saying, "These pieces represent our faith and trust. They shall one day be joined together again." Kasil then brought forth his horse and said, "This is the finest horse in the land, and I shall certainly have use for him in days to come. But while I am gone he will have no master to serve, so I would like for you to take him into your care and to make use of him." Then they said their farewells and parted.

But as it happened, the army had cause to retain troops at the defensive sites rather than allowing them to return after performing their shifts; therefore, Kasil was unable to return home for six years. Sŏl-ssi's father told her, "Kasil promised to return to marry you after three years. That day has already passed and still he has not returned home. You must find someone else to marry." But Sŏl-ssi replied, "I became Kasil's betrothed in order to bring you peace. And because Kasil trusted in our promise of marriage, he has for a long time served as a soldier, suffering the hardships of hunger and cold, to say nothing of being pressed close to the enemy border without a weapon in hand. Like one standing close to a tiger's mouth, he must constantly worry about being chewed up. If we forsake his trust and break our word, how can we consider ourselves humane? I dare not do as you suggest. Let us not speak of this again."

Her father was getting extremely old, however, and he was concerned because his daughter was now in the prime of her life and still had not found a husband. He therefore resolved to have her married even if it meant resorting to coercion, so he secretly made arrangements with a village man and had the wedding date set. But when he summoned the man, Sŏl-ssi adamantly refused to marry him and tried instead to run away. However, when she reached the horse stables and caught sight of the horse which Kasil had given her, she stopped and gave a great sigh of grief while bitter tears rolled down her cheeks.

At this time, Kasil returned home at last, but he had become thin as a
skeleton and his clothes were tattered. The people of Söl-ssi’s house did not even recognize him and they took him to be someone else. Kasil walked forward and produced his half of the broken mirror and tossed it upon the floor. Söl-ssi picked it up and uttered a cry of joy. Her father and her family were all pleased as well. Söl-ssi and Kasil selected a date to complete their wedding ceremony and were married at last. They lived out their lives in each other’s company and grew old together.

TOMI

Tomi was a man of Paekche. Though he came from a common and humble family, he had a sharp sense of moral righteousness. His wife was not only beautiful and elegant, but faithful as well. The couple elicited the praise of the people of their time.

At one time, King Kaeru heard of the beauty of Tomi’s wife, so he summoned Tomi before him and said, “In general, wives consider their foremost virtue to be their faithfulness, yet I maintain that there is no woman who cannot be swayed if tempted by clever words in a dark place when no one is near.” To this Tomi replied, “One cannot measure the emotions of another; however, in the case of your subject’s wife, she would remain faithful to me even if threatened with death.”

The king decided to put this to the test, so he had Tomi detained on some business matters and then had one of his personal attendants fetch his clothes and horse. When night fell his attendants went to Tomi’s home in advance to announce, the king’s arrival. When the king arrived, he confronted Tomi’s wife and told her, “I have long heard of your exquisite beauty, so by winning a wager with Tomi I have acquired you for myself. Tomorrow you are to be installed as a lady of the court, and hereafter you will be my property.” He then began to act lasciviously, so she said, “The king would never tell a lie, so how could I dare not to submit. If the king will go into the bedroom first, I will change my clothes and follow you in.” But after the king had gone into the bedroom, she dressed up a female house servant and sent her into the room to serve the king as his mistress.

Afterward, the king saw the servant and knew that he had been deceived. He became enraged and later had Tomi falsely charged with a crime. As punishment, he had Tomi’s eyes gouged out and had him led into a small boat which was then cast adrift upon the river. The king then had Tomi’s wife brought before him. But when he tried to force her, she told him, “Now I have
lost my husband and I am all alone. Since I cannot support myself, and since I have become the king’s attendant, how could I dare to defy the king’s command? However, since I am menstruating now and my body is unclean, I ask the king to wait for another day and to return when I am clean.” The king believed her and granted her request.

Hereafter, Tomi’s wife fled the capital and came to the mouth of a river. She could not cross over, however, so she turned her eyes to the heavens and wailed sorrowfully. Suddenly, a solitary boat appeared followed by a wave. She jumped into the boat and rode the wave to Ch’ŏnsŏng Island where she found her husband who had not yet died. For a time the couple survived by digging out grass roots to eat, but they eventually left the island together in the boat and sailed as far as the base of San Mountain in Kogur'yŏ, where the Kogur'yŏ people took pity on them and gave them food and clothing. Tomi and his wife lived out the remainder of their lives in poverty, wandering far from home.
ANNUAL REPORT
of the
ROYAL ASIATIC SOCIETY – KOREA BRANCH
1992

This is my second opportunity to present the President's report, the first having been in 1957, and I feel it a great honor to have been elected to this post a second time.

The Korea Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society was established in 1900 by a group of foreign residents in Korea, who sought to encourage investigation of all aspects of Korean life, culture, customs, geography and literature in order to deepen their understanding of the country and its people and to make them better known to the rest of the world. The original nucleus was soon joined by many others, including a number of Korean scholars. Some of the members had great scholarly gifts and their names will forever be associated with Korean Studies, while many others contributed the first, and often the only papers on many aspects of Korea, leaving a legacy in the Transactions that are still a primary source of information on Korea in many fields. It is only appropriate that at this Annual Meeting we remember this great contribution of our forebears, and remember that the primary objective of the Branch is still the encouragement of studies on Korea.

The Korea Branch is organized with a Council of twenty-six members, including the officers. To carry out its functions the Council is organized into five committees: Membership, Publications, Programs, Tours, and Finance.

Membership: At present the RAS-Korea Branch has a total of 1,643 members. This includes sixty-eight life members, 523 overseas members and 1,052 regular members residing in Korea, a slight rise over 1991.

Programs: Programs involving lectures, slide presentations and performances were held regularly on the second and fourth Wednesdays of each month at the Daewoo Foundation Building near Seoul Station and were generally well attended. In addition, the annual Garden Party, graciously hosted by Mr. and Mrs. Raymond Burghardt, Deputy Chief of Mission of the U.S. Embassy, was
most successful as a program, for book sales and as an opportunity for members to meet each other on an informal basis. The Branch also sponsored the showing of three prize-winning Korean films with English sub-titles that were very well received by the membership.

*Tours:* A full schedule of tours was carried out largely during the spring and fall of 1992. A total of 1,810 members and non-members participated in these tours. Once again, it is clear that the tour program remains one of the most successful activities of the Society despite the challenges posed by the ever more incredible congestion of Korea's highways. Thankfully, the results of this year's tour program permit us to be guardedly optimistic about the continuing success of this very important activity of the Society in the years to come.

*Publications:* The Publications Committee had another successful year supervising book sales, reviewing manuscripts, and editing Vol. 67 of the *Transactions* for publication. A revised Book List was prepared and distributed to all members and to various libraries and institutions interested in Korean studies. Dr. Donald Clark, an overseas member at Trinity University in San Antonio, has taken on the task of being the American distributor for RAS-Korea Branch publications.

*Finances:* I am pleased to report that the finances of the RAS-Korea Branch remained on an even keel during 1992. Although operating expenses are modest, the Society depends totally upon the support you provide as members in paying annual dues, participating in tours and purchasing publications. Remember, your support continues to be critical to the financial well-being of the Society. Lastly, I want to take this opportunity to acknowledge once again the generosity of the Daewoo Foundation in making these premises available for our use free of charge.

Respectfully submitted,

Horace G. Underwood
President
1992 R.A.S. Lectures

Seoul Branch

January 8  Sea Power and Diplomacy In the Far East
Amb. David J. Wright

January 22  Kosan Yun Sŏnada: His Life and Garden on Pogil-do
Prof. Y.D. Kim and Mrs. M. Dodds

February 12  Trip to Paek-tu Mountain
Dr. Horace G. Underwood

February 26  Religious and Ideological Background of the Unification War
(400-676 A.D.)
Dr. Kim Chong-Sun

March 11  Primitive Rebels? Popular Resistance in North Korean Historiography
Mr. Charles Armstrong

March 25  South Korean-Japanese Relations from 1969 to 1979: Emotionalism or Realpolitik?
Mr. Victor Cha

April 8  The Centennial of the Inauguration of the Tonghak Rebellion
(1892-1992)
Dr. Daniel Davies

April 22  Korea’s Link With China’s Ming Dynasty: the Sam Hwangjae Paehyang (Sacrificial Ceremony for Three Emperors)
Prof. David A. Mason

May 13  Korean Buddhist Ritual Dance and Music
Mr. Alan Heyman

May 27  Initiating Performance: A ritual For a Young Korean Shaman
Dr. Laurel Kendall

June 10  Women’s Political Participation in Korea
Dr. Bong-Scuk Sohn

June 24  From Pottery to Politics: The Koreanization of Korean Catholicism
Prof. Don Baker

August 26  Korean Traditional Folk Dance
Prof. Chong-nyo Kim

September 9  Landscapes of Fortune: Looking for wind and Water (P’ungsu) in Modern Korean Architecture
Prof. Thomas B. Kass
September 23  Guilds, Chambers, and Brokers: The Port of Inch'on at the Turn of the Century  
Mr. Dennis McNamara

October 12  From End to End-Photographs of Korea  
Mr. Michael F. O'brien

October 28  Ming and Ch'ing Paintings from the Forbidden City: A Guide to the Exhibition at the Hoam Art Gallery  
Dr. Yi Song-Mi

November 11  Roots of Experimentation: Studies in Korean Music  
Mr. Joseph Celli

November 25  An American Correspondent in Korea  
Mr. Bradley K. Martin

December 9  Kim Il-Sung 1941-1948: The Creation of a Legend; The Creation of a Regime  
Mr. Sidney A. Seiler
### 1992 R.A.S. Tours

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